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This dissertation follows two interrelated lines of inquiry. The first, I formulate as 
follows: 
(1) How, historically speaking, has the discourse of literary criticism 
thought the book? How has it represented the book? Used the book? 
Put simply, what has the book become in the hands of the critic? 
Though, of course, answers to such questions will vary widely—especially as they 
intersect with related matters concerning the critic, herself, and what Henry Sussman 
refers to as the perceived ―task of the critic‖—it is my contention that the discourse of 
literary criticism remains unified by its inability to extricate itself from what I call the 
transcendent orientation to literature: an orientation that has both ancient and modern 
coordinates. In Part 1 of the dissertation, I map criticism‘s ongoing historical affair with 
transcendence—an affair that begins as far back as the Platonic dialogues, but that can be 
traced right up through the twentieth century, in and through the work of any number of 
critics, and many prominent schools of literary critical thought. 
I, then, formulate the second of my two lines of inquiry as follows: 
(2) How might the materialist critic, imbued by Deleuzean sensibilities, 
think the book anew? And, by extension, how might the materialist re-
think the role or task of the critic? 
In Part 2, I shift the focus from the transcendent to the immanent (or immanentist) 
orientation; that is, from the logic of representation to what philosopher Gilles Deleuze—
a prominent voice within this dissertation—labels ―the logic of sensation‖; also, from 
fixed essences (i.e., fixed laws, identities) to potential powers; from being to becoming; 
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from the regulated and scientized practices of the institutional critic (spawning 
predictable results) to the ―co-creative‖ encounters of the critic-artisan (unleashing pure 
potentials from the book). In short, Part 2 of the dissertation explores the question of how 
the book opens up to its own becomings—i.e., its own difference, its own transformation. 
To that end, I will enter into a number of co-creative relations of my own with various 
works of American literature (including, Kerouac‘s On the Road, Melville‘s Moby-Dick, 
Whitman‘s Leaves of Grass, Stephen Crane‘s The Red Badge of Courage, and William 
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Mapping the Plan of Escape 
“What good is commentary?” 
—Maurice Blanchot (The Infinite Conversation, 390) 
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I am sometimes asked about the basic claims or objectives of my dissertation—a 
simple enough question, I suppose, which I find oddly difficult to answer. When 
cornered, I might (for the benefit of my interlocutor) point to the discourse of literary 
criticism as my so-called ―object of study‖; alternatively, I might link my broader 
interests to literary theory or possibly the philosophy of literature—a sub-field of 
aesthetics that admittedly I have little fondness for, given the banality of its claims and 
concerns—while trying to remain somewhat circumspect about my actual objectives. 
In any case, I have often times gone to great lengths to steer clear of what, for me, 
has become an uncomfortable discussion. Upon reflection, I believe my reticence before 
this somewhat elemental question has a few obvious roots: (1) my dissertation—though 
not initially conceived this way—has evolved into what is sometimes referred to as (and 
sometimes pejoratively so) a ―theory dissertation‖—a moniker I am reluctant to invoke 
for it connotes impracticality, if not tedious polemic; (2) my dissertation (for reasons that 
will be clarified in my second chapter) critiques the whole idea of a fixed object of 
study—even while it casts a jaundiced eye across the discourse of literary criticism, from 
Plato to the present—and so tying this work to (say) a specific author, object-text, or field 
of study feels somewhat disingenuous; (3) my arguments are constructed against the 
backdrop not of conventional literary theory, but philosophy, and in particular the work 
of Gilles Deleuze, who in no way identifies with literary critical discourse, nor with any 
specific school of criticism or theory. In an interview on the publication of his first book 
with Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze insists that 
We‘re writing for unconsciousnesses that have had enough. We‘re looking 
for allies. We need allies. And we think these allies are already out there, 
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that they‘ve gone ahead without us, that there are lots of people who‘ve 
had enough and are thinking, feeling, and working in similar directions: 
it‘s not a question of fashion but of a deeper ―spirit of the age‖ informing 
converging projects in a wide range of fields. (Negotiations 22) 
Likewise (4) my dissertation derives not from the desire to create a new Deleuzean-
inspired school of criticism, but from the perhaps more modest (and as yet vague) feeling 
of having ―had enough‖ of what I call, in Part 1, the transcendent orientation to literature, 
and of wanting to map the coordinates of what I call, in Part 2, the immanentist 
orientation to literature—if only provisionally at this point. 
But more than that, I attribute the fact of my obfuscations (as they relate to the 
subject matter of this dissertation) to an unwillingness to rhetorically describe this work, 
in perhaps utopic fashion, as a plan of escape—even though that description resonates 
with me. In other words, in Part 1, I land on ―the plane of transcendence,‖ like a foot-
soldier on a battlefield, wrestling with the enemy—i.e., the signifier, the logic of 
representation, the various forms of idealism that have historically permeated literary 
critical discourse, and so forth. In Part 2, I explore the question of how the book opens up 
to its own becomings, or its own difference, by looking at a number of prominent works 
in American literature (i.e., Kerouac‘s On the Road, Melville‘s Moby-Dick, Whitman‘s 
Leaves of Grass, Crane‘s The Red Badge of Courage, and William Gass‘s On Being 
Blue). So my emphasis shifts in Part 2 from transcendence to immanence; from the logic 
of representation to what Deleuze calls ―the logic of sensation‖; from being to becoming; 
from the fixed coordinates of extant literary critical models (spawning predictable results) 
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to the possibility that the critic herself might play a more experimental, or what I will call 
―co-creative,‖ role in relation to the book. 
Finally, let me suggest that while the spectre of institutional criticism hangs over 
this dissertation, forcing me, at times, into a fairly exhaustive argument concerning the 
historical trajectory of literary critical discourse, I ultimately pursue a twofold agenda 
herein that requires me (1) to push back against those institutional models; and (2) to 
explore how the critic might come to think differently about literature, rather than simply 
―different-from‖ (say, existing critical standards), which hardly connotes difference at all. 
So what begins as a set of confrontations, emerges, in the end, as a mandate for the critic 
(to borrow a phrase from Emanuel Levinas) to think-otherwise—a mandate that for me, 







The Book, and Other Machines 
A book itself is a little machine…But when one writes, the only question is which other 
machine the literary machine can be plugged into, must be plugged into in order to work. 
—Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (A Thousand Plateaus, 4) 
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To begin, consider the following excerpts from a letter by philosopher Gilles 
Deleuze to one of his more petulant colleagues and critics, philosopher Michel Cressole:
1
 
There are, you see, two ways of reading a book: you either see it as a box 
with something inside and start looking for what it signifies, and then if 
you‘re even more perverse or depraved you set off after signifiers. And 
you treat the next book like a box contained in the first or containing it. 
And you annotate and interpret and question, and write a book about the 
book, and so on and on. Or there‘s the other way… (Negotiations 7–8) 
At this point, Deleuze urges Cressole to ―see the book‖—i.e., Deleuze‘s book (Anti-
Oedipus), or any book for that matter—―as a little non-signifying machine‖ (8); in other 
words, instead of asking what the book signifies or means, one should ask, 
‗Does it work, and how does it work?‘ How does it work for you? If it 
doesn‘t work, if nothing comes through, you try another book. This second 
way of reading‘s intensive: something comes through or it doesn‘t. 
There‘s nothing to explain, nothing to understand, nothing to interpret. It‘s 
like plugging into an electric circuit. 
Deleuze then concludes his comments on the matter with a series of reflections that speak 
directly to the basic concerns of this dissertation: 
This second way of reading is quite different from the first, because it 
relates a book directly to what‘s Outside. A book is a little cog in much 
                                                          
1
 The following passages—first published by Cressole, and later reprinted by Deleuze in his book, 
Negotiations (under the title ―Letter to a Harsh Critic‖)—are excerpted from Deleuze‘s creative and wide-
ranging set of epistolary responses to Cressole‘s somewhat unsympathetic treatment of not only Deleuze 
himself, but his books, his teaching life, his career path, his politics, and his celebrity. While parts of the 
letter I am singling out herein may read more didactic than defensive, Deleuze begins his reply to Cressole 
as follows: ―You‘re charming, clever, mischievous, even vicious sometimes. You might try to be a bit 
nicer‖ (3); he later adds, ―Your letter‘s full of false sympathy and a real thirst for revenge.‖  
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more complicated external machinery…This intensive way of reading, in 
contact with what‘s outside the book, as a flow meeting other flows, one 
machine among others, as a series of experiments for each reader in the 
midst of events that have nothing to do with books, as tearing the book 
into pieces, getting it to interact with other things, absolutely anything…is 
reading with love. (8–9) 
*** 
In his comments to Cressole, Deleuze advises against the type of reading (or 
critical encounter) that subjects the book to various unities and uniformities—what is 
sometimes referred to as the logic of representation—and, by extension, the assorted 
prohibitions, correspondences, controls and containments that follow from such totalizing 
engagements. Deleuze further takes aim at the ―perverse or depraved‖ reader, who 
stubbornly pursues what Deleuze and his occasional co-author—psychoanalyst Félix 
Guattari
2
—refer to as ―the imperialism of the Signifier‖ (Plateaus 65), or, more 
generally, ―the signifying regime of the sign‖ (112). That is, Deleuze-Guattari, in an 
attack on Lacanian psychoanalysis (and other language-based critical/interpretative 
models), indict those who they describe as ―signifier enthusiasts‖ (66), because of the 
somewhat decadent pleasure they take in being able to isolate and extract abstract chains 
of signifiers from the material flows of the book. In other words, the apparent goal of the 
more ―depraved‖ critic is to forge internal resemblances between signifiers (or between 
meaningful semiotic units), whether those resemblances be generic, structural, symbolic, 
narratorial, or otherwise. However, Deleuze-Guattari would say that all internal 
                                                          
2
 Deleuze and Guattari would co-author four influential books over a twenty-year period, including, Anti-
Oedipus, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, A Thousand Plateaus, and What is Philosophy? Henceforth, I 
will refer to this authorial coupling as Deleuze-Guattari. 
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resemblances are in no way essential to the book, no way necessary; rather, they are 
textual effects. They derive from emergent properties of the book. And yet those 
aforementioned ―enthusiasts‖ will tend to assign fixed ―semiotic coordinates‖ (75) to 
those particular effects through a multi-phased process that (at minimum) involves 
(1) disconnecting the book‘s emergent properties from their causal or 
genetic history; 
(2) declaring those properties ideal (i.e., self-contained, self-caused—the 
necessary preconditions of the book); and 
(3) assigning to them the unassailable capacity to govern, organize, and 
formally unify the material flows of the book. 
Little effect made good. This process, in turn, gives rise to what Deleuze-Guattari, in 
What is Philosophy?, call ―the plane of transcendence‖ (49). So, in the context of this 
dissertation—for as the authors argue ―every discipline‖ has its own ―capacity…to 
produce its own illusions and to hide behind its own peculiar smokescreen‖ (6)—the 
plane of transcendence fuels altogether dogmatic ways of thinking about the book. In 
other words, various textual effects will become (at least in some quarters) over-arching 
textual values—values that, again, are thought to govern or control the diverse material 
flows of the book. 
Put another way, when specific effects of the book are rendered ideal (through the 
process summarized above), those ideals are thought to not only code the book, but to 
serve as pre-condition for its actualization. They fold the book, often by force, into strict 
signifying regimes; they envelop and interiorize the book, and do so in ways that reduce 
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the book to little more than the standardized measures by which the book itself is 
formally judged, categorized, explained, etc. According to Brian Massumi,
3
 
Bodies that fall prey to transcendence are reduced to what seems to persist 
across their alterations. Their very corporeality is stripped from them, in 
favour of a supposed substrate—soul, subjectivity, personality, identity 
[or, with regards to the book, author, literary structure, narrative device, 
etc.]—which in fact is no foundation at all, but an end effect, the infolding 
of a forcibly regularized outside. Transcendence is the glorification of 
habit. (User‘s Guide 112) 
The problem for book-bodies,
4
 then—those that similarly ―fall prey to transcendence,‖ as 
Massumi says, or fall prey to what I will call the transcendent orientation—is not only 
―the glorification of habit‖ (i.e., regulated, critical encounters with the book), but a basic 
denial of the book‘s doings, that is, its material (or bodily) capacity to act or be acted 
upon, to transform or become-other, and to operate productively in the here and now—
issues that will be closely considered in later chapters. 
                                                          
3
 Massumi‘s work figures prominently in this dissertation. He is well-known in Deleuze circles for his 
translation of Deleuze-Guattari‘s A Thousand Plateaus, and for his creative (read: experimental, inventive, 
wide-ranging in terms of aims and interests) uptake of the Deleuzean conceptual vocabulary in several 
books and essays over the last 20 years. It would be incorrect, though, to ground his work in Deleuze alone. 
4
 For Deleuze, a body is in no way restricted to, say, a human body, but in fact includes any spatio-temporal 
consistency, any unity, which may be grouped (or held) together in some way with other bodies. Bruce 
Baugh glosses the term as follows: ―any whole composed of parts, where these parts stand in some definite 
[albeit temporary or provisional] relation to one another‖ (30). To this, Baugh adds a Spinozian addendum, 
that bodies, understood primarily in relational terms, always maintain the capacity to affect, and to be 
affected by (i.e., to register), other bodies. So, in general, the term body could refer, say, to any 
geographical or geological body (e.g., a body of water), any mathematical body (e.g., a unit, element, 
axiom, constant, etc.), any institutional or socio-political body, and so forth; it could also refer to 
everything from very small micro-physical bodies (genes, molecules, cells, etc.), to larger, more complex 
plant, animal or human bodies, to vast universal or celestial bodies (e.g., stars, black holes). At various 
points in this dissertation, given its larger focus on questions of language and literature, I may have 
occasion to speak of linguistic bodies (e.g., phonemes, graphemes, morphemes, lexemes, phrases, clauses); 




Put simply, the transcendent orientation of the critic subjects the book to the sort 
of debilitating ascesis that (1) flattens its affect, (2) denies the book any sort of productive 
or generative connection to its outside, (3) suppresses its transformational capacities, and 
(4) starves it of an essential vitality. So the application of derived critical values—to 
adapt Massumi‘s phrase, cited above—―strip[s]‖ the book of its ―corporeality‖; it 
denatures the book through a process that not only involves a clear repudiation of the 
book‘s affective capacities, but also its power to express
5
 itself in novel and diverse ways, 
to renew or go beyond itself. Why? Because, as suggested above, the book falls prey to 
the signifying regimes of the sign; it falls prey to (or is reduced to) the dyadic supremacy 
of signifier/signified, to a set of fixed and forcibly imposed semiotic coordinates, to a set 
of syntagmatic links between signs, and ultimately to various forms of order and 
organization, which follow from such regimented critical operations. In fact, in any 
signifying regime, ―every sign refers to another sign, and only to another sign, ad 
infinitum‖ (Plateaus 112); this turning inward of the sign, then—i.e., in upon itself—
restricts the capacity of that sign to (say) trigger material processes, to enter into new 
socio-political arrangements, to induce transformations of, for example, other linguistic 
or social structures, other sign systems. Literary signs—and their potential uses, their real 
world applications and operations, their variable effects, their power to do things, make 
things, change things—are reduced to little more than signifiers of other signs (i.e., signs 
of signs), which effectively explains what Deleuze-Guattari mean when they say that in 
                                                          
5
 The concept of expression requires careful elucidation, and will be discussed in detail in other parts of this 
dissertation, primarily in Part 2. A brief note on terminology: I may, at times, need to unpack Deleuze‘s 
conceptual vocabulary in stages (or in steps) so as not to allow the argument itself to be disrupted, or 
brought to an abrupt halt, at any one time, by having to descend into abstract and potentially interminable 
glosses of individual concepts. As we will see over the coming chapters, the best—and really only—way to 
make sense of Deleuze‘s (or Deleuze-Guattari‘s) often difficult, multi-layered concepts is to put them to 
work, or better yet, to see them at work, in variable ways, and in variable settings. 
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signifying regimes the signifier cannot ―impart…signified without the signified re-
imparting signifier in its turn‖ (114). This circular and wholly insular dispensation of 
signs devolves into endless rounds of signifier production (what Deleuze-Guattari call 
―signifiance‖) and manic interpretation (or, ―interpretance‖).
6
 In general, Deleuze-
Guattari characterize semiotic cycles of this sort—i.e., signifiance  interpretance  
signifiance, etc.—as a kind of hermeneutic sickness, or what they otherwise refer to as 
―interpretosis.‖ For them, ―signifiance and interpretosis are the two diseases of the earth 
or the skin, in other words, humankind‘s fundamental neurosis.‖ 
As noted, these issues will be explicated more fully in later chapters, especially 
where questions of institutionalized literary criticism arise. For the moment, though, I 
would like to reiterate the point that critico-interpretative encounters of the sort described 
above—whether they be carried out by scholars, psychoanalysts, priests, or whomever—
ostensibly concern themselves with what Massumi calls a ―mirroring or moulding‖ 
(―Introduction‖ xvi) of (in this instance) the book. So the reader (or reading) reduces the 
book, and all its pragmatic or productive capacities, 
(1) to what it denotes or possibly signifies; 
(2) to what it symbolizes, alludes to, or allegorizes; 
(3) to the representational logic of its critical audience; 
(4) to the chastisements of various factions within the critical community 




                                                          
6
 Deleuze-Guattari derive their conception of signifier production and manic interpretation (which they 
label signifiance and interpretance) from French linguist Émile Benveniste.  
7
 Jarrett made this remark in a conference at Thompson Rivers University, in 2005, where he likened the 
sort of critical practices designed to denounce the ―sins‖ of the writer—which is usually a sin of adherence 
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(5) to how the book itself conforms to certain standards or ideals (e.g., 
aesthetic, social, moral, or otherwise); 
(6) to how it might simply be ranked or positioned (e.g., canonically, 
generically, historically). 
These sorts of representational and ultimately totalizing approaches to literature, as the 
first part of this dissertation will argue, have had a lasting impact on the discourse of 
literary criticism, and have made pernicious contributions to historical conceptions of the 
literary artefact, itself, in the university and beyond. 
Comparatively, though, the ―intensive way of reading‖ (to which Deleuze refers 
in the passages cited at the outset to this introduction) will make no effort to contain or 
control the book in any of the ways discussed above. In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze-
Guattari make the following pledge: ―We will never ask what a book means, as signified 
or signifier; we will not look for anything to understand in it‖ (4). Instead the authors 
advance what one might refer to as an energetics of literature, which, in the most general 
sense, means that they view the book as but a singular node in a much more expansive 
network of matter-energy flows,
8
 and that it expresses itself in and through its pulsating 
and variable relations with those pure exteriorities. But to more fully unpack this notion 
of an energetics of literature, I propose a short detour into Deleuze-Guattari‘s Kafka: 
Toward a Minor Literature (Kafka, hereafter)—a book that figures prominently in this 
dissertation. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
to some dominant ideology—to a kind of secular evangelism. Critics, he argued, are renowned for wanting 
to scold writers for their transgressions, or rather, for wanting to ―sit them down,‖ as he says, like impudent 
little children, and spell out in fine detail their various misdeeds (literary, political, ideological, etc.), so as 
to then ―teach them a lesson‖ they won‘t soon forget. 
8
 On this point, we recall Deleuze‘s characterization of the book, cited above, ―as a little cog in much more 
complicated external machinery…in contact with what‘s outside the book, as a flow meeting other flows, 
one machine among others.‖ 
13 
 
At the outset of Kafka, Deleuze-Guattari ask the question: ―How can we enter into 
Kafka‘s work?‖ (3), and from there go on to map their own critical agenda as follows: 
This work is a rhizome, a burrow. The castle has multiple entrances whose 
rules of usage and whose locations aren‘t very well known. The hotel in 
Amerika has innumerable main doors and side doors that innumerable 
guards watch over; it even has entrances and exits without doors…We will 
enter, then, by any point whatsoever; none matters more than another, and 
no entrance is more privileged even if it seems an impasse, a tight passage, 
a siphon. We will be trying only to discover what other points our entrance 
connects to, what crossroads and galleries one passes through to link two 
points, what the map of the rhizome is and how the map is modified if one 
enters by another point. 
As I will show over the course of this dissertation, there is much at stake in this passage 
for literary criticism, and for the practices of the literary critic. At this stage, however, I 
would simply like to focus on Deleuze-Guattari‘s claim that the hotel in Kafka‘s Amerika 
―has innumerable main doors and side doors that innumerable guards watch over.‖ This 
image speaks directly to one of Deleuze-Guattari‘s primary objectives in Kafka, to take 
on the Kafka critical establishment, and especially the policing of the entrances into 
Kafka‘s oeuvre by prominent scholars in the field such as Marthe Robert.
9
 At one point in 
Kafka, Deleuze-Guattari make the case that ―[t]he three worst themes in many 
interpretations of Kafka are the transcendence of the law, the interiority of guilt, the 
                                                          
9
 In France, Robert was a translator and interpreter of Franz Kafka (and others). She was known for her 
predominantly Freudian treatment of literature, in general, and of writers like Kafka, in particular. In a late 
essay, Deleuze would write that Marthe Robert ―pushed [the] infantilization or ‗psychoanalization‘ of 




subjectivity of enunciation. They are connected to all the stupidities that have been 
written about allegory, metaphor, and symbolism‖ (45). One might argue that common to 
all such interpretations, aside from their collective overcoding
10
 of Kafka‘s writings, are 
the various modes of isolation and interiority that they impose over its surfaces. They do 
so (1) by subjecting the oeuvre to specific unities, specific themes or motifs, specific 
tropes, etc.; (2) by domesticating the politics of Kafka‘s writings—i.e., their capacity to 
act, and to act out; (3) by curtailing flows of desire (or desiring production) within those 
writings,
11
 and hence their capacity to make novel connections, to unfold (and affirm) 
themselves in various ways, to remain open to new encounters, etc.; and (4) by cutting 
the work itself off from its capacity to escape its own hermeneutic straightjackets, 
imposed from without. In effect, all such interpretations of Kafka nail shut the windows, 
pull the blinds, and (recalling Deleuze-Guattari‘s point) put guards at the entrances. 
So Kafka‘s critics not only restrict access into his writings, but turn the work itself 
inward (or in on itself), by again forcing its repeated submission to, and/or corroboration 
of, the various critical preoccupations (legalistic, oedipal/psychological, etc.)—the 
critical fetishes, really—of Kafka‘s mostly academic audience. In a strangely Kafkaesque 
turn, then, there are no entrances into Kafka‘s body of work, without the password—i.e., 
the critical code—nor are there exits, no escaping the code. As a result, Kafka‘s work 
                                                          
10
 For Deleuze-Guattari, the process of ―overcoding‖ involves the unification of differential codes linked to, 
say, a given body or system, text or territory, under the strict purview of a ―State apparatus‖ (Plateaus 427). 
In literary critical circles, the Signifier (and also the dyadic pairing of Signifier/Signified) has long 
overcoded the book, reducing it (as discussed above) to little more than specific acts of signification, 
subject to the hermeneutic treatment of a nearly transcendent authority, who impose certain textual, 
subjective, and/or linguistic values on the book: ―Such is the regime of signs of the State: overcoding, or 
the Signifier‖ (428).  
11
 Briefly, in Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze-Guattari make the case for a conception of desire that breaks with the 
subjective longings of a desiring subject who lacks (or is deprived access to) a specific object of affection. 
Instead, their notion of desire indexes the more autonomous and impersonal capacity of bodies or systems, 
caught in the grip of their own materiality, to access their own unactualized potentials and express 
themselves in unpredictable ways—ways that break (with) codes, that destabilize territorial strongholds 
(e.g., linguistic, structural), that forge novel connections, etc.—when brought to a point of operative crisis. 
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progressively falls into bureaucratic hands; in fact, it becomes so caught up in those 
institutional bureaucracies and their psychological (read: oedipalizing, infantilizing) 
interpretations of his work, that the very capacity of those writings to be accessed—i.e., 
read, used, put to work—by different readers, in different ways, becomes suppressed or 
stifled. Those critical bureaucracies deprive Kafka‘s work of its power (1) to draw upon 
(or make use of) its own unactualized potentials;
12
 (2) to enter into variable arrangements 
with bodies other than (or outside) itself; and (3) to communicate or express itself in 
ways that escape its oppressive codings, i.e., the habitual deployments and various 
interpretative frameworks to which Kafka‘s writings have been historically subject 
(institutionally, culturally, or otherwise). In a sense, Kafka‘s critical audience would 
seem to have forced his work to take up residence in what Leibniz, in his Monadology (of 
1714), calls the windowless monad—but with the following stipulation. That is, for 
Kafka, such residence offers no hope of connection or communication with the outside; 
for Leibniz, however, the atomistic monad—despite having ―no windows, by which 
anything could come in or go out‖ (179)—distinguishes itself in the way it ―enters into 
compounds‖ or relational harmonies with its outside. So the monad actively mirrors, and 
thereby forms connections, with the world, whereas Kafka‘s critics deprive him of such 
harmonious encounters. Their pronouncements isolate the oeuvre, cut it off from 
productive connections with the outside—i.e., beyond the regulated points of entry and 
exit deemed appropriate by his critics. Their pronouncements entomb Kafka‘s work, 
rather than open it up to any sort of living or integrative continuum. 
So recognizing what has befallen Kafka, I ask the following question: how does 
the book (or book-body) break from that which seals off its entrances—e.g., the 
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 An issue that again will be fully explicated in later chapters. 
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outwardly-imposed semiotic coordinates, analytical fixations, and assorted interpretations 
of its (largely academic) audience? How does the book escape the burden of its various 
forms of containment and critical confinement? This problematic brings to mind Kafka‘s 
own depiction (at the outset of The Castle) of K.‘s arrival, after being summoned to the 
village by castle authorities: ―There was no sign of the Castle—hill, fog, and darkness 
surrounded it, not even the faintest gleam of light suggested the larger Castle‖ (1). Kafka 
then adds, ―on the wooden bridge that leads from the main road into the village‖—i.e., at 
the one and only point of entry into this insular locale, shrouded in snow—―K. stood a 
long time…gazing upward into the seeming emptiness.‖ 
Keeping in mind those aforementioned questions concerning the capacity of the 
book to escape its various modes of critical confinement, we recall Deleuze-Guattari‘s 
claim, cited above, concerning their own critical approach to Kafka: ―We will enter, then, 
by any point whatsoever; none matters more than another.‖ The authors go on to refer to 
this approach as ―the principle of multiple entrances‖ (Kafka 3)—a principle to which 
they steadfastly adhere in their work because, as a principle, it underscores the critical 
imperative to protect the book in any way possible from being overcoded by its ―enemy, 
the Signifier.‖ So by entering into Kafka‘s body of work ―by any point whatsoever,‖ 
Deleuze-Guattari not only seek to proliferate connections, or variable points of contact, 
between the book and its outside (i.e., the non-book, the ―absolutely anything‖ to which 
Deleuze refers in his letter to Cressole), but to highlight a certain pragmatic conception of 
literature or the book as that which is essentially ―open to experimentation.‖ This view of 
the book may help explain why Deleuze and Deleuze-Guattari ceaselessly pursue 
questions of exchange, interconnection, and transmission in their work, and why they 
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repeatedly draw attention to such relational phenomena, if you will, as doors, passages, 
hallways, entrances and exits, planes, bridges, thresholds, borders, etc. Such terms will 
often have a privileged role to play in the mapping of their conceptual vocabularies, and 
in the philosophical (and hence practical and productive) ways they approach a wide 
range of topics, including, language, literature, art, science, and politics—to name only a 
few.
13
 For Deleuze-Guattari, these terms are not mere metaphors, but rather they assume 
a very material, very pragmatic and operational, role in their philosophy. It is through 
doors and across thresholds that flows (of one sort or another) are channeled, blocked, 
and re-routed; that limits are broached and passed beyond; that encounters occur; that 
unions or couplings are forged; that trajectories take shape; that processes unfold; that 
relays are made. As Deleuze-Guattari write, ―The problem is not that of being free but of 
finding a way out, or even a way in, another side, a hallway, an adjacency‖ (7–8). 
Collectively, these terms (e.g., assemblage, bridge, coupling, relay, etc.) index a 
pure between, that which neither belongs to, nor can be reduced to, the individual bodies 
a given relation may happen to couple. By way of example, think of a room. That which 
effectively distinguishes a room from, say, a large, self-contained box is its connection to 
an outside of some sort (e.g., another room, or the outside world). But for that connection 
to occur between the room and its outside, a door must facilitate or make possible the 
passage between those two realms. But here‘s the rub: to carry out such a function, or to 
                                                          
13
 There are literally countless applications of these terms in Deleuze and Deleuze-Guattari—I offer here 
only a few examples. In What is Philosophy?, Deleuze-Guattari write, ―we go from one concept to another 
by a kind of bridge‖ (19). In A Thousand Plateaus, they argue that ―the self is only a threshold, a door‖ 
(249), and elsewhere that ―Dismantling the organism has never meant killing yourself, but rather opening 
the body to connections that presuppose an entire assemblage, circuits, conjunctions, levels and thresholds, 
passages and distributions of intensity, and territories and deterritorializations measured with the craft of a 
surveyor‖ (160); in addition, they define the rhizome in terms of ―its gaps, detours, subterranean passages, 
stems, openings, traits, holes, etc.‖ (415). Finally, in Essays Critical and Clinical, Deleuze contends that all 
writing (including literature) ―is a passage of Life that traverses both the livable and the lived‖ (1). 
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facilitate that passage, the door must operate (in some way, and to some degree) outside 
its relata—i.e., outside the particular rooms themselves, lest those rooms remain entirely 
self-contained, and hence not rooms at all. In fact, the link between a specific room and 
its outside, or really the creation of any whole that might emerge from such a coupling 
(e.g., a home, a place of business), is inconceivable without that liminal space or pure 
relation enabling the whole to emerge. Once again, the relation itself can neither be 
reduced to, nor interpreted through the lens of, that which it relates; in part, this means 
that spatialized bodies (like rooms or books) differentiate themselves as such—i.e., in 
their own actuality—through the activation of their relational capacities, or rather, 
through that which links those bodies to their outside (i.e., to what they‘re not). 
On this point, one might go further and say that all discrete bodies and their 
corresponding identities (e.g., as rooms, books) are necessarily derivative; they emerge 
from, or are functions of, the various processes of individuation or differentiation that 
give rise to those bodies. This is what Brian Massumi, in Parables for the Virtual, means 
by the expression ―passage precedes position‖ (46). To put a fine point on the matter, the 
room and the non-room (or the outside-room) do not come together as structural binaries, 
nor are they causally related; that is, they do not imply or presuppose one another. They 
neither depend upon one another, nor is their relation in some way necessary; instead 
their relation is merely fortuitous, a ―purely contingent relation between actualities‖ 
(Baugh, ―Deleuze‖ 360). As suggested above, relations are always independent of their 
relata, which means (1) that the various properties (or component parts) internal to some 
discrete body are unable to explain the whole that might emerge from that body‘s 
relations (potential or actual) with other discrete bodies; and (2) that the relations 
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themselves can change without inducing a necessary alteration to the relata, as discrete 
entities. In fact, there can always be new entrances into, or exits from, what might 
otherwise remain relatively stable phenomena. 
Deleuze initially derives his views on this topic—that which is variously referred 
to in his work, and in Deleuzean scholarship, as the ―autonomy of relation‖ (Massumi, 
―Introduction‖ xxxiii); the ―exteriority of relations‖ (DeLanda, New Philosophy 11); and 
the ―primacy of relations‖ (Bains 22; Massumi, Parables 165)—from philosopher David 
Hume, and Hume‘s concept of ―associationism.‖ The fairly complex set of variables 
involved here will be revisited (in some form or another) in later chapters of this 
dissertation. But with regards to this question of the book, suffice to say that for Deleuze-
Guattari, ―[a] book exists only through the outside and on the outside‖ (Plateaus 4), 
which again means that the book exists relationally, in and through what it plugs into, and 
what plugs into it. So one might conclude that even the book itself is derived; it exists, or 
assumes its identity, its ―Objectality‖ (Deleuze-Guattari, What is? 3), its book essence, as 
an effect of various productive encounters and couplings, which ceaselessly unfold 
between pre-individuated (or non-differentiated) material flows. Again, ―passage 
precedes position.‖ But even when the book differentiates (or actualizes) itself, as such, 
its pure outside continues to channel through, unleashing what Deleuze would call 
―nomadic distributions and crowned anarchy‖ (Difference 265) in and through the book. 
In other words, through these various synergies, these couplings and ceaseless 
negotiations between the book and its outside (i.e., the non-book), the book‘s specific 
forms of organization—i.e., the various codes, controls and containments that have taken 
hold of the book, stratified the book, like so much fog or haze—are collectively thrust 
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into, and/or consumed by, an anarchic outside, a swirling of incorporeal events, a 
wildness that ceaselessly dissolves the semiotic haze that has descended over the book. 
What emerges, in its place, is ―[the] book as assemblage with the outside‖ (Deleuze-
Guattari, Plateaus 23), rather than ―the book as image of the world‖—or, better yet, as 
representation of the world. So, for example, the critical themes of subjectivity, interior 
guilt, the transcendence of the law, and so forth—i.e., all that contains and controls the 
interior spaces of the book, all that both constitutes and propels Kafka criticism—are 
denied their transcendent status. The imposed analytical infrastructures of the book 
collapse, as do the spatial geographies of the castle. To repeat: ―Only the principle of 
multiple entrances prevents the introduction of the enemy, the Signifier and those 
attempts to interpret a work that is actually only open to experimentation‖ (Kafka 3). 
So, for Deleuze-Guattari, the book is best understood as a kind of composite, even 
a record, of its various inputs and outputs; its exchanges and interactions; its entrances, 
exits, and subterranean passageways; its forms of expression, consumption, transmission, 
destruction, and transformation. In Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze-Guattari claim the following: 
Reading a text is never a scholarly exercise in search of what is signified, 
still less a highly textual exercise in search of a signifier. Rather, it is a 
productive use of the literary machine, a montage of desiring machines, a 
schizoid exercise that extracts from the text its revolutionary force. (106) 
So for the schizoanalytic critic, the book is caught in the grip of its own circulating 
desires, its own revolutionary becomings. Those desires, then, expressed in and through 
the book, disrupt its equilibrium—i.e., its ―steady-state,‖ in complexity terms—that 
which otherwise serves to unify the book in one form or another, say, in editor‘s offices, 
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in print shops and publishing houses, in classrooms and academic institutions, and also 
structurally, discursively, or what have you. Forcing the book far-from-equilibrium not 
only enables previously unactualized potentials to emerge, but allows the book itself to 
express or renew itself in entirely new and unpredictable ways. Because any unity or 
organizational form that may have befallen the book, for whatever period of time, need 
necessarily be understood as derived or (again) emergent—i.e., never presupposed. So, in 
effect, the book becomes a record of its own circulations (and ways of circulating), its 
own variations and serial encounters. As Deleuze-Guattari conclude, 
We think the material or machinic aspect of an assemblage [at the level of 
bodies, statements, actions] relates not to the production of goods but 
rather to a precise state of intermingling bodies in a society, including all 
the attractions and repulsions, sympathies and antipathies, alterations, 
amalgamations, penetrations, and expansions that affect bodies of all kinds 
in their relation to one another. (Plateaus 90) 
Similarly, the book-body remains in a constant state of interaction with its outside, a 
constant state of variance, as it ceaselessly registers and records its ongoing encounters 
with that outside (e.g., its variable attractions, sympathies, penetrations, and so forth). 
Thus far, then, we have forged a preliminary understanding of how the book 
expresses itself in ways that break (or break with) its habitual codings; but, to this point, 
we have yet to deal with the question of how certain critical practices, or what Deleuze 
refers to as an ―intensive way of reading,‖ might contribute to the book‘s capacity to 
express or transform itself. On this, consider Deleuze-Guattari‘s comments in a 1972 
interview, published in the wake of Anti-Oedipus, concerning their critical method: 
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What we look for in a book is the way it transmits something that resists 
coding: flows, revolutionary active lines of flight, lines of absolute 
decoding rather than any intellectual culture. Even in books there are 
oedipal structures, oedipal codes and strictures that are all the more 
insidious for being abstract, nonfigurative. What we find in great English 
and American novelists is a gift, rare among the French, for intensities, 
flows, machine-books, tool-books, schizo-books. All we‘ve got in France 
is Artaud and half of Beckett. People may criticize our book [i.e., Anti-
Oedipus] for being too literary, but we‘re sure such criticism will come 
from teachers of literature. Is it our fault that Lawrence, Miller, Kerouac, 
Burroughs, Artaud, and Beckett know more about schizophrenia than 
psychiatrists and psychoanalysts? (Negotiations 22–3). 
At various points in his work, Deleuze reveals his great admiration for many prominent 
Anglo-American writers, and locates that admiration in the seemingly rare gift among 
those writers to break with certain forms of order and organization—i.e., extant social 
and literary codes, dominant (or prevailing) uses of language, specific histories, 
geographies (or landscapes), and so forth. In so doing, these writers create new practices, 
new ways of doing things; they open up new spaces, new worlds; in short, they take 
flight, and flight, for Deleuze, is ―the highest aim of literature‖ (Dialogues 36). In fact, 
for many Anglo-American writers (e.g., Melville, Hardy, Virginia Woolf, Fitzgerald, and 
those listed in the citation above), Deleuze argues, ―everything is departure, becoming, 
passage, leap, daemon, relationship with the outside. They create a new Earth.‖ They do 
so, I would add, not by simply depicting, for example, ―a new Earth,‖ or by representing 
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certain ―departures‖ or ―passages‖ in their work (though they may do that), nor by overtly 
critiquing certain norms or forms of representation in their work (though they may do that 
as well). Instead, their work actually forces those norms (e.g., grammatical, linguistic, 
textual, aesthetic or literary, discursive, narratorial, political, institutional) to the point of 
auto-critique—i.e., where the book escapes its various codes and conventions, or where it 
breaks (with) identity. For Deleuze, great writers induce upheavals and transformations, 
not only in language and literature, but in potentially any social or territorial arrangement, 
any code or structure. In effect, they ―liberate a living and expressive material‖ (Deleuze-
Guattari, Kafka 21) from the book, just as all great artists will render visible a living 
potential—i.e., that which cannot be fully contained in, nor exhausted by, the art object. 
The power of art, then, manifests through its ruptures and breakthroughs, its becomings. 
So the reason that Deleuze-Guattari have high regard for certain writers (and not 
others) is that those writers make new uses of language; they deterritorialize (read: undo, 
decommission, send flying) prevailing codes and conventions; they build new 
relationships, new connections; they unleash what Deleuze-Guattari refer to as 
―collective assemblage[s] of enunciation‖ (Plateaus 80) from the book—i.e., new ways 
of speaking, of gesturing, of using and organizing signs that point to previously 
unrecognized collectives (such as ‗a people yet to come‘). Great writers and great 
literatures create ―a new Earth…a revolutionary-machine to come‖ (Kafka 18). To 
borrow a term from the Situationists, great writers go on a kind of literary dérive
14
 of 
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 For the Situationists, the dérive (i.e., drifting, being ‗on the drift‘) is ―playful-constructive behaviour‖ 
that unfolds in and through (or across) a certain cityscape. So while on the drift, individuals ―drop their 
usual motives for movement and action [e.g., going to work], their relations, their work and leisure 
activities, and let themselves be drawn by the attractions of the terrain and the encounters they find there‖ 
(Debord 50). A ―literary dérive‖ similarly emphasizes a set of experimental movements, but, in this case, 
those that forge new territories of the book, while breaking apart the constants of the literary terrain. 
24 
 
sorts, by which I mean they forge transversal relations—a concept that will be explored 
more fully in later chapters of this dissertation (also, see note 16, below)—or rather, new 
lines of connection and communication. We recall that what Deleuze-Guattari ―look for 
in a book is the way it transmits something that resists coding: flows, revolutionary active 
lines of flight, lines of absolute decoding‖ (Deleuze, Negotiations 22); they follow that 
singular transmission to find ―whether it works, and how it works, and who it works for.‖ 
An important question that this dissertation asks concerns the role of criticism in 
the creation (or co-creation) of this ―new Earth‖—a role that, in a sense, links critical 
practice to artistic practice, and the writing of criticism to, say, the writing of literature, 
which (for its part) is engaged in its own ―enterprise of co-creation‖ (Deleuze-Guattari, 
What is? 173) with the world (or, as I will discuss in Chapter 3, with incorporeal life). In 
general, the artist‘s co-creative endeavors involve the ―invent[ion of] unknown or 
unrecognized affects‖ (174), the ―extract[ion of] new harmonies‖ (176). So I ask, then, in 
a related vein, how might criticism play an active and productive role in relation to the 
book? How might it extract new and unrecognized harmonies without, in turn, allowing 
its interventions to devolve into practices that suffocate the book, that constrain or restrict 
it? Deleuze-Guattari remain determined in the case of Kafka—as their various statements 
of critical intent would indicate—not to contribute to (nor further) existing lines of 
critical inquiry into Kafka by simply offering one more dominating interpretation of his 
work that emphasizes, for example, its psychological (or oedipal) underpinnings. Instead, 
they hope to make him happy. In Dialogues, Deleuze writes, 
My ideal, when I write about an author, would be to write nothing that 
could cause him sadness, or if he is dead, that might make him weep in his 
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grave. Think of the author you are writing about. Think of him so hard that 
he can no longer be an object, and equally so that you cannot identify with 
him. Avoid the double shame of the scholar and the familiar. Give back to 
an author a little of the joy, the energy, the life of love and politics that he 
knew how to give and invent. So many dead writers must have wept over 
what has been written about them. I hope that Kafka was pleased with the 
book that we did on him, and it is for that reason that the book pleased 
nobody. (119) 
This revealing passage both reinforces and expands upon the value Deleuze assigns to 
this idea of ―reading with love,‖ which he advocates for in his letter to Cressole. In later 
chapters, I will explore, in detail, what it means for the literary critic to ―give back to an 
author a little of the joy [etc.]‖ that the author herself ―knew how to give and invent.‖ 
In the first part of this dissertation, though, my concerns are more grave, less 
joyous. That is, I plan to explore what it means not to please, but to sadden, an author. By 
this I mean that critical practices designed to ―lift the veil of truth,‖ as it were, on the 
book, or to spank writers (as Jarrett says) for their ideological sins, or, more generally, to 
objectify, unify, judge, analyze, interpret, categorize, or defend literature carry out the 
most damage on the book. Such approaches do little more than deaden the book; they 
weaken its affective capacities, its joy; they close it off (or close it down), and do so in 
part by restricting its purview to that of the specialist, i.e., to those who would police its 
exits and entrances, so as to protect or maintain their own institutional stake in a given 





 and the ―constant transversal communication‖ (Kafka 40) 
between them,
16
 as an open system (1) that acts (e.g., upon language, upon code, upon 
life, etc.); (2) that acts politically, expressively, affectively; and (3) that is ceaselessly 
acted upon by its outside (i.e., by the non-book). Put another way, Deleuzo-Guattarian 
criticism most often concerns itself with the actual operations (or movements) of the 
book in and through things—i.e., in and through other bodies, other machines, etc.; it also 
concerns itself with what the book does, say, to language; with what it produces (or can 
produce) socially, aesthetically, or otherwise; with what it brings to life, and so forth. In 
A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze-Guattari make the case that ―contrary to a deeply rooted 
[read: arborescent or fixed, grounded] belief, the book is not an image of the world. It 
forms a rhizome with the world, there is an a-parallel evolution of the book and the 
world…this is its becoming-world‖ (11). Then, in their final collaboration, What is 
Philosophy?, the authors contend that literature fosters becomings, intensities; it brings to 
life, as it were, compounds of sensation, of percepts and affects, those that exceed the 
book, and yet mark the passage between the book and its pure outside, i.e., the non-
book—issues that will be explored in Part 2 of the dissertation. 
In any case, treating the book as an open system, and in a way that heeds, even 
hastens, its ―becoming-world‖—as manifest through its variable links to, breaks from, 
and transformations of, that world—demands, at minimum, that critics forgo their efforts 
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 Kafka‘s writings include not only his books (i.e., short stories and novels), but diaries, public lectures, 
and letters, as well: taken as a whole, they amount to what Deleuze-Guattari variously refer to as ―Kafka‘s 
writing machine‖ (Kafka 34), ―literary machine‖ (29), and ―expression machine‖ (32). 
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 Transversality, in this context, points to the non-hierarchical and a-symmetrical bonds of connection and 
communication between different modes of writing, different utterances; more concretely, the concept 
indexes the fact that these writings act upon one another, seize upon and actualize one another‘s potentials, 
and do so in creative and unpredictable ways that contribute to the ―new Earth,‖ of which Deleuze speaks. 
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to present that one dominating interpretation of the writer. Therefore, in terms of his 
―basic approach to literary commentary,‖ Deleuze 
may offer poetic evocations of textual effects or cite occasional examples, 
but never does he attempt to demonstrate that his is the best reading of a 
passage or the proper way of interpreting a text. Rather, he simply invents 
a way of thinking about a work, one that has the dual purpose of 
articulating the logic of a work‘s construction from the perspective of the 
artist and of formulating philosophical concepts of sufficient inner 
consistency to sustain that logic. The purpose of his analyses is to think 
alongside the work of art, not to explain it or to stand in for it, but to 
create a philosophical analog that invites the reader to imagine the work in 
a new way that necessarily entails a new understanding of the world. 
(Bogue, ―Minor Writing‖ 114) 
It is this idea of thinking with or thinking alongside the book that appeals to Deleuze-
Guattari in Kafka (and elsewhere), and to Deleuze, generally, throughout his protracted 
philosophical engagement with literature over the course of his career, from Proust and 
Sacher-Masoch in the early 1960s, to his final book, Essays Critical and Clinical, 
published in France in 1993, only a few years before his death.
17
 In fact, ―to create a 
philosophical analog…that necessarily entails a new understanding of the world,‖ as 
Bogue suggests, is what Deleuze-Guattari, in What is Philosophy?, call creating concepts. 
In part what this means—recalling Deleuze‘s letter to Michel Cressole—is that thinking 
alongside the book involves creating 
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contact with what‘s outside the book, as a flow meeting other flows, one 
machine among others…[it involves] a series of experiments for each 
reader in the midst of events that have nothing to do with books…tearing 
the book into pieces, [and] getting it to interact with other things, 
absolutely anything. (Negotiations 9) 
So thinking with the book means thinking (and even fostering) those contacts with the 
outside-book, through various empirico-pragmatic operations. Put succinctly, the critico-
philosophical encounter for which Deleuze and Deleuze-Guattari advocate in their work 
involves sustained efforts to machine the book—an issue to which we now turn. 
As has been suggested, the book operates (literally, not figuratively) as ―a 
machine, producing certain effects, amenable to a certain use‖ (Deleuze-Guattari, Anti-
Oedipus 109). The book is a machine that plugs into, that channels, and that channels 
through, other machines. Kafka, for his part, plugs into ―the ship-machine, the hotel-
machine, the circus-machine, the castle-machine, the court-machine, each with its own 
intermingled pieces, gears, processes, and bodies contained in one another or bursting out 
of containment‖ (Plateaus 88). Contextually speaking (for want of better phrase), the 
book-machine plugs into machinic assemblages of bodies and utterances, of content and 
expression. And into those open-ended machinic assemblages, the critic enters to not only 
evaluate—in the diagnostic sense of that word—the ―measurable‖ relations of the 
literary-machine to, for example, ―a war-machine, love-machine, revolutionary-
machine…bureaucratic-machine‖ (4), but to experiment with the book by plugging still 
more machines into it. So, of machines, in general, one might say that they function and 
function with (i.e., they co-function); they work and are put to work; they act upon 
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bodies; they make or produce things; they liberate potentials; and finally, they enter into 
novel arrangements with one another. From a machinic perspective, then, literature is 
fundamentally connective; it is a set of hook-ups or circuits into which things plug, and 
through which an affective charge (of one sort or another) emits or transmits itself. So the 
primary question that the Deleuzean critic (let alone the novelist) might ask can be 
formulated as follows: ―How can the book find an adequate outside with which to 
assemble in heterogeneity, rather than a world to reproduce?‖ (24). To create such 
assemblages, and to liberate the expressive potentials of the book, the critic must 
experiment. As suggested a moment ago, this means plugging the book into its outside, 
into the non-book—a ―much more complicated machinery‖—just like ―plugging into an 
electric circuit,‖ as Deleuze says. This means putting the book to work to see what it can 
do, or, better yet, to see what it might be capable of. 
Brian Massumi refers to this sort of critical intervention as ―operative reason‖ 
(Parables 109), that which he describes as both ―experimental‖ (111) and ―pragmatic 
rather than analytic‖ (111–112). Massumi further characterizes the operative approach as 
follows: 
It doesn‘t master a situation [nor does it master the book or piece of 
literature] with exhaustive knowledge of alternative outcomes. It ‗tweaks‘ 
it. Rather than probing the situation to bring it under maximum control, it 
prods it, recognizing it to be finally indomitable, and respecting its 
autonomy. Operative reason is concerned with effects—specifically 
counter-effects—more than causes. It deploys local interventions in an 
attempt to induce a qualitative global transformation: small causes with 
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disproportionate effect, excess-effect, a little tweak for a big return. 
Operative reason is inseparable from a process of trial and error, with 
occasional shots in the dark, guided in every case by a pragmatic sense of 
the situation‘s responsivity (as opposed to its manipulability). (112) 
Massumi contrasts this practice of operative reason—which in this context refers to the 
practice of tweaking the book, of making it go critical (109), so as to release its 
expressive potential
18
—with what he refers to as ―instrumental reason.‖ In other words, 
where operative reason ―deploys local interventions in an attempt to induce a qualitative 
global transformation,‖ instrumental reason, in its turn, abstracts, systematizes, and even 
formalizes those critical interactions. Through instrumental reason, literature becomes a 
predictable object of study: ―regularized, repeatable, uniform‖ (94), which, in effect, 
means that the book loses its charge, its connection to/with the outside, its capacity to act 
upon the world; as Deleuze would say, the book loses its capacity to ―come into full 
possession of [its] power of action‖ (Logic 273). 
In any case, what Massumi characterizes in terms of the deployment of ―local 
interventions,‖ Deleuze more generally refers to as ―reading with love‖; yet, for both, the 
goal is the same: to pry open new spaces in the book; to amplify the book, intensify it; to 
see what it can do, what it can effect, produce, or make felt. Deleuzean scholar Bruce 
Baugh—in his essay, ―How Deleuze can help us make Literature work‖—assigns a triple 
aspect to the more interventionist or operative modes of literary criticism with which this 
dissertation concerns itself: that is, we (as critics or readers) experiment with the book, 
with an eye on its potential for use, so as to force new experiences of the book. So we 
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 Of note is the fact that this potential of the book remains hidden or inaccessible in its ―steady-state,‖ as 
complexity theorists would say.  
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experiment; we unleash potential; we experience. In so doing, we break (and break with) 
established modalities of the book. That is, we induce flight: i.e., the augmentation and/or 
mobilization of the book‘s power to act beyond those critical controls, by stimulating its 
capacity to act and be acted upon. Baugh, who links the augmentation of the ―power to 
act‖ not only to the book, but to the reader, as well (52), offers up a provocative moniker 
for this approach to literary criticism: ―a revolutionary pragmatics of reading‖ (34)—an 
approach that enfolds both Nietzschean and Spinozist currents. I will have more to say 
about these matters in Part 2 of the dissertation. For the moment, though, let me simply 
underscore the fact that Baugh‘s revolutionary pragmatics of reading—if ultimately 
productive or beneficial in terms of the reader‘s critical engagement/encounter with the 
book
19
—depends upon the capacity of the reader to directly access the materiality (or 
material aspect) of the book, and to that extent machine the book. Machining the book, 
we recall, involves ―plugging [it] into an electric circuit,‖ putting it to work, charging it 
up, unleashing its potential. Put another way, machining the book involves the coupling 
of heterogeneous components between the book and its outside; or rather, it involves 
feeding the book various raw materials—the ―absolutely anything,‖ to which Deleuze 
refers in his letter—from without. Therefore, machining the book means drawing on the 
capacity of the book to make or produce things, to generate outputs; it means amplifying 
the book‘s potential by manipulating its speeds and maximizing its yield. To my mind, 
the excerpts of Deleuze‘s letter to Cressole, cited at the outset to this introduction, read 
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 I derive this point (and the point that follows) from Deleuze‘s reading of Spinoza; however, it is a more 
important issue than I am letting on at the moment. To get a sense of my larger intent here, it might be 
helpful to recall Deleuze‘s question to readers (cited in his letter to Cressole) about their localized 
encounters with the book: ―How does it work for you? If it doesn‘t work, if nothing comes through, you try 
another book.‖ That is, if nothing productive comes from the encounter, if the book fails to reveal its 
expressive potentials, then simply move on to the next book, the next machinic intervention. Baugh gives 
great weight to this matter as well in his essay, ―How Deleuze can help us make Literature work.‖  
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much like a critical manifesto, ―practically a war cry,‖
20
 because they ground the 
practices of critical reading that Deleuze proposes in, for example, experimentation, 
pragmatics, and ultimately ethics, rather than in something like the analysis of fixed and 
self-sustaining values and the banal pursuit of authorial intent. 
*** 
I conclude this opening chapter by briefly returning to Deleuze‘s letter to Michel 
Cressole, wherein he (Deleuze) makes the following claim: ―There are, you see, two 
ways of reading a book: you either see it as a box with something inside and start looking 
for what it signifies…Or there‘s the other way.‖ In my own example of the monadic, 
purely internalized room (i.e., windowless, door-less, without access in or out), discussed 
earlier in this chapter, I drew upon this same image of the ―box.‖ If you recall, my 
comments on the matter read as follows: ―That which effectively distinguishes a room, 
say, from a large, self-contained box is its connection to an outside of some sort (e.g., 
another room, or the outside world).‖ The point for both me, on this question of the room, 
and Deleuze, on this question of the book, is that any and all material things (like rooms 
or books, or even boxes for that matter) cannot be reduced to wholly self-contained, self-
sufficient beings, with no essential connection to their respective outsides; nor should 
they be summarily reduced to a set of logical properties—in terms of the room: shape, 
size, color, etc.; in terms of the book: the various subjects and objects generally attributed 
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 I take this phrase from Deleuze‘s first major work on Spinoza, Expressionism in Philosophy, wherein 
Deleuze writes, ―When Spinoza says that we do not even know what a body can do, this is practically a war 
cry‖ (255). So by asking—as Deleuze does in his letter to Cressole—what a book-body can do, how it 
works, what it functions with, and so forth, Deleuze foments his own revolution (of sorts), this time in the 
way book‘s are accessed and interacted with.  
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to books (e.g., plot or narrative, character, theme, aesthetic or literary form, etc.).
21
 For 
Deleuze, the book (much like any ―machinic assemblage‖)
22
 retains a very real set of 
potentials or capacities—the capacity, for example, to affect and be affected by a non-
present outside; also, the capacity to envelop a set of forces (e.g., a certain reading or 
evaluation, a certain use or application by an audience; also, the forces unleashed by 
other socio-political machines, other assemblages). The book, in turn, enters into new and 
novel arrangements with the non-book, and in so doing triggers material processes in 
those other bodies (linguistic, textual, social, etc.). So the book is not only put to work in 
a certain way through its variable encounters with exterior forces, but, as a direct result of 
those encounters, the book releases or draws upon its own untapped (i.e., unactualized) 
potentials, and thereby transforms or re-modulates in the process. Put simply, what I have 
argued in this chapter is that the book is neither closed nor fully complete in and of itself, 
nor is it amenable to being read or evaluated in a definitive and/or totalizing way. 
Nevertheless, over its long history, from Plato to the present, the discourse of 
literary criticism
23
 has—in one form or another—been mired in sustained efforts to 
somehow totalize the book (i.e., to box it up) 
1. by subjecting the book to a logic of representation (and the related 
attributions of identity and internal resemblance);  
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 Here I am thinking of a point that the authors raise at the outset of A Thousand Plateaus: ―A book has 
neither object nor subject; it is made of variously formed matters, and very different dates and speeds. To 
attribute the book to a subject is to overlook this working of matters, and the exteriority of their relations. It 
is to fabricate a beneficent God to explain geological movements‖ (3). We will return to this way of 
thinking about the book in Part 1 of the dissertation. 
22
 For Deleuze-Guattari, all bodies (including book-bodies) enter into relations with other bodies (social, 
political, institutional, etc.—i.e., not just textual bodies). Those relations, then, either enable or block the 
body in question to transform or become-other; which is to say, the body derives its meaning or function 
from its complex interactions (or ways of co-mingling) with other bodies (Plateaus 88). 
23
 I will define this phrase in a moment. 
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2. by overcoding the book under the unifying auspices of a master 
Signifier, and an enduring set of meanings/values interpreted by the 
priest (or academically, by the so-called ―sage on the stage‖); 
3. by depriving the book of ―an adequate outside with which to assemble 
in heterogeneity,‖ as Deleuze-Guattari contend; 
4. by denying what Paul Bains refers to as ―the primacy of semiosis,‖ or 
what he also calls, following Deleuze, ―the being of relation‖ (17), and 
hence the capacity of the book itself to form (or again, enter into) 
novel machinic assemblages; 
5. by strictly regulating critical encounters with the book—or better, by 
regulating what Henry Sussman calls ―the task of the critic‖;
24
 
6. by subjecting the book to endless cycles of signifier production and 
manic interpretation (i.e. ―signifying regimes‖)
25
 in a confused effort 
to authorize, as Deleuze says, the more ―perverse or depraved‖ 
critics/readers among us; and 
7. by stripping the book-body of its ―corporeality‖—to borrow a phrase 
from Massumi—through its repeated submission to various forms of 
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 In his book, The Task of the Critic, Sussman speaks to the emergence of a new (i.e., post-war) critical 
persona. The modern critic, he argues, challenges boundaries (disciplinary, institutional, even religious) by 
engaging in a kind of registerial ‗sleight-of-hand.‘ Sussman writes that ―the task of the critic has never been 
harder‖ (1), in that such a task involves the free-wheeling (though not indiscreet) synthesis of the various 
discourses and practices of, for example, the poet, philosopher, theologian, scholar, programmer (13, 23), 
city dweller or flaneur (66; also, 261, n.3), cultural watchdog (133), and so forth—whatever the occasion 
(or scene of writing, as Derrida says) calls for. The critic performs, enacts, transgresses, and does so in and 
through language and the tools of close reading. But when I speak of ―the task of the critic‖ in the first part 
of this dissertation, I concern myself not with any new task for the critic—though that will be the 
overarching concern of my later chapters, and the second part of this dissertation—but with a more 
traditional, anti-materialist agenda, and its reinforcement of what I view as an enduring Platonism. 
25
 Cf. pp. 10–11, above. 
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transcendence (or to what Deleuze in his book, Essays Critical and 
Clinical, refers to as ―the poisoned gift of Platonism‖). 
As I will demonstrate in the first part of the dissertation, each of these literary critical 
gestures, if you will, each in their own way, serves to contain or control the book‘s 
materiality, to block its becomings; in so doing, they point the way to a transcendent 
orientation at the heart of literary critical discourse. So, Part 1 of the dissertation takes a 
detailed inventory of these acts of dematerialization in literary criticism‘s treatment of 
the book—acts that have historically served to erect, renew, and ceaselessly reconfigure 
what Deleuze-Guattari, in What is Philosophy?, refer to as ―the plane of transcendence‖ 
(a concept to which I will turn in the first and second chapters). Part 2 of the dissertation, 
then, maps the coordinates of a more uniquely Deleuzean criticism—a form of criticism 
saddled, in part, with overcoming many of the biases within literary critical discourse, as 
a whole, that have both historically and institutionally impeded progress toward a more 
decidedly materialist engagement with the book. 
But let‘s look at this issue from another angle, beginning with a return to the 
question of literary critical discourse. 
Michel Foucault, in The Archaeology of Knowledge, defines discourse, in general, 
as ―[a] group of statements that belong to a single system of formation‖ (121). That is, a 
group of statements—or what Deleuze-Guattari call ―a collective assemblage of 
enunciation‖—that coexist or co-function ―with a domain of objects‖ (Archaeology 
120)—or what Deleuze-Guattari call ―a machinic assemblage of bodies‖—in and through 
some sort of relational field—or what Deleuze-Guattari call ―a plane of immanence.‖ Put 
another way, any given discourse (e.g., of education, of economics, of psychiatry, of 
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literary criticism) emerges or unfolds through the distribution, dispersion, and (fairly) 
regular reproduction of a finite group of statements—statements that derive their 
historically-situated meanings and values from certain ―rules of formation‖ (Archaeology 
42). So, in short, a discourse is the sum total of its visual and verbal semiotics, and also 
the limits that those semiotic coordinates impose on its user‘s capacity to see or perceive, 
to speak, to articulate, and to interpret. Within the wider field of discourse analysis—a 
field that owes much to the pioneering work of Foucault on these matters—the concept of 
―discourse‖ typically refers to any contextualized use of language in and through which 
(1) meanings are made and reinforced; (2) social actions and interactions unfold in 
largely regulated ways; and (3) social structures are forged, fortified, and ultimately, 
codified. So while in each and every act of literary criticism nothing less than the book, 
and related conceptions of the so-called ―task of the critic,‖ are on the table and tacitly 
negotiated, most within the critical community will (to some extent) conform to a certain 
―group of statements‖ that both regulate and confine the practices of the critic, let alone 
the expressive capacities of the book. My task, then, in Part 1, involves bringing that 
discursive programming into focus, so as to open the door, in Part 2, to what Greg Ulmer 
calls a kind of ―post-criticism.‖ 
The ubiquitous figure of the ―post-‖ in literary critical discourse—e.g., post-
structuralism, postmodernism, post-colonialism—draws attention, on the one hand, to 
some sort of discursive or historical past, and to a decisive separation from that past 
through any number of practical or theoretical displacements; on the other hand, the 
figure of the ―post‖ signals a turn, a new mapping, a new hope or freedom: in short, a 
look forward. The post, then, comes before and after, just as any (supposedly) new or 
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novel methodological development in the discourse of literary criticism requires a basic 
pledge, by critics, to think differently. By this I do not mean to imply—not at this point 
anyway—that, as critics, we need to think ―difference in itself,‖ or to think ―lines of 
continuous variation,‖ as Deleuze would say (issues to which we will turn in Part 2 of the 
dissertation). Instead, I simply wish to suggest that the turn toward a distinctly Deleuzean 
criticism (or to any other critical agenda, past or present) makes significant, yet 
nonetheless unavoidable, demands on critics in terms of their ability to ―think-
otherwise‖—to think-otherwise about the book, about themselves as critics, about their 
task, and about the nature of critical practices in general. So in order to shift one‘s focus 
to new critical trajectories, new mappings (of the book, etc.), critics must first distance 
themselves from some of the enduring literary critical conceits to which they may have 
unwittingly conformed. As Foucault says, there is ―negative work to be carried out first: 
we must rid ourselves of a whole mass of notions‖ (Archaeology 23). That is, criticism 
must rid itself of its various modes of transcendence, its logic of representation. To that 
end, critics must embark on a set of betrayals and falsifications—what Nietzsche calls 
―the great overcoming‖—so as to ultimately open themselves up to new practices, new 
ways of thinking, new potentials, new freedoms. So thinking-otherwise will put the critic 
on two conflicting yet interrelated paths, propelled (in both instances) by the paradoxical 
figure of the post. 
In fact, it is certainly not out of the question to situate Deleuze‘s work in that 
same twofold trajectory, that coincidental back-and-forth progression. That is, Deleuze is 
as much tied, for example, to the thought of difference and becoming, as he is to the idea 
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of ―a generalized anti-Hegelianism,‖
26
 an ―overturning of Platonism,‖
27
 and to what he 
and Guattari, in their final collaborative work, What is Philosophy?, refer to as ―the long 
history of an illusion‖ (47). This latter phrase—to which we will return in the first part of 
the dissertation—has a direct line to Nietzsche in Twilight of the Idols, who argues 
against what he calls ―the history of an error‖ (40) and ―the four great errors‖ (47). 
Nietzsche, in Ecce Homo, would also speak to the need to overcome ―the lies of the 
millennia‖ (783)—a negative critique, an overcoming, that would, in turn, serve his more 
positive philosophical interests such as ―the revaluation of all values‖ and ―self-
overcoming.‖ So Nietzsche—perhaps more than most—would decisively separate 
himself from his predecessors, from Kant, Hegel, and Schopenhauer, in particular; he 
would further separate himself 
1. from a dialectic conception of man, ―the abstract thought of 
contradiction‖ (Deleuze, Nietzsche 10)—i.e., the ―dialectical no‖ (9); 
2. from history, values, the will, the concept of truth, and all semblances 
of interiority; 
3. from grudges (i.e., ressentiment), bad conscience, guilt, the ascetic 
ideal; 
4. from morality and the thinking of the slave (or slave mentality); 
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 In Nietzsche and Philosophy, Deleuze would suggest that ―anti-Hegelianism runs through Nietzsche‘s 
work as its cutting edge‖ (8). Elsewhere, in his preface to Difference and Repetition, Deleuze would point 
to the more widespread modern repudiation ―of the identical and the negative, of identity and 
contradiction‖ (xix)—i.e., the repudiation of Hegelian dialectics and its associated logic of representation. 
Keith Ansell-Pearson argues that ―Deleuze invokes, as the peculiar spirit of his age, a generalized anti-
Hegelianism because for him it is Hegel who puts all the resources of mobile thought in the service of the 
sedentary, [thus] making good sense, for example, of the State or Christianity‖ (5). 
27
 This is the original title of an essay that Deleuze would later re-name ―Plato and the Simulacrum‖ and 
append—in revised form—to his work, The Logic of Sense. In the first part of this dissertation we will 
discuss Deleuze‘s engagement with Plato, at length, and his idea of what it means to ―overturn Platonism.‖ 
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5. from Socrates, Christ; also Christianity, Christian nihilism, the 
Christian priest and also the Judaic Priest. 
On and on. So much to leave behind in order to move forward. So much to renounce or 
denounce. So much to triumph over. One cannot help but recall Lyotard‘s denunciation 
of ―grand narratives‖—narratives that would certainly include the sort of hero narratives 
within which Nietzsche (or, more precisely, Nietzsche‘s Zarathustra) was mired. 
But is all this just a simple example of the idea that you‘ve got to go back before 
you can move forward? Or that we need to redress the past? 
My contention is that long-standing biases toward materialist conceptions of the 
book have opened the door to a long history of critical distortions within the discourse of 
literary criticism, those that have suppressed the book‘s capacity for difference (i.e., 
excess, variation, becoming) by locating an enduring Platonism at the heart of literary 
critical discourse. As a result, the wider discourse has been dominated (1) by the logic of 
representation (an issue to which I will return in Part 1 of the dissertation); (2) by the 
perpetuation of various structural, semiotic, and/or moral confinements of the book (i.e., 
various false unities); (3) by the assumption of the autonomous critical subject, pursuing 
a standardized critical agenda; and (4) by more contemporary efforts to coordinate critical 
practices around a (presumed) set of consensually-derived conversational constants. It is 
a history beholden to, and reinforced by, what I will call (following Deleuze-Guattari) a 
―transcendent orientation‖ to the book—where transcendence itself is erected and 
stabilized (in large part) by illusory claims to unity and uniformity that follow from the 
institutional (or what Deleuze-Guattari would call ―molar‖) application of standardized 
critical measures. In fact, I would argue (admittedly in somewhat polemical fashion) that 
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literary critical discourse is both defined and propelled by its transcendent orientation—
an orientation we find rooted in the Platonic dialogues—and the near-ceaseless renewals 
of those transcendences, right up through the present day. So to antiquity we turn in 
Chapter 1, before shifting the focus, in Chapter 2, to (again) the various renewals and 
reconfigurations of Plato‘s ―poisoned gift‖ in later developments of the discourse of 
literary criticism. 
Then, as suggested above, the second part of the dissertation will go on to map the 
coordinates of a Deleuzean (or, more generally, materialist) criticism—a criticism that 
distances itself from the plague of this enduring Platonism. That is, the focus, in Part 2, 
turns away from the various stratigraphic currents of literary critical discourse (discussed 
in Part 1), and toward the question of how literary critical practices might be grounded in 
what I call an immanentist orientation to the book. So, Part 2 examines how long-
standing impediments to machining the book are ultimately overcome by a criticism that 
mobilizes what I call (following the lead of Massumi and complexity science) the 
criticality of the book, or rather, the capacity of such to go critical. Left behind by this 
approach are the various modes of critical overlay that suppress the relational or 
transformational powers of the book. In Part 2, then, I will examine the productive role of 
the literary critic, and will attempt to find common ground (both theoretical and practical) 
between Maurice Blanchot‘s claim that ―criticism recovers itself…in the work as one of 
its essential moments‖ (―Preface‖ 5) and the more active, materialist interventions of the 
critic. 
Finally, in the epilogue to this dissertation, I posit the notion of critic as artisan—
an idea I derive from Deleuze-Guattari‘s discussion of the minor sciences in A Thousand 
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Plateaus, and in particular the authors‘ comments on the artisan (and the artisanal 
economies), therein. In this context, I ask the following questions: How might literary 
criticism be reconceived or reconstituted in light of its own minoritarian-becomings (a 
concept I will discuss in the epilogue)? What then becomes of what Deleuzean scholar 
Gregg Lambert calls the ―official or institutional language‖ (Who‘s Afraid 42) of literary 
criticism in literary critical circles where the more ―intensive way of reading‖ (that 
Deleuze proposes) begins to gain a strong foothold? And finally, how is the critic herself 
ultimately transformed when stripped of direct control over the operative movements of 
the critical? I will argue, in short, that a uniquely Deleuzean critical practice requires a 
new role for the critic, one where the critic gives up her official pretensions (vis-à-vis 
critical judgment) and her sense of control or ownership over the book, so as to pursue 
the path of the rude artisan, which ultimately involves working with (i.e., forcing) a 
certain set of materials—in this case, aesthetic and linguistic materials—just to see what 






The “Plan[e] of Transcendence,” The “Plan[e] of Organization” 
Perhaps there are two planes, or two ways of conceptualizing the plane. The plane can be a 
hidden principle, which makes visible what is seen and audible what is heard, etc., which at 
every instant causes the given to be given, in this or that state, at this or that moment. But the 
plane itself is not given. It is by nature hidden. It can only be inferred, induced, concluded 
from that to which it gives rise (simultaneously or successively, synchronically or 
diachronically). A plane of this type is as much a plan(e) of organization as of development: it 
is structural or genetic, and both at once, structure and genesis, the structural plan(e) of 
formed organizations with their developments, the genetic plan(e) of evolutionary 
developments with their organizations. 
—Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (A Thousand Plateaus, 265)  
In one aspect, the plane of transcendence is an image of the glory beyond…; in another, it is 
the identity grid coextensive with that image; in yet another, the medium that brings the 
image to light (the apparatus by means of which the identity grid is reapplied to and evaluates 
some of the bodies from which it was abstracted). The plane of transcendence, however, is 
best understood not in terms of the content of any particular image…but as the process 
presiding over the creation of a certain kind of image (general images: those constituting 
categories, identities, good/commonsensical ideas). 







“The Poisoned Gift of Platonism”— 
On the Dematerialization of the Book 
The poisoned gift of Platonism is to have introduced transcendence into philosophy, to have 
given transcendence a plausible philosophical meaning (the triumph of the judgement of 
God). 







The story of literary criticism—as chronicled in anthologies, and long narrated by 
literary critics—begins, almost routinely, in antiquity, with Plato‘s Republic, and the 
largely disparaging view of the imitative arts (e.g., poetry, drama, music, painting) therein 
contained. The irony has rarely been lost on philosophers and critics that Plato should be 
so notorious for mounting one of history‘s most searing indictments of the arts, and yet 
be such a great dramatist and literary stylist in his own right. Perhaps his own insight into 
the artist‘s psyche and the practices of the artist makes Plato more mindful than most of 
the remarkable power of art to mould minds and stir passions. Whatever the case, Plato 
would famously (some would say infamously) argue that if art were somehow 
misconstrued by the denizens of the republic, or if artists themselves were thought to 
present accurate depictions/imitations of reality, their work might ultimately do 
significant damage (psychological or otherwise) to the burgeoning republic at a 
vulnerable stage of its development. I will clarify Plato‘s position on these matters more 
fully below, but in brief let me say that according to Plato a republic needs an enduring 
set of standards with which to assess, and in turn pass judgement on, its various cultural 
products (among other things). Moreover, the poets, and those who interpret their work, 
need be properly schooled in the formal and unerring truth about the various objects, 
themes, issues, values, social roles, etc., depicted in their poetry—a schooling that, as one 
might imagine, most lack. So because the poets are deficient in the sort of rational or, at 
least, practical understanding of the worldly things that their work depicts, Plato would 
censure these individuals (1) for their flawed or mistaken imitations; (2) for their 
deceitful and often corrosive impersonations (or representations) of the gods; and (3) for 
their capacity to whip the most vulnerable citizens (e.g., children, the ill-informed or 
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naïve, and even the more inexperienced stewards of the State) into a psychological 
frenzy. Poetry, Plato argued, if not perceived rationally, and if not recognized for its 
capacity to charm or mystify the unsuspecting, can foster everything from moral 




 Given such concerns, Plato would call for the banishment of most all the poets, 
less those who compose hymns to the gods or praise great leadership—in other words, 
those who reinforce existing values (e.g., social, political, moral) in their work, or who 
attempt to represent the refined simplicity of the truly good man. Specifically, Plato held 
that the poets should (1) reproduce the simple and fixed meters and rhythms of an 
ordered and brave life, and (2) express a positive harmony between rhythm and 
language—and should do so in a way that not only mirrors, but reinforces, the social, 
psychological, and spiritual balances that a people need in order to prosper. And by 
maintaining those balances, the poets effectively utilize their art (and their artistry) to 
positively influence those who might otherwise be manipulated by the sort of transitory 
beliefs and opinions that for Plato are endemic to the imitative arts. 
 So Plato was the first (though in no way the last) to bring the social, moral, and 
didactic responsibilities of the poet into focus; he was also the first to argue that, ideally 
speaking, poets should operate as functionaries of the State, which means that their work 
should highlight a set of non-reactive, non-incendiary ideals, such as reasoned 
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 As we will see later in this chapter, concerns such as these persist in political and cultural discourse right 
up through the present day. A notable example of contemporary Platonism—one of many—is Alan 
Bloom‘s book, The Closing of the American Mind. Therein, Bloom laments the fact that modern American 
culture has been reduced to ―three great lyrical themes: sex, hate and a smarmy, hypocritical version of 
brotherly love. Such polluted sources issue in a muddy stream where only monsters can swim. A glance at 
the videos that project images on the wall of Plato‘s cave since MTV took it over suffices to prove 
this…Nothing noble, sublime, profound, delicate, tasteful or even decent can find a place in such tableaux. 
There is room only for the intense, changing, crude and immediate‖ (74). 
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moderation, optimism, poetic justice, and the like. Moreover, the poets ought to reinforce 
a society‘s prevailing systems of value, and should, in turn, excise the images of vicious, 
unrestrained, mean, and graceless characters from their work. Plato, then, was the first to 
forge a direct relationship between artistic devices—i.e., the mimetic activities of the 
artist—and the stability of the State. 
What I want to argue at this point is that Deleuze‘s phrase, ―the poisoned gift of 
Platonism‖—to which I refer in the title to this chapter
29
—does not so much refer (in the 
present context) to Plato‘s critique of the arts, but rather to the influence of Plato‘s 
metaphysics on what I would characterize as materialist conceptions of, and approaches 
to, poetry in the discourse of literary criticism.
30
 Which is to say that the supposed threat 
that the poets and their work pose to the republic—i.e., the threat of materiality—is the 
threat of unregulated (read: non-representational) lines of continuous variation (or 
ceaseless modulation); the threat of pure exteriority, without interior grounding or stable 
identity. It is the threat posed by pure potential (i.e., by the wild, the chaotic, the 
uncontrolled or uncontrollable). It is, moreover, the relativist threat that ―anyone can lay 
claim to anything‖—a point to which I will return below. In any case, Plato‘s desire to 
mitigate the materialist threat has habitually masked (or diverted attention away from) his 
underlying ―moral motivation in all its purity‖ (Deleuze, Difference 265). As Deleuze 
points out, this moral motivation involves (1) the introduction of transcendence into 
philosophy (and, more broadly speaking, into the history of ideas); and (2) the 
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 Admittedly, I use this phrase in a way slightly different from Deleuze, who is referring to the impact of 
Plato‘s poisoned gift—i.e., transcendence and ―the triumph of the judgement of God‖ (Essays 137)—on 
philosophy. I contend, though, that Platonic doctrine has made equally pernicious contributions to 
conceptions of poetry (or literature), and has done so through the same conceptual mechanisms (namely, 
transcendence and judgement). 
30
 Recalling the introduction to Part 1 of this dissertation, when I speak of the discourse of literary criticism 
in the pages that follow, I am referring to the patterned and often regulated ways of making meaning, and 
of performing the task of criticism in (largely) institutionalized settings. 
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assignment of a ―plausible philosophical meaning‖ to the concept of transcendence—i.e., 
―the triumph of the judgement of God.‖ In terms of the former, I would add that 
transcendence—or what I call the transcendent orientation—has not only permeated 
philosophy, but also various questions (or conceptions) of society, culture, the law, 
leadership, and, for our purposes, the literary critical acts of dematerialization that have 
traditionally informed conceptions of the book. In this chapter, and the chapter that 
follows, I will explore the historical role that the transcendent orientation to the book has 
played in propelling anti-materialist sensibilities in and through the discourse of literary 
criticism. For the moment, though, let me simply suggest that introducing transcendence 
(or the idea of such) into conceptions of the book involves—at minimum—the 
implementation of certain normative measures, certain standards and organizing 
principles, into literary critical discourse, those that not only forge a certain idea of the 
critic, but that regulate or coordinate critical encounters with the book (i.e., the way 
books are read, received, and represented by critics). 
So this chapter will explore, in detail, Plato‘s view of the arts, with a special 
emphasis on Plato‘s critique of the poets and their work, and his embryonic conceptions 
of the critic, as well, which I derive primarily from a close reading of the Ion, an early 
Platonic dialogue. As was suggested in the introduction to this dissertation, my objective 
in this first chapter is to map the semiotic coordinates of the transcendent orientation to 
literature, as they present themselves in and through Platonic doctrine. This, then, will set 
the stage for exploring, in the next chapter, how Plato‘s concept of transcendence—his 
―poisoned gift,‖ as it were—has since guided the literary critical enterprise, from 
Aristotle (Plato‘s student) through the twentieth-century. With regard to this last point, I 
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should add that my intention is not to offer an exhaustive recounting of the discourse of 
literary criticism in terms of its repeated appeals to transcendence, but to explore the 
broader trajectories of literary criticism‘s anti-materialist agenda and its consequences for 
conceptions of the book, the critic, and the perceived task of the critic, by drawing upon a 
number of pertinent historical examples from literary critical discourse. The first two 
chapters, then—Part 1 of the dissertation—provide the backdrop to Part 2, where my 
focus shifts from the transcendent orientation to literature to the question of how the 
Platonic orientation (vis-à-vis literature) can ultimately be overcome through a critical 
approach to literature (or the book) that, following Deleuze, I characterize as immanentist 
in nature, and that will mark the return to a more fully materialist engagement with the 
book. In any case, before turning to Plato‘s critique of the arts, we first need to consider 
the cultural and philosophical context in which the dialogues themselves took shape, that 
which contributes to Plato‘s ultimate denunciation of the poets and their work. On these 
issues, Gilles Deleuze offers a variety of important insights. 
Plato’s Athens 
Deleuze argues that ―what Plato criticizes in the Athenian democracy is the fact 
that anyone can lay claim to anything‖ (Essays 137). This means that anyone—excluding, 
of course, women, slaves, prisoners, and anyone else who might be marginalized, for 
whatever reason—can lay claim (or at least potentially so) to positions of power and 
authority within the Greek polis, and anyone can wield considerable influence on/over 
the people. More specifically, anyone (who maybe so inclined) can teach children or the 
uninitiated. Anyone can practice law, and potentially be in the position to pass judgement 
or mete out justice in some way. Anyone can put their intellectual or creative stamp on 
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the telling of history or on the writing of philosophy. Anyone wandering through the 
Greek marketplace can advance specific social or political ideals, can posit their own 
moral agendas, can speculate on questions important to the republic (e.g., truth, justice, 
love, moral action, good and evil). And to support or defend one‘s biases or opinions 
(doxa), anyone—or again, potentially anyone—can make use of the tools of rhetoric to 
render their arguments more persuasive or intellectually compelling. 
So ―Platonism appears,‖ according to Deleuze, ―as a selective doctrine‖ (Essays 
136), that which ―restore[s] criteria of selection‖ (137) to everything from public debate, 
to the vetting of public officials (e.g., leaders, teachers, etc.), to philosophy, and to 
wherever specific assessments or appraisals of one sort or another—e.g., cultural, 
political, legal—that may be required to arbitrate competing claims. Put another way, 
Platonism concerns itself with erecting precise measures for ―judging the well-
foundedness or legitimacy‖ (136) of individual claims to, say, governance, knowledge, 
the truth, or what have you. Moreover, Socrates—the main character and enduring voice 
of reason in Plato‘s dialogues—does more than make specific judgements about those 
claims; he also makes judgements, tacit or otherwise, about the claimants, themselves—
those who Deleuze variously refers to as ―pretenders‖ (Logic 257),
31
 ―imitators‖ (258), 
―suitors‖ (254), and ―rivals‖ (Essays 136), for reasons that will become clear in a 
moment. In Republic, and really throughout the Platonic dialogues, Socrates assumes a 
kind of administerial role, that of ―philosopher-arbiter‖ (Lambert, Non-philosophy 28), in 
his dealings with citizens, strangers, and the rhetorically-savvy Sophists (e.g., lawyers, 
teachers, statesmen) who frequent the Athenian marketplace. Platonism, as Deleuze 
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 The text cited here is drawn from an essay entitled, ―Plato and the Simulacrum‖—a revised version of an 
earlier essay (―Overturning Platonism‖). The newer version of the essay then was appended to the English 
translation of Deleuze‘s book, The Logic of Sense. 
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writes, ―confronts sophism as its enemy,‖ and adds that because the Sophists ―lay claim 
to anything and everything, there is the great risk that [they] will scramble the [e.g., 
procedures of] selection and pervert the [e.g., tools of] judgement‖ (Essays 136). 
So to alleviate those risks, Plato posits the need for enduring standards through 
which to make selections among claimants, and pass rational judgement on their claims. 
In general, such standards derive from one‘s recollection of, and/or rational scrutiny into, 
intelligible Ideas, i.e., the pure form of things, instantiated in particulars.
32
 Deleuze also 
suggests that Plato‘s ―installation of the mythic circle‖ (Difference 66) similarly offers 
the ―philosopher-arbiter‖ (or the process of arbitration, itself) a set of standardized 
measures and organizing principles with which to assess particular claims to the truth. 
Greek myth, according to Deleuze, not only expresses (or provides demonstrations of), 
say, timeless ideals, values, organizing principles, etc., but becomes the very ground upon 
which those aforementioned claims are situated and formally assessed or evaluated. In 
discussing the authoritative role of myth in the Platonic dialogues, Deleuze argues, 
Myth, with its always circular structure, is indeed the story of a 
foundation. It permits the construction of a model according to which the 
different aspirants can be judged. What needs a foundation, in fact, is 
always a pretension or a claim. It is the claimant who appeals to a 
foundation, whose claim may be judged well-founded, ill-founded, or 
unfounded. (Logic 255; trans. modified) 
Myth, in other words, illuminates the human condition and provides a narrative means of 
moral instruction; myth also becomes a kind of heuristic for screening, dividing up, and 
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 In the Meno, Socrates argues that ―what we call learning is only a process of recollection‖ (sec. 81), 
meaning that we are only able to learn (or know) what the soul already possesses, i.e., an essential 
knowledge of things, or of basic truths, derived neither from sensation nor mere opinion. 
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deciding among individual claims to the truth. So, for example, by telling the stories of 
good and heroic men (e.g., overcoming obstacles, deciphering oracles); by depicting acts 
of wisdom and virtue; by offering up images of, say, justice (or the truly just man), and so 
forth, myth—not dramatic poetry, not art—provides models, and hence a set of enduring 
standards with which to measure the relative strengths and weaknesses of individual 
claimants, and thus to judge the well-foundedness of their claims. More to the point, 
myth implicates or captures individual claimants (and their claims) in an over-arching 
system of judgement, given that for Plato, all are measured by the quality of their 
pretensions (or better, their claims), which, in turn, situates those individual claims in 
pre-existing hierarchies (social, political, etc.) and pre-existing systems of value. So the 
aspirants‘ claims are judged on a sliding scale, somewhere between valid and invalid, 
pure and impure, true and false, laudable and wicked, authentic and inauthentic, etc., as 
each in their own way—each claim, each claimant—is measured in relation to the sort of 
ideals retrieved through memory (and/or rational inquiry) or exemplified in myth. 
According to Plato, the burgeoning republic must people itself with aspirants and 
contenders, with wannabes, those who allow themselves (their beliefs, their claims, etc.) 
to not only be read through the lens of those aforementioned ideals—which, by the way, 
all claimants aspire to, though necessarily fall short of—but to be tied to derivative social 
identities (e.g., claimant, rival), as well, which in turn implicates them in what Deleuze 
calls ―lineages‖ (Logic 254) or ―lines of descent‖ (Difference 60), through the democratic 
process of ―elective participation‖ (61). For his part, Socrates, through a methodological 
procedure that appeals to various fixed principles and enduring standards, again derived 
through myth, judges the degree of legitimacy that ought to be accorded individual 
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conceptions of, and/or claims related to, say, the good (or the good life), leadership (and 
effective governance), justice, beauty, and other ideals, and then hierarchically positions 
those claims, and the claimants who advance them, accordingly. For Plato, all claims are 
necessarily limited copies or reproductions of abstract universals; sensible copies of those 
standards become increasingly less authentic or less pure, as a matter of degree, than the 
models from which they derive, and to which they conform. So Platonic doctrine 
concerns itself—at least superficially—with sorting out the differences between second-
hand (third-hand, etc.) versions of those universal forms, and with ranking and organizing 
copies according to their greater or lesser claims to the truth. For Plato, the method of 
arbitration that forges those gradations plays a vital role in bringing order and 
organization to a still tentative democracy beset, he believes, by the sort of relativist 
leanings that, as Deleuze contends, enable anyone to ―lay claim to anything.‖
33
 
The Republic, then, depicts a society in its becoming—i.e., in its acts of self-
differentiation; in its crossing of thresholds and breaking with extant traditions; in its 
social, political, and intellectual unfolding—a society wherein debates or discursive 
battles repeatedly crop up over key concepts and questions deemed relevant to the 
Athenians of antiquity. As well, the dialogues depict a philosophical cohort who come 
together as rivals, from all walks of life: what links yet creates divisions among them are 
their combative sensibilities. In fact, the same sort of situational agons depicted in the 
dialogues, between rival or adversarial philosophers making formal pronouncements on 
any number of matters, Deleuze sees ―exercised in diverse domains [across Athenian 
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 Parenthetically, this form of arbitration distinguishes Plato‘s dialectical methods from those concerned 
with forging, say, genus/species distinctions (Aristotle), or with the representation of contradictions and 
contrarieties (Hegel). That is, Plato concerns himself not with representation, in whatever form, but with 
making informed decisions about where individual claims stand in relation to the One, so as to distinguish 
between ―pure and impure, good and bad, authentic and inauthentic‖ (Deleuze, Difference 60) 
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society]: love, athletics, politics, the magistratures‖ (Essays 136). To this list, one might 
add the various battles or contests that take place between dramatists competing for 
artistic supremacy in the Dionysian festivals, and between gods and humans vying for 
power in Greek myth. In fact, the Platonic dialogues (or Platonic doctrine itself) cannot 
be adequately understood independent of the culture of contest and competition, wherein 
those dialogues took shape. Plato, in fact, would seek to foster that cultural proclivity in 
an effort to bring the nascent democracy to fruition in a way that authenticates its winners 
and exposes its losers. So, in short, ―the totality of the Platonic motivation…has to do 
with selecting among claimants‖ (Deleuze, Logic 257; trans. modified), and then situating 
those claimants in structured and hierarchically-ordered lineages. 
So let me sum up the picture thus far. Ideals depicted in Greek myth (and 
rationally recalled) provide necessary ―criteria‖ (Deleuze, Difference 62) for making 
selections among individual claimants (and their claims) by not only laying the 
foundation—or what Deleuze calls ―the ground‖—for an enduring set of standards to be 
revealed, but also by allowing rival claimants ―to participate in greater or lesser degree in 
the object of the claim[s],‖ themselves. So, on the one hand, the ground is always ideal, 
always ―first place‖ (61), in the sense that ―Justice alone is Just…[but as] for those whom 
we call the just, they possess the quality of being just in second, third, or fourth place…or 
[even] in simulacral fashion‖ (62)—a point to which we will return in a moment. In 
Platonic doctrine, as suggested above, those who possess the quality of, for example, 
being just, no matter where they might stand in relation to the ideal form of Justice, can 
never be more than claimants or aspirants themselves.
34
 But again, the primary function 
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 Socrates notwithstanding. That is, for Plato, Socrates would set the standard for the ―philosopher king,‖ 
and much like Christ—the ―king of kings‖—Socrates was persecuted and ultimately put to death for his 
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of the ground—which in our example is the ideal form of Justice—is ―to allow 
participation,‖ or better, to actually further the process of ―elective participation‖ (61). 
The participating claimant, then, in making a claim (to whatever), invokes or ―calls for a 
ground‖ (62), at which point ―the claim must be grounded (or denounced as groundless).‖ 
So, in short, while the ground authorizes both claim and claimant, they then reinforce the 
ground through a process of reciprocal determination. 
Plato‘s impetus here is threefold. We have already encountered his first two 
objectives: (1) he wishes to set standards by which to judge claimants and their claims in 
a society where ―anyone can lay claim to anything‖; and (2) he wishes to forge lines of 
descent, whereby claimants (and again their claims) are hierarchically situated within 
those lines through an elective mode of participation. But Plato‘s third and final objective 
here is to suppress every last trace of simulacra in the republic. Deleuze argues that 
―Platonism as a whole is erected on the basis of this wish to hunt down the phantasms or 
simulacra which are identified with the Sophist himself, that devil, that insinuator or 
simulator, that always disguised or displaced false claimant‖ (Difference 127; trans. 
modified); he adds elsewhere that the ―Platonic wish to exorcise simulacra…entails the 
subjection of difference‖ (Logic 265) through ―the exclusion of the eccentric and the 
divergent, in the name of a superior finality‖ (260). What this effectively means is that 
through the history of ideas, positive difference (read: that which escapes, diverges, 
exceeds; or rather, that which cannot be contained, and in no way models itself on a pre-
                                                                                                                                                                             
beliefs. But the point here is that Plato becomes more than a student of Socrates and instead one of his 
apostles, disseminating his prophetic message, his rational faith. For Plato, Socrates is the living 
embodiment of ―the just‖ or ―the beautiful.‖ He, in other words, does not so much have pretentions of 
justice, but is the form of the just made flesh. And he, unlike the artist, is not divinely inspired, but again, 
like Christ, the actual incarnation and expression of the divine itself.  
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existing idea or ideal) has consistently been viewed as a kind of monstrosity, even an 
―evil‖ (Difference 29), owing in large part to the enduring influence of Platonic doctrine. 
In Deleuze‘s reading of Plato, the simulacrum is the mark of pure difference; it is 
an inherently false copy, that which differs in kind (not degree) from the true claim (i.e., 
the copy), which as we know is modeled on the pure idea. So simulacra are not copies of 
copies, not lesser copies; they neither conform to, nor measure up to, an original. As true 
dissemblers they will neither promote (nor outwardly revel in) their lack of conformity. 
They are not simply iconoclastic in that way. Instead, they will maintain their purely 
superficial, imagistic reproductions of worldly things (e.g., the poet will falsely render, 
say, the actions of a General, the ideals of Justice and Beauty, etc.), while following an 
independent and inauthentic trajectory of their own. These acts of dissimulation are then 
what make the unfounded pretensions of the simulacrum so dangerous: 
Plato distinguishes, and even opposes, models and copies [but does so] in 
order to obtain a selective criterion with which to separate copies and 
simulacra, the former founded upon their relation to the model while the 
latter are disqualified because they fail both the test of the copy and the 
requirements of the model‖ (Logic 264–65; my emphasis). 
So simulacra—coded in Platonic doctrine as ‗poetry‘ (or any other imitative art form), 
but also coded historically as, for example, ‗woman,‘ ‗writing,‘ ‗body,‘ ‗matter,‘ etc.—
are essentially false or inaccurate images without a fixed resemblance to any foundational 
form, or without prior identity. For Plato, ―copies are secondary possessors…[potentially] 
well-founded claims, guaranteed by resemblance; simulacra [however] are like false 
claims, built upon a dissimilarity, implying an essential perversion or a deviation‖ (256; 
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trans. modified). The simulacrum, then, needs to be exposed, according to Plato, for its 
inherent deviancy, its ―essential perversion,‖ and its potentially corrosive psychological 
effects on the uninitiated. It needs to be confronted in instances where its dissimulations 
are either unrecognized or unknown, and most certainly in instances where the falsities it 
promotes are taken to be true and just images of the truth, despite its independence from 
any a priori standard or ideal. This is precisely what Plato fears could happen if artists 
and their work were allowed to flourish in the republic. So simulacra need be mediated, 
domesticated, controlled, if not excised altogether from the republic. In Difference and 
Repetition, Deleuze writes, ―It is true that Platonism already represents the subordination 
of difference to the powers of the One, the Analogous, the Similar, and even the 
Negative. It is like an animal in the process of being tamed‖ (59). Put simply, 
subordinating the play and affirmation of pure difference to the One, the Analogous, 
etc.—or by installing that difference in specific lineages or lines of descent—contains 
that difference, subjects it to, and measures it by, a set of pre-existing standards, models, 
universals, laws, values, codes, principles, axioms, hierarchical orders, or what have you, 
―in order to render it [i.e., difference] both liveable and thinkable‖ (30). This process of 
taming difference, or, in particular, the materiality of the book—as we will see in the next 
chapter—is a historical driver of the discourse of literary criticism. 
Plato, in any case, betrays his ultimate motivation (i.e., taming difference) in the 
dialogues through the legitimate role he assigns the copy—or rather, the entire model-
copy dyad—in the dialectical processes of division and selection. Deleuze argues, 
The model-copy distinction is there only in order to found and apply the 
copy-simulacra distinction, since the copies are selected, justified and 
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saved in the name of the identity of the model and owing to their internal 
resemblance to this ideal model. The function of the notion of the model is 
not to oppose the world of images in its entirety but to select the good 
images, the icons which resemble from within, and eliminate the bad 
images or simulacra. (Difference 127) 
Plato‘s emphasis on the ―well-founded‖ copy, ―guaranteed by resemblance,‖ can be read 
as an essential rebuke of that which cannot be modeled on transcendent ideals, or of that 
which eschews resemblance—in short, simulacra (i.e., false copies, false claims). 
According to Deleuze, ―[w]hat is condemned in the figure of the simulacra is the state of 
free oceanic differences, of nomadic distributions and crowned anarchy, along with all 
that malice which challenges both the notion of the model and that of the copy‖ (265), 
and this is precisely what underscores (if not propels) Plato‘s moral agenda, as discussed 
above. So, subordinating simulacra, and hence the play of ―free oceanic differences‖ and 
―crowned anarchy,‖ not only involves the crucifixion of emerging and positive 
difference, but the basic denial of materiality, itself—an issue to which we now turn. 
Platonism judges (and/or comes to know) a material world, a world of particulars, 
through the quality of that world‘s various claims to certain immaterial standards, ideals, 
or principles. Hence, Platonic doctrine takes aim at the legitimacy of things that do not—
for whatever reason—conform or somehow measure up to those higher ideals. In other 
words, Plato targets the simulacrum (read: ―false copy‖) (1) for its circumvention of the 
dialectics of division/selection (and also that of model/copy, general/particular); (2) for 
its eschewal of any grounded (or grounding) identity and/or stable reference; and (3) for 
its lack of resemblance to a given form (or formal truth). The materialist‘s charge, then, 
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against Plato, is that the attribution of resemblance strips that world of particulars of its 
corporeality (or of what I will call its material substrate), and hence its own expressive 
traits and powers of self-organization. Resemblance, in other words, flattens difference—
that is, it reduces things (like books) to the various features or functions they have in 
common with other similarly categorized or classified things, which in turn binds those 
things (perhaps inextricably) to specific lineages or lines of descent. So while few would 
deny that two books might resemble one another—at least in some respects—or share 
certain features/functions in common, the simple attribution or demarcation of those 
resemblances (authorial, generic, structural, narratorial, what have you) ultimately 
suppresses or restricts the power of the book to become-other, to enter into new material-
semiotic arrangements, to express itself anew, to renew or reinvent itself. Put another 
way, any and all marks of interior resemblance work to contain and control the book, to 
limit its potential or untapped capacities, i.e., its difference. Resemblance imposes an 
identity and a set of values on the book from which the book, then, struggles to extricate 
itself. Comparatively, the simulacrum sidesteps those marks of resemblance and the 
various ancestral bonds (i.e., lines of descent) that such resemblances give rise to. The 
simulacrum interiorizes dissimilarity or difference, rather than commonality, and as a 
result does not receive its force externally, from some sort of stable (or stabilizing) 
authority, some sort of transcendent value. 
If nothing else, then, the simulacrum confounds the idealism at the heart of 
Platonic doctrine because it affirms a material and productive power, a power of non-
identity, of chaotic discord, and of independent and exterior (i.e., not interior) relation. 
Moreover, the simulacrum falsifies or undermines the competitive spirit at the heart of 
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ancient Athens, i.e., the sort of aspirations that drive competitions, that separate winners 
from losers, and that propel the idea of the ―good copy.‖ The simulacrum undermines 
such hierarchies in its basic eschewal of resemblance; it defames the dialectics of copy-
making, and even the whole model-copy dyad. This, as Deleuze says—following 
Nietzsche—is the power of the false (Logic 263), a falsification of the copy, icon, or idol; 
the simulacrum ―overturns representation and destroys the icons‖ (265; trans. modified). 
It escapes all external or abstract grounds, all marks of subordination, all appeals to the 
One or the analogous. This is the ―twilight of the idols.‖ The simulacrum, for its part, has 
its own integrity, its own ground, beyond any supposed referent. It is its own positive or 
productive power, its own doing or affirmation, its own affective force: ―a joyful and 
positive event…an unfounding‖ (263). And while the simulacrum does aspire to things, 
or better, to copy things (cf. p. 55, above), it does so ―underhandedly, under cover of an 
aggression, an insinuation, a subversion‖ (257); this, in turn, creates problems for ―the 
domain of representation filled by copies-icons, [which are] defined not by extrinsic 
relation to an object, but by an intrinsic relation to the model or foundation‖ (259). 
So, in short, the simulacrum is an ―aggression.‖ It falsifies and ruptures. It 
subverts. It destroys and overturns. It induces ―vertigo‖ (Logic 262), as Deleuze contends, 
and is propelled by a kind of intoxication—―a Dionysian machine‖ (263). Its determining 
features are its non-iconic status and essential non-resemblance. Also, its eschewal of 
formal order. Its ―demonic character‖ (258)—complete with its own set of falsities (or 
falsifications), its own forms of dissemblance, its own fallen nature. The simulacrum, as 
we know, never possesses (ideals, etc.) in a secondary or more subordinate way. Rather, 
it enters into its own primary relations, and thereby produces concrete, material effects 
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(or what Deleuze-Guattari call desires)
35
 in other bodies. And because the simulacrum is 
not simply imitative, but rather locates itself ―outside knowledge [i.e., the good copy] and 
[right] opinion,‖ Plato—in an obvious attempt to render inert or inactive the innately 
―rebellious‖ character of the simulacrum, or better yet, to stave off its ―becoming-mad‖ 
or ―becoming unlimited‖—tries ―to repress it as deeply as possible, to shut it up in a 
cavern at the bottom of the Ocean‖ (259). But can the simulacrum ever be repressed or 
closed off in this way? Can it be decisively barricaded? Deleuze would say no, if for no 
other reason than ―the simulacrum implies huge dimensions, depths, and distances that 
the observer cannot master‖ (258). So when it ultimately ―breaks its chains and rises to 
the surface‖ (261) and, like man, ―forsake[s its] moral existence in order to move into 
aesthetic existence‖ (257), the simulacrum asserts its power through its limitless capacity 
to force movement in other bodies, to induce transformations, to affect (and be affected). 
While the simulacrum, then, may be experienced or encountered as a set of 
unregulated material forces, it can never be grasped in totality, except mistakenly through 
various representational controls, or, through the illusory ―impression of resemblance‖ 
(Deleuze, Logic 258). On this point, Deleuze concludes ―the aim of Platonism…[is] to 
bring about the triumph of icons over simulacra‖ (259)—a ―triumph‖ that involves 
(1) assigning regularity and uniformity to infinite movement; 
(2) imposing form on/over matter;36 
(3) forging equalities or resemblances (i.e., demarcating similarities); 
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 Bonta and Protevi define Deleuze-Guattari‘s concept of ―desire‖ as ―the material process of connection, 
registration and enjoyment of flows of matter and energy coursing through bodies in networks of 
production in all registers, be they geologic, organic, or social‖ (76). More on this in Part 2. 
36
 Through the process of ―hylomorphism‖—a process that Deleuze-Guattari discuss in A Thousand 
Plateaus, and to which we will return in the next chapter. My argument, in brief, will be that the discourse 
of literary criticism has a long and varied history with the hylomorphic model. 
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(4) setting limits on the expressive capacities (or potential) of simulacra. 
Continued efforts to contain simulacra in any or all of these ways reflect the normalizing 
powers of a pervasive and wide-ranging ―State apparatus‖ (Deleuze-Guattari, Plateaus 
245). So Platonic doctrine, in short, ―is a question of assuring the triumph of the copies 
over simulacra, of repressing simulacra, keeping them completely submerged, preventing 
them from climbing to the surface and ‗insinuating themselves‘ everywhere‖ (Logic 257). 
Plato‘s more widespread agenda in this area will eventually come to envelop questions of 
the book, as he sets his sights on a more specific foe in the figure of the poet. So on this 
point our focus now shifts to Plato‘s critique of the arts. 
 “An Ancient Quarrel” 
In Republic, Plato points to a quarrel—what he, in fact, deems an ―ancient 
quarrel‖ (X.607b)—between philosophy and poetry, or rather, between philosophers and 
those who would champion the cause of poetry (e.g., poets, critics, the ―rhapsodes‖).
37
 
Though Plato fails to outline this acrimonious history in any great detail,
38
 he bases his 
own quarrel with poetry, first, on ontological grounds; second, on epistemological 
grounds; and third, on psychological grounds. We will deal with each in turn. In brief, 
Plato‘s ontological argument holds that poetry, as a copy of a copy of the eternal forms, 
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 We will consider the figure of the rhapsode in our discussion of the Ion later in this chapter. In brief, 
rhapsodes were professional performers of Epic poetry in Ancient Greece. 
38
 Plato writes that this quarrel ―is proven by phrases like ‗the dog yelping at its master‘…and ‗great in the 
empty talk of fools‘ and ‗the crowd of over-wise heads‘ or ‗subtle thinkers‘…and innumerable other signs 
of the old opposition between them‖ (X.607b–c). These phrases provide little insight for the modern reader 
into this ancient quarrel. In a footnote to this cryptic passage, translator G. M. A. Grube writes that Plato 
―presumably‖ derived these phrases ―from poetry, but their sources are unknown‖ (251, n.14). Elsewhere, 
in his introduction to Aristotle‘s Poetics, Grube claims that, like Plato, Xenophanes and Heraclitus 
―violently attacked Homer [and Hesiod] for telling immoral and untrue stories about the gods‖ (ix).  
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resides ―at three removes from nature‖ (X.597b),
39
 that is, three removes from the pure, 
self-same (or transcendent) source from which all material (or otherwise worldly) things 
derive, and against which all things are measured and formally judged. The poets, 
though, draw almost exclusively on what they see or hear about a given object or a 
specific virtue for their knowledge of such things. But for Plato the senses remain a 
notoriously unreliable gauge of the truth, as compared to the knowledge one acquires 
through practical know-how, or better, through recollection (cf. note 5, above). By 
deriving one‘s knowledge of objects/things in the world through the mere sensual 
apprehension of diluted copies—i.e., particular instances of more general or ideal 
forms—and not a reasoned appeal to the actual forms themselves, the poet has little 
recourse but to simply mirror or imitate those secondary copies. For Plato, imitation (or 
mimesis) will only compromise the originary truth and, as suggested above, divert the 
attention away from both the aspirations of the copy (i.e., to measure up) and the formal 
conventions of copy-making. In any case, because the poets lack either a practical or 
rational orientation toward that which they copy, the ultimate value of their poetry to the 
republic as a source of knowledge, a tool of moral instruction, or a purveyor of the truth, 
comes directly into question, which points the way to the second phase of Plato‘s dispute 
with the arts, his epistemological argument. 
While in dialogue with one of his marketplace disciples, Glaucon, Socrates takes 
pains to acknowledge his appreciation for Homer, whom he deems the greatest of all 
tragedians. Yet Socrates cannot accept the legitimacy of any poet, including Homer, who, 
because of his indirect or third-hand contact with the truth, lacks not only ―worthwhile 
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 Plato uses the phrase ‗at three removes from nature‘ because ―the Greeks always counted the first as well 
as the last number of a series‖ (Grube, 234, n.9). Plato puts the matter as follows: there are ―one genuine 
and two bastard pleasures‖ (IX.587c). 
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knowledge of his subject‖ (X.602b), but also ―right opinion about the beauty or quality of 
the things he imitates‖ (X.602a). In other words, given poetry‘s degraded ontological 
status, as discussed above, it follows that any knowledge or practical insight into, say, 
questions of virtue or human nature that the poem itself provides must also be considered 
degraded or corrupt, and thus summarily dismissed for the possible distortions and moral 
equivocations that it propagates. As Plato writes, ―the maker of the image, we say, knows 
nothing of the reality; he only knows appearance‖ (X.601b–c). So by travelling in that 
realm of appearances, the poet cannot help but advance faulty or incomplete renderings 
of the truth, which prompts Plato‘s well-known contention that a defenceless and 
inexperienced citizenry—which includes the more naïve stewards of that citizenry 
(III.387c)—are put at substantial psychological risk through their exposure to poetic lies 
and half-truths, or better, through their exposure to the sorts of poetic imitation and 
impersonation (i.e., mimesis) that pale in comparison (in terms of their value, their use, 
the knowledge they offer, etc.) to the more authentic and rational claims to the truth 
pursued by historians and philosophers. This, then, sets the stage for the final prong of 
Plato‘s threefold attack on the arts, his psychological argument. 
According to Plato, poetry (just like all the imitative arts) is problematic for Greek 
society not just because it firmly situates itself in the mutable world of appearances 
(rather than the immutable and transcendent realm of the forms) but because it demands a 
so-called willing suspension of disbelief from its audience. That is, because poets want 
their audiences to forge deep-seated emotional or psychological attachments to the 
imaginative universes they create, they want those audiences to ignore the fictive and 
constructed nature of art; and, on this point, audiences may be all-too-ready to oblige. 
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Why? Because of what Socrates refers to as ―the natural charm of poetry‖ (X.601b), that 
which manifests itself at the level of words, phrasing, meter, tune—in the more material 
(though admittedly, still regulatory or structured) elements of the poem. Socrates argues, 
though he knows nothing except how to imitate, [the poet] gives colour to 
certain crafts with words and phrases so that others without knowledge, 
who judge by the words, believe that anything said with meter, rhythm, 
and tune, be it on cobbling or Generalship or anything else whatever, is 
right—so great is the natural charm of poetry. (X.601a–b) 
So while the otherwise unsuspecting audience may be ready to believe whatever the artist 
asserts or puts forward, Plato fears that the poets and their poetry are then free to spread 
various forms of confusion or misprision—e.g., about the gods, about the true nature of 
humans—throughout the republic, and do so (1) with little or no concern for accurately 
representing those things in ways that either the philosophers or historians would deem 
truthful, and (2) without censure or criticism for disseminating such inaccuracies. 
So, in short, poetry seduces; it deceives. While poets produce inferior truths and 
promote distorted virtues, even worse, they actively foster the illusion that such 
distortions retain their connection to the real world, to real virtues, which thereby 
persuades a less critical or less knowledgeable audience to embrace such illusions, as if 
they were real. The result, then, for Plato, is that poetry corrupts the minds of the 
uninitiated, and it defiles the republic in its embryonic and hence most vulnerable state: 
―If you admit the Muse of sweet pleasure, whether in lyrics or epic, pleasure and pain 
will rule as monarchs in your city, instead of the law and that rational principle which is 
always and by all thought to be the best‖ (X.607a). For Plato, poetry appeals to the body, 
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to one‘s emotions, passions, base appetites and desires; it appeals to the material self 
rather than one‘s higher, more virtuous self, or one‘s innate sense of reason. Poets, then, 
have the ability to disturb or psychologically damage the layperson, precisely because 
their poems compromise one‘s capacity for rational and informed thought. 
This concludes Plato‘s multi-pronged attack on the poets and their poetry. It is 
worth recalling that Socrates, at several points in the dialogues, freely acknowledges the 
greatness of Homer,
40
 but such acknowledgements in no way alter the fact that the poets 
―lay claim to anything‖; and the resulting impact (social, psychological, or otherwise) of 
doing so distorts or undermines everything from the rational appeal to the truth, to the 
defence (if not the guarantee) of specific values and/or social norms, to the very stability 
of the republic. Accordingly, Platonic doctrine assaults the poet‘s legitimacy and exposes 
the seductive lure of the poem. So threatening, in fact, are the poets and their work that 
Socrates, in Republic, makes the following decree: 
[If] a man who in his cleverness can become many persons and imitate all 
things should arrive in our city and want to give a performance of his 
poems, we should bow down before him as being holy, wondrous, and 
sweet, but we should tell him that there is no such man in our city and that 
it is not lawful that there should be. We would pour myrrh on his head and 
crown him with wreaths, and send him away to another city. (III.398c) 
But despite the fact that Plato lets his position on the arts—which as I will show envelops 
not only his conception of poetry, but his literary critical position as well—be dictated by 
both his political and epistemological concerns, he will admit, as suggested above, the 
                                                          
40




sort of poet who appeals to the higher self, who sings hymns to the gods (X.607a), who 
celebrates marriage (V.460a), who praises heroic men and preserves values: ―We 
ourselves would employ a more austere and pleasure-giving poet and story-teller for our 
own good, one who would imitate the speech of a good man‖ (III.398a–b). Plato also 
draws a distinction between mimetic and narrative poetry, between poets who imitate the 
vices or moral failings of, for example, a psychologically disturbed character and those 
who simply report what a given character says or does, while retaining their own separate 
identity as narrators of the action (III.396e). Plato is clearly concerned with the former, 
with those forms of poetry (or drama) that ―[remove] the distance of personal judgment‖ 
(Asmis 348), and do so by putting words in the mouths of Gods and men. But underlying 
Plato‘s concerns about mimetic poetry is not simply the contribution of such to moral 
equivocation in the republic, or the danger posed by pleasure-giving forms of poetry 
judged without reference (say) to an ideal beauty, but the enduring threat of the 
simulacrum (i.e., false copy or semblance)—and, by extension, the sophistry—which 
remains the greatest threat to good judgment and stable authority in the republic. In 
Plato‘s ―poetic ontology,‖ a poem ―is essentially a moral rather than a linguistic 
construct; [and] formulated in language, it is realized by being imprinted in the soul of 
another‖ (345–6). So Plato subordinates (linguistic) matter to (moral) form; in so doing, 
he subordinates what I will call—in line with the complexity sciences—the self-
organizing capacities of language to vary, to elaborate or develop itself, to escape its own 
forms of homogeneity and/or equilibrium, to induce sensation in other living bodies, and 
so forth: ―In Plato‘s general aesthetics, the whole sensory environment is an image, or 
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‗iconic‘ symbol, of moral goodness or badness‖ (349), and so his aesthetics becomes an 
essential contributor to his wider anti-materialist agenda. 
That artists and their work must be judged worthy, or that they ought to serve a 
greater good—whether that good be social, political, psychological, pedagogical, moral, 
or spiritual—remains one of the most enduring legacies of Platonism in the discourse of 
literary criticism. Friedrich Nietzsche, in The Birth of Tragedy, posits a decisive shift in 
Greek conceptions of tragedy, where Dionysian principles associated with Aeschylean 
tragedy—e.g., the joy of suffering, transcendental justice, individual annihilation—give 
way to the Apollonian dictates of Socratic rationalism—e.g., optimism, poetic justice, the 
desire to conform to universal truths, and the use of art for moral instruction.
41
 So with 
the rise of Socratic rationalism, and with the related notion, discussed at length in 
Republic (and elsewhere), that the poets and their work suffer from an inherent crisis of 
legitimacy—that which Plato attributes to poetry‘s distortions of reality (i.e., the One, the 
truth, etc.), and the inability of most poets to accurately reflect and reinforce existing 
values—comes a variety of long-held convictions among literary critics that, for example, 
literature should conform to certain standards, that it should elevate, rather than unsettle, 
a society, and that it should, as Sir Philip Sidney held, both ―teacheth and moveth to 
virtue‖ (348). We will return to these matters in the next chapter. At this point, though, 
we might profitably turn our attention to Plato‘s Ion, a dialogue that provides a good 
many of the semiotic coordinates for the modern literary critic—a term I use with some 
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 According to Nietzsche, Wagnerian opera would mark the end of this trajectory, but only a few years 
after making this pronouncement, Nietzsche would renounce this position in his storied break with 
Wagner—a break precipitated by Wagner‘s turn toward Christianity and enduring anti-Semitic sensibilities, 





—and that formally sets in motion the anti-materialist bias that will come to 
dominate literary critical discourse. 
Plato’s Ion—Occupying the Middle Ground 
Socrates: ―I really do want to hear you, but not before you answer me this…‖ 
—Plato (Ion sec. 536) 
The Ion—an earlier and much lesser known dialogue that that of the Republic—
provides some of Plato‘s most compelling insights into those who would occupy the 
middle ground—or what Plato calls the ―middle ring‖ (an image I will discuss later)—
between spectator and poet. That position is held by the rhapsodes (i.e., professional 
performers of epic poetry), and it is Socrates‘ main objective in his encounter with Ion—
a rhapsode himself—to stir a nascent critical impulse in a profession (i.e., rhapsody or 
professional oratory) that he (Socrates) has little regard for. To that end, Socrates poses a 
question to the rhapsode: ―don‘t you use the same discipline throughout whenever you 
master the whole of a subject?‖ (sec. 532). Without hesitation, Ion concedes the point. 
Socrates then speculates that by having a thorough knowledge of how different poets 
represent/depict certain topics, and of the aesthetic and textual principles to which poets 
adhere (albeit unwittingly or involuntarily),
43
 an orator would be well-equipped to 
analyse, interpret, compare and contrast particular poems (if not particular poets). By 
extension, the orator-critic would be better able to differentiate good art from bad (e.g., 
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 Strictly speaking, Ion—the dialogue‘s title character—is not a critic, but an actor and orator. However, 
the dialogue itself deals with matters directly related to the practices of the critic, including, what it means 
to be an effective interpreter, how to make sound judgements on a text or on an author, and so forth. 
43
 As I will discuss in detail below, Socrates contends that ―none of the epic poets, if they‘re good, are 
masters of their subject; they are inspired, possessed, and that is how they utter all those beautiful poems. 
The same goes for lyric poets if they‘re good…as soon as they sail into harmony and rhythm they are 




―He‘s good, and they‘re inferior‖). So, in short, Socrates argues that if ―there is an art of 
poetry as a whole‖ (my emphasis), a strong understanding of that art (or of the rules of 
art) should not only strengthen the rhapsode‘s own reading of a given poet, but his ability 
―to speak about all the other poets as well‖; that is, such knowledge should enable Ion (1) 
to provide clever comments about individual works of art, (2) to be a sound judge of all 
poets and their work, and again (3) to sort good art from bad. So knowing the ―art of 
poetry‖ contributes to the orator‘s capacity not only to dissect and comment upon a given 
art object, but to ground their own performance of that art in truth, that is, in competent, 
authoritative, and ultimately well-informed renderings of the text. 
Socrates believes, though, that Ion lacks (1) either a rational or practical 
understanding of the myriad things with which the Homeric verses concern themselves 
(e.g., horses, chariots, being a General, and so forth); and (2) any sort of critical 
competency at the level of poetry and poetics. Ion‘s main problem, in fact, is that his 
concentrated focus on Homer leaves him ill-equipped to make useful comparisons 
between poems or between poets—a charge to which Ion freely admits: ―When someone 
discusses another poet I pay no attention, and I have no power to contribute anything 
worthwhile: I simply doze off‖ (Ion sec. 532). With this admission, Ion sinks his own 
case in the debate. In fact, Ion goes even further and confesses that his passion for Homer 
really comes down to the glory he receives for orating the Homeric verses (sec. 530), and 
to the money that audiences, sufficiently moved, pay for his efforts (sec. 535). But 
Socrates asks, what of truth? What of any sort of interpretative mastery over the text? He 
also laments the fact that while some make comparisons between specific works of art—
e.g., between paintings, between sculptures—no one seems prepared to pass judgement 
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on the poets and their work (sec. 533). So by lacking a meaningful knowledge of poetics 
and most worldly things depicted within the poems, Ion‘s self-professed erudition vis-à-
vis Homeric Epic (his one true love) must be viewed with suspicion. 
On this point, Socrates captures the rhapsode‘s attention. That is, Ion prides 
himself on being acknowledged as the greatest of all the Homeric rhapsodes, and with 
being ―crowned by the Sons of Homer with a golden crown‖ (Ion sec. 530). So trading on 
some of Ion‘s own vanity, Socrates persuades—or at least begins to persuade—the 
rhapsode that by simply viewing himself as able to ―speak more beautifully about Homer 
than anyone else‖ (sec. 533) amounts to little more than arrogant self-promotion when 
not reinforced by a rational orientation to the text, and by repeated appeals to the sort of 
unassailable critical values we discussed a moment ago (e.g., the pursuit of truth, 
interpretative mastery, authoritative knowledge of worldly things, the ability to make just 
comparisons between poets, and so forth). So even by this early stage of the dialogue, 
Socrates has begun to make the case that Ion—and, by extension, all rhapsodes, or all 
those who would champion the poet‘s cause, as Socrates says in Republic (X.607d)—
needs to shift the focus away from a more creative or performance-based interaction with 
the poetry, and toward a more abstract conception of, let us say, poetic form. That form 
not only transcends particular poems, but governs, interiorizes, and gives formal unity to 
those poems, as well. In other words, the focus now turns to what Deleuze-Guattari, in 
What is Philosophy?, refer to as the ―Objectality‖ (3) of, in this instance, poetry—i.e., its 
abstract or generalized essence; or better, the formal condition or quality of the poetry, 
itself, that which functions independently of any particular art object, or any material (or 
sensible) creation. The construction of an abstract poetic whole is derived through the 
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extraction of what Massumi calls an ―identity grid‖ (User‘s Guide 113), or rather, 
through the extraction of ―an order and organization of [in this case, poetic] functions‖ 
(113) from an amorphous and unrestricted field of unassigned variables, pure potentials, 
or from what Deleuze-Guattari generally call ―lines of continuous variation.‖ This 
process of extraction-abstraction then gives rise to a self-contained, internally consistent, 
object of reflection and critical scrutiny. We will return to these matters in the next 
chapter in relation to the historical discourse of literary criticism. 
So Ion, to be an effective orator, needs to engage any number of fixed, critical 
values. Short of that, Socrates argues, ―Anyone can tell that you [Ion] are powerless to 
speak about Homer on the basis of knowledge or mastery‖ (Ion sec. 532). In Phaedrus, 
Socrates similarly draws attention to the need for this type of knowledge in both speech-
making and poetry: ―First, you must know the truth concerning everything you are 
speaking or writing about; you must learn how to define each thing in itself; and, having 
defined it, you must know how to divide it into kinds until you reach something 
indivisible‖ (sec. 277). In Laws, Plato‘s main character, simply named ―Athenian,‖ 
rhetorically asks the following question: ―may we not say that in everything imitated, 
whether in drawing, music, or any other art, he who is to be a competent judge must 
possess three things;—he must know, in the first place, of what the imitation is; secondly, 
he must know that it is true; and thirdly, that it has been well executed in words and 
melodies and rhythms?‖ (sec. 669a–b). In these (and other) dialogues, Plato assigns a set 
of clear epistemological objectives to the poet, while in Ion, those same objectives come 
to enfold the practices of the orator-critic, as well. Which is to say that in preparation for 
an artful performance, the rhapsode needs to make rational, critically competent, and 
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morally responsible, decisions about whether or not a given melody or rhythm adequately 
supports (or does justice to) specific imitations within the poem. 
But Socrates goes on to argue that the rhapsode may be wholly incapable of being 
a competent judge of the poets and their work: 
Many are the noble words in which poets speak concerning the actions of 
men; but like yourself [Ion] when speaking about Homer, they do not 
speak of them by any rules of art: they are simply inspired to utter that to 
which the Muse impels them, and that only; and when inspired, one of 
them will make dithyrambs, another hymns of praise, another choral 
strains, another epic or iambic verses—and he who is good at one is not 
good any other kind of verse: for not by art does the poet sing, but by 
power divine. Had he learned by rules of art, he would have known how to 
speak not of one theme only, but of all; and therefore God takes away the 
minds of poets, and uses them as his ministers. (Ion sec. 534) 
Of note is the fact that, in the Ion, Socrates will ultimately conclude that the rhapsodes, 
just like the poets, can never really be discerning or expert when it comes to knowing the 
truth about worldly things (e.g., chariots, Generalship). In fact, in the above passage and 
elsewhere in the Platonic dialogues, Socrates attributes a kind of divine madness to the 
poets, arguing that they are ―possessed by the Muses‖ (Phaedrus sec. 245). In the Ion, 
Socrates claims—in somewhat denigrating fashion—that ―a poet is an airy thing, winged 
and holy, and he is not able to make poetry until he becomes inspired and goes out of his 
mind and his intellect is no longer in him. As long as a human being has his intellect in 
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his possession, he will always lack the power to make poetry or sing prophecy‖ (sec. 
534). Similarly, in the Phaedrus, Socrates contends that a mindless inspiration takes 
hold of a delicate and virgin soul, and there inspiring frenzy, awakens 
lyrical and all other numbers; with these adorning the myriad actions of 
ancient heroes for the instruction of posterity. But he who, having no 
touch of the Muses‘ madness in his soul, comes to the door and thinks that 
he will get into the temple by the help of art—he, I say, and his poetry are 
not admitted; the sane man disappears and is nowhere when he enters into 
rivalry with the madman. (sec. 245) 
 In the Ion, though, Socrates ascribes this same ―touch of the Muses‘ madness‖ to 
not only the poets, but to audiences, and to those such as Ion who engage (i.e., speak, 
perform, interpret, comment upon) the Epic verses of, say, Hesiod or Homer. I will 
discuss the nefarious linkages that Socrates draws between the poets, their poetry, their 
interpreters (or public face), and their audiences, below. For the moment, I would simply 
say that, according to Socrates, speakers of epic poetry are just as mad, just as deluded, as 
the poets themselves, which is the reason why Socrates would want interpreters of epic 
verse, such as Ion, to no longer take the stage, if you will, with the poet, but instead move 
to the shadows. He would want them to stand back and judge, to master the poets and 
their work. Plato holds that all particulars (which includes specific instances of art) 
contract an ideal essence into their own internal makeup—i.e., a resemblance that then 
becomes the formal cause of a given material copy. So the Ion makes the case that all art 
objects, in their sensible or material guise, ought to be perceived by just interpreters of 
that art (i.e., the critics) as reflections of larger ideals, and that the art itself ought to be 
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judged in terms of its relative conformity to those ideals. This is the critical role that 
Socrates assigns to the otherwise misguided and ill-informed Ion. But at this point it is 
worth recalling that for Plato, both poets and rhapsodes are, at best, dissemblers, and as 
such entirely incapable of offering authentic or even useful insight into that which the 
poets themselves contract into their verses. And while the poet‘s imitations will always 
be fabricated, imagined, or derived from hearsay, Socrates must also assume that the 
rhapsodes are even at further remove from the truth: ―So you turn out to be 
representatives of representatives‖ (sec. 535). But Socrates‘ argument, even if thought to 
be persuasive, raises important ethical considerations to which we now must turn. 
First off, one should recognize that Socrates poses an insurmountable task to Ion. 
That is, he poses a set of epistemological (if not ontological) imperatives that can never 
be satisfied without separating the rhapsode from his own creative energies, his own 
power to act, and even his own way of being in the world (for reasons that will become 
clear in a moment). In short, Socrates dismisses Ion‘s capacity to speak (or perform) the 
Homeric verses with the sort of creative zeal that had yielded the rhapsode first prize at 
the Festival of Asclepius (Ion sec. 530). Socrates, in effect, says to Ion: curb your 
enthusiasm. That is, he lets him know that his skill as an orator is inconsequential; his 
self-professed ―clever[ness]‖ (sec. 531), vis-à-vis Homer, and his desire to be ―crowned 
by the Sons of Homer,‖ are little more than mere conceits; and that his assumption that 
spoken word performances can be a useful tool for illuminating Homeric epic is 
misguided. Socrates arrives at these conclusions, as noted, because of Ion‘s lack of 
knowledge about worldly things—i.e., what Homer depicts in his poems—and his 
admitted readiness to ―doze off‖ when other poets and their work are discussed. So when 
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first told of Ion‘s award-winning performance of the Homeric verses, Socrates finds the 
accomplishment to be dubious, but is superficially polite, and makes a somewhat 
deferential gesture toward the rhapsode: ―Surely you won‘t begrudge me a 
demonstration?‖ (sec. 530). However when Ion agrees to demonstrate his talents, 
Socrates stalls: ―Really, I shall make time to hear that later‖; and when that later arrives, 
Socrates again changes the subject: ―I really do want to hear you, but not before you 
answer me this…‖ (sec. 536). 
Socrates‘ hesitations are, in fact, telling, because the point (as suggested above) to 
which he will ultimately arrive in this dialogue is that the rhapsode only magnifies the 
errors and misdeeds of the poet. The rhapsode, he believes, like the poet, offers nothing 
to a rational society, nothing to that society‘s understanding of worldly things, nothing to 
the pursuit of truth. Moreover, the rhapsode himself offers nothing to even one‘s 
understanding of poetry. So while Socrates himself is the first to raise the idea that Ion 
should demonstrate his talents—―Surely you won‘t begrudge me a demonstration?‖—it is 
Socrates who, at the end of the dialogue, curiously laments Ion‘s inability to perform: 
You assured me that you knew many lovely things about Homer, you 
promised to give a demonstration; but you‘re cheating me, you‘re a long 
way from giving a demonstration. You aren‘t even willing to tell me what 
it is that you‘re so wonderfully clever about, though I‘ve been begging 
you for ages. (Ion sec. 541) 
Both this passage and Ion‘s attendant silences are critical for understanding the 
progression of Socrates‘ argument, as a whole. The fact is that by the end of the 
exchange, Ion is literally left speechless, i.e., deprived of the sort of performance that can 
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responsibly be presented at this point, and Socrates knows it. In fact, Socrates concludes 
that ―If you‘re really a master of your subject, and if, as I said earlier, you‘re cheating me 
of the demonstration you promised about Homer, then you‘re doing me wrong. But if 
you‘re not a master of your subject…then you‘re not doing me wrong‖ (sec. 542). So, in 
other words, if you admit your own critical and epistemological failings with regard to 
Homer then silence is really your only recourse. And because you cannot speak 
knowledgeably about Homer, about poetry, or about the various themes and issues 
represented within the Homeric verses, then you bring nothing of value or importance to 
those verses, and your performance of such is purely corrupt. In the end, Socrates 
silences the rhapsodes of antiquity; he cuts out their tongues, leaving them little more 
than the poet‘s lowly sidekicks—―representatives of representatives‖ (sec. 535)—forced 
into the same inspired frenzy that consumes the poet. Given the rhapsode‘s madness, and 
his obviously degraded status in relation to both poem and poet, his silence is certainly 
understandable, and perhaps all for the best. So Socrates rationalizes Ion out of a job. 
But here‘s the rub. Socrates argues that Ion needs a knowledge of things that he 
can never have knowledge of. Ion, as we know, is but a mere rhapsode, not a General, not 
a charioteer, not a sheepherder, just an orator—and, as such, he has neither expertise nor 
mastery in things beyond the realm of oratory. But lacking direct knowledge of real-
world things, Ion‘s expertise as a speaker of the Homeric verses, according to Socrates, 
must be brought into question. So Ion, when pressed to demonstrate a first-hand 
knowledge of the myriad things that Homer writes about—again, being a General, a 
navigator, a horseman, and so forth—Ion has nothing to say. So Socrates brings Ion to an 
impasse. Socrates, in effect, asks: how can one speak knowledgeably about Homer, when 
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one cannot even speak with any authority about the quality of his imitations, either as 
they compare to similar imitations by other poets, or, more importantly, as they conform 
to active realities? As we know from Republic, Plato also derides the poet‘s familiarity 
with such matters, and perceives their work as simulacra, i.e., false copies. So, of course, 
the rhapsode fares no better in this equation, given that he derives his own understanding 
of things from the poet‘s corrupt body of half-truths and dissimulation. The rhapsode‘s 
knowledge, therefore, is only a further corruption, a further degradation of the truth. 
Rhapsodes are nothing more than second-generation dissemblers. 
But what would it mean for the rhapsode to affirm his authority before the 
Socratic tribunal? The answer is nothing less than, say, being a General, being a 
navigator, etc. But of course, that‘s not possible, and again Socrates knows it. For even if 
Ion were actually a General, then Socrates immediately wants to know ―why in heaven‘s 
name [do you] go around the country giving rhapsodies but not commanding troops?‖ 
(Ion sec. 541). The suggestion here is clearly absurd: according to Socrates, what it 
would mean for Ion to be a just interpreter of Homer is to renounce the practices of 
orating or performing the Homeric verses and—should he wish to stretch the point—
pursue a career path as some bizarre ‗rhapsode-General‘ hybrid. Similarly, we know from 
Republic that what it would mean for the poet to offer a knowledge worth knowing is to 
not be a poet at all, but instead a General, a charioteer, even an artisan or historian: only 
then is direct, first-hand knowledge a possibility. But, of course, the point remains that 
poets who would wish to write about things other than, say, being a General (or what 
have you), would have little use for discrete factoids on this one particular matter. 
Whatever the case, Socrates‘ critical agenda brings Ion to his epistemological, if not 
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ontological, limits. Socrates derides Ion for not knowing what cannot be known (except 
perhaps in a very limited, and ultimately pointless, way), and diminishes the rhapsode for 
not being someone (e.g., a General, a charioteer) who might have access to the sort of 
first-hand knowledge that Socrates deems relevant in this context. So by the end of the 
dialogue, when Socrates complains ―you‘re cheating me of the demonstration you 
promised‖ (sec. 542), the complaint must be read as rather disingenuous, given that the 
demonstration Socrates wants cannot be demonstrated. One wonders, in fact, if there may 
be any other purpose here than to simply dishonour the rhapsode, or to formally discredit 
his way of engaging (i.e., reading, interpreting, performing) the Homeric verses? 
Of note is the fact that Socrates‘ critical agenda puts severe restrictions on Ion‘s 
power—i.e., his power to act, to perform—and does so, in large part, by reducing that 
power to a point of creative impotence (―really, I shall make time to hear that later‖; 
―you‘re cheating me of the demonstration you promised,‖ etc.). Ion has little recourse 
throughout the dialogue with Socrates but to repeatedly fall silent when the opportunity 
to demonstrate his skills arises. For to accept the dictates of Socratic rationalism in this 
context, Ion must accept, as Daniel Smith puts it, his own ―subjection and slavery as if it 
were his salvation‖ (―Deleuze and Derrida‖ 63), and so faces an ethical dilemma: 
The fundamental question of ethics is not ‗What must I do?‘ (the question 
of morality) but rather ‗What can I do?‘ Given my degree of power, what 
are my capabilities and capacities? How can I come into active possession 
of my power? How can I go to the limit of what I ‗can do‘? (62) 
In the Ion, Socrates raises the question of ‗what must I do?‘ to be, for example, a 
competent interpreter or speaker of Homeric epic. This, as Smith points out, is a 
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―question of morality,‖ in that it presupposes an answer—an answer foretold. It 
presupposes a set of pre-existing rules or standards, and the fact that one must conform 
(adhere, defer) to those standards. To ask ―what must I do?‖ is to assume that, in this 
case, a kind of critical law has already been written, that which both authorizes and puts 
restrictions on specific literary critical (or, more performance-based) encounters with 
writers and their work. And for Socrates, as we know, the rhapsode remains obligated to 
meet those supposed mandates. But as Deleuze points out in his reading of Spinoza (from 
which Smith‘s aforementioned claims derive), ―In an ethical vision of the world it is 
always a matter of capacity and power, and never of anything else. Law is identical to 
right. True natural laws are norms of power rather than rules of duty‖ (Expressionism 
268). So Ion‘s natural right in this (and any other) context is to do all he can, to extend 
his power as far as he can, and pursue the sort of co-creative encounters with the book 
that agree with him. But Socrates subordinates this approach to ―rules of duty,‖ and, as 
Deleuze says, to ―a moral law that purports to prohibit and command.‖  
By posing the moral question—‗what must I do?‘—transcendence (or what I am 
calling the transcendent orientation) now enters the equation. As Smith points out, 
―transcendence is what represents my impotence (power = 0)‖ (―Deleuze and Derrida‖ 
63). In other words, the requirement to meet certain unimpeachable standards, those that 
formally regulate my critical encounters with the book, and that restrict me from 
exercising my ‗will to power,‘ not only prevent me from acting, but rob me of my true 
freedoms, my natural right. They enslave me. Smith also suggests that ―transcendence 
represents my slavery and impotence reduced to its lowest point: the absolute demand to 
do the absolutely impossible is nothing other than the concept of impotence raised to 
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infinity‖ (62–3). Adopting a transcendent orientation (to the book, or whatever else), 
then, ―represents my slavery and impotence,‖ my inability to perform and see what I can 
do. So the fact that Ion pledges to be ―crowned by the Sons of Homer‖ as the greatest of 
all the Homeric rhapsodes, and the fact that he ceaselessly strives to magnify his powers 
of action—i.e., his performative abilities, his capacity to affect spectators and the book—
by maximizing his own joyful passions—i.e., his power to be affected by the Homeric 
verses and the enthusiastic reactions of the spectators—carries little weight in a literary 
critical context that obligates the rhapsode to pursue unachievable epistemological and 
ontological objectives. By having, then, to accept ―the absolute demand to do the 
absolutely impossible,‖ Ion has to accept his own ―subjection and slavery,‖ his own 
―impotence,‖ as Smith pointedly argues, ―as if it were his salvation.‖ Ion has to accept a 
morally-based critical agenda that delegitimizes what he does (what he can do, or might 
be capable of). 
Replacing, then, the question of ―what can I do?‖ with the more restrictive ―what 
must I do?‖ becomes an important driver of the moral motivations at the heart of Plato‘s 
contributions to literary critical discourse. But anticipating some of the claims of my later 
chapters, I want to point out that the materialism (or materialist sensibilities) with which 
this dissertation concerns itself cannot be divorced from questions of ethics. That is, I 
pose the possibility of an ethico-materialist encounter with the book, one that views both 
critic and book from the point-of-view of their unactualized capacities to perform, or to 
go to the limits of what they can or might do. This is a form of criticism that draws upon 
(or better yet, stimulates, amplifies, intensifies) the book and its potentials, its productive 
capacities, its expressivity, etc. The materialist critic, as the Interchapter will show, rather 
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than reducing the book to a set of fixed intentions or values, or to what it means or 
signifies, actually induces criticality in the book—making it go critical. 
In any case, as I have suggested, the apparent purpose of Plato‘s Ion is to 
reprimand the rhapsode (and any other) for laying the emphasis on the wrong things. That 
is, the rhapsode concerns himself with beautiful words, with oratory, with being good at 
what he does, with elevating the poet and his poetry. But the rhapsode, for all his skilful 
encounters with the book, lacks knowledge, and is unable (just like the poet) to offer up a 
knowledge worth knowing. The rhapsode cannot be a competent judge of what he orates 
because he lacks a studied sense of where the Homeric verses stand in relation to the 
work of other poets. Ion cannot see internal resemblances. He cannot forge lateral 
continuities between poets and their poetry. When the work of another is raised, Ion 
simply dozes off, which is just as well because his supposed mastery of Homer, 
according to Socrates, is mere illusion. Ion makes his greatest mistake, then, in believing 
that the singularity of his ethico-materialist encounters with the book—i.e., the singular 
extremes and excesses that unfold in and between himself and Homer, himself and the 
audience, Homer and the audience, and even the audience members, themselves—have 
an inherent value of their own. Socrates derides the rhapsode for his penchant for the pure 
encounter because he (Socrates) sees little or no reason for the rhapsode-cum-critic to be 
in league with Homer, to ―sing his praises,‖ to forge enthusiastic, performance-based 
partnerships with the poet. The rhapsode‘s encounter with the Homeric verses counts for 
very little when, say, judgment, knowledge, critical competency, and rational scrutiny are 
held in higher esteem than what one might refer to as the ephemera of relations produced 
between speaker and verse, speaker and spectator, etc. Moreover, those relations, those 
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encounters, count for little when an abstract understanding of the enduring principles of 
art has greater value than the singular relays, propulsions, and excesses of the rhapsode. 
So while Socrates‘ primary objective in this dialogue may be to debase or devalue 
Ion‘s pretensions about himself, about his gift for interpreting Homer, and so forth, what 
we see here are some of the earliest semiotic coordinates for what will become (even in 
Aristotle, Plato‘s student) the discourse of literary criticism. In a way, Plato offers 
important clues in the Ion into what an authentic, morally sanctioned critical encounter 
with the book might involve, and even offers a glimpse into the future of literary critical 
discourse. First off, Socrates wants to make Ion feel ashamed of his vocation; he wants 
him to concede his own investments in the world of simulacra (e.g., ―you turn out to be 
representatives of representatives‖); he wants him to defer to certain epistemological 
objectives, lest his efforts as a reader and interpreter of the Homeric verses lose their 
value to the republic—―you make many lovely speeches about [Homer] without knowing 
anything‖ (sec. 542). At the same time, Socrates wants Ion to recognize the validity of 
another type of vocation related to poetry, one grounded in truth and the pursuit of 
knowledge. One that emphasizes the ability to judge, to make comparisons, to separate 
good from bad, to create rankings, etc.—in short, all the just and noble pursuits of the 
rhapsode-cum-critic—before anything else. So taking the Ion to its logical conclusions, 
one might argue that Socrates really wants to persuade the rhapsode that if his vocation is 
to have a noble future, the rhapsode needs to get off the stage and into the gallery. From 
there, and there alone, he can judge; he can be the first real judge. In the gallery (or in the 
shadows), Ion is more than just another spectator; rather, he comes to Homer armed with 
a set of critical tools that allow him to express why one should admire Homer, and how 
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the quality of Homer‘s imitations compare to those generated by other poets. He comes to 
Homer with the necessary foundations upon which to make comparisons. Finally, he 
comes to Homer ready to test, to carry out measurements, to establish rankings, etc. In so 
doing, Ion‘s engagement with the Homeric verses may be perceived as legitimate, and his 
critical pursuits, worthy (or at least more so). 
But it is important to point out at this point that Socrates sincerely doubts that 
there ever could (or should) be a noble future for the rhapsode. That is, simply tweaking 
his way of engaging the poets and their poetry is not enough. Socrates goes so far as to 
question Ion‘s state of mind when performing/reciting the Homeric verses: ―are you at 
that time in your right mind, or do you get beside yourself? And doesn‘t your soul, in its 
enthusiasm, believe that it is present at the actions you describe…?‖ (Ion sec. 535). Ion 
readily concedes the point. That is, he concedes that he may be deluded or mad; he 
concedes his own passionate involvement in the text, and the fact that he may be swept 
away by Homer‘s simulacral images. Socrates, in fact, likens the effect of Homer on the 
rhapsode‘s mind to the effect produced by ―a ‗Magnetic‘ stone [that] moves iron rings‖ 
(sec. 533)—an image that he goes on to describe as follows: 
This stone not only pulls those rings, if they‘re iron, it also puts power in 
the rings, so that they in turn can do just what the stone does—pull other 
rings—so that there‘s sometimes a very long chain of iron pieces and rings 
hanging from one another. And the power in all of them depends on this 
stone. In the same way, the Muse makes some people inspired herself, and 




There is a familiar ring to this remarkable passage. That is, the electro-magnetic charge—
perhaps we might call it an Ionic charge—that enables the rhapsode to assume the middle 
ground (or middle ring) between Homer and the spectator (i.e., that ―chain of other 
enthusiasts‖), is precisely what Plato fears might be the case in Republic. 
We recall that one of the primary dangers associated with the simulacrum, or with 
the acts of dissimulation and unfounded pretension perpetuated by the poet, are the 
psychological and behavioural disturbances that such artistry provokes in the minds of 
the uninitiated. Socrates anticipates this claim (in the passage cited above) through the 
suggestion that a material charge of sorts passes through this set of interlocking rings, 
which then forges (or perhaps reinforces) deep reciprocal ties between poet, poetry, 
rhapsode, and spectator. Socrates then furthers the point in the following passage (which 
I quote at length):  
This spectator is the last of the rings….The middle ring is you, the 
rhapsode or actor, and the first one is the poet himself. The god pulls 
people‘s souls through all these wherever he wants, looping the power 
down from one to another. And just as if it hung from that stone, there‘s 
an enormous chain of choral dancers and dance teachers and assistant 
teachers hanging off to the sides of the rings that are suspended from the 
Muse. One poet is attached to one Muse, another to another (we say he is 
―possessed,‖ and that‘s near enough, for he is held). From these first rings, 
from the poets, they are attached in their turn and inspired, from one poet, 
some from another; some from Orpheus, some from Musaeus, and many 
are possessed and held from Homer. You are one of them, Ion, and you are 
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possessed from Homer. And when anyone sings the work of another poet, 
you‘re asleep and you‘re lost about what to say; but when any song of that 
poet is sounded, you are immediately awake, your soul is dancing, and 
you have plenty to say. You see it‘s not because you are a master of 
knowledge about Homer that you can say what you can say, but because 
of a divine gift, because you are possessed. (Ion sects. 535–36) 
Ion, then, like the poet, ―is possessed,‖ and consumed by a kind of Bacchic frenzy (―your 
soul is dancing‖); moreover, he finds himself inextricably bound to what Socrates calls a 
―looping‖ power of possession. In this, then, we have the heterogeneous linking (the 
assemblage) of various bodies (e.g., books, rhapsodes, spectators), and a breaking up of 
their respective equilibriums. We have plugs and hook-ups. Relays and propulsions. A 
movement of forces, ascending and descending. Emergent subjectivities. An exteriority 
of relations. We have a machining of the book—the book as conduit, that is, both a 
harnessing and channelling of material/bodily energies. We have the book in its 
becoming, as a being of sensation. Ion, for his part in the chain, readily admits that when 
he tells sad stories his ―eyes are full of tears‖ (sec. 535), and when he tells ―frightening or 
awful‖ stories, his ―hair stands on end with fear and [his] heart jumps.‖ The spectator 
then takes up that rhapsodic charge: ―The spectator is the last of the rings.‖ In the end, a 
line of possession unfolds between poet, rhapsode, and spectator that according to 
Socrates robs them, collectively, of their ―right mind[s]‖; the rhapsode, for example, 
dresses up, and dances around, in an inspired frenzy. 
So Socrates wants the rhapsode, the middle ring on the chain between poet and 
spectator, to break the chain, as it were, that which carries the magnetic current along an 
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unbroken line from poem to spectator, forming a material continuum. As discussed 
above, the real problem here is that uninitiated audiences (or spectators) find themselves 
both mentally and physically swept up in these currents of divine madness, with no 
ability to make sense of what they may be experiencing, or what they may be exposed to. 
This is why Socrates ultimately condemns the rhapsode for facilitating these relations, 
rather than regulating the unchecked energies, the delirium, that passes unimpeded 
between poem (or poet) and spectator. The rhapsode, if responsible, would filter or 
mediate those magnetic currents; to do so, he would need to ground his critical agenda in 
(shall we say, provisionally) a type of instrumental reason. 
In any case, the issues raised in Plato‘s ―allegory of the rings‖—despite the fact 
that Plato intended to use this allegory as a way to attack the rhapsode, and the nefarious 
relations he sought to forge between poet (or poetry) and spectator—point the way, I 
would argue, to a mode (or method) of literary critical engagement that finds its modern 
correlate in the complexity sciences. So I would simply suggest, in defence of Ion, that 
his objective as a rhapsode is to enliven or make vital the Homeric verses for the 
spectator, to intensify them, to draw upon their operative forces—i.e., their capacity to 
affect, to live (and be relived)—and to maximize (or magnify) their potential outputs. In 
short, Ion wants to ‗turn people on,‘ to bring tears to their eyes, to make them feel or 
register sensation more profoundly. Ion wants to engage Homer in an affective fashion, 
and wants for his audience to deepen or extend their own encounters with the epic poet. 
Ion, let us say, is a ―friend‖ of poetry, or of ―beautiful thoughts‖ (Ion sec. 530), just like 
the philosopher is a friend of wisdom: ―this I know about myself: I speak about Homer 
more beautifully than anybody else and I have lots to say; and everybody says I do it 
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well‖ (sec. 533). Ion is an enthusiast, an artisan with words (taking them on a line of 
flight). Homer presents a set of materials to the rhapsode, and Ion stretches and 
manipulates that material substrate, rendering it plastic, malleable. But for Socrates this is 
an illegitimate pursuit, one that has Ion reinforcing the illusions of the poet through a 
simulacral critical encounter of his own, wherein the rhapsode—just like the poet before 
him—trades in false claims and pretensions. 
So the rhapsode-cum-critic needs to reject his form of critical encounter with the 
book and replace it with a critical strategy that strips the poem of its corporeality. He 
needs to eschew the immediacy of the encounter, and the ephemera of relations, for a 
more abstract and generalized non-connection to art—―you have to learn his thought, not 
just his verses!‖ (Ion sec. 530). Socrates argues that Ion, who I deem the proto-critic, 
rather than attempting to infuse life into the Homeric verses (i.e., rather than making them 
work, putting them to work, seeing what they are capable of, etc.), rather than attempting 
to machine the book, must now stand in judgement of it. He must make comparisons 
between poets, sort winners from losers, and excise false claimants from the equation. He 
must evaluate their respective representations of a given topic, theme, object, social role, 
etc.; he must create rankings, sort good from bad, speak knowledgeably about the poets 
and their work. Ion must know who speaks best on questions of society, war, heaven and 
hell, the gods and man. So when Socrates raises such questions as, ―[who] will be an 
adequate judge of all who speak on the same subjects…?‖ (sec. 532), and how does one 
know ―when [a poet] does his work well and when he doesn‘t…?‖ (sec. 533), he presents 
a direct challenge to the rhapsode (and to critics of the future, or the critic yet to come) to 
pursue the sort of critical encounter with the book that values knowledge and mastery 
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above all else. And yet by doing so, a sort of ascesis falls over the materiality (or material 
capacities) of the book, as the rhapsode himself is reduced to silence (―really, I shall 
make time to hear that later‖). When Socrates concludes that ―anyone can tell that you 
[Ion] are powerless to speak about Homer on the basis of…knowledge or mastery‖ (sec. 
532), he means to express the Platonic hope for the future of professional discourse on 
poetry (or literature). 
The Ion, then, is of particular importance to the discourse of literary criticism (and 
this dissertation) (1) because of the comparisons it makes between the sensibilities and 
practices of both poet and critic, and (2) because it posits a fundamental distinction 
between the truly knowledgeable and the merely conversant in the realm of literary 
criticism. In terms of this latter point, I would add that the Ion draws attention to the 
question of expert systems—or the role of the expert—within a critical or interpretative 
milieu. While in the end, the rhapsode may not be a literary critic in a way recognizable 
to more modern practitioners in the discourse of literary criticism, I view this dialogue as 
a preliminary indoctrination of the proto-critic into a critical way of thinking, a critical 
mindset. Plato wants the sort of ally in his ―quarrel‖ with the poets who will renounce the 
magnetic energies flowing between poet and spectator; he wants the sort of ally who will 
think critically about the poets, make assessments about their work, create lineages, 
separate good from bad, etc., and do so by toning down their enthusiasms (or inspired 
frenzy) so as to pursue a more sober, more rational path toward critical mastery over the 
book. It is Plato, then, who advances the need for a generalist‘s knowledge. It is Plato 
who advances a disinterested, expert-oriented agenda, which replaces rhapsodic charge 
with the sort of staid methodical procedures that dull critical practices to this day. 
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Transcending the Book 
Without transcendence, we are warned, we will fall into a dark of chaos, reduced to a pure 
‗subjectivism‘ or ‗relativism,‘ living in a world without hope, with no vision of an alternate future. 
—Daniel W. Smith (―Deleuze and Derrida‖ 62) 
Let me suggest at this point that Plato‘s wide-ranging quarrel with the imitative 
arts has seeded many problematic conceptions of literature, particularly among literary 
critics, and has contributed (to) any number of flawed or—at minimum—narrowly 
defined premises concerning the role and practice(s) of the critic, as well. One might even 
hypothesize that the discourse of literary criticism serves as an ongoing reply to, and/or 
confrontation with, Platonism—a hypothesis that, at first blush, echoes Alfred North 
Whitehead‘s famous dictum that ―all of philosophy is but a footnote to Plato,‖ and 
perhaps, less obviously, Harold Bloom‘s notion of the anxiety of influence.
44
 Indeed, I 
will argue in the next chapter that literary criticism‘s most hardened and enduring motifs 
remain in tacit and sometimes overt dialogue with Platonic doctrine on the arts; also, the 
dominant (or, let me say, majoritarian)
45
 discourse of literary criticism has, at a genetic 
level, preserved deep reciprocal ties with Platonic sensibilities. I will add, finally, that 
with rare exception, literary critics have routinely been powerless to escape the still 
palpable grip of Platonism. 
However, the point I wish to make in this context breaks with the suggestion that 
all literary criticism (like all philosophy) is a mere footnote to Plato, if by ―footnote‖ we 
mean something secondary. Something exegetical or purely referential. Something 
                                                          
44
 In his book, The Anxiety of Influence, Bloom argues that the great writings associated with each new 
literary epoch must be evaluated in terms of a perennial struggle for creative territory, that which manifests 
itself in and through a defensive and patterned ―misreading‖ (30) of the great poets who have come 
before—i.e., through a process that Bloom generally refers to as creative misprision. 
45
 The major/minor distinction, first formally articulated in Deleuze-Guattari‘s Kafka, will be discussed in 
the latter stages of this dissertation. 
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derivative or contingent. A simple attribution.
46
 That is, I shift the focus away from the 
more conventional (though no less accurate) argument that Plato set the terms of literary 
critical debate, and instead emphasize the point—which I adapt from Deleuze‘s reading 
of Plato—that Platonic doctrine would historically suffuse the discourse of literary 
criticism (1) with a transcendent orientation to literature; and (2) with bureaucratic or 
administerial conceptions of ―the task of the critic.‖ So the ―poisoned gift of 
Platonism‖—to which Deleuze refers—speaks less to the obvious reproduction of, and/or 
adherence to, specific themes or imperatives, advanced by Plato, and more to a kind of 
conceptual programming, a software, if you will, that has had profound effects on both 
philosophy and literary criticism. For Deleuze, Plato‘s real ―gift‖ to the history of ideas is 
the operative idea of transcendence, and the credibility that Platonism assigns to 
transcendent modes of thinking. Put simply, Platonic doctrine not only establishes a 
template for critical action—i.e., a set of assignments and a corresponding set of values 
accorded different variables (e.g., the critic, the text, the task of the critic) within the 
literary critical equation—but sets in motion a key conceptual algorithm, as well—i.e., 
the logic of transcendence and its attendant forms of image production, unfolding on 
what Deleuze-Guattari refer to as ―the plane of transcendence‖ (What is? 49). This 
algorithm has long directed, nay compelled, literary critics to pursue a quasi-theistic 
agenda—a position I will attempt to clarify over the final pages of this chapter. 
                                                          
46
 I would argue that the footnote ought not be viewed as a textual appendage, but as a subset of critical 
action, in general, that which amplifies and intensifies the text through ―an elevation of [its] power, an 
increase in [its] dimensions, a gain in [its] distinction‖ (Deleuze, Fold 73). Footnotes, in short, directly 
intervene in the text and induce transformations; they catalyze, mobilize, magnify; they act as creative 
relays; they break apart unities; they feed the textual rhizome, affirm the expressive potential of the work, 
and deliver up counter-images. The footnote, in short, maximizes various ―amplitude[s]‖ of the work. 
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First off, philosopher Todd May offers the following observations concerning the 
question of transcendence: 
That which transcends stands outside or above. It is beyond. God of the 
Judeo-Christian tradition is the primary example. God transcends. He 
transcends the world, but also transcends human experience. He is beyond 
anything we can conceive of him. (27) 
So any onto-theological conception of transcendence would hold that, say, humans are of 
a lesser order than God, and that they are composed of an inferior, or at least dissimilar, 
ontological stuff.
47
 From this, then, a question emerges (which I pose in several ways): 
How does the human actually know or experience God? How do transcendent forms (like 
God), rendered abstract within the human realm, affirm both themselves and their power 
to control whomever (or whatever) within that realm, despite their superiority? Put 
another way, how can transcendence even identify itself as such, given the cognitive and 
perceptual limitations of the human mind? The religious, philosophical, and socio-
political mechanisms by which the case for God (or transcendence) has historically been 
made are certainly complex and far beyond the scope of this chapter. But, in brief, a 
materialist perspective on the matter—that which informs much of the thinking in this 
dissertation as a whole—would be that God both derives and exercises his power through 
the sustained efforts of interested parties (in religion, government, and elsewhere) on a 
world-historical stage to concretize or reify those powers. Such efforts might involve (1) 
assigning God, the father, the capacity to somehow capture or enfold humans (and other 
animals)—those from whom God has been deemed ontologically separate—within his 
                                                          
47
 Parenthetically, the monistic principle of immanence—which is typically contrasted with transcendent 
dualisms—would hold that God expresses or explicates himself equally in all things, and so all things share 
equally in that expression. The immanentist orientation will be discussed in Part 2 of the dissertation. 
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own larger purpose or purview; (2) labelling those newly captured beings God‘s children; 
and (3) holding them up to the supposed standards, values, or eternal judgements set 
down by God. The effort to reify ideals or abstractions, like God, would also involve 
separating those abstractions from their own genetic or productive ancestries—i.e., their 
own social, historical, or psychological origins, their own conditions of intelligibility—so 
that they operate in a way that seems self-generating and self-sustaining. 
These processes, as one might imagine, quite readily lend themselves to paranoid 
and largely over-determined efforts (again, among interested parties) to assign the kind of 
substance and/or foundational role to the abstractions themselves that enable them (1) to 
overcome their own abstracted, imagistic nature, and re-present themselves as wholly 
independent forms; and (2) to assert control, from without, on those from whom they 
have been abstracted, and to do so with the kind of authority whereby the various 
mandates they hand down are viewed as unimpeachable. To those interrelated ends, the 
idea of an all-powerful, all-knowing God relies not only on what philosopher Ludwig 
Feuerbach
48
 would describe as the outward projection of the inward (albeit ideal) nature 
of humans, but also on the autocratic capacities of those individuals or institutions who 
would serve (and be served by) the sort of power assigned to God: as Deleuze-Guattari, 
in A Thousand Plateaus, write, ―The interpretive priest, the seer, is one of the despot-
god‘s bureaucrats‖ (114). So a key role of ―the interpretative priest,‖ or of religion, more 
generally, is to subordinate the life and life-force of all things (e.g., all beings, bodies, or 
whatever else) to an omnipresent yet wholly despotic power—a power that from a purely 
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 Conceptions of God from a materialist perspective begin (arguably) in the work of Feuerbach, who 
argued that God is an abstraction or outward projection of the inward nature of human beings; as such, the 
attributes assigned God correspond directly to the needs (or perceived short-comings) of humanity vis-à-vis 
morality, love, understanding, etc. 
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materialist perspective that amounts to little more than a vapour, a fog, even a ghost. But 
despite its residual nature, God or ―the glory beyond‖ (as Massumi calls it in the head-
note to Part 1 of this dissertation) is obviously far from powerless: its unerring capacity to 
operate with an iron fist and to maintain its position and privileged rule certainly goes 
without saying. God sets the standard against which all things are formally measured; at 
minimum, those measurements are produced and felt materially (e.g., in the ascetic, 
flagellating, or self-mortifying body), socially, politically, and so forth. Still, the effects 
of transcendence—i.e., of transcendent power, transcendent forms, transcendent modes of 
thinking, and so forth—are all enabled by a kind of vampirism, a purging of the life, or of 
its material and self-organizing powers, from that which has been rendered subordinate to 
an abstract power. So to this point we have parasites, ghosts, vampires: all things that live 
or live on in a purely derived fashion.  
These processes, when generalized, have important repercussions outside the 
onto-theological realm. In fact, they apply whenever (or wherever) an appeal might be 
made to a ―higher‖ standard or norm, as it reflects itself in, for example, a superior 
power, a superior thought, a superior narrative, a superior order, etc., or really any 
abstract conception of, say, a consciousness beyond consciousness, a subject outside the 
subject, a world external to the world, and so forth. As noted, all such transcendent 
constructions identify themselves (or are identified) in like fashion, which affirms or 
grounds their right to govern or control from without. Deleuze, though, in a late 
interview, makes the claim that ―Abstractions explain nothing, they themselves have to 
be explained: there are no such things as universals, there‘s nothing transcendent, no 
Unity, subject (or object), Reason‖ (Negotiations 145). So, for Deleuze, the prevailing 
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forms of transcendence in and through the history of ideas—e.g., the Judeo-Christian 
God, the Platonic Forms, Subject/Object relations, Man, or what Massumi describes as 
―general images: those constituting categories, identities, good [and/or] commonsensical 
ideas‖ (User‘s Guide 111)—rather than being given, rather than preceding the sensible 
flux of human experience, rather than being the One that explains the many by supplying 
the fixed foundations upon which life erects itself, these things need be explained by the 
multiple processes (e.g., genetic, material, social, semiotic, discoursal, historical, and 
political) that they presuppose. Transcendence must be explained by what enables or lies 
immanent to it,
49
 and in a way that ―frees thought of any ultimate metaphysical 
foundation… represented in images…by the privileged mind of man (subject)‖ 
(Colebrook, Deleuze 87). 
Deleuze-Guattari contrast those who they deem ―first philosophers‖—e.g., 
philosophers involved in the making and mapping of concepts—with philosopher- 
sages, who are religious personae, priests, because they conceive of the 
institution of an always transcendent order imposed from outside by a 
great despot or by one god higher than the others….Whenever there is 
transcendence, vertical Being, imperial State in the sky or on earth, there 
is religion. (What is? 43) 
Like philosophy, the discourse of literary criticism has historically given rise to its own 
critic-as-sage motif, and has done so (1) through the dissemination of certain illusory 
(read: unified, standardized, privileged) images of the critic, and of the critical task, in 
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 For Deleuze, what might succumb to transcendence emerges, initially, from ―the intense world of 
differences‖ (Difference 57), which parenthetically should not be confused with a kind of structure, or 
structural  logic. What enables or conditions the sensible remains integral to, yet wholly separate from, its 




general; and (2) through its manufacture of, and/or repeated appeal to, a set of enduring 
critical constants as they relate to specific conceptions of the book and its author. Like 
Deleuze-Guattari‘s ―interpretive priest,‖ mentioned above, the literary critic similarly 
passes powerful judgements on the book, and does so through the repeated invocation 
and application of various abstract standards or modes of organization. Those 
organizational modalities prevent the book, I would argue, from expressing itself in novel 
or transformative ways, or rather, they preclude the ―unfolding of its lines, the production 
of something new‖ (Deleuze, Negotiations 146). Instead, the installation of static, 
evaluative measures petrify the book, restrict and deny it—deny its life-force. For 
Deleuze, ―unifications, subjectifications, rationalizations, centralizations have no specific 
status; they often amount to an impasse, a closing off,‖ and so, 
When you invoke something transcendent you arrest movement, 
introducing interpretations instead of experimenting…interpretation is in 
fact always carried out with reference to something that is supposed to be 
missing. Unity is precisely what‘s missing from multiplicity, just as the 
subject‘s what‘s missing from events…[but whatever the case] it‘s only 
ever abstractions [posed from] a transcendent viewpoint. 
I will have more to say on these matters in the next chapter. But it is worth noting at this 
point that the plane of transcendence expresses itself as a paranoid extension of a truly 
immanentist power; that is, the plane can be explained by the operations of arrest and 
control on the plane of immanence, by the attempt to silence, limit, or restrict the 
unerring flux of difference and productive variation. 
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To sum up, the plane of transcendence—as suggested above—is not tied simply 
to theological, or even ontological, imperatives alone, i.e., to higher beings, or to a Judeo-
Christian God, imposing eternal mandates from without. Transcendence is also affirmed 
through the production of empirical, social, theoretical, or political constants, and really 
in and through any ―system of laws or relations that would govern life‖ (Colebrook, 
Perplexed 129). Moreover, the transcendent orientation serves the interests of a powerful, 
totalitarian, and ultimately paranoid State apparatus in a way that captures or overcodes
50
 
various bodies (including, book bodies) various relationships, social arrangements, etc. 
Transcendence, in fact, striates ―all reality: space, time, body, culture, nature‖ (Bonta and 
Protevi, Geophilosophy 147), and does so generally (though not exclusively) by 
subjecting those things to the operations of standardized and pre-existing regimes of 
signification. Literary criticism, I argue, like most all theoretical or interpretative 
endeavours, is typically written from what Deleuze-Guattari call ―a sedentary point of 
view and in the name of a unitary State apparatus‖ (Plateaus 23). From that perspective, 
various critical postulates take shape around, for example, a conception of individuated 
enunciation—i.e., what Michel Foucault refers to as the text‘s ―author-function‖
51
—or, 
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 In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze-Guattari claim that ―Unity always operates in an empty dimension 
supplementary to that of the system considered (overcoding)‖ (8); they then add that overcoding is a 
semiotically ―produced…phenomena of centering, unification, totalization, integration, hierarchicalization, 
and finalization‖ (41; trans. modified), which on the whole suggests transcendent operations are in play. 
51
 In ―What is an Author?,‖ Foucault undermines—as would Maurice Blanchot and Deleuze—most all 
propositions concerning the author-function, among them, the suggestion that ―the author provides the basis 
for explaining not only the presence of certain events in a work, but also their transformations, distortions, 
and diverse modifications (through his biography, the determination of his individual perspective, the 
analysis of his social position, and the revelation of his basic design). The author is also the principle of a 
certain unity of writing—all differences having to be resolved, at least in part, by the principles of 
evolution, maturation, or influence. The author also serves to neutralize the contradictions that may emerge 
in a series of texts: there must be—at a certain level of his thought or desire, of his consciousness or 
unconscious—a point where contradictions are resolved, where incompatible elements are at last tied 
together or organized around a fundamental or originating contradiction. Finally, the author is a particular 
source of expression that, in more or less completed forms, is manifested equally well, and with similar 
validity, in works, sketches, letters, fragments, and so on‖ (384). 
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more generally, around what Deleuze-Guattari call ―a tripartite division between a field 
of reality (the world) and a field of representation (the book) and a field of subjectivity 
(the author)‖ (Plateaus 23), which involves the enduring pursuit of dominant 
significations. Also, the critical State apparatus lays a consistent emphasis on structures 
of the book: e.g., ends, beginnings, points of departure and arrival, foundations, filiations, 
reproductions, interiorities. Deleuze-Guattari conclude that ―It is a regrettable 
characteristic of the Western mind to relate expressions and actions to exterior or 
transcendent ends…[to] culmination and termination points‖ (22). At this point, then, we 
turn in earnest to the question of how the discourse of literary criticism has historically 






How to Make a Dead Writer Sad— 
Stratigraphic Criticism and the Judgment of God 
Every stratum is a judgment of God. 
—Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (A Thousand Plateaus, 44) 
I tell you that they have reinvented microbes in order to impose a new idea of God. 
They have found a new way to bring out God and to capture him in his microbic noxiousness. 
—Antonin Artaud (To Have Done with the Judgment of God, A Radio Play) 
 
My ideal, when I write about an author, would be to write nothing that could cause him 
sadness, or if he is dead, that might make him weep in his grave…So many dead writers must 
have wept over what has been written about them. 
—Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet (Dialogues II, 119)52 
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 The authorial coupling between Deleuze and his former student, Claire Parnet, would result in the 1977 
publication of an unusual volume, entitled Dialogues—re-released in English under the title Dialogues II. I 
describe this work as ―unusual‖ because, despite its title, the authors skirt the communication—or 
interview-based—format in favour of a series of individual, though perhaps heteroglossic, essays on a 
variety of subjects, signed separately by each author. Deleuze and Parnet would later collaborate on a series 
of wide-ranging interviews, entitled L‘Abécédaire de Gilles Deleuze (The ABCs of Gilles Deleuze)—an 8-
hour presentation that would come to French television in 1994, a year prior to Deleuze‘s death, despite his 
wish to have the interviews released only after his death. In any case, I will hereafter refer to this coupling 
as Deleuze-Parnet, following the same convention I set for Deleuze and Guattari. 
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The Literary Organism 
We begin by recalling Deleuze‘s claim—highlighted in the last chapter—that ―the 
poisoned gift of Platonism is to have introduced transcendence into philosophy, to have 
given transcendence a plausible philosophical meaning (the triumph of the judgment of 
God).‖ In particular, I wish to focus on the phrase ―the judgment of God‖—a phrase that 
plots an intricate philosophical trajectory through the work of Deleuze (and Deleuze-
Guattari), and so requires careful elucidation. The phrase itself can be traced back to 
French poet/philosopher Antonin Artaud, and his infamous radio play,
53
 ―To Have Done 
with the Judgment of God.‖
54
 In this play, Artaud claims that God is renewed in the 
figure of ―man.‖ He writes, ―although nobody believes in God any more everybody 
believes more and more in man. / So it is man whom we must now make up our minds to 
emasculate.‖ The sincerest wish of Artaud‘s speaker, then, is ―to put an end to this ape 
once and for all […] to strip him bare in order to scrape off that animalcule that / itches 
him mortally.‖
55
 So putting an end to ―this ape‖ means—at least in part—putting an end 
to the idea of man as organic unity, and dismantling the representation of bodies as self-
sufficient, self-contained bio-mechanical organisms, which are structured in ways similar 
to the amoeba, but at a higher level of complexity. 
For Artaud, ―God‖—or really, the judgment of God—renews itself in the discrete 
and autonomous figure of the organism, and, by extension, the organizing principles and 
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 Strictly speaking, Artaud‘s work is scripted less like your average radio drama, and more like a long 
poem that in recent interpretations (of the last decade, or so) has been presented as ―performance art.‖ 
54
 This piece was first recorded in late 1947, by Artaud himself—after several years being confined to 
psychiatric hospitals, and a few months prior to his death in 1948. The play, however, would never make it 
to air in France—a fact that seemed to have hastened its author‘s death—and would remain on the shelf for 
the next 30 years, owing in part to its sacrilegious content and chaotic mode of presentation. The following 
selections are excerpted from a transcript of the play, reproduced in Antonin Artaud: Selected Writings.  
55
 A microscopic organism, like an amoeba or a paramecium, is sometimes referred to as an ―animalcule,‖ 
which basically translates as ―little animal.‖ 
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organic unities that serve to contain and control that material body. So the organism‘s 
predetermined organization is the real enemy, the real target, of Artaud‘s play. Put 
simply, God, and the attendant power of any transcendent authority to enclose the body—
i.e., to subject it to a set of restrictions or confinements—reasserts itself not just in the 
figure of man, but, more precisely, in the semiotic and structural coordinates that various 
organic conceptions of man impose on the body. So Artaud concludes: ―you can tie me 
up if you wish, but there is nothing more useless than an organ.‖ By this he means a 
couple of things. First, there is ―nothing more useless‖ than that which regulates (or gives 
order to) the body‘s machinic encounters with the outside; nothing more useless than that 
which selectively filters (or filters out) intensive sensory inputs by limiting itself to a 
specific function within the body (e.g., seeing, breathing, or circulating blood).
56
 In other 
words, ―there is nothing more useless‖ than that which partitions and organizes material 
flows in, out, and through the organism. Second, John Protevi points to what he calls ―the 
interchange of theology, biology and politics inherent in the question of nature and the 
organism‖ (30). He labels this ―traditional nexus‖ a ―theo-bio-political structure,‖ and 
isolates numerous historical convergences of these various discourses in the work of, 
among others, Aristotle and Kant. A simple example of this nexus may be a concept like 
the ―body politic,‖ or Kant‘s notion of an ―architect God.‖
57
 But in his reading of 
Aristotle, Protevi provides a more complex rendering of the issue as follows: 
Under the rule of the soul, the body becomes unified, a single organ…Any 
formation of a unity is always that of ruler/ruled, and the unification of the 
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 Think of the eyes reducing sensation/experience to a set of visual coordinates: What do they overlook? 
57
 Protevi argues that in Kant‘s Critique of Judgment, ―nature and freedom are finally related in the thought 
of a moral architect God who guarantees that nature must at least cooperate with our moral action‖ (35). 
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animal body under the rule of soul is masterly rather than political 
(Politics…). Psychic organisation entails somatic enslavement. (33) 
So the discursive exchanges between biology, politics, and theology—which are nearly 
ceaseless—underscore the link that Artaud formulates between conceptions of the organ 
(or the self-contained organism) and the judgment of God. In fact, taking Artaud‘s point 
to its extreme, one might conclude that ―there is nothing more useless than…‖ a pre-
determined organization, an organizing principle, an organic unity, an organizing power, 
a discursive organization (social, psychological, literary), or the idea of a hermetically-
sealed organism, for which God provides the basic model. 
So Artaud concludes with the following provocation: 
When you will have made him a body without organs, 
then you will have delivered him from all his automatic reactions 
and restored him to his true freedom. 
Here then we have the first appearance of what will become one of Deleuze-Guattari‘s 
most notorious and difficult concepts, the ―body without organs‖ (henceforth, BwO)—a 
concept that can be rendered in any number of ways.
58
 One approach is to note that the 
organism—and not the ―organ,‖ per se: as Deleuze-Guattari claim, ―the BwO is not at all 
the opposite of the organs…The enemy is the organism‖ (Plateaus 158)—deprives us of 
―true freedom,‖ because it effectively automates the material body; it regulates the 
capacities (or powers) of the body; it imprisons the body by way of preset organizations 
and organic unities. Deleuze-Guattari then advance the issue as follows: 
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 At different times in their work, Deleuze-Guattari describe the BwO as ―the zero degree of intensity,‖ 
―the plane of immanence‖ or ―plane of consistency,‖ the ―molecular‖ body, ―the earth,‖ ―a recording 
surface,‖ ―the disjunctive synthesis,‖ etc. We will return to this concept in the Interchapter between 
Chapters 3 and 4. 
102 
 
The BwO is opposed not to the organs but to that organization of the 
organs called the organism…the organic organization of the organs. The 
judgment of God, the system of the judgment of God, the theological 
system, is precisely the operation of He who makes an organism, an 
organization of organs called the organism, because He cannot bear the 
BwO, because he pursues it and rips it apart so He can be first, and have 
the organism be first. The organism is already that, the judgment of God, 
from which medical doctors benefit and on which they base their power. 
The organism is not at all the body, the BwO; rather it is a stratum on the 
BwO, in other words, a phenomenon of accumulation, coagulation, and 
sedimentation that, in order to extract useful labour from the BwO, 
imposes on it forms, functions, bonds, dominant and hierarchized 
organizations, organized transcendences‖ (158–59; emphasis my own). 
There are several important gestures in this passage that will need to be unpacked as we 
move forward. Of particular note, though, is the direct correlation the authors draw 
between the organism and the judgment of God. Their point is that God, in whatever 
shape or form it takes—from transcendent authority to microbe (see Artaud‘s statement 
in the head-note to this chapter)—always remains the figure (or marker) of organic unity 
and transcendent order. Moreover, the function of God, in every context, is to suppress 
difference, to contain and control it, and to unite bodies under the banner of some sort of 
structured and totalizing whole. So, as Artaud says, what once was God is renewed in the 
concept of man, or even the ―animalcule [i.e., ‗little animal‘] that / itches him mortally.‖ 
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 Deleuze reinforces this point in a late essay, whose title, ―To Have Done with 
Judgment,‖ obviously harkens back to Artaud‘s radio play. In this essay, Deleuze claims 
that ―judgment implies a veritable organization of the bodies through which it acts: 
organs are both judges and judged, and the judgment of God is nothing other than the 
power to organize to infinity‖ (Essays 130). In other words, judgment presupposes the 
organized body. It presupposes a set of standards, and a certain foundation or ground that 
guarantees those standards; it also presupposes that which can be judged in light of those 
standards. So wherever prefigured organizations of one sort or another set standards, and 
encourage claims to be made—i.e., through elective modes of participation—in relation 
to those standards, and wherever reactions or interactions in and between bodies become 
automated, thus giving rise to, for example, regulated encounters, fixed identities, habits, 
patterns, routines, and so forth, the judgment of God is at work. That judgment suppresses 
the unpredictable, unregulated body. And recalling our discussion of Spinoza from the 
last chapter, it cuts the body off from its power to act, from what it can or might do, from 
its actions and passions, its true freedoms or ―natural right‖ (Deleuze, Expressionism 
258), and its ―joyful affections‖ (261). Judgment then not only reinforces stabilized (or 
stabilizing) structures of knowledge and authority, but it also reinforces dialectical 
schemata for organizing (e.g., categorizing, ranking, stratifying) bodies—as Deleuze 
says, organizing them ―to infinity‖: ―Where we once had a vital and living body, God has 
made us into an organism…an organized body without which his judgment could not be 
exercised‖ (Essays 131). 
 But the enduring question in this context is how, precisely, is the body made into 
an organism, that which, in turn, reflects and reinforces the judgment of God? For 
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Deleuze-Guattari, the simple answer is that organisms are created through strata—or 
rather, through the processes of stratification.
59
 They argue the point as follows: 
Strata are acts of capture, they are like ‗black holes‘ or occlusions striving 
to seize whatever comes within their reach. They operate by coding and 
territorialization upon the earth…The strata are judgments of God; 
stratification in general is the entire system of the judgment of God (but 
the earth, or the body without organs, constantly eludes that judgment) 
(Plateaus 40). 
The point here is that all organisms are essentially stratified at the level of form (by way 
of various codes, structures, territorializations); and at the level of substance (by way of 
the contents it captures and the matters it selects). So the organism, in terms of both form 
and substance, is the sum total of its various layerings and formed matters (i.e., its strata). 
The judgment of God, then, is reflected in and through that strata: ―a stratum, and not 
only an organism, is necessary to make the judgment of God‖ (159). The stratified 
organism, newly constituted, now weighs upon the body; it codes and restricts the body. 
It occludes the body, and its potential variations (i.e., its capacity to alter, to transform, to 
enter into new arrangements with other bodies). The stratified organism suppresses 
difference in the body, and does so by suppressing the body‘s capacity to renew itself, to 
unfold, to become-other. But as Deleuze-Guattari go on to say, the organism itself is just 
one form or type of strata that imposes on the body: ―Let us consider the three great strata 
                                                          
59
 Drawing on the work of Dutch Linguist, Louis Hjelmslev, Deleuze-Guattari argue that the creation of 
any sort of strata (geological, linguistic, social, etc.) requires a ―double articulation,‖ which means that 
strata take shape through the contents they gather, and give form to (i.e., code), and in the way that those 
contents are formally expressed. Both expression and content are themselves doubly articulated, through 
form and substance (e.g., form of content, substance of expression, etc.). It is in and through the form of 
expression that the stratum will ―sing the glory of God‖ (Plateaus 43). 
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concerning us, in other words, the ones that most directly bind us: the organism, 
signifiance, and subjectification.‖ So the body is confined not only to its bio-mechanical 
frame, but is reduced to what it signifies (i.e., the interpretations or representations we 
may have of it—e.g., we ask: ‗what is it?‘ or ‗what does it mean?‘). The body is also 
restricted to structures of value and import, and ultimately subjected to some type of 
identity or essential attribute that only further shuts down its materio-semiotic capacities 
to engender sensation, to bifurcate, and to become-other.  
These matters are somewhat complex, and admittedly I provide only a very brief 
sketch of Deleuze-Guattari‘s work on these issues. But the point to which we have thus 
far been leading in this chapter is the idea that book-bodies, just like all other bodies, are 
stratified in and through the discourse of literary criticism. Book-bodies are subject to 
various controls at the level of both form and content—again, just like any other stratified 
body. Book-bodies repeatedly endure the imposition of organizational structures, the 
regimes of signification, and both the subjective and communal will. Under these various 
forms of control, book-bodies are organically unified. They are schematized and 
regulated through a form of criticism (or critical methodology) that I will generally refer 
to—over the pages that follow—as stratigraphic criticism. That is, I will show that 
various approaches to the book (if not the critic, and the task of the critic, as well) that 
stratigraphic modes of criticism promote have played a prominent, yet wholly pernicious, 
role in the discourse of literary criticism, from Plato to the present. Those modes of 
criticism manifest themselves, most clearly, in the historical efforts of many critics (and 
many schools of criticism) to impose various settlements and stabilities on the book, 
various forms of semiotic containment and control. In part, stratigraphic modes of 
106 
 
criticism view the book through the lens of its lateral continuities with other books—i.e., 
its generic and structural bonds, its internal resemblances, its various marks of identity. In 
that way, then, stratigraphic criticism subjects the book to the judgment of God, to what 




 it. So ―the triumph of the judgment of God‖ in 
this context is really the triumph of the literary organism, the triumph of critical strata, 
and the triumph of the various universals (or literary values) that promote that strata. This 
is the triumph of form over matter (the hylomorphic model). The triumph of interiorities. 
The triumph of endless tribunals, or of ceaseless rounds of legitimation and validation. 
The triumph of what contains or suppresses the new, the vital. The triumph of what stifles 
the book‘s becomings, its machinic flows—in short, the immanent capacity of the book to 
forge productive connections and go to the limits, or the n
th
 degree, of its power.
62
 In the 
end, Deleuze-Guattari make the critical point that ―the judgment of God weighs upon and 
is exercised against the BwO…[and it] is the BwO that is stratified‖ (Plateaus 159). 
In this chapter I will demonstrate how, and to what extent, literary critical 
discourse has been mired in what Deleuze-Guattari refer to as ―the long history of an 
illusion‖ (What is? 47)—the illusion of transcendence—which is ceaselessly renewed and 
reinforced by subordinating the book to various critical striations: i.e., ―the triumph of the 
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 A code is a set of rules governing the combination, juxtaposition and organization of various resources 
(e.g., semantic, phonological, syntactic, semiological) in the use of language (or any other sign system). 
Codes control how speakers activate and make use of the meaning-making potentials of language, and they 
regulate not only the production, but also the reading/reception, of texts (think: narrative codes). More 
precisely, codes determine the range of formal options—i.e., the linguistic, grammatical, semiotic, and 
discursive repertoire—available to language users; they then become powerful markers of hegemony and 
social control in their capacity to both express and reinforce ideologically-saturated social information. 
61
 We first encountered this notion in the introduction. In general, overcoding—or the process of such—
involves (1) the suspension of heterogeneous codes (syntactic, narrative, textual), and the substances that 
they structure (i.e., give form to); and (2) the expression (or re-articulation) of those ―formed matters‖ at a 
higher—or at least different—level of organization. According to Deleuze-Guattari, this semiotic process 
yields ―phenomena of centering, unification, totalization, integration, hierarchicalization, and finalization‖ 
(Plateaus 41). So the book is overcoded, first, by being extracted from a more material (though coded) 
milieu; and second, by being expressed as a unified, organic whole, which means or signifies something.  
62
 On this point, recall our discussion of Spinoza and ethics from the last chapter. 
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judgment of God.‖ I also argue that critics have become (unwitting?) participants in the 
dissemination and persistent renewal of Plato‘s ―poisoned gift.‖ In fact, I would go so far 
as to suggest that the true Platonic legacy regarding the book does not so much manifest 
itself in, for example, critical concerns about the ontological status of the book, or the 
psychological distortions propagated by literature—though this latter has long been an 
issue for many schools of literary/cultural criticism—but instead in rhetorical efforts to 
erect and stabilize the literary organism, itself. As has been suggested, erecting the 
literary organism involves the ongoing stratification of the book and the forced 
imposition of, among other things, a set of sanctioned critical values, those that not only 
standardize or regulate critical encounters with the book (i.e., how books are interpreted, 
evaluated, represented), but that ultimately dematerialize the book, and hence its capacity 
to vary, to affect and be affected, to function as a being of sensation, to remain open to 
external forces and ultimately go critical—matters that we will explore in Part 2 of the 
dissertation. So the role of transcendence in literary critical discourse reveals itself most 
fully in the enduring efforts of critics to stratify the book, or to unify it in some way, and 
then to mask the underlying discursivity that undoubtedly conditions those critical efforts. 
The “Triple Illusion” 
Contemplation, reflection and communication are not disciplines, but machines for constituting 
Universals in every discipline. 
—Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (What is Philosophy?, 6) 
In their final collaborative effort, Deleuze-Guattari broach the question at the 
centre of that work—i.e., what is philosophy?—by making a case (in the early stages of 
the book) for what they believe philosophy is not: 
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We can at least see what philosophy is not: it is not contemplation, 
reflection, or communication. This is the case even though it may 
sometimes believe it is one or other of these, as a result of the capacity of 
every discipline to produce its own illusions and to hide behind its own 
peculiar smokescreen. (What is? 6) 
For Deleuze-Guattari the primary role of philosophy is to invent concepts—those that 
―map‖ (read: think along with, put to work)
63
 everything from, say, chaotic material 
processes in the physical universe (and beyond), to novel states of affairs in given social 
or political bodies; from transformative events and worldly becomings, to the lived 
experiences and everyday encounters of the individual; from the cultural sensibilities of 
the present, to new and unusual ways of thinking or ways of doing. The creation of 
concepts may involve either the overturning or reinvention of older concepts—those that 
reflect the concerns of a different age—as philosophers attempt to engage, or take a more 
contemporary accounting of, current realities (conditions, situations, experiences), in 
whatever ways they might present themselves. So concepts create new possibilities for, 
new ways of thinking, and/or interacting with, the world. 
But the potentially vital role that concepts can play, and, by extension, philosophy 
and philosophers, in society and elsewhere, is diminished or suppressed in one of two 
ways: first, by philosophers who make repeated appeals to, and hence reinforce, a given 
body of overworked, if not altogether obsolete, conceptual formulations—those created 
for perhaps an earlier time, or a different set of problems (philosophical or otherwise)—
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 In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze-Guattari distinguish the productive, experimental practices associated 
with ―mapping‖ from the sort of mimetic reproductions involved in what they call ―tracing.‖ (See, for 
example, their introductory plateau, ―The Rhizome,‖ pp. 12–3, 21.) 
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even while trying to speak to current concerns, and novel experiences. Following 
Nietzsche on this point, Deleuze-Guattari agree that philosophers 
‗must no longer accept concepts as a gift, nor merely purify them and 
polish them, but first make and create them, present them and make them 
convincing. Hitherto one has generally trusted one‘s concepts as if they 
were a wonderful dowry from some sort of wonderland.‘
64
 
So because experiential realities (or events on the ground, if you will) remain in a 
constant state of metamorphosis, concepts that have become little more than petrified 
abstractions, and that offer only conventional renderings of supposedly universal 
concerns, must be overturned or creatively re-configured by a philosophy that seeks to 
meet the exigencies of a continuously changing reality: 
there‘s no point at all doing philosophy the way Plato did, not because 
we‘ve superseded Plato but because you can‘t supersede Plato, and it 
makes no sense to have another go at what he‘s done for all time. There‘s 
only one choice…transplanting bits of Plato into problems that are no 
longer Platonic ones. (Deleuze, Negotiations 148) 
Second, and more importantly for our purposes, the essential work of the 
philosopher (i.e., concept creation) may also be suppressed by a philosophy that falls prey 
to what Deleuze-Guattari call the ―triple illusion‖ (What is? 49) of (1) contemplation, 
which involves the tracing (e.g., copying, mimetic reproduction) of a set of privileged, 
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 I cite this passage from Deleuze-Guattari‘s What is Philosophy? (5). The original excerpt, though, comes 
from Nietzsche‘s The Will to Power.
 
In his comments, Nietzsche begins by saying that philosophers ―have 
not stopped to consider that concepts and words are our inheritance from ages in which thinking was very 
modest and unclear.‖ He then concludes with the following: ―this piety towards what we find in us is 
perhaps part of the moral element in knowledge. What is needed above all is an absolute scepticism toward 
all inherited concepts‖ (III.1.409; pp. 220–21). 
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self-same ideals against which we then measure our relative degrees of perfection or 
legitimacy, and through which we come to define (or understand) ourselves; (2) 
reflection, which involves not only the interpretation of subjective experience—i.e., 
subjective modes of engagement with the world, subjective ways of knowing—but the 
inquiry into a commonly-held set of critical (or cognitive) faculties that falsely unify 
experience; and (3) communication, which involves establishing (or working toward) 
some sort of foundational consensus about things (in society, in culture, and beyond) 
through a preset conceptual vocabulary (e.g., democratic, liberal humanist); put another 
way, communicational paradigms assert the legitimacy of ready-made conversational 
constants in the explanation or description of, say, the structure and contents of conscious 
experience in the phenomenal world. 
For Deleuze-Guattari, these forms of philosophical activity (contemplation, 
reflection, communication), despite claims to the contrary, all derive from singular and 
localized encounters with the world; and so, they each have ―a history‖ (What is? 17) and 
a ―becoming‖ (18) of their own, i.e., an evolution and set of transformations unique to 
that practice; and each practice—even if it may be thought to serve some type of ―first 
philosophy‖ or universal principle—either presupposes or grounds itself in a multiplicity 
of pre-established concepts.
65
 At certain points in the history of philosophy, though, and 
in the hands of certain philosophers (e.g., Plato, Descartes, Kant, Husserl), these one-time 
philosophical trajectories (both localized and situated) become, in a word, constants of 
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 On this point, Deleuze-Guattari give the example of Descartes‘ cogito, which despite its claims to being a 
first philosophy (which ostensibly means a philosophy without supposition), presupposes—at minimum—
an understanding of the concepts (or processes) of doubting, thinking, and being (What is? 24). So as 
Deleuze-Guattari write, ―There are no simple concepts. Every concept has components and is defined by 
them. It therefore has a combination. It is a multiplicity…There is no concept with only one 
component…Every concept is at least a double or triple, etc.‖ (15). 
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philosophical activity in their own right—i.e., preconceived ways of thinking and 
knowing the world. They become the philosophical (and also critical) mechanisms by 
which the judgment of God is rendered. They bring a transcendent unity to the world, and 
to our subjective or intersubjective experience of that world; they each, in their own way, 
become a kind of critical lens for interpreting and organizing experiences; and they each 
provide the conceptual or discursive tools—i.e., the terms of discussion, the talking 
points (or points of reference)—for recognizing, understanding, or communicating those 
experiences. So a philosophy that contemplates a set of Ideas or ideals (e.g., Justice, 
Truth—the Platonic Forms, in general; also, God, Being) that transcend, and yet govern, 
reality, Deleuze-Guattari label ―objective idealism‖ (7); a philosophy that reflects upon 
the subject of knowledge (e.g., Descartes‘ Cogito), or on the cognitive conditions for all 
possible experience (e.g., Kant‘s transcendental critique), they call ―subjective idealism‖; 
and a philosophy that pursues the goal of establishing communicative agreements, 
rational consensus, shared concerns, etc. (through, say, the tools of communicative action 
and/or discourse ethics), they deem ―intersubjective idealism‖ (7).
66
 In each of these 
philosophical activities, then, what Deleuze-Guattari call ―the mole of the transcendent‖ 
(46) repeatedly renews itself.
67
  
So if, as Deleuze-Guattari contend, ―every discipline‖ retains the capacity ―to 
produce its own illusions,‖ and as well the capacity ―to hide behind its own peculiar 
smokescreen,‖ then the following question presents itself, given the concerns of this 
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 Deleuze-Guattari further characterize this notion of rational consensus as the ―cogito of 
communication‖—i.e., an intersubjective mode of knowing or thinking the world which, they add, ―is even 
more dubious than that of reflection‖ (108). 
67
 By ―mole,‖ Deleuze-Guattari are indexing something like a molar unit—e.g., some type of normalized 
(and normalizing) variable that regulates, governs, organizes, etc. from without—and not some furry, 
subterranean creature. In brief, molar formations of the book-body are typically in play when a derived 
literary effect becomes a normative measure for interpreting or making sense of the book. 
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dissertation: Does the discourse of literary criticism similarly produce its own set of 
illusions or idealisms by promoting—not unlike philosophy—its own universals of 
contemplation, reflection, and consensus-oriented communication? And, if so, in what 
ways have those various ―fogs and miasmas‖ (Guattari, Chaosmosis 135) come to 
regulate critical encounters with the book? And how have they contributed to the kind of 
critical injustice that, as Deleuze laments, must have made many dead writers ―weep‖ in 
their graves? In fact, following Deleuze-Guattari‘s indictment of the Kafka critical 
establishment in their work, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature (which we discussed in 
the introductory chapter), Deleuze himself, in Dialogues, goes on to chastise certain 
elements within the critical community for the ways they have sought to subjugate or 
debase writers: ―You should hear qualified critics talking of Kleist‘s failures, Lawrence‘s 
impotence, Kafka‘s childishness, Carroll‘s little girls. It is unworthy… the work will 
appear all the greater the more pitiful the life is made to seem‖ (49). 
Before turning, then, in the next chapter to the question of what it might mean for 
critics to effectively circumvent the judgment of God, I wish to examine, in the pages that 
follow, the various critical tools by which literary criticism has historically pursued what 
I have been calling a stratigraphic agenda, vis-à-vis the book. That is, following Deleuze-
Guattari‘s claim that there are essentially ―[three] machines for constituting Universals in 
every discipline‖ (What is? 6): contemplation, reflection, and communication, I will 
attempt to show how these machines have become coextensive with literary criticism, or 
rather, how they have aligned themselves with ―the image‖ that literary critical thought 
―gives itself of what it means to think, to make use of thought, to find one‘s bearings in 
thought‖ (37). My argument, in short, is that the discourse of literary criticism—or, more 
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generally, literary theory—has demonstrated a nearly ancient proclivity for perpetuating a 
transcendent orientation to the book, and has done so through the construction of various 
universals of thought, or literary critical constants, that have served to unify, systematize, 
and organize the book, and in a way that both renders it abstract and wholly predictable. 
So critics in this field have long pursued an agenda (1) that objectifies the book, in large 
part by reducing it to an instantiation of certain aesthetic or linguistic principles; (2) that 
subjects the book to various critical representations; and (3) that further subjects the book 
to the consensus of a given discourse community. But as Deleuze-Guattari repeatedly 
remind us, ―Universals explain nothing, they themselves have to be explained‖ (7).
68
 And 
so, with this injunction in mind, I wish to illuminate what has become universal in 
literary critical discourse, and thus an enduring source of the book‘s organizational strata: 
i.e., its stable critical values and the restrictive judgments that those values imply. 
First Trajectory: Universals of Contemplation 
Philosophy, the history of philosophy, is encumbered with the problem of being, IS. They discuss 
the judgment of attribution (the sky is blue) and the judgment of existence (God is). 
 —Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet (Dialogues II, 56) 
To begin, we recall that in Plato‘s Ion, Socrates raises the spectre of an abstract 
art object, or what I am calling a literary organism. This organism is accessible—at least 
potentially so—to the astute reader/interpreter of poetry through a kind of disciplinary 
knowledge of the field, according to Socrates (sec. 532), and is therefore knowable 
independently of the particular instantiations of poetry. So when Socrates asks Ion, ―what 
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 In Negotiations, Deleuze similarly argues, ―Abstractions explain nothing, they themselves have to be 
explained: there are no such things as universals, there‘s nothing transcendent, no Unity, subject (or object), 
Reason; there are only processes, sometimes unifying, subjectifying, rationalizing, but just processes all the 
same‖ (145). For further repetitions of these same ideas, see Deleuze-Parnet‘s Dialogues II, p. vii.; also, 
Stivale‘s summary of L‘Abécédaire de Gilles Deleuze, avec Claire Parnet (see especially: ―U as in ‗Un‘‖). 
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in the world is it that you‘re clever about in Homer but not in Hesiod?‖ (sec. 531), he 
means to say that there are enduring poetic principles—and a generalized art object, 
itself—that will transcend the work of individual poets, yet nonetheless organize, unify 
(i.e., overcode), and hence assert significant control over, the various literary pretensions 
of the poet. Knowledge of those principles provide those who would presume to assess 
individual poems with the necessary know-how to make just comparisons between poets 
and their poems, to pass judgment, to sort good art from bad, and to arbitrate the relative 
quality of related claims to the truth or related imitations of worldly things. 
So, by extension, Socrates raises the possibility that someone—perhaps the 
rhapsode, but more likely someone else, yet to be named—may be capable of assessing, 
even mastering, the poetic genre (again, as a whole), by knowing how a given poet‘s 
work ranks within the more abstract stratifications of the literary organism. On this point, 
Socrates offers the following example (in somewhat patronizing fashion, I would add): 
―Well now, Ion, dear heart, when a number of people are discussing arithmetic, and one 
of them speaks best, I suppose someone will know how to pick out the good speaker‖ 
(Ion sec. 531). That someone will likely have access to a set of criteria by which to 
compare speakers. Socrates then expands the point as follows: ―now take the whole of 
any other subject: won‘t it have the same discipline throughout? And this goes for every 
subject that can be mastered‖ (sec. 532)—including, of course, poetry. On this point, 
Socrates links the mastery of the poem to the mastery of poetics. But Ion—as we well 
know—lacks any sort of rational or practical attunement to such disciplinary knowledge: 
Anyone can tell that you are powerless to speak about Homer on the basis 
of knowledge or mastery. Because if your ability came by mastery, you 
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would be able to speak about all the other poets as well. Look, there is an 
art of poetry as a whole, isn‘t there? 
So, in the Ion, poetry becomes an object of critical scrutiny—a self-contained, internally 
consistent set of operations that (at least potentially) can be known to the rhapsode-cum-
critic, or to anyone else who judges individual instances of art through the lens of certain 
critical filters, or certain aesthetic and social rankings, tied to fixed poetic principles. 
At the outset of What is Philosophy?, Deleuze-Guattari claim that ―With the 
creation of philosophy, the Greeks violently force the friend into a relationship that is no 
longer a relationship with an ‗other‘ but one with an Entity, an Objectality, an Essence‖ 
(3)—a point that helps clarify Socrates‘ argument in the Ion. That is, the rhapsode—or, 
let us say, the friend of Homer (who sings the poet‘s praises)—is forced to postpone the 
performance (―I‘ll make time for it, I promise‖). He is forced to suspend his intimacies 
with the poet, the poet‘s verses, and the spectator. He is forced to delay, defer the 
singularity of those encounters, the in-between, the living relationship. He is forced to 
eschew any sort of creative or constructive coupling with the book, and thus his 
capacity—what I deem essential—to experiment with the book, amplify its intensities, 
bring it to a point of operative crisis (a place far from equilibrium), and infuse it (or open 
it up to) any sort of life-force. In a sense, the rhapsode is the living embodiment of the 
book‘s potential (just as the philosopher, for Deleuze-Guattari, is the ―potentiality of the 
concept‖ (5)—an issue to which we will return in the next chapter). But the relationship 
with the book, now foisted upon the rhapsode, becomes possessive in nature, rather than 
co-creative. One of dominance and control, because in Platonic doctrine, ―Friendship 
must reconcile the integrity of the essence and the rivalry of claimants‖ (4). What this 
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means for the rhapsode is that he must reconcile himself to, or acknowledge, a rational 
idea of the poem, a rational essence, which transcends the work of any one poet, any one 
poem. Ion must judge the quality of Homer‘s pretensions (i.e., his imitations, his 
thought), as they relate to higher ideals, and thereby assess how the Homeric verses 
themselves compare to, or rival, the other poet ―claimants‖ of his age. So, in effect, Ion is 
forced—and forced ―violently,‖ I would add—to give up old friends, leave the stage 
(following the ancient chorus in this regard),
69
 and enter into a kind of pre-arranged 
marriage with a more abstract ―Entity.‖ As we well know, self-same, self-evident ideals 
(as conceived of by Plato) never allow for the sort of co-creative, and perhaps more 
friendly (i.e., reciprocally determining, mutually intensifying), relations that might 
unfold, say, between allies or intimates caught within the immediacy of the encounter. 
Deleuze-Parnet refer to relations of this latter sort as ―Nuptials without couples or 
conjugality‖ (Dialogues 8)—an issue that will be taken up in later chapters, as we begin 
to imagine more ephemeral and intensive modes of the literary critical encounter. 
Still, I argue that the separation of poem from friend—i.e., from spectator, from 
critic, from the ―champions‖ of poetry ―who are not poets‖ (Plato, Republic X.607d)—
and the subject-object dualism that displaces this type of pre-Socratic coupling, becomes 
the necessary precursor to what one might call an ―eidetic‖ (Deleuze-Guattari, What is? 
47) mode of criticism, and its focus on ―the great Object of contemplation‖ (51). That is, 
critical efforts to identify a literary object of study—a literary organism, or, more 
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 According to Friedrich Nietzsche, in The Birth of Tragedy, a pre-Socratic, ―primordial unity‖ gives way 
to a series of binaries (or dualisms) that begin to take shape in later developments of Greek tragedy—in 
part owing to the shift in sensibilities associated with Socratic rationalism—including those between 
comedy and tragedy, just and unjust, good and bad, reward and punishment, and (interestingly enough) 
stage performer and chorus: in other words, the chorus—in a way that reflects Socrates‘ hope for Ion—is 
separated from the action, and thus no longer serves as an active player or participant in the drama. 
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precisely, a harmonious, self-same, and thus internally consistent idea (or ideal) of the 
poem or novel—depends, first of all, on the extraction/isolation of what Deleuze-Guattari 
would call the ―Objectality‖ of the poem. The poem‘s objectality derives from particular 
instances of art—or, in fact, from specific poetic variables lifted from the book, rendered 
abstract or ideal, and hence re-conceived as the knowable or recognizable substrate that 
informs the production (and reception) of all books, all poems. So the poem, guaranteed 
by its internal resemblance to other poems, can now be subjected to the tools of 
comparative analysis and rational inquiry. It can be known, mastered. The Eidetic era of 
critical contemplation grounds itself, then, in the formal recollection or reminiscence—
i.e., the ―total recall‖—of the poem‘s objectality.
70
 Eidetic criticism, in short, is memory-
based. So when the critic or spectator first encounters the poem, they encounter an 
objective memory of a more abstract art object (or structural form), stripped from the 
immediacy of its material environs, and formally positioned in an essential relation (1) to 
other poems; (2) to the various aesthetic and epistemological preconditions of that poetry; 
and (3) to the various critical, aesthetic, and socio-cultural codes that have grown up and 
taken shape around those poems. Situated thus, the poem‘s materiality, its energies and 
ephemera, are collectively subordinated to a set of unimpeachable and enduring critical 
values that transcend art—those that filter, domesticate, and tame art. This, then, is what 
Deleuze means when he says that Plato‘s real motivation is to root out the simulacrum, 
which, in this instance, involves rooting out the artistic dissembler. It means purging 
difference (anomaly, excess, divergence) from all critical orientations to poetry. 
                                                          
70
 The ―eidetic‖ plays a pivotal role in Plato‘s metaphysics (i.e., his theory of the Forms), with the basic 
idea being that things/objects are only recognizable to us only because they mimic (or are pale reflections 
of) immutable Forms. So material objects (like a poem) repeat the One, the same—an idea rarely out of 
fashion in literary critical discourse, especially in the 20
th
 century (e.g., in formalism and structuralism). 
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Towards a Structural Destiny
71
 
Structural linguists and semioticians—i.e., those who wish to isolate a unified 
ideal of language, or system of langue (in Saussurean linguistics), buoyed by a rationally-
derived body of linguistic or grammatical constants—relate the book, as Deleuze-
Guattari contend, ―to exterior or transcendent ends‖ (Plateaus 22) through the dual 
construction of a ―genetic axis‖ (12) and a ―deep structure‖ or ―structural destiny‖ (14) to 
the book.
72
 Leaving aside the many semantic (and conceptual) complexities associated 
with these terms, I would simply say that Deleuze-Guattari mean to draw attention to 
their particular role as ―infinitely reproducible principles of tracing‖ (13). That is, each 
linguistic axis—both genetic and structural—has a foundational character that can be 
traced (i.e., copied, mimetically reproduced) in any given statement or utterance. So what 
we have are fixed, structuralist categories; each in their own way, then, and in 
combination with other structural imperatives, not only limit (frame, close off) the range 
of potential statements a system (or book-body) can generate, but give a coherent and 
rational unity to language, itself, which can then be scientifically isolated. In effect, the 
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 In the following passage, Greg Lambert provides a short recounting of the shift to the structuralist 
paradigm in literary critical discourse, which I will unpack in detail over the pages that follow: ―[T]he entry 
of structuralist categories into the study of language and literature after the 1950s marks the beginning of a 
scientific function which has dominated the major movements of literary criticism from that period onward; 
however, the need to guarantee a constancy of the object of knowledge (which is a major trait of 
structuralist and narratological theories of Gérard Genette, in particular, but also Gerald Prince, Michel 
Riffaterre, and Robert Scholes) shares many of the same attributes of what Deleuze-Guattari describe as 
‗Royal Science.‘ Thus literary criticism of this type may indirectly serve to inscribe the normative value of 
literary expression within an apparatus of specialisation, one that also bears a political function consonant 
with the institutional determination of its subject‖ (―Uses‖ 140). In Part 2, I contrast the idea of criticism 
being a ―Royal Science‖ with it being a ―minor‖ or ―nomad‖ science (Deleuze-Guattari, Plateaus 368). 
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 Somewhat cryptically, Deleuze-Guattari define the former, the genetic axis, as ―an objective pivotal unity 
upon which successive stages are organized‖ (Plateaus 13), and the latter, the deep structure, as ―more like 
a base sequence that can be broken down into immediate constituents, while the unity of the product [i.e., 
the book] passes into another, transformational and subjective, dimension.‖ While the more commonly 
known concept of a ―deep structure‖ has many wide-ranging applications in (especially) Saussurean and 
Chomskian linguistics, the cognitive and information sciences, rationalist philosophy, and elsewhere, the 
idea of a ‗genetic axis‘ would seem to relate more directly to Chomsky‘s notion of a generative grammar—
an issue that we will pick up on in a moment. 
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linguist collects data, separates the essential from the accidental (or merely contingent), 
and makes clear determinations about the so-called universal aspects of language. Brian 
Massumi (following Deleuze-Guattari) sees little value in such administerial pursuits, 
arguing that ―the challenge is to conceptualize the real conditions of production of 
particular statements ([e.g.,] how does the system move from one unique permutation to 
the next? How is it forever becoming other than itself?)‖ (User‘s Guide 43). In other 
words, the challenge is to shift the focus away from what a given set of linguistic or 
grammatical constants (i.e., a genetic axis or deep structure to language) will allow—vis-
à-vis habitual utterances or habitual meanings/understandings. The question then turns 
(1) to what actually does happen in the singular ―production of particular statements‖; 
and, more importantly, (2) to what might happen—i.e., the question of pure potential. 
One of Deleuze-Guattari‘s primary targets in this matter, beyond Saussure‘s 
systematization of language and of sign (i.e., sound-image) relationships, is Noam 
Chomsky. In particular, they target Chomsky‘s transformative or generative grammar and 
its systematic efforts to decipher the human mind—or rather, the innate cognitive 
capacities of the individual, especially as those capacities directly relate to language 
use
73
—by describing how, for example, children or native speakers of a given language 
are able to access a set of rational heuristics in order to learn and make use of the formal 
(read: context-free) syntactic structures of their own language, and thus speak 
grammatically. Chomsky‘s generative grammar also explains how speakers with limited 
linguistic or grammatical competence are not only able to reproduce the formal syntactic 
structures of a given language, but are able to modify and/or extend the extant syntactic 
markers of that language through the rational or cognitive application of complex 
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 For Chomsky, linguistics is a branch of cognitive psychology. 
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transformative rules. Deleuze-Guattari, for their part, characterize Chomsky‘s 
transformative rules as an ―arborescent schema‖ (Plateaus 323)—or rather, linguistic 
arborescence—and contrast their own open-ended, rhizomatic conceptions of language 
and the book with Chomsky‘s obviously closed, and highly prescriptive, grammatical 
method. Deleuze-Guattari argue that ―[t]here are no points or positions in a rhizome, such 
as those found in a structure, tree, or root‖ (8), and that ―what constitutes arborescence is 
the submission of the line to the point‖ (323). What this means is that Chomsky‘s 
arboreal model reduces the sign (or sign-becoming) to something like a fixed sign-
coordinate, which can be readily located in, and interpreted through the lens of, an 
overarching ―grammaticality‖ (148). So individual statements and utterances, individual 
uses of language, become predictable copies or tracings of a central order and fixed 
grammatical unity. Put another way, the speaker has access to, and makes use of, a ―pre-
traced destiny, whatever name is given to it—divine, anagogic, historical, economic, 
structural, hereditary, or syntagmatic‖ (13), which, in turn, overcodes (and hence 
organizes) any and all linguistic or grammatical constructions. 
So speakers or language users derive the capacity to competently generate and 
transform specific grammatical constructions through their rational access to a 
―supplementary dimension‖ of language, which is transcendent and wholly autonomous 
in nature. In short, they draw upon (as previously suggested) ―a root command structure,‖ 
given that ―all of tree logic,‖ according to Deleuze-Guattari, ―is a logic of tracing and 
reproduction‖ (Plateaus 12), or a logic of infinite reproduction of the same. Moreover, 
―all of tree logic‖ depends on deep structural homologies (or correspondences) unfolding 
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in regulated and predictable ways between the lexicon and the abstract operations of a 
Universal Grammar. So Deleuze-Guattari conclude the following: 
In linguistics as in psychoanalysis, [the] object [of study] is an 
unconscious that is itself representative, crystallized into codified 
complexes, laid out along a genetic axis and distributed within a 
syntagmatic structure. Its goal [that of linguistics or psychoanalysis] is to 
describe a de facto state, to maintain balance in intersubjective relations, 
or to explore an unconscious that is already there from the start, lurking in 
the dark recesses of memory and language….[Reaching that goal] consists 
of tracing, on the basis of an overcoding structure or supporting axis, 
something that comes ready-made. The tree articulates and hierarchizes 
tracings; tracings are like the leaves of a tree. (12) 
Chomsky‘s ―great Object of contemplation‖ is a syntactic or linguistic ―unconscious,‖ 
which, as suggested in the passage above, is ―crystallized into codified complexes, laid 
out along a genetic axis and distributed within a syntagmatic structure.‖ Related objects 
of study for Chomsky include the underlying mental reality (or human essence) that this 
representative unconscious denotes in the speaker (or language user), and even the whole 
notion of competence itself—the concept that Chomsky effectively substitutes for 
Saussure‘s primary object of contemplation, langue. 
In any case, the point I wish to emphasize is that, just like the linguist or 
psychoanalyst, the critic comes into full possession of his own object of contemplation by 
viewing the book, or its component parts, as ―particular instances of a type‖ (Massumi, 
User‘s Guide 96)—or rather, particular instances of more universal types, either 
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structural, aesthetic, grammatical, generic, narratorial (or what have you)—and hence by 
grasping the book-body, itself, ―solely from the point of view of [its] generality.‖ In so 
doing, the critic restricts the operations of the book to a set of organizational dictates, i.e., 
the judgment of God, which not only involves subjecting the book to certain normative 
(and normalizing) unities, but to the oppressive tyranny of the signifier (or signifying 
regime of signs), as well. Deleuze-Guattari argue, for example, that textual unity—or, at 
least, the image of such—takes shape through ―the tripartite division between a field of 
reality (the world) and a field of representation (the book) and a field of subjectivity (the 
author)‖ (Plateaus 23). The book-body, then, is enclosed by these various fields, unable 
to escape the proliferating controls/confinements of a powerful institutional apparatus.  
The discourse of literary criticism has a long history, extending as far back as 
antiquity, of attempting to regulate critical encounters with the book (e.g., poetry, drama, 
and eventually the novel)—the apparent goal of which was to coordinate the activities of 
critics, so as to mitigate the possibility that they might make entirely subjective, if not 
simplistic, misguided, unproductive, investments in the text—an issue to which we will 
turn in the next section. The idea of a fixed object of contemplation has hardly abated in 
the intervening millennia between Plato and the present—―the long history of an 
illusion.‖ Aristotle, even more than Plato (his teacher), would be the first to really give 
weight to this illusion of an objective essence (or objectality) to the play. That is, 
Aristotle would shift the critical focus away from the more extrinsic matters of morality 
and social responsibility as they relate to questions of literature (or literary influence)—
which Plato had so carefully sought to pull into focus—and toward a systematic 
delineation of the material aspects of the text, that is, its generic or stylistic elements 
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(e.g., plot, character, diction, rhythm or meter), and the principles of literary construction. 
Aristotle, in short, makes those aforementioned aspects of the poem, and their formal 
combination within the poem itself, a true and legitimate object of study in its own right; 
with that, he advances the notion that the poet must be as much condemned for 
inadequate diction and meter, ineffective characterization, a lack of formal unity, and 




By the twentieth century, (Russian) Formalism, New Criticism, the Chicago 
School (or New Aristotelians), Archetypal Criticism, Genre Criticism, (French) 
Structuralism, Structural Linguistics, and even some branches of Rhetorical Criticism, 
would go a long way to reviving and expanding upon the Aristotelian project. For 
example, archetype critic Northrop Frye writes, ―We discover that the critical theory of 
genres is stuck precisely where Aristotle left it‖ (13). The Chicago School (e.g., R. S. 
Crane, Elder Olson, etc.), in anticipation of Frye‘s landmark work in the area of genre 
criticism, would explore the question of generic classifications (e.g., lyric, novel, etc.), 
and of different types of plots (comic, tragic, etc.); they would also (at times) draw upon 
an Aristotelian vocabulary, as in their conception of literature—or rather, certain aspects 
of such—as imitative or mimetic. Of particular note, though, is the Chicago School‘s 
critical emphasis on Aristotle‘s notion of a fourfold causality (e.g., material, formal, 
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 It should be noted, however, that Plato, in Phaedrus, not unlike Aristotle, draws attention to the need for 
artful execution in speech-making and poetry (sects. 277–78). Moreover, in Laws, Plato‘s main character, 
simply named ―Athenian,‖ rhetorically asks the following question: ―may we not say that in everything 
imitated, whether in drawing, music, or any other art, he who is to be a competent judge must possess three 
things;—he must know, in the first place, of what the imitation is; secondly, he must know that it is true; 
and thirdly, that it has been well executed in words and melodies and rhythms?‖ (sec. 669a–b). In these 
ways, Plato maps out the requirements of the poet, and on this last point, Platonic and Aristotelian concerns 
converge: i.e., they both agree that poets must be educated in the tools of composition. For Plato, such 
knowledge is a direct outgrowth of rational inquiry and conceptual understanding. 
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efficient, final), and its application to questions of poetic structure, or what Crane calls 
the ―concrete wholeness‖ (qtd. in Shereen 239) of the literary artefact—which points the 
way to the more general influence of Aristotle on literary criticism. That is, Aristotle‘s 
own ―poisoned gift‖ most fully reveals itself in the appeal to what Deleuze-Guattari call 
―the great Object of contemplation,‖ among so many twentieth-century critics (and/or 
schools of criticism)—in this case, that object is the autotelic or self-generating book—
and the related analytical pursuit of intrinsic modes of criticism. 
A widely held conceit among the New Critics, which has its roots in the work of 
British critic I. A. Richards, was that the poem operates as a complex, autonomous whole, 
and that it does so by organically synthesizing a set of ambiguities, ironies, or paradoxes 
at the level of, say, attitude, impulse, image, symbol, feeling, connotation, and so forth. 
So within the New Critical canon, the poem, in and of itself, offers up a coherent, moral, 
even therapeutic image of balance and harmony: a welcome respite, perhaps, in a time of 
world wars and the horrors of modernity. New Critic Cleanth Brooks would argue that 
the poem structures itself through ―a pattern of resolved stresses…[a] pattern of 
resolutions and balances and harmonisations‖ (203), and that it need be analyzed as an 
internally consistent, self-contained unity: an autonomous whole. So leaving aside for the 
moment Richards‘ own, fairly idiosyncratic psychological orientation to questions of the 
literary artefact, for the New Critics (e.g., Brooks, John Crowe Ransom, W. K. Wimsatt, 
Alan Tate), the poem becomes its own guarantee: a symbolic or linguistic monism that 
does not recognize literary types or genres, and that provides its own criteria—e.g., the 
complex linguistic handling of its multiple (read: paradoxical, ambiguous) meanings, the 
interdependency of its parts—for its evaluation or close reading. 
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According to Terry Eagleton, New Criticism would mark the ―beginnings of the 
‗reification‘ of the literary work‖ (Literary 44), which means that the New Critics would, 
by and large, excise social dialectics from the literary critical equation, i.e., the sorts of 
authorial (or biographical), historical, psychological, referential information/data—the 
extra-literary markers—that might come to inform, and thus confuse or distort, the 
critic‘s own close reading of the text.
75
 In downplaying such matters, the poem qua poem 
becomes what Wimsatt calls the ―verbal icon,‖ which, like the Bible, is not so much an 
indicator (or index) of some external referent, but an actualization of the word (and 
judgment) of God, in and of itself. So the New Critics lift (or deterritorialize) the poem 
from the realm of worldly things—or at least from the prevailing discursive, historical, 
political, and/or socio-cultural contexts in which it may find itself—and re-locate (or 
reterritorialize) the poem, newly essentialized, in a ―supplementary dimension‖ 
(allegedly) of the poem‘s own making.
76
 Within that idealized milieu, then, the poem 
reveals itself by way of its unities, its forms of order and organization. Or, put another 
way, the critic knows, and is able to analyze, the poem as a literary organism—i.e. a 
determined and self-same whole, complete with its own set of organizing principles. So 
the New Critic, by viewing the poem through the lens of its extracted/abstracted 
objectality, owns the poem. Enslaves and incarcerates it. The book-body now becomes 
the stuff of obsession—of control and mastery. Is this how to make a dead writer sad? 
Critic as fetishist? As dominatrix? Critical practices as ―automatized interpretations‖ 
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 Many New Critics would eschew the question of efficient cause (or cathartic effect), as it relates to the 
poem, and the Platonic focus on the potentially deleterious effects of such on an unsuspecting spectator—
themes that nonetheless would play a prominent role at other points in the discourse of literary criticism. 
76
 Deleuze-Guattari‘s dual concepts of deterritorialization-reterritorialization, in this context, speak to the 
New Critical act of wresting the art object from whatever territories thought to have conditioned/informed 
its production—e.g., its social, political, discursive, authorial, etc. groundings (or territorializations)—and 
re-inscribing (or re-territorializing) the book body on to new capital markets, thus exposing it to new forms 
of exploitation and control, new ownership.  
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(Baldick 116) and classroom orthodoxies? The book as self-contained, self-sufficient 
organism: its own body of knowledge, its own judgment of God? 
But the New Critics would only mark the beginning of this descent into what I 
would deem criticism‘s psychosexual affair with the book-body, and the book‘s related 
plunge into its own acts of self-flagellation. That is, the pursuit of the great object of 
contemplation would arguably reach its apogee in the twentieth century in the work of 
both the (Russian) Formalists and (French) Structuralists, where the object of study 
becomes something so abstract that it transcends not only authorial intention and its own 
politico-discursive situation (claims already on the table with the New Critics), but even 
the book, itself. In other words, a commonly held conceit among many Formalists and 
Structuralists is that the book becomes a material record of (especially) the various 
linguistically-derived rules that govern its organization and constrain its development. 
The book combines and juxtaposes a variety of semiotic resources that pre-exist and, to a 
large extent, predict the material form that the book will take.
77
 So these formal, 
meaning-making resources now become the object of study, in part because of their 
capacity to inform how audiences will read, and thus orient themselves to, the book—
which incidentally points the way to the second of the three critical trajectories dealt with 
in this chapter, the subject of reflection. But staying with our current focus, the object of 
contemplation in these schools is typically viewed through the lens of, and reduced to, the 
extant categorical distinctions of the linguist. So eschewing any direct concern for, or 
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 Though to be fair, certain branches of structuralism would be quick to point out that the text in fact 
transgresses its structural elements (i.e., its social context), meaning that the text transgresses the inscribed 
(prescribed, presupposed) limitations imposed on it by various social/literary structures, codes, genres, 
registers, etc. and thereby re-makes those things in the process. Barthes‘ S/Z is a case in point. 
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contact with, the book-body itself, the focus now turns to any or all of the following 
(typically linguistic) abstractions: 
(1) the self-regulating, internally-generated system of differential relations 
that situate signs and render them intelligible—i.e., Saussure‘s langue; 
(2) the unconscious rules of association or combination that govern the 
synchronic (or systematic) structure/organization of words (or better, 
signs), as instantiated in concrete speech acts; 
(3) the minimal units of signification (semes, memes, lexemes, mythemes, 
narremes), which correspond in meaning to what the phoneme means 
in linguistics: when meaningfully combined these units enable various 
relations (syntactic, semantic, socio-cultural, familial, narratorial);
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(4) the operations of various binary oppositions (signifier/signified; 
syntagmatic/paradigmatic; synchronic/diachronic) in the text/narrative; 
(5) the question of surface structure as opposed to that of deep structure; 
(6) the action/operation of various narrative or literary codes; 
(7) the formulation of various narratorial or genre-based typologies; 




There are a number of key figures who would pursue these sorts of agendas in 
their work, including, Claude Lévi-Strauss, Roman Jakobson, Vladimir Propp, Roland 
Barthes, Gérard Genette, and Jonathan Culler. Jakobson, for example, would argue that 
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 In terms of narrative, Barthes calls this ―functional syntax‖ (―Introduction‖ 269), or, the grammar of 
narrative, which isolates the rules for combining basic narratorial units ―along the narrative syntagm.‖ 
79
 On this, Roland Barthes is again a pivotal figure; also, Mikhail Bakhtin and his idea that ―form-shaping 
ideology‖ (Morson and Emerson 283)—e.g., of the novel, the lyric, genre—becomes the object of inquiry. 
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―Poetics deals primarily with the question, ‗What makes a verbal message a work of 
art?‘‖ (1258)—and by asking such a question, he would locate poetics under the wider 
purview of linguistics, and would duly subordinate conceptions/analyses of the poem to 
―the problems of verbal structure‖ or, more precisely, to the operative dynamics of, on 
the one hand, synchronics and diachronics, and, on the other hand, metaphoric selection 
and metonymic combination. Throughout his work, Jakobson variously conceived of the 
object of study as the ―poetic function‖ (or rather, ―poeticalness,‖ the ―grammar of 
poetry‖), also ―defamiliarization‖
80
 and what he called ―literariness.‖
81
 By way of these 
terms/concepts, Jakobson would place the critical focus squarely on the formal, autotelic 
devices of the poem (e.g., rhyme, imagery, character)—devices that yield poetic effect 
and bring formal unity to the poem: in other words, for Jakobson, the poem‘s form is its 
content, and his general focus on linguistic universals would be widely influential in 
many formalist and structuralist conceptions of literature. Meanwhile, Russian Folklorist 
Vladimir Propp‘s object of study, the narreme—i.e., minimal narratorial units (generic 
characters, action types), predictably arranged/ordered—would form the basis of his 31-
part typology of narrative structures. Gérard Genette would offer an even more 
systematic (or schematic) rendering of a kind of narratorial syntax—e.g., tense, mood, 
voice; and the numerous sub-categories (and sub-sub-categories) that derive from those 
primary fields (i.e., order, frequency, duration; perspective or focalization, narrative 
voice; the act/effect of narration, and so forth). Genette would tie these narrative 
invariants, and their rule-bound combination, to the genetic or structural axes of the book. 
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 Which basically highlights poetry‘s capacity to deviate from, or make strange, normal uses of language. 
81
 Roman Jakobson, in 1919, claimed that ―the object of literary science is not literature but literariness, 
that is, what makes a given work a literary work‖ (qtd. in Todorov70). 
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Common, in fact, among many structuralisms, beginning with Frye‘s archetypal 
criticism, was the focus on the underlying codes, unconscious structures, integrated sign 
systems, and organizing principles (i.e., the rules of combination and juxtaposition in 
language use and storytelling) that collectively overcode (read: unify, centralize, finalize) 
the book. Roland Barthes, who, early in his career, sought to generate a structural 
analysis of narrative, pursued the goal (like so many others) of a science of literature. 
Following the lead, then, of structural anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss—and the 
latter‘s focus on the universal (i.e., recurring, ―quasi-objective‖
82
) structures of myth, and 
again the cognitive rules (e.g., binary oppositions) governing the meaningful combination 
of mythological invariants (or mythemes), Barthes would similarly define the object of 
study as the wider cultural semiotic or system of meaning (e.g., fashion, sport) that 
renders texts (and actions) meaningful—though, as we will see, Barthes would break with 
this early emphasis in important ways. Finally, critic Jonathan Culler, also in an early 
phase of his criticism, would posit the idea of ―literary competence‖ (owing, in large part, 
to Chomsky‘s influence on his way of thinking) as the object of study in an effort to 
delineate the rules and conventions that make meaning (or rather, interpretation) possible, 
but here again the mole of the transcendent begins to shift from the object of 
contemplation to the subject of reflection—a point to which we will return below. 
So the common link between these various twentieth-century currents of literary 
criticism—and their nineteenth-century progenitors in aestheticism, mounting the 
widespread cry of ―art for art‘s sake‖—was the effort to contain and control the book, to 
wrest it of its power to act in ways independent of the organizing principles that bring 
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 In discussing Levi-Strauss‘ work, Terry Eagleton claims that ―Myths have a quasi-objective collective 
existence, unfold their own ‗concrete logic‘ with supreme disregard for the vagaries of individual thought, 
and reduce any particular consciousness to a mere function of themselves‖ (Literary 104). 
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order to the book. These criticisms would collectively subordinate the book to a set of 
critical values (linguistic, narratorial, semiotic, structural, generic, registerial, discursive), 
and hence to the sorts of organizational schema and prescriptive models consistent with 
criticism becoming, as Northrop Frye had hoped, ―a structure of thought and knowledge 
existing in its own right‖ (5). So an evolving ―apparatus of specialization‖ (Lambert, 
―Uses‖ 140) would set the basic terms of critical engagement with the book; it would 
create the codes (or better, the passwords) for return visits to the book, and duly pervert 
the latter (1) by the extraction of a plane of transcendence (or, judgment of God) from its 
material undercurrents; (2) by the strictures of internal resemblance; and (3) by its 
―signifying power takeovers‖ (Deleuze-Guattari, Plateaus 13). The book, then, devolves 
into what Deleuze-Guattari call the ―image-book‖ (22)—i.e., that which imposes 
structure on the world, ―a set of points and positions‖ (21), and hence an enduring set of 
representational images and semiotic coordinates that serve a powerful State apparatus. 
Second Trajectory: Universals of Reflection 
In this second mode of stratigraphic criticism, the mole of the transcendent now 
shifts from the object of contemplation to the subject of reflection (i.e., the subject as 
represented to itself). Deleuze-Guattari argue that Kant, by way of the critical subject, 
―discovers the modern way of saving transcendence‖ (What is? 46), but also add that ―no 
one needs philosophy to reflect on anything‖ (6); no one needs (or waits for) philosophers 
to reflect on—and hence pass judgment on, analyze, assess—for example, art, music, 
math, or what have you. In a similar light, writers—e.g., novelists, poets—neither 
require, nor wait for, the literary theorist to reflect upon either their work or the affections 
their work generates in the mind of the critical subject. Nevertheless, in this paradigm, 
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the subject is thought to bring a conventional unity (e.g., structural, linguistic, historical, 
narratorial, discursive, etc.) to the book-body (1) through the despotic powers associated 
with ―the signifying regime of the sign‖ (Deleuze-Guattari, Plateaus 124);
83
 or (2) 
through the critical response—i.e., aesthetic judgment—that art provokes in the sensual 
faculties of the reader. Whatever the case, the order and organization of the book are now 
guaranteed by various subjective—read: cognitive, analytical, semiotic, hermeneutic, 
axiological (i.e., values-based), ―readerly/writerly‖
84
—layerings (or striations) of the 
literary organism, or through what Deleuze-Guattari otherwise refer to as ―the art of 
reflection‖ (What is? 6). 
In Criticism in the Wilderness, Geoffrey Hartman writes that ―fiction imposes on 
us, by a subtle or blatant seduction. We are always surprised or running to catch up or 
wishing to be more fully in its coils‖ (22). And so, as Hartman goes on to claim, 
Literary commentary is comparable to the detective novel: confronted by a 
bewildering text, it acts out a solution, trying various defences, various 
interpretations, then pretending it has come to an authoritative stance—
when, in truth, it has simply purged itself of complexities never fully 
mastered. Seduction, then, in fiction or life seems to contain the promise 
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 The introduction to this dissertation discusses the ―signifying‖ regime of the signs, in particular. We 
recall that in signifying regimes, signs emanate from the critic-despot or critic-bureaucrat, and spiral 
outwards in endless cycles of signifier production (signifiance) and continuous interpretation 
(interpretosis). But it is important to note that, for Deleuze-Guattari, there are—at minimum—four ideal 
sign regimes (e.g., pre-signifying, signifying, post-signifying, and counter-signifying), which mix together 
in any society, system, or State at any given time. Collectively, though, they are all forms (or 
formalizations) of expression, and they all operate ―as determining and selective agents…in the constitution 
of languages‖ (Plateaus 70). 
84
 Roland Barthes, in S/Z, uses these terms to index the different types of investment a reader makes in a 
text. So while the ―readerly‖ text largely restricts reader involvement to the passive consumption of a set of 
fixed textual coordinates, the writerly text demands more active or productive investments by the reader. 
However, one should recall that for Barthes the reading subject emerges at the nexus of various codes. 
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of mastery or, paradoxically, of joining oneself to an overwhelming intent 
even at the cost of being subdued. 
From a Deleuzo-Guattarian perspective, this textual seduction—or what Socrates, in 
Republic, calls ―the natural charm of poetry‖ (X.601b)—results in the book, itself, and 
not the otherwise unsuspecting audience (contra Socrates-Plato), falling prey to the 
gravitational forces of a critical ―black hole,‖
85
 that is, a set of significations, circularities, 
interiorities, and interpretative traps that admit no light, no escape. In fact, the formation 
of this black hole owes much to the capacity of the critical subject—i.e., the subject of 
reflection—to purge difference and variation from critical conceptions of the book, and 
from literary critical practices, in general. 
Michel Foucault writes that, in ―transcendent terms,‖ the so-called task of the 
critic conforms to ―the religious principle of the hidden meaning (which requires 
interpretation) and the critical principle of implicit significations, silent determinations, 
and obscured contents (which give rise to commentary)‖ (―Author?‖ 380). Governed by 
these principles, the critic-hermeneut will likely reduce critical practices, themselves, to a 
set of necessary confrontations, even aggressions—those between author and critic, 
literature and criticism, literary language and the language of critical commentary, 
problems and solutions, subjects and objects. These dualisms are then doubled by a 
dialectical agenda of division and selection (following Plato) that unfolds among literary 
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 In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze-Guattari repeatedly return to the image of what they call ―the black 
hole of subjectivity‖ (186). They contend, for example, that ―Subjectification is never without a black hole 
in which it lodges its consciousness, passion, and redundancies,‖ and add that ―One can form a web of 
subjectivities only if one possesses a central eye, a black hole capturing everything that would exceed or 
transform either the assigned affects or dominant significations‖ (199; my emphasis). Incidentally, though, 
in a nod to Anglo-American literature, Deleuze-Guattari commend authors such as Hardy, Melville, 
Lawrence, and Henry Miller for ―[knowing] how difficult it is to get out of the black hole of subjectivity, of 
consciousness and memory‖ (207). For ―[how] tempting it is,‖ they argue, ―to let yourself get caught, to lull 
yourself into it, to latch back onto a face‖ (i.e., a set of enduring significations). 
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scholars on the academic stage, in the enduring struggle to secure institutional stake. 
James Joyce, in his renowned (perhaps apocryphal?) skewering of the critical profession, 
anticipates the role that this particular triumph of the judgment of God would play in 
relation to his own work. When asked to schematize Ulysses, Joyce is said to have 
remarked, ―I have put in so many enigmas and puzzles that it will keep professors busy 
for centuries arguing over what I meant, and that‘s the only way of ensuring one‘s 
immortality‖ (qtd. in Ellmann 521). So, in other words, Joyce (if we are to trust 
Ellmann‘s recounting of the matter) assumes his immortality as a writer depends on the 
capacity of the book to fend off those who would wish to re-present it—i.e., reduce the 
book to what it signifies, denotes, alludes to, allegorizes, or symbolizes. But equal to the 
task, professors, like big-game hunters, will track signifiers, hunt down significations, 
capture the machinic flows of the book, and so forth—all in an effort to tame or conquer 
their prey through practices that wrest the book of its material substrate: i.e., its 
intensities, its becomings (or untapped potentials), its power to act, etc. 
Maurice Blanchot, who, perhaps more than most, would challenge the legitimacy 
of such stultifying critical preoccupations, writes, 
What an abundance of explication and a frenzy of interpretation; what 
exegetical fury, be it theological, philosophical, sociological, political, or 
autobiographical; how many forms of analysis, allegorical, symbolic, 
structural, and even (anything can happen) literal! And so many keys: each 
employable by the one who forged it, each opening one door only to close 
others. Where does this delirium come from? Why is reading never 
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satisfied with what it reads, incessantly substituting for it another text, 
which in turn provokes another? (Infinite 391) 
The simple answer may be that literary critics have long been inspired (even flattered) by 
the Platonic/Arnoldian assignment of selective and distributive powers, which has duly 
compelled the critical community to link their interpretative prowess, their subjective 
investments, their projection of a ―face‖ on to the book, as Deleuze-Guattari say, to a 
kind of social and moral responsibility. In other words, by maintaining a disinterested 
critical demeanour, by fending off the natural charms of the book (contra the rhapsode), 
by coordinating the activities of the critic, by convening the specialist‘s tribunal, and, as 
Blanchot says, by subjecting the book to ―an abundance of…exegetical fury,‖ critics 
would both define their role and defend their worth on the academic stage. 
Authorizing the Subject of Reflection 
Matthew Arnold would be the first modern critic to legitimize literature as an 
object of study in its own right, and his efforts in that regard would open the door to the 
institutionalization of the literary critical enterprise in the twentieth century. Arnold 
would declare that poetry, as a kind of cultural and intellectual touchstone, and as a 
displaced form of religion, has a vital role to play in the stability of the state. But of note 
here is the equally vital role that literary critics would come to play in what Arnold 
famously calls the ―disinterested endeavour to learn and propagate the best that is known 
and thought in the world‖ (824). In other words, Arnold links the growing prominence of 
literature on the public stage to the ascension of those who would ―propagate the best that 
is known and thought,‖ or—as he would later add in what begins to read like a sermon—
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those who would save us from our fate to ―die in the wilderness‖ by delivering up ―the 
promised land‖ (825)—this time, in the form of the righteous literary artefact. He writes, 
Judging is often spoke of as the critic‘s one business, and so in some sense 
it is; but the judgment which almost insensibly forms itself in a fair and 
clear mind, along with fresh knowledge, is the valuable one; and thus 
knowledge, and ever fresh knowledge, must be the critic‘s great concern 
for himself. And it is by communicating fresh knowledge…that the critic 
will generally do most good to [sic] his readers. Sometimes, no doubt, for 
the sake of establishing an author‘s place in literature, and his relation to a 
central standard. (824) 
With this, Arnold assigns a moral, if not quasi-religious, agenda to the literary critic—one 
that depends on the critic being of both ―fair and clear mind‖ to determine ―the best that 
is known and thought.‖ The competent critic will then disseminate that knowledge to a 
world gone astray and urgently in need of good news.  
However, given the resilience of Platonism in literary critical discourse, critics 
have long feared the charge of relativism in their encounters with the book, and so have 
struggled with the possibility that critical judgment (or the critic‘s own judgment) might 
be mired in what Terry Eagleton blithely refers to as ―aestheticist chit-chat‖ (Literary 44), 
that is, a kind of critical sophistry—recall Deleuze‘s comment that ―what Plato criticizes 
in the Athenian democracy is the fact that anyone can lay claim to anything‖ (Essays 
137). So for critic-arbiters to ultimately succeed with their Arnoldian agenda intact, they 
would first need fresh schooling in the proper procedures of selection and division. That 
schooling would, in turn, spawn the critic-as-sage motif (i.e., literary criticism‘s answer 
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to the philosopher-king), whereby the book‘s meaning, interpretation, and value is left to 
the privileged insights of a select few—i.e., those who are more morally responsible and 
critically astute than the average reader or, say, literary enthusiast (like Ion). Nowhere 
historically is this motif more fully evident than in Alexander Pope‘s efforts to fashion 
the elite critical mind in his neo-classical tour de force, An Essay on Criticism. Therein, 
Pope makes the case that the critic ought to be a man of judgment (ll. 12–20, 233–4, 657–
8); of learning (ll. 15–29); of taste and good breeding (ll. 572–7, 635); of good and 
common sense (ll. 25, 28);
86
 of wit (ll. 36–40, 298–9); of high moral standards (ll. 152–5, 
560–3) and reasoned moderation (ll. 48–9, 201–4), and thus in no way vulnerable to the 
excessive, rhapsodic flourishes of what he calls ―half-learn‘d Witlings‖ (l. 40)—i.e., 
those powerless to formulate sound critical judgments.
87
 
The timeless assault on those half-learn‘d Witlings would arguably reach its 
apogee in the modern era of literary critical discourse. Of particular note here is I. A. 
Richards‘ attack on so-called ―defective scholarship‖ (185) in his book Practical 
Criticism, wherein one of Richards‘ primary aims is ―to provide a new technique for 
those who wish to discover for themselves what they think and feel about poetry…and 
why they should like or dislike it‖ (3). In general, Richards sought to delineate, in 
systematic fashion, both the causes of failed critical analyses and the assorted 
impediments to what he would characterize as sound critical judgment. His overall 
objectives in this regard would include (1) reforming critical procedures, (2) refining 
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 For Deleuze, in Difference and Repetition, good sense and common sense are the ―two essential 
functions‖ (33) that drive judgment and guarantee the subject of reflection: through common sense, we 
create correspondences and coordinate things; through good sense, we sets priorities, forge hierarchies. 
87
 I would argue that literary criticism—regardless of its perhaps countless renderings of the critical task—
has never strayed far from the realm of elites, nor from Pope‘s conception of the critic as a man of taste and 
discerning judgment. This is no more true than in the twentieth century, where strict disciplinary 
boundaries come to the fore, just as critics begin to find a cushy, institutional home in the academy. 
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techniques of discussion, and (3) quelling so-called ―erratic opinions‖ (292). But his more 
tacit purpose was to coordinate, if not regulate, critical encounters with the book, itself. 
To that end, Richards sought to present a unified (and ultimately integrated) conception 
of how the critical subject ought to interpret or make sense of the literary artefact. 
In line, then, with Richards‘ various intuitions on these matters—and those of 
most all the New Critics who would follow—many mid-century currents in literary 
critical discourse (e.g., Formalism, Structuralism), despite their differences with the New 
Critics, would similarly pursue the goal of coordinating the activities of the critical 
subject, again in their flight from the charge of relativism. Northrop Frye, for example, 
would contend that literary value should not be derived from the subjective musings of 
the critic (no matter how refined that individual may be), and so posed a schematic—i.e., 
scientivizing, though not scientific
88
—orientation to the book. Hence Frye (following 
Matthew Arnold in this regard) would criticize those who would seek ―to bring the direct 
experience of literature into the structure of criticism‖ (28), and would link the problem 
of direct experience to the vagaries of ―private memories, associations, and arbitrary 
prejudices‖—all of which upset the fixed, aesthetic coordinates of the book, if not the 
methodological legitimacy of literary criticism itself. So what Frye labelled the problem 
of direct experience, New Critic Cleanth Brooks would term ―the heresy of the 
paraphrase,‖
89
 and W. K. Wimsatt the ―affective fallacy‖ (21). That is, Wimsatt (really, 
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 Frye, T. S. Eliot, the Russian Formalists, and most all the New Critics, would hold to the basic 
proposition that critics need to be both objective and rigorous in their analysis of, and orientation to, their 
primary object of study. But they would also believe that literature offers a special kind of knowledge, 
unrecognizable to the sciences, proper. So many twentieth-century critics would paradoxically seek to 
legitimize their quasi-scientific practices—Frye, for example, would write, ―There is a place for 
classification in criticism…[and] schematization in poetics‖ (29)—while at the same time differentiating 
themselves from the positivist. 
89
 Brooks raises this problematic in his book, The Well Wrought Urn. By ―the heresy of the paraphrase,‖ 
Brooks means to highlight the limits of the reader‘s impressionistic representation of the poem, given that it 
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Wimsatt and collaborator M. C. Beardsley) would claim that the analysis of the 
structured internalities of the book (i.e., its paradoxes, ambiguities) mitigates the relativist 
threat posed by a critical apparatus mistakenly concerned with the effect of that work on, 
and/or interpretative proclivities of, the critic or reader. 
In any case, most mid-century literary critics would be staunchly anti-humanist in 
their critical orientation to the book—there may be some question as to whether or not 
the New Critics themselves were anti-humanist; clearly, in some respects they were—and 
would thereby decisively fend off charges of the sorts of relativism (or subjectivism) that 
many, including the New Critics, believed threatened to derail the literary critical 
enterprise as it sought to secure its institutional home. Securing that home, though, and 
the related institutional privilege accorded the critic, would not only involve fixing the 
object of study, and unifying the efforts of the critical community, but also displacing the 
authorial subject (the role of the author), as well. Roland Barthes would argue, in a well-
known essay, that ―the birth of the reader must be at the cost of the death of the author‖ 
(―Death‖ 148; my emphasis)—a death that even by the time of Barthes‘ essay may have 
long been foretold. That is, Nietzsche, in The Birth of Tragedy, would be (one of) the first 
to entertain the idea that because the Dionysian artist ends up ―silencing‖ all vestiges of 
―the individual will and desire‖ (48), ―everything subjective vanishes into complete self-
forgetfulness‖ (36); in other words, the artist shatters the illusion of individuation and 
ultimately triumphs over subjectivity. But in a subsequent perversion of Nietzschean 
ethics, many Formalists, New Critics, and Structuralists, in their collective efforts to 
undermine the (largely unavailable) intentions, meanings, or values of the author, and 
                                                                                                                                                                             
organizes itself as an aesthetic complex of interrelating parts that have no need for supplementary 
paraphrases to render it meaningful. 
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further isolate their object of study, would either tacitly or openly sanction the idea of 
what Wimsatt-Beardsley call the intentional fallacy (3).
90
 Still the author—despite the 
New Critical assault—would still have some life. 
Arguably, thought, the silver bullet in this context would be Michel Foucault‘s 
seminal statement, ―What is an Author?‖ Therein, Foucault challenges a number of extant 
propositions concerning the author-function in the text, among them the idea that 
the author provides the basis for explaining not only the presence of 
certain events in a work, but also their transformations, distortions, and 
diverse modifications (through his biography, the determination of his 
individual perspective, the analysis of his social position, and the 
revelation of his basic design). The author is also the principle of a certain 
unity of writing—all differences having to be resolved, at least in part, by 
the principles of evolution, maturation, or influence. The author also 
serves to neutralize the contradictions that may emerge in a series of texts: 
there must be—at a certain level of his thought or desire, of his 
consciousness or unconscious—a point where contradictions are resolved, 
where incompatible elements are at last tied together or organized around 
a fundamental or originating contradiction. Finally, the author is a 
particular source of expression that, in more or less completed forms, is 
manifested equally well, and with similar validity, in works, sketches, 
letters, fragments, and so on. (384) 
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 Despite the distinction Wimsatt-Beardsley pose, ―The outcome of either Fallacy, the Intentional or the 
Affective, is that the poem itself, as an object of specifically critical judgment, tends to disappear‖ (21). 
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Deleuze reminds us in his book on Foucault (published shortly after the latter‘s death) 
that Foucault, throughout his work, ―continually submits interiority to a radical critique‖ 
(Foucault 80). In terms of the book, an enduring source of that interiority would, of 
course, be the author-function (and the related critical appeal to the author‘s perspective), 
which restricts the book from escaping the intentions of its author. We recall that for 
Deleuze-Guattari, ―[a] book exists only through the outside and on the outside‖ (Plateaus 
4); moreover, the sort of reading for which Deleuze himself advocates (in his letter to 
Cressole) ―relates a book directly to what‘s Outside,‖ so as to affirm that book‘s variable 
status as ―a little cog in much more complicated external machinery.‖ Similarly, we need 
recognize that Foucault‘s arguments in this context serve to open the book to its outside, 
or rather, its own becomings, by releasing such from the confines of the author-function. 
But displacing the author as the singular source of creative expression and textual 
unity would have the paradoxical effect—at least among certain critics—of not so much 
opening the book to its outside (which is what Foucault and Deleuze want), but of re-
asserting the privilege of the inside (which is precisely what they do not want). That is, 
Foucault himself would anticipate just such a move in his claim that the ―[subject of] 
reflection,‖ if left to its own devices, ―tends irresistibly to repatriate‖ the outside (or the 
experience of such) ―to the side of consciousness…the form of an imagined outside‖ 
(―Thought‖ 427). Which is to say, Foucault acknowledges that the so-called death of the 
author would likely shift any accountability for the unity, structure, meaning, aesthetic 
organization—in short, the stratification—of the literary organism to a perceiving subject. 
So with the author finally out of the picture, the stage would be set for the emergence of 
the critical subject of reflection, and for yet another ―triumph of the judgment of God.‖ 
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The Critical Subject 
The ―subject of reflection‖—at least in the way Deleuze-Guattari understand this 
(largely) Kantian figure in their mapping of the ―triple illusion‖ of transcendence—
judges its sensual experience of art (or nature) beautiful in and through the unconscious 
conceptual structures and organizing principles of the mind, which then give rise to all 
possible experience. For Kant, in Critique of Judgment, art is no longer objectively 
guaranteed, but rather subjectively deduced (as a judgment of beauty) through the novel 
representation of that object in the mind of the perceiving subject; which is to say, the 
subject of reflection judges as pleasing the form of the representation itself. So aesthetic 
judgment does not, in fact, depend upon there being an object (either real or imagined) 
separate from the mind (or observing subject) that then gives rise to the judgment of 
beauty. Think, for example, of the individual who takes pleasure in the experience of, 
say, a glacier, an alpine meadow, or a Jackson Pollack. For Kant, such experiences, if 
sufficiently intense, trigger the free-play of the imagination, the emotions, the 
understanding (§20), with the point being that unhinged, unregulated perceptions of this 
sort are inherently pleasing to the subject of reflection.
91
 
So Kant essentially concerns himself with what goes on in the various faculties of 
the perceiving subject when caught in the throes of aesthetic judgment. He wants to get at 
the immediacy of the unprovoked, or even involuntary, judgment of beauty. I use the 
word ―involuntary‖ in this instance because aesthetic judgment, in Kant‘s philosophy, 
operates disinterestedly, i.e., without self-interest, without foreknowledge, expectation, or 
culturally-conditioned values (such as taste) informing that judgment (§12). Kant claims 
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 My thanks to Bruce Baugh for assisting me with this formulation of Kant‘s theory of aesthetic judgment. 
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that the subject of reflection intuits what he calls the ―purposiveness‖
92
 of the objects of 
experience, which is to say that the subject intuits something like a purpose, something 
that seems to have greater import, but that cannot be objectively known as purposeful. 
Wordsworth captures just such a feeling in the following lines from ―Tintern Abbey‖: 
And I have felt 
A presence that disturbs me with the joy 
Of elevated thoughts; a sense sublime 
Of something far more deeply interfused. (ll. 93–6) 
Wordsworth‘s narrator, at this point, goes on to describe what he senses or intuits as 
A motion and a spirit, that impels 
All thinking things, all objects of all thought, 
And rolls through all things. (ll. 100–2) 
This is the subject reflecting on itself, on its own experiences. Similarly, in the Kantian 
schematic, our experience of things (in art or nature) unfold in and through the sensual 
faculties of the perceiving subject. In fact, this form of cognition operates without, or in 
the absence of, a corresponding concept (i.e., the cognized) (§21), and without an external 
or self-same object of contemplation to guarantee that cognition—as was the case with 
Plato. Instead it falls upon the critical subject to bring internal resemblance to the 
aesthetic body—i.e., a supposed consistency across its multiple variations. Nevertheless, 
the book is once again identified (recognized, classified, categorized) by the enduring 
judgment of God, only now that judgment is grounded in the critical subject, and in that 
subject‘s own reflection on the unregulated play of its senses. So in Descartes, and later 
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 Strictly speaking, Kant defines this concept of purposiveness as the intuition or sensation of something 
―without purpose‖ (§15); because that something is inherently satisfying, or because it provokes the free-
play of the mind and imagination, it invokes the feeling of something like a purpose. 
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Kant, the critical subject evolves as a direct correlate to the ―I think,‖
93
 which guarantees 
the subject‘s conceptual explanation of its experience, and the synthetic or analytic 
unities that the subject extracts from its experience. The net effect here—as with all arms 
of the ―triple illusion‖ of transcendence—is the basic denial of difference: that is, a basic 
denial of the impersonal forces that insist upon the mind, or upon states of affairs (both 
physical and psychological). Put simply, the critical subject pays little attention to what 
exceeds the various cognitive or sensory inputs she reflects upon, and ignores the related 
idea that a given art object, like the book, operates—as Deleuze insists—as ―a little cog 
in much more complicated external machinery.‖ 
In any case, questions concerning the productive role (or what one might call the 
critical performance) of the critic/reader, and also the processes of cognition that inform 
literary interpretation, have long been an object of scrutiny in the discourse of literary 
criticism—e.g., in the phenomenological criticism of Roman Ingarden, the structuralism 
of Jonathan Culler, and the semiotics of Umberto Eco; but this has especially been the 
case among American Reader-Response critics (e.g., Stanley Fish, David Bleich, Norman 
Holland), and among their European counterparts in Reception Theory (e.g., Wolfgang 
Iser, Hans Robert Jauss). For theorists in these fields, the reader becomes (to varying 
degrees) an active participant in both the meaning-making processes and aesthetic unity 
of the text—a role, I might add, that requires a certain amount of critical competence on 
the part of the reader. That is, following Chomsky‘s notion that users of any given 
language have a tacit mastery of a universal grammar (e.g., the ability to make sense of 
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 In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze writes, ―The ‗I think‘ is the most general principle of 
representation‖ (138). That principle expresses itself in and through mental/cognitive acts of identification, 
recollection, judgment, and perception. Or, put another way, that principle is expressed in and through a 
critical subject that generates comparisons, analogies, and internal resemblances between bodies. 
144 
 
novel utterances, to recognize mistakes in the ways sentences are syntactically produced 
or combined), Jonathan Culler posits the related notion of ―literary competence,‖ arguing 
that capable readers have an implied mastery over the generic conventions and structural 
rules that govern literature. Culler links competency in this context to an ―implicit 
knowledge‖ (136) of ―a set of conventions for reading literary texts‖ (137). He argues, on 
the one hand, that ―conventions of poetry, the logic of symbols, [and] the operations for 
the production of poetic effects, are not simply the property of readers but the basis of 
literary forms‖ (136)—a classic structuralist position—but, on the other hand, ―it is easier 
to study [those forms] as the operations performed by readers.‖
94
 Similarly, for Umberto 
Eco, the reader must acquire a type of cultural competence—a competence in part 
determined by textual exigencies—in order to complete the meaning of the text (as open 
system). Similarly, Wolfgang Iser (following phenomenologist Roman Ingarden) posits a 
kind of critical competency through the notion of an ―implied reader‖—i.e., the sort of 
reader a text actively requires in order to productively ―concretize‖ (i.e., give shape to) its 
various indeterminacies, so as to enable the text to realize or achieve its full intentions.
95
 
However, a number of American reader-response critics have seemed more 
determined than their European counterparts to shift the focus away from the book, as an 
object of contemplation, in order to advance the idea that readers—not texts—produce 
meaning and value. For example, David Bleich puts forward the concept of a ―subjective 
criticism,‖ arguing that readers complete the meaning of the text; they elucidate it, bring 
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 Culler adds, ―poetics is a theory of reading‖ (149), and so ―literary competence‖ involves being able ―to 
restate propositions about poetic or novelistic discourse as procedures of reading.‖ 
95
 Though to be accurate, the aesthetic object, even among phenomenologists like Iser and Ingarden, 
unfolds at a point of convergence between reader and text, through acts of cognition within the reader. So 
the reading itself becomes a structured act in this paradigm, in that the text has some say  (or role to play) 
in how the reader makes meaningful the text. So the subject is neither purely autonomous, nor wholly 
reflective, in critical phenomenology and reception theory. 
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it into the full light of being, through their own subjective, associative, axiological, and 
psychological investments. Similarly, Norman Holland (Bleich‘s teacher) would pursue a 
form of psychological criticism that analyzes the emotional and/or subjective dynamics 
of literary response—an analysis that, at points, goes so far as to oedipalize the reader‘s 
engagement with the text. Critic Stanley Fish also assigns a productive role to readers—
i.e., to those who actively shape texts and generate meanings; however, Fish grounds 
readers in pre-existing interpretative communities (e.g., legal, political, academic, etc.)—
communities that inform or condition their discursive investments in the text. So, for 
Fish, readers (and their readings) are ultimately regulated by what Deleuze-Guattari call 
the ―universals of communication‖—an issue to which we will turn in the next section. 
So, to sum up, in some formulations (e.g., Jauss, Ingarden), the critical subject is 
thought to play an active role not only in the historico-discursive processes of 
interpretation and value assessment, but in creative transformations of the literary artefact 
as well; for others, the reader tends to be viewed as a textual strategy (Iser), or structural 
effect (Barthes), located at the nexus of various literary, linguistic, and cultural codes; for 
still others, the competent reader is responsible for bringing a meaningful organization to 
the book through acts of structural encoding (Culler). On the whole, though, critics 
beholden to this paradigm draw attention to the work of the reader (or of the reading) in 
one or more of the following ways: (1) by bracketing the book‘s objective reality, so as to 
make room for the critic‘s own cognitive investments in the sensual and/or rational object 
of its experience; (2) by tying the book to a critical cogito, a constitutive ―I think‖; (3) by 
linking the interpretations of the reader (or critical subject) to extant signifying regimes, 
where everything is accounted for, everything means; and (4) by organizing (or bringing 
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some degree of order to) the text, itself, through readerly codes located within the text. 
Overall, then, the critical subject of reflection will tend to embody certain values, beliefs, 
assumptions about the book, and even the non-book (i.e., extra-literary values), and to 
that extent renews Plato‘s ―poisoned gift.‖ However the enduring legacy of Kantian 
subjectivity may not be strictly confined to, for example, the theoretical models put 
forward by reception theorists or reader-response critics. Certainly, the subject has an 
essential role to play in these critical contexts—that which unfolds in relation to the text, 
its history of reception, or the communities that decide (consensually, intersubjectively) 
upon the criteria of evaluation applied to the text. But my point here is that the Kantian 
subject (understood, generally, as the subject in control of itself, reflecting on its own 
modes of interpretation) most likely finds its modern correlate in the institutional critic, 
and the structures of authority that not only guarantee this figure, but that promote 
coordinated critical activities and unified, pan-critical assessments in and across the wider 
critical community. In other words, the subject of reflection makes essential contributions 
to both the institutionalization and progress of critical discourse in the 20th century. 
Third Trajectory: Universals of Communication 
Communication…only works under the sway of opinions in order to create ‗consensus‘. 
 —Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (What is Philosophy?, 6) 
In What is Philosophy?, Deleuze-Guattari express contempt for the idea that 
communicational paradigms in philosophy, and their predictable store of conversational 
constants—i.e., the socio-political concerns (e.g., freedom, culture, civil society, human 
rights, democratic institutions, political representation, etc.) that we (e.g., philosophers, 
critics, politicians, citizens) tend to talk about or debate in the academy, or on the public 
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stage—could ever be an adequate substitute for, or structured form of, philosophical 
activity.
96
 They argue that paradigms of this sort effectively subordinate philosophy 
(1) to the rhetorical activities of conversation and consensus-building; 
(2) to the furtherance of communal rivalries—i.e., rival claims to the truth; 
(3) to the dialectical pursuit, and ultimately mutual recognition, of some 
sort of triumphant, majority opinion (doxa); and 
(4) to the idealization of both ―common sense‖ and ―good sense.‖97 
In short, this is philosophy in the business—literally: the marketing, the promotion, the 
buying and selling
98
—of generic subjectivities, or what Deleuze-Guattari otherwise call 
―intersubjective idealism‖ (What is? 7). This is philosophy that succumbs to the dogma of 
mutual affections, shared knowledge, shared values, and the liberal-democratic hope of 
friendly disputation—i.e., ―pleasant or aggressive dinner conversations at Mr. Rorty‘s‖ 
(144), where ―rival opinions at the dinner table‖ become ―the object of a struggle.‖ 
To be clear, the problem is not that philosophy concerns itself with the question of 
communication, or that human beings, for their part, do not communicate (or, for that 
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 Outside philosophy, communicational paradigms have found an institutional home in social and political 
theory, discourse analysis, psychology, cultural criticism, etc. Reader Response critics have made important 
contributions to this debate. For example, Stanley Fish, in an effort to account for ―the stability of 
interpretation (at least among certain groups at certain times)‖ (171), points to the interpretative 
conventions of specific discourse communities. Those ―who share interpretive strategies…[which] exist 
prior to the act of reading‖ (14), he argues, ―will necessarily agree because they will see (and by seeing, 
make) everything in relation to that communities‘ assumed purposes and goals‖ (15). 
97
 In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze argues that the dual orthodoxies of common sense and good sense 
―constitute the two halves of the doxa‖ (169–70)—i.e., the so-called ―image of thought‖ from which 
philosophy ceaselessly strives to extricate itself. Common sense, for its part, ―contributes the form of the 
same‖ (134), or the mutually recognizable. For Kant, the ―validity‖ of all ―judgments of taste‖ predicate 
themselves upon the ―subjective principle‖ of common sense (§20). Comparatively, good sense contributes 
a ―norm of distribution‖ (Deleuze, Difference 169), which cancels the differential element (i.e., that which 
cannot be normalized) and in doing so reinforces the universality accorded to hierarchical judgments. 
98
 Of note here is Deleuze-Guattari‘s contention that so-called ―communicative action‖ is inseparable from 
a persuasive marketing of the opinion-cum-concept. That is, concepts are not so much invented or created 
in conversational settings as owned, exchanged, bought and sold. They ask: ―Are we not led back in this 
way to the simple opinion of the average Capitalist‖? (What is? 149). 
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matter, reflect or contemplate), but instead that communication, itself, or what Jürgen 
Habermas calls communicative action
99
—and its enduring appeal (1) to a set of talking 
points, or to a global conversation (which not only reinforces a communitarian or 
communication-based agenda, but a capitalist one, as well); and (2) to the relatively 
stable lens of a unified subject negotiating its identity on the public stage—can never be a 
suitable stand-in for philosophy, as it is for Habermas. Why? For Deleuze-Guattari, the 
basic reason is that philosophies that raise communication to the level of transcendent 
universal typically disregard the vital importance of concept creation,
100
 and do so by 
emphasizing the repetition and reinforcement of the same: the same stock opinions and 
values, the same points of inquiry, the same political agendas. If nothing else, 
philosophies of this sort succumb to a kind of creative ―inertia‖ (Colebrook, Deleuze 16), 
or even the very ―failure of thinking‖ itself. So for Deleuze-Guattari, communication 
becomes a poor substitute for thinking anew; for new encounters (and the becomings they 
engender); for new resistances, new mappings, new openings onto the world. Put simply, 
communication remains ill-equipped, they argue, to deliver up ―a new earth and [a] 
people that do not yet exist‖ (What is? 108). That which then weakens the active and 
creative nature of thinking not only flattens difference and dispels variation, but 
condemns thought (or better, thinking) to take up residence in a set of broad or well-worn 
generalisations. Deleuze-Guattari further contend that ―[w]e do not lack communication. 
On the contrary, we have too much of it. We lack creation. We lack resistance to the 
present.‖ We lack, in other words, the capacity to overcome ever-present dogmas (in the 
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 For Habermas, communicative action is a subset of social action, whereby certain values or norms—
presupposed by the speaker—are foregrounded, discursively negotiated, and mutually validated. So action 
of this sort is a tool of communication used by social agents to reach rational, intersubjective agreements. 
100
 Recall that for Deleuze-Guattari, the primary role of philosophy is to invent concepts. 
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form of majority opinions), and thus the capacity to think differently. Deleuze also claims 
(in a late essay on a phenomenon he refers to as ―control society‖), that what we need is 
―something different from communicating. The key thing may be to create vacuoles of 
non-communication, circuit breakers so we can elude control‖ (Negotiations 175)—or so 
we can elude the sort of opinioneering and/or political programming that regularly find 
its way into conversational paradigms and their preset conceptual agendas.
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A “new Athens” 
I begin the mapping of this third and final reconfiguration of Deleuze-Guattari‘s 
mole of the transcendent with the suggestion that there is still more evidence of ―the 
triumph of the judgment of God,‖ more evidence that Plato‘s ―poisoned gift‖ continues to 
wreak havoc on the discourse of literary criticism, in the very inability of that discourse 
to extricate itself from ongoing debates over the legitimacy (moral, social, psychological, 
epistemological) of the poets and their work. In the following passage from Republic, 
Socrates offers a challenge to those who would disagree with his position on the arts: 
Lest we be charged with a certain harshness and boorishness…it should be 
said that…if poetry that aims at pleasure and imitation has any argument 
to bring forward to prove that it must have a place in a well-governed city, 
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 It is for this reason, according to Deleuze-Guattari, that ―philosophers have very little time for 
discussion. Every philosopher runs away when he or she hears someone say, ‗Let‘s discuss this.‘ 
Discussions are fine for roundtable talks, but philosophy throws its numbered dice on another table. The 
best one can say about discussions is that they take things no farther, since the participants never talk about 
the same thing. Of what concern is it to philosophy that someone has such a view, and thinks this or that, if 
the problems at stake are not stated? And when they are stated, it is no longer a matter of discussing but 
rather one of creating concepts for the undiscussible problem posed. Communication always comes too 
early or too late, and when it comes to creating, conversation is always superfluous. Sometimes philosophy 
is turned into the idea of a perpetual discussion, as ‗communicative rationality,‘ or as ‗universal democratic 
conversation‘…But those who criticize without creating, those who are content to defend the vanished 
concept without being able to give it the forces it needs to return to life, are the plague of philosophy. All of 
these debaters and communicators are inspired by ressentiment. They speak only of themselves when they 
set empty generalizations against one another. Philosophy has a horror of discussions‖ (What is? 28–9). 
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[we] should be glad to welcome it…[and, if persuasive] it is right that 
[poetry] should come back from exile after making its defence in lyric or 
any other meter (Republic, X.607b–d; my emphasis) 
Socrates then goes on to add, 
We should also give its champions who are not poets the opportunity to 
speak on its behalf in prose to the effect that it not only gives pleasure but 
is useful to cities and to human life. We shall listen to them in a friendly 
spirit, for we shall certainly benefit if poetry is shown to be not only 
pleasant but useful. (X.607e) 
So in keeping with the agonistic sensibilities of Ancient Greece, those who would speak 
on behalf of poetry (e.g., the poets, the rhapsodes, the sophists or proto-critics of the 
time) can argue their case before a public tribunal of sorts—if they so choose. However, 
given the controlling interests of Socratic rationalism in this context, all are compelled to 
judge poetry in terms of (1) its usefulness or benefit to the republic; (2) its aesthetic 
merit; (3) its psychological impact on the uninitiated; (4) the knowledge it offers; (5) the 
virtue (or vice) it promotes, and so forth. In a sense, these are the talking points of the 
debate. So to make a reasonable case for poetry‘s ―place in a well-governed city‖—i.e., to 
legitimize poetry on the public stage—its ―champions‖ (so-called) must somehow speak 
to these various matters both to rhetorically authenticate their claims and establish their 
ethos. For Habermas, ―we are constantly making claims, even if usually only implicitly, 
concerning the validity of what we are saying, implying, or presupposing,‖
102
 which in 
this case means that the champions of poetry are accountable for the validity of their 
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 I cite this passage from translator Thomas McCarthy‘s introduction to the first volume of Habermas‘ 
The Theory of Communicative Action (p. x). 
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claims—i.e., the mutually agreed upon foundations of communicative interaction—in 
order to make their case for poetry both rational and persuasive.
103
 
Habermas offers a useful conceptual vocabulary for understanding this latest 
renewal of the mole of the transcendent. On the one hand, his philosophy disentangles 
itself from ―the constitutive capacities‖ (Edgar 139) of the rational agent—e.g., the 
Cartesian ego, Kant‘s subject of reflection—but does so, on the other hand, to re-locate 
that same transcendence—or what I have been calling, following Artaud and Deleuze, the 
judgment of God—in the rational structures of communication. So what Habermas calls 
communicative reason (and its appeals to universalism and Enlightenment rationalism) 
becomes the modern substitute for the epistemological turns of what Richard Rorty refers 
to as a ―subject-centered reason‖ (67). Kenneth Baynes adds, ―Kant‘s ideas of a single 
world, the soul, and the unconditioned (or God)…correspond to the suppositions, in 
Habermas‘ work, of a common world, accountable subjects, and context-transcending 
validity claims‖ (195). In his theory of communicative rationality (discussed primarily in 
his seminal, two-part The Theory of Communicative Action), Habermas links the very 
possibility of mutual understanding and even shared experience, to the speakers‘ ability 
to demonstrate the normative framework implied by any given speech act, if called upon 
to do so; hence, rational communication depends upon the speakers making concessions 
to the validity dimensions of language: ―Every consensus rests on an intersubjective 
recognition of criticisable validity claims‖ (Theory 1:119). But if the speech acts of 
rational agents cannot (for whatever reason) be justified, through mutually recognized 
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 For Habermas, this concept of ―validity claims‖ specifically refers to the idealized and shared 
assumptions among speakers (1) about language, (2) about the good will of the other, and (3) about the 
nature of rational argument. So, in short, each actor in the conversation is (or ought to be) accountable for 
her claims through good, recognizable reasons. Habermas links communicative reason to emancipation 
because it coordinates the actions of social agents, and also forms the basis of all mutual understanding. 
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reasons, those agents may be tagged as irrational. For Habermas, then, it is what I would 
call ―the regimes of justification‖
104
 that become universal, which means that free and 
unfettered communication—in any context—derives from, or is founded upon, a set of 
rational agreements among speakers about the validity of the claims being made. 
So here we again come up against the idea of competence—specifically, the idea 
of communicative competence—which has roots in Chomskian grammar, but breaks with 
the more restricted focus of that grammar in important ways. That is, Habermas links his 
notion of competence, which figures prominently in his ―Universal Pragmatics‖ (Edgar 
138–40), to a tacit mastery of the rules that people draw upon in everyday exchanges to 
(1) communicate their desires, intentions, and feelings; 
(2) forge connections with the world around them; 
(3) justify (and assume accountability for) their arguments/claims; 
(4) interpret and make judgments (Habermas, Theory 1:130); 
(5) ―carry out decisions on the basis of binding norms‖ (Theory 2:180); 
(6) reach consensus or a mutual understanding about things; 
(7) coordinate plans of action in accordance with what Habermas calls the 
life-world (i.e., the cultural, discursive, and socio-political contexts—
or shared spaces—in which meanings are produced and exchanged, 
social identities are recognized, values are established) (Theory 1:112). 
Rational communication, then, requires that we intuitively, and pragmatically, make use 
of these rational structures of communication, and that we do so in good faith. Again, we 
are always accountable for the validity (normative value, truth, honesty) of what we say. 
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 I borrow this phrase from Ian Mackenzie (in The Idea of Pure Critique). I will return to this notion. 
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Literary critical operations beholden to the structures of rational communication 
ultimately stratify the book and delimit its capacities by contributing to what one might 
(perhaps impudently) refer to as an intersubjective mind-meld, that is, a type of group-
think that contains and controls the book through a set of mutually recognized opinions 
(i.e., ways of talking about the book). In fact, the very capacity to construct agreements 
and negotiate values involves what Deleuze (in a late interview) calls ―the art of 
interrogations‖
105
—a phrase that he glosses as ―a demand for one‘s opinion, an 
interrogation…that ward[s] off any real questions.‖
106
 In other words, despite it ―[being] 
tempting to see philosophy as an agreeable commerce of the mind…which, from the 
point of view of a lively, disinterested sociability of Western democratic conversation, is 
able to generate a consensus of opinion and provide communication with an ethic‖ 
(Deleuze-Guattari, What is? 99), the basic problem with this philosophical trajectory has 
to do with the fact that well-argued opinions (or rather, impulses, inclinations, 
assumptions) are made to assume the mantle of some sort of normative framework or 
majority rule, while fuelling that intersubjective mind-meld or group-think. For Deleuze-
Guattari, ―a generic subject experiencing a common affection‖ (145)—or rather, a society 
of friends chatting, discussing, fighting over an abstract or universal opinion—has 
become ―the Western democratic, popular conception of philosophy,‖ which leads them 
to ask, ―is this not the eternal Athens, our way of being Greek again?‖ (144–45). 
I would argue that conversational constants concerning the legitimacy of the 
literary artefact have had a lasting impact on the discourse of literary criticism, right up to 
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 Charles Stivale, in his summary of  L‘Abecedaire de Gilles Deleuze, refers to Deleuze‘s particular 
comments on this point as follows: ―philosophy has strictly nothing to do with communication. 
Communication suffices very well in itself, and all this about consensus and opinions is the art of 
interrogations‖ (―U as in Un‖—One). 
106
 See: ―Q as in Question,‖ L‘Abecedaire de Gilles Deleuze. 
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the present day. That is, literary criticism has historically been unable to extricate itself 
from the so-called ―regimes of justification,‖ and within that basic discursive framework 
has followed one of two critical paths: (1) validation—e.g., the defence of literature, the 
authorization of the poet, the rationalization of extant literary or generic forms; or (2) 
vilification—e.g., what Michael Jarrett calls ―spanking writers,‖ typically for their 
adherence to, and/or reproduction of, dominant ideologies.
107
 But in either of these 
historical guises (i.e., apologist or censor, arbiter or judge), critics have continued to 
debate the legitimacy of literature (or of the poet/writer), and this, I would argue, owes 
much to the insatiable appeal of Platonic sensibilities, not only for those critics who 
would wish to monitor high culture, but those who would wish to patrol the back allies of 
popular culture, as well.
108
 Critics—in their contributions to what Antonio Gramsci calls 
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 In a contemporary context, many ―schools of criticism‖ (e.g., feminism, deconstruction, new 
historicism, post-colonialism—to name but a few) have collectively pursued a line of inquiry that has 
sought to expose or, at least, problematize the literary artefact, and (in some cases) the ―culture of 
expertise‖ (Habermas, ―Modernity‖ 9) that has grown up around that artefact. Random elements of this 
wider critique include (1) the supposed autonomy or self-legitimization of literature; (2) its appeal to, 
and/or reinforcement of, certain structures of power (patriarchal or otherwise); (3) its representations (i.e., 
distortions, simplifications, obfuscations, even fetishizations) of the ―other‖—i.e., other cultures, other 
histories, other people—and the cultured or gendered underpinnings associated with those representations; 
(4) its debasement or denial of the body; (5) its so-called ―unreadability‖ (de Man); and (6) its 
positionality—or rather, its lack of reflexivity about its own historico-discursive situation, its own 
productive or material pre-conditions, its own circulations and/or disseminations on the public stage. 
Historically, critics from Aristotle and Horace to Philip Sidney, John Dryden, and Samuel Johnson would 
take the poets to task (1) for breaking with aesthetic, generic, or otherwise formal literary conventions; (2) 
for a lack of stage decorum (i.e., unjust, disturbing, or artificial imagery); (3) for their lifeless 
representations (or for not being ―true to life‖); and (4) for a failure to provide sound moral instruction (i.e., 
―to teacheth virtue,‖ as Sidney says). 
108
 While efforts to legitimize literature have remained a persistent motif in literary critical discourse, the 
charges of, say, moral equivocation and the negative influence of popular art levelled against artists and 
their work have yet to lose their currency, right up to the present day, on the public stage—a fact that only 
further attests to the persuasive power of Platonic doctrine on critical, if not socio-political, sensibilities. In 
particular, I am thinking of the so-called ―culture wars,‖ and of how so much public or political debate 
seems geared toward protecting the innocence or moral fibre of the community, while mitigating the effects 
of cognitive and/or perceptual desensitization through long-term exposure to (say) acts of violence in the 
media. Yet escalating rates of both youth suicide and aggressive or antisocial behaviour invariably results 
in charges levelled by politicians or public advocacy groups against various forms of media and popular art. 
The usual suspects here are typically violent video games, sexually explicit images in movies and on 
television, the incendiary lyrics of rap artists, the demonically-influenced music of heavy-metal artists from 
Led Zeppelin to Marilyn Manson. Moreover, concerns are repeatedly raised about (1) the way the 
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the professional ―strata of intellectuals‖ (5)—have historically become ―experts in 
legitimation‖ (Said 172). In other words, whenever they find themselves mired in the 
pursuit of discoursal agreements about the validity or legitimacy of the literary artefact, 
critics open the door to the unexpressed, yet persistent, hope of what Deleuze-Guattari 
call ―a new Athens‖ (What is? 7)—however naïve or misguided that hope might be—
wherein the most reasonable arguments or opinions hold sway. But of added note here is 
that the question of legitimacy, itself, comes to implicate more than just the artists and 
their art: it implicates the critic, as well, as the value or necessity of the (literary) critical 
enterprise, itself, is put on trial, especially (though not exclusively) in the modern and 
postmodern eras—an issue to which we now turn. 
Functional Crises 
Criticism today lacks all substantive social function. It is either part of the public relations branch 
of the literary industry, or a matter wholly internal to the academies. 
 —Terry Eagleton (The Function of Criticism, 7) 
Critical discourse (or what one might otherwise refer to as critical action)
109
 has 
long been in the business of justifying itself, both institutionally, and also in the court of 
public opinion. In his Essay on Criticism, Alexander Pope sought to validate the literary 
critical enterprise, in large part by authorizing the critic-gentleman of the time through his 
capacity for wit and judgment, or through his refined and judicious character—in short, 
through a set of shared (or at least mutually recognized) eighteenth-century values. So 
                                                                                                                                                                             
entertainment industry markets its wares to children and teens—and this, despite warning labels on music 
and video games; and (2) the way mass entertainment represents, for example, bodies, women, visible 
minorities, etc. in and through what Feminist critic Susan Bordo refers to as ―the empire of images.‖ 
109
 Following Habermas‘ lead on this point, I define critical action as a subset of communicative action, 
which reflexively takes itself, either tacitly or overtly—and its own raison d‘être, its own goals and 
objectives, its own values, its own critical presuppositions, its own validity or rationale—as its own object 
(of study), even while critics, themselves, may still be immersed in the problematic of the text. 
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Pope was clearly in conversation with the critical community of his day, and the success 
of his argument in this context would have depended upon its reasoned appeal to a set of 
stable neo-classical values deemed important for the critic to possess. In the nineteenth 
century, Oscar Wilde would assign a creative and even artistic value to the critical act 
itself, and would thereby validate his claims about the critic by appealing to the 
prevailing aestheticism of his day. Wilde writes, ―Criticism is itself an art…[and] is really 
creative in the highest sense of the word. Criticism is, in fact, both creative and 
independent‖ (904). In effect, he proposes the novel idea of criticism for criticism‘s sake. 
Since Matthew Arnold, though, the discourse of literary criticism has rarely 
strayed—at least for any protracted period of time—from the question of its own validity, 
or rather, from the perceived need among critics, themselves, to differentiate what 
Habermas calls the ―validity claims‖ of their (literary) critical endeavours.
110
 So 
beginning with Arnold‘s renowned nineteenth-century inquiry into ―the function of 
criticism at the present time,‖ the larger critical community would be beset by a series of 
functional crises, vis-à-vis the norms or the validity of critical action, in general—crises 
that have hastened a discoursal turn into communicative action. By this I mean that critics 
(again, in a post-Arnoldian universe)—by posing such questions as, (1) what is the role 
or purpose of criticism?, (2) are critical practices useful or socially relevant?, (3) is 
criticism a legitimate undertaking at this point in time?—have effectively called upon 
their fellow hermeneuts, or better, the critical intelligentsia (writ large), to explain or 
defend their actions, to demonstrate the rationality of their various presuppositions, to 
validate their claims, their purposes, and so forth. Consequently, a number of celebrated 
critical theorists over the last century (or more) have either taken up the Arnoldian 
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 I bracket the ―literary‖ in this context for reasons that will be made clear below. 
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question directly (e.g., T. S. Eliot, Northrop Frye, Terry Eagleton), or have posited a kind 
of functional impasse related to the task of the critic, and have done so (I would add) with 
no less a fervent interest in trying to clarify and ultimately legitimize what defines (or at 
least what ought to be) the enduring aims of the literary critical enterprise. Some familiar 
examples in this context include the following: Richards‘ Practical Criticism, Cleanth 
Brooks‘ The Well Wrought Urn, and William Empson‘s Seven Types of Ambiguity;
111
 
Northrop Frye‘s Anatomy of Criticism;
112
 Harold Bloom‘s The Anxiety of Influence;
113
 
Stanley Fish‘s Is There a Text in this Class?;
114
 Paul de Man‘s Allegories of Reading;
115
 
Edward Said‘s The World, the Text, and the Critic;
116
 Terry Eagleton‘s After Theory
117
 
(and The Function of Criticism—a book to which I will return); and Homi Bhabha‘s The 
Location of Culture
118
—to name but a few function-oriented treatises. 
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 In their collective efforts to professionalize literary criticism, the New Critics would strive to coordinate 
(even homogenize) critical practices, largely around the autonomous figure of the text, the rhetorical or 
poetical devices of paradox or ambiguity, and a pan-critical commitment (at the time) to close reading. 
112
 Frye both builds upon and goes further than the New Critics, by tying the functional need for criticism to 
certain epistemological imperatives. He writes, ―To defend the right of criticism to exist at all…is to 
assume that criticism is a structure of thought and knowledge in its own right, with some measure of 
independence from the art it deals with. (4–5). 
113
 In particular, I am thinking of Bloom‘s ―Manifesto for Antithetical Criticism,‖ and its suggestion that 
criticism is a kind of ―prose poem‖ (95), and like poetry, is an ―achieved anxiety‖ (96) to the extent that 
critics—like poets—are engaged in acts of creative misprision in relation to their critical forbearers. 
114
 Fish, as we know, focuses on the constitutive role of discourse communities in interpretative practices, 
and holds that one recognizes the interpretative strategies of another through the appeals, of that other, to 
what Habermas calls the same validity claims. 
115
 de Man claims that ―[a] literary text simultaneously asserts and denies the authority of its own rhetorical 
mode‖ (17)—i.e., it ―asserts and denies‖ its own fixed meanings, while it ―puts into question a whole series 
of concepts that underlie the value judgments of our critical discourse‖ (16). He then adds that ―criticism is 
the deconstruction of literature, the reduction to the rigors of grammar of rhetorical mystifications‖ (17), 
and it is this ―reduction‖ that puts us ―in a mood of negative assurance that is highly productive of critical 
discourse‖ (16)—all welcome news to someone like de Man, given the rhetorical skeletons in his closet. 
116
 In opposition to Yale deconstruction, Said advocates for the sort of criticism that locates the book in 
―the world,‖ or in the powerful historico-political contexts from which it derives its meaning. Critics, he 
holds, need attend directly to those contexts, while eschewing the orthodoxies of contemporary critical 
models. 
117
 Like Said, Habermas, and Rorty, Eagleton ties a functional necessity to a populist, politically-engaged 
criticism, one that serves the interests of human solidarity, collective action, and the good life (125–29), in 
general, while it dispenses with the sort of vapid, jargonistic ―patois of contemporary criticism‖ (75). 
118
In his essay, ―The Commitment to Theory,‖ Bhabha calls for the ―erasure of the traditional boundary 
between theory/politics‖ (30). He asks ―what the function of a committed theoretical perspective might be‖ 
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But my point here is that these shifting functional exigencies—which again are 
linked to historically-situated critical practices—are rationalized (and hence guaranteed) 
through the so-called validity dimensions of language. In other words, the critical 
community will need to have reached an agreement or general consensus about the 
possible ways that critical discourse can validate itself, and thereby justify its claims, at 
any given point in time. So, as we saw, Pope validated the critical enterprise (and his 
conception of the critic) through a rhetorical appeal to certain eighteenth-century values 
(e.g., wit, judgment, reasoned moderation); similarly, Wilde validated his claims 
concerning criticism through an appeal to the prevailing aestheticism of his day. Matthew 
Arnold, then—whose views would (in some respects) anticipate those of the New Critics 
and Northrop Frye in the mid-twentieth century—validates the critic‘s engagement with 
literature by viewing the literary artefact as a displaced form of religion, or a kind of 
gospel unto itself.
119
 As Arnold famously believed, criticism is ―a disinterested 
endeavour to learn and propagate the best that is known and thought in the world‖ (824), 
and this ―endeavour,‖ then, translates into what he calls ―the function of criticism at the 
present time.‖ But of note here is that Arnold further legitimizes this ―disinterested 
endeavour‖ by highlighting the critic‘s various credentials, those that include (1) the ―fair 
and clear mind‖ of the critic, attuned to the elevated ideals, values, etc. reflected by (or in 
and through) the literary artefact; (2) the critic‘s commitment to a kind of epistemological 
                                                                                                                                                                             
(21), as far as ―the activist agent or the intellectual agent provocateur‖ (30) is concerned? Bhabha holds 
that theoretical discourse (if properly calibrated) can force ―the passage of history‖ (25), and do so in a way 
that ―overcomes the given grounds of opposition and opens up a space of translation: a place of hybridity… 
where the construction of a political object that is new, neither the one nor the other, properly alienates our 
expectations, and changes, as it must, the very forms of our recognition of the moment of politics.‖ 
119
 Arnold writes that ―while the multitude imagines itself to live by its false science, it does really live by 
its true religion‖ (819), and later adds, ―The epochs of Aeschylus and Shakespeare make us feel their pre-
eminence. In an epoch like those, no doubt, is the true life of literature; there is the promised land, towards 
which criticism can only beckon…[lest we resign ourselves to] die in the wilderness‖ (825).  
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agenda, one that promotes the manufacture of what Arnold calls ―fresh knowledge‖ for 
the sake of a society gone astray, both morally and spiritually (Frye would advance this 
point in his Anatomy); and (3) the critic‘s unique capacity to fuel ―a current of true and 
living ideas‖ (825) that will ultimately serve the wider needs (e.g., cultural, educational, 
moral, etc.) of English society, and thus guarantee its progress or long-term stability. 
The New Critics, for their part, would attempt to validate literary criticism by 
assigning a quasi-scientific legitimacy to its various practices, guaranteed (1) by the self-
contained object of critical scrutiny (e.g., Wimsatt‘s ―verbal icon‖; Brooks‘ ―well-
wrought urn‖); and (2) by the coordinated empirical activities and methodological rigour 
(i.e., close reading) of the critic. In Principles of Literary Criticism, I. A. Richards further 
extends the New Critic‘s commitment to this cause (i.e., quasi-scientific legitimacy) by 
appealing to the so-called soft science of behavioural psychology, and to what he calls 
literature‘s ―emotive use of language‖ (250)—i.e., the fact that literary language cannot 
be reduced to fixed referents—as a way to explain the paradoxical interpretations of 
readers. But the scientivism of literary critical discourse would arguably reach its apogee 
in formalism,
120
 and later in the linguistically-based structuralisms (or structuralist 
sciences) of the mid- to late-twentieth century, wherein the dream of deriving objective 
knowledge (or empirical truths) from the book held sway for many prominent scholars at 
the time (e.g., Propp, Frye, Lévi-Strauss, Todorov, Genette, Barthes). 
But the (supposed) scientific rigour that had once validated literary critical 
practices would steadily be replaced, or at least challenged, by the value progressively 
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 Boris Eichenbaum, in The Theory of the Formal Method, writes, ―the so-called ‗formal method‘ grew 
out of a struggle for a science of literature that would be both independent and factual‖ (1062). Meanwhile, 
Formalist Roman Jakobson would write, ―linguistics is the global science of verbal structure, [and] poetics 
may be regarded as an integral part of linguistics‖ (1258), and, by extension, part of that global science. 
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accorded to certain socio-political agendas/orthodoxies over the last several decades. In 
fact, since the 1960s, there has been a pan-critical resurgence of social dialectics within 
the discourse of literary criticism, reinforced by predictable, conflict-free norms of 
critical action (a point to which I will return in a moment). Or, put another way, from a 
Habermasian perspective, the validity dimensions—or better, the ways of differentiating 
(and hence arriving at) the validity dimensions—of critical theory and practice have been 
re-configured by the critical community. The worm has turned; and, on this point, the 
work of Terry Eagleton provides a representative case in point. What follows is a 
passage—which I quote at length—from his aptly titled book, ―The Function of 
Criticism,‖ wherein Eagleton laments the failings of the modern literary critical agenda: 
I began this essay by arguing that modern criticism was born of a struggle 
against the absolutist state. It has ended up, in effect, as a handful of 
individuals reviewing each other‘s books. Criticism has become 
incorporated into the culture industry as a ‗type of unpaid public relations, 
part of the requirements in any large corporate undertaking‘ […]…it is 
arguable that criticism was only ever significant when it engaged with 
more than literary issues—when, for whatever historical reason, the 
‗literary‘ was suddenly fore-grounded as the medium of vital concerns 
deeply rooted in the general intellectual, cultural and political life of an 
epoch. The period of the Enlightenment, the drama of Romanticism and 
the moment of Scrutiny are exemplary cases in point. It has only been 
when criticism, in the act of speaking about literature, emits a lateral 
message about the shape and destiny of a whole culture that its voice has 
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compelled widespread attention. It was only when ‗culture‘ became a 
pressing political project, ‗poetry‘ a metaphor for the quality of social life, 
and language a paradigm of social practice as a whole, that criticism could 
claim any serious title to exist. Today, apart from its marginal role in 
reproducing the dominant social relations through the academies, it is 
almost entirely bereft of such a raison d‘être. It engages at no significant 
point with any substantive social interest, and as a form of discourse is 
almost entirely self-validating and self-perpetuating. It is hard to believe 
that, in a nuclear age, the publication of yet another study of Robert 
Herrick is justifiable. Should criticism, then, be allowed to wither away, or 
can some productive role be discovered for it? (107–8; my emphasis) 
So Eagleton pens but one example of the contemporary call—by any number of critics 
and schools of criticism—for the discourse of literary criticism to again justify itself by 
re-capturing its more traditional ―raison d‘être,‖ as he says. That is, Eagleton expresses 
nostalgia for (among other things) eighteenth-century periodicals (e.g., Steele‘s The 
Tatler, Addison‘s The Spectator, Johnson‘s The Rambler and The Idler, and also 
Smollett‘s Critical Review), and their opinion-based, socio-political interventions in what 
Habermas calls ―the public sphere.‖ In the contemporary scene, though, Eagleton argues 
that institutions have struggled to place (or create space for) the more politically engaged 
critics, those committed to some type of activist agenda—such as the Marxist critic 
Raymond Williams—which leads Eagleton to raise serious questions about the enduring 
validity of, and/or justification for, what he views as the bourgeois pursuits of the modern 
critic, and the very rationale for the continued presence of literary criticism within the 
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academy. Pragmatically speaking, Eagleton calls for (1) a set of shared, or at least widely 
accepted, standards about the validity that ought to be accorded to certain forms of 
critical action; and (2) a shared context of understanding through which to coordinate 
various critical agendas, with minimal dissent or misunderstanding among critics. So 
communicative action of this sort, through its regulatory grounding in what Habermas 
calls universal validity, coordinated action, and fundamental agreements between critics, 
becomes the guarantor of liberal hope in a secular age. 
Habermas, in his essay ―Modernity—an Incomplete Project,‖ makes his most 
direct contribution to the discourse of literary criticism through his critique of expert 
systems—i.e., professional critics who ―step outside the modern world‖ (13) and ―into 
the sphere of the far-away and the archaic‖—and his related critique of ―the decisive 
confinement of science, morality and art to autonomous spheres separated from the 
lifeworld and administered by experts‖ (14). Habermas, like Eagleton, critiques the self-
legitimization of the literary artefact, or rather, the modes of aesthetic isolation that have 
come to dominate literary critical discourse in the wake of the New Critics; he further 
challenges criticism‘s ―exclusive concentration on one aspect of validity alone and the 
exclusion of aspects of truth and justice‖ (12). The problem, according to Habermas, is 
that specialist (or expert-oriented) forays into the art object (as aesthetic unity) have both 
separated reason from the lifeworld of everyday action (decision, social practice, etc.), 
and colonized that lifeworld, as well, through specialist knowledges. Habermas believes 
that the road out of this impasse involves coordinated action, shared agreements, 
universal validity—in short, communicative reason. In other words, the isolation of the 
aesthetic and cultural spheres from the lifeworld, and the related fragmentation of various 
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instrumental knowledges from that world, are at the forefront of Habermas‘ concerns in 
this area, and so he argues that we need to ―dispense with the usual concentration upon 
art‖ (7). As a cure, then, for the sort of ―dogmatism‖ (11) and ―moral rigorism‖ that has 
resulted in the professionalization of taste and critical judgment within the critical 
community, Habermas advances the need for the absorption of aesthetic experience back 
into the lifeworld, back into history, back into the problems of everyday life. To that end, 
critics must renew their various socio-political commitments—those primarily concerned 
with (1) the ―demands of moral-practical justification‖ (14); (2) ―the inherent justice of 
dialogical reason‖ (Edgar 39); (3) the question of unequal or unjust socio-political 
structures (of power); (4) the naturalization of certain social or institutional norms; (5) the 
securing of legitimacies (i.e., good reasons) for communication and action, and so forth. 
The Habermasian critic, then, will not allow herself to be distracted by a self-contained, 
self-sustaining aesthetic object which colonizes the lifeworld, advances the need for a 
specialist knowledge, and promotes the sort of self-reflective activity that inhibits just 
and free-flowing communication. Instead, the Habermasian critic disturbs what is natural 
in art (or what renders the art object autonomous from the lifeworld), by asking where its 
emanicipatory potential lies. But, to reiterate, my point here is that critics beholden to 
some form of communicative competency (or intersubjective idealism) once again renew 
the judgment of God, this time through their idealization of the regimes of justification. 
I would further contend that the widespread subordination of the literary within 
the critical community, as a whole, becomes a significant indicator of this functional shift 
toward the more socio-political forms of legitimacy that Eagleton (in Habermasian 
fashion) called for, beginning in the 1980s. In other words, for feminists, new historicists, 
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discourse analysts, cultural critics, and post-colonialists the study of literature would 
become but a singular node in a much more wide-ranging critical programme. 
Consequently, it may not be unusual (at this point in time, anyway) to encounter critics or 
theorists who seem loathe to identify themselves with what may seem—at least to 
them—to be a more antiquated or politically naïve focus on works of literature alone. 
However, this is not to suggest that literature, as an object of study, no longer has any 
critical purchase, but that because various schools of criticism have sought to mount a 
sustained attack on the narrowly defined category of ―literature,‖ or on the ―literary text,‖ 
and on the perceived autonomy and/or self-sufficiency of such (which, in some quarters, 
turns the text into a microcosm of the State), they are no longer wont to identify the 
figure of the literary as a politically neutral participant on either the public or institutional 
stage. In short, ―literature‖ has become a hotly contested space. It has become a 
prominent site of cultural and political struggle, where both social and national identities 
are regularly bought and sold, or where ideologically-motivated forms of common sense 
morph into the hierarchical structures of good sense—i.e., the fixed image of the good, 
the right, the just, the true—and thereby end up reinforcing a powerful State apparatus. 
Richard Rorty picks up the point as follows:  
The word ‗literature‘ now covers just about every sort of book which 
might conceivably have moral relevance—might conceivably alter one‘s 
sense of what is possible and important. The application of this term has 
nothing to do with the presence of ‗literary qualities‘ in a book. Rather 
than detecting and expounding upon such qualities, the critic is now 
expected to facilitate moral reflection by suggesting revisions in the canon 
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of moral exemplars and advisers, and suggesting ways in which the 
tensions within this canon may be eased. (82) 
So for many contemporary currents of literary (or, more broadly, social) criticism, the 
focus has turned to some version of what Rorty himself calls ―solidarity,‖ wherein public 
needs ―and the rise of liberal institutions and customs‖ (68) take precedence in the 
discourse, along with a renewed commitment to social responsibility and the liberal-
democratic hope of a diminishment of cruelty (63). 
While perhaps sympathetic to such ideals, Deleuze-Guattari remain unconvinced 
by the likes of Rorty and Habermas: 
What social democracy has not given the order to fire when the poor come 
out of their territory or ghetto? Rights save neither men nor a philosophy 
that is reterritorialized on the democratic State. Human rights will not 
make us bless capitalism. A great deal of innocence or cunning is needed 
by a philosophy of communication that claims to restore the society of 
friends, or even of wise men, by forming a universal opinion as consensus 
able to moralize nations, States, and the market. (What is? 107) 
So how, in the end, can we eschew the rational, communication-oriented modes of 
criticism, without returning to the conservatisms of the past, such as, the self-sustaining 
autonomy of the book? The answer, as I will argue in Part 2 of the dissertation, is an 
immanentist orientation to the book, and a turn away from the various forms of 
transcendence (and their associated idealisms) that in the end, despite their outward 
appearances, are all stratigraphic modes of criticism: they each, in their own way, give 
voice to the enduring judgment of God. 
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Conclusion: Criticism in a Major Key 
Semiotician Umberto Eco argues that ―frequently the overcoded entities [e.g., 
literature, the book] float—so to speak—among the codes, on the threshold between 
convention and innovation. It is by a slow and prudent process that a society [or perhaps, 
a school of criticism] admits them to the ranks of the rules upon which it bases its own 
very raison d‘être‖ (134). Deleuze-Guattari, in A Thousand Plateaus, put a finer point on 
Eco‘s ethereal image of ―overcoded entities‖ floating ―among the codes‖; that is, they 
argue that, above all else, overcoding practices invoke a certain ―Unity [that] always 
operates in an empty dimension supplementary to that of the system considered‖ (8). In 
this chapter we have seen that over time any number of critical values have similarly 
ascended ―the ranks,‖ as it were, and become universal in and through the discourse of 
literary criticism. With that guarantee of universality, these different values have begun to 
operate with near God-like authority and autonomy in an ―empty dimension‖ of sorts—
i.e., a privileged and ideal realm—wherein they have become the enduring rules of 
literary critical engagement. Put another way, they have become the dogmatic purveyors 
of a compulsory unity, and have done so through what Massumi calls the ―infolding of a 
forcibly regularized outside‖ (User‘s Guide 112) into the interior spaces of the book. 
This chapter has attempted to show that the ―triple illusion‖ of contemplation, 
reflection, and communication have historically spawned what Deleuze-Guattari (in A 
Thousand Plateaus) refer to as a ―royal science‖ (368) tradition in the discourse of 
literary criticism, or, more generally, majoritarian modes of criticism (i.e., criticism in a 
major key). In so doing, this triple illusion—which I have collectively characterized as a 
stratigraphic critical agenda—has long suppressed the expressive capacities of the book 
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and hence its capacity to become-other. So this chapter has explored the underlying 
principles that inform a transcendent orientation to not only the book, but to various 
conceptions of criticism, as well (i.e., Sussman‘s task of the critic). I have further argued 
that while this orientation derives largely from the enduring spectre of Platonism, the 
discourse of literary criticism has made essential and enduring contributions to this 
pernicious programming, as well, through its persistent renewal and reconfiguration of 
what Deleuze-Guattari call the mole of the transcendent. So, in short, the relentless 
critical assault of the transcendent orientation to the book has, I conclude, played a 
seminal role in fulfilling a Platonic destiny. In Part 2 of this dissertation, I will open up 
the question of how to think the book in a way that actively eschews the transcendent 
orientation at every turn, and that points to a new outside role for the critic, one that 
follows what I will be calling an immanentist (and hence more Deleuzean) orientation to 






The “Plan[e] of Immanence,” the “Plan[e] of Consistency” 
Here, there are no longer any forms or developments of forms; nor are there subjects or the 
formation of subjects. There is no structure, any more than there is genesis. There are only 
relations of movement and rest, speed and slowness between unformed elements…We call 
this plane, which knows only longitudes and latitudes, speeds and haecceities, the plane of 
consistency or composition. 
—Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (A Thousand Plateaus?, 266) 
If the first response to the illusion of transcendence is to think all the different grounds, 
origins and foundations which have operated as ‘planes of transcendence,’ the second and far 
less easily achieved task is to think ‘THE plane of immanence’ as such. 




In Part 1 of this dissertation, I sought to demonstrate how and in what ways ―the 
poisoned gift of Platonism‖ (i.e., transcendence—or what Deleuze, following Artaud, 
calls ―the triumph of the judgment of God‖) has played an enduring role in the discourse 
of literary criticism, from Plato to the present. I argued that the transcendent orientation 
to literature most fully reveals itself through the sustained efforts of critics to submit 
literature (or, more broadly, the book) to different generalities of thought—e.g., preset 
methodological agendas and various discoursal confinements (contemplation, reflection, 
communication). The cumulative effect of these ways of thinking about literature results 
not only in its overall abstraction, but in its ―molar-moral‖ containment (Massumi, User‘s 
Guide 119)—i.e., its normalization, its subjection to hierarchical values. By extension, 
the very capacity of the book to affect, to be affected (i.e., to vary in terms of its power to 
act), to transform or become-other—issues that will be explored in Part 2 of the 
dissertation—have all been severely curtailed, as well. In Part 1, I also showed that the 
transcendent orientation to literature has not only had lasting effects on literature, but—as 
far back as Plato‘s Ion—on the perceived task of the critic. 
So the basic question I ask—that which will determine the overall progression of 
Part 2—can be formulated as follows: Where does the critic go from here? Or, more 
precisely, how might the critic effectively re-map (or re-vector) her basic orientation to 
the book, and in a way that ultimately eschews transcendence at every turn? How might 
the critic think otherwise—not only about the book, but more importantly (at least for our 
purposes) about the role of criticism (or of critical practices), in general? The various 
challenges that confront any sort of Deleuzean criticism—or, new materialism
121
—
include (1) overcoming the inclination (so prevalent within the discourse of literary 
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 The form of materialism I have in mind will need to be carefully elucidated over the pages that follow. 
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criticism) to transcend, and thereby render abstract, the literary artefact; and (2) reviving 
the power of the book, itself, to take flight—or ―to follow the witch‘s flight,‖ as Deleuze-
Guattari say—by amplifying its untapped potentials.
122
 To meet these challenges, I posit 
a new, co-creative role for the critic, whereby the task of the critic (vis-à-vis the book) is 
newly re-conceived through the lens of what I call the immanentist orientation—an issue 
to which we now turn. 
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 In Dialogues, Deleuze concludes—through his reading of D. H. Lawrence, Melville, Kerouac, and other 
Anglo-American writers he admires—that ―the highest aim of literature‖ is ―to leave, to escape…to trace a 
line‖ (36); he adds that for those aforementioned writers, ―everything is departure, becoming, passage, leap, 






Criticism as “Enterprise of Co-Creation” 
Life alone creates such zones where living beings whirl around, and only art can reach and 
penetrate them in its enterprise of co-creation. 
—Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (What is Philosophy?, 173) 
Criticism ceases being distinguished from the creative discourse of which it would be the 
necessary actualization. 
—Maurice Blanchot (“What is the Purpose of Criticism?” 4) 
Ernest:  But is criticism really a creative art? 
Gilbert: Why should it not be? It works with materials, and puts them into a form that is at 
once new and delightful. What more can one say of poetry? Indeed, I would call 
criticism a creation within a creation. 




Disrupting the Creative/Critical Divide 
It is precisely that purely functional notion of criticism, or that great divide between criticism and 
creation, which is now in dispute. 
—Geoffrey Hartman (Criticism in the Wilderness, 204) 
The discourse of literary criticism has long grappled with the creative
123
 potential 
of the critic—in some instances that has meant blurring the line that divides literature 
from criticism (or commentary); artist (e.g., dramatist, poet, novelist) from critic; and so-
called ―primary‖ texts from ―secondary‖ texts. Yale deconstructionist Geoffrey Hartman, 
who, along with Oscar Wilde, reduces the ―English tradition in criticism‖ to a form of 
―sublimated chatter‖ (199), posits, in its place, the notion of ―literary commentary as 
literature‖ (204). Hartman asks, for example, 
Does the essay…and the literary essay in particular, have a form of its 
own, a shape or perspective that removes it from the domain of positive 
knowledge to give it a place beside art, yet without confusing the 
boundaries of scholarship and art? (191)
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As far back as the Ion, however, Socrates would reprimand the rhapsode—the proto-critic 
of his day—for what he took to be Ion‘s vainglorious, performance-based contributions 
to the Homeric verses, and for Ion‘s consequent lack of critical acumen with regard to 
how Homer‘s work compares (in terms of the quality of his depictions) to that of the 
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 It is with some reluctance that I use a word like ―creative‖ in this context, let alone words like ―artistic‖ 
or ―experimental‖—words sufficiently vague enough to account for any type of criticism that seems to 
deviate from some existing idea about what criticism ought to be. Following Geoffrey Hartman, I would 
hope ―the barriers between the academic and the creative spheres‖ (183) can be broken down. I wonder, 
though, what it might mean to break down those ―barriers‖? Or what it even means to be creative in a 
critical setting? These matters, suffice to say, do not go without saying, and will be explored over the pages 
that follow. 
124
 Yet those confusions abound, Hartman claims, in a work like Derrida‘s Glas: ―it is not only hard to say 
whether Glas is ‗criticism‘ or ‗philosophy‘ or ‗literature,‘ it is hard to affirm it as a book. Glas raises the 
specter of texts so tangled, contaminated, displaced, deceptive that the idea of a single author fades‖ (204). 
173 
 
other Epic poets of the time. But clearly Socrates‘ complaints would in no way put to rest 
the creative aspirations of the critic: not for all time, not even in his own time. As 
discussed in Chapter 1, the irony has rarely been lost on philosophers and critics alike 
that Plato (Socrates‘ boy) would, historically, be so well known for his searing indictment 
of the arts, and yet be such a great dramatist and literary stylist in his own right. 
Following Plato‘s lead, some critics (e.g., Horace, John Dryden, Oscar Wilde, among 
them) would dabble in the dramatic (or dialogical) representation of their ideas. 
In the eighteenth century, Alexander Pope would versify his views on (among 
other things) critics, criticism, and literature in his lyrical tour de force, ―An Essay on 
Criticism,‖ and thereby set a new standard for critical experimentation: 
The gen‘rous Critick fann‘d the Poet‘s Fire, 
And taught the World, with Reason to Admire. 
Then Criticism the Muse‘s Handmaid prov‘d, 
To dress her Charms, and make her more belov‘d. . . (ll. 100–3) 
In this passage, Pope claims that a beneficent (albeit subordinate) critic enters into, shall 
we say, functional dealings with the poet: (1) by becoming ―Handmaid‖ to the creative 
―Muse‖; and (2) by ―[dressing] her Charms,‖ so as to ―make her more belov‘d.‖ So 
Pope‘s critic-handmaiden (or is it lackey?) primps, dresses, adorns the poems, revealing 
them in their finest light; the critic fusses with particulars, smoothes the edges, and sets 
the stage for the poems‘ public showing. But the question to which Pope gives rise, less 
in his criticism than through his criticism (i.e., through his style, his mode of expression, 
the creative formulation of his ideas, and so forth)—a question that would re-assert itself 
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in more dramatic fashion in the centuries following the first publication of the Essay, in 
1711, and in ways that Pope, himself, would neither have dreamed of, nor sanctioned—
can be formulated as follows: can the literary critic actually ―[fan] the Poet‘s Fire,‖ as 
Pope says, without dowsing the poems with water? Or, put another way, can the critic 
escape her purely functional or gate-keeping role, and thereby assume a more co-creative 
role in relation to, or alongside, the text? Can the critic, as Foucault suggests, ―multiply‖ 
the book‘s ―signs of existence‖ (―Masked‖ 326)? Can she ―summon‖ those nascent 
signs—i.e., ―drag them from their sleep‖—rather than simply pass judgement on a 
supposedly self-contained, self-sufficient objet d‘art, and in a way that (as Foucault 
himself claims) puts the rest of us to sleep?
125
 Finally, can criticism be re-conceived as 
both a cooperative and creative act in its own right? 
As discussed in previous chapters, both art and artist have long been subordinated 
to the various controls and confinements of whatever the critic-cum-dominatrix allows at 
any given point in time. However, critics—in their turn—have unduly relied upon, even 
fetishized, the literary artefact as object of study. So the will to dominate in literary 
criticism is, to a certain extent, offset or counterbalanced by what Hartman calls ―a 
psychology of dependence‖: 
the literary critic most of us know, the academy-grown variety, is a scholar 
of one candle who pores over texts, and at his most sublime chants a text 
(although obscure) that is an answer. This image of a task both ascetic and 
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 I see a parallel between Pope‘s claim that ―The gen‘rous Critick fann‘d the Poet‘s Fire‖ and Michel 
Foucault‘s ―dream‖ scenario—which we will discuss in more detail below—in which the latter asserts that 
a superior or more enlightened critical practice would, as he suggests, ―light fires.‖ Now, I do not ignore 
the fact that Pope‘s rational and rule-bound ‗fanning‘ of the poetic fires involves something quite different 
than what Foucault, more than two and a half centuries later, would have meant by ‗lighting fires.‘ All that 
I wish to draw attention to at this point is the impulse within criticism to creatively intensify literature—or 
as Foucault claims, bring it ―to life.‖ 
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absorbing is not unattractive…It involves, however, a psychology of 
dependence, and of deepening dependence. (219) 
Hartman adds that the ascetic scholar, or critic-hermeneut, ―accepts too readily his 
subordinate function‖ (216), vis-à-vis the work of literature; he provocatively asks, then, 
whether or not ―the barriers between the academic and the creative spheres [can be 
broken down] so that everything imaginative can find a place in the university?‖ (183). 
Now, I am not at all certain that the critic ―accepts too readily‖ a purely ―subordinate 
function,‖ as Hartman contends. Part 1 of this dissertation suggests just the opposite—
that the literary artefact has historically fallen prey to a dominant critical apparatus. So 
while critics may be hopelessly mired in a self-defeating cycle of both domination and 
―deepening dependence,‖ I would agree, pace Hartman, that critics will—at minimum—
need to shed their seemingly pious devotion to the text: 
The basic question is that of creative criticism: what to make of…this 
phenomenon, which liberates the critical activity from its positive or 
reviewing function, from its subordination to the thing commented on, 
whether artefact or general theme. (191) 
If, in fact, this so-called ―creative criticism‖—a phrase Hartman takes from T. S. Eliot—
were able to liberate critics from their more administerial roles (vis-à-vis the text), then 
one certainly needs to ask, following Hartman: ―what to make of this phenomenon‖ that 
liberates the critic by productively fusing the creative and the critical?  
It would take the likes of Oscar Wilde, in ―The Critic as Artist,‖ and (to a lesser 
extent) the young T. S. Eliot, in his 1923 essay, ―The Function of Criticism‖—an essay 
that stands as obvious rejoinder to Mathew Arnold‘s nineteenth-century touchstone of 
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literary criticism, ―The Function of Criticism at the Present Time‖
126
—to perhaps 
formally challenge this propensity within the discourse of literary criticism to dissociate 
the movements (or actions) of the critical from those of the creative.
127
 Eliot, for 
example, would claim that novelists/authors engage in a kind of ―critical activity‖ (74), 
and that they possess ―critical powers‖ of their own. He would also speak to what he calls 
―the polity of literature and of criticism…[noting that] there is the possibility of 
cooperative activity‖ (76); and following Wilde‘s own excoriation of Matthew Arnold, 
Eliot would suggest that the latter ―overlooks the capital importance of criticism in the 
work of creation itself‖ (73). But of particular note here is the fact that while Eliot was 
initially inclined to support the idea that criticism should form some sort of creative union 
with ―the labour of the artist‖ (74), he would eventually renounce this way of thinking, 
rejecting it as a kind of youthful indiscretion on his part: ―Eliot draws back from what 
seems to him an ultimate and dangerous sophistication... [arguing that] criticism cannot 
be a creative activity‖ (Hartman 190). This idea, then, that ―creative activity‖ need be 
strictly partitioned from critical discourse—an idea we see at work in the New Critics, 
Russian Formalists, and French Structuralists, and, in particular, the work of I. A. 
Richards, Cleanth Brooks,
128
 Northrop Frye, and parts of Roland Barthes, among 
others—would become an enduring dogma in and through twentieth-century criticism. 
As we know, many critics (and schools of criticism) would hitch their wagon to science 
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 Interestingly enough, Wilde‘s essay, ―The Critic as Artist,‖ also takes on Arnold. Wilde had initially 
titled his essay, ―The True Function and Value of Criticism, with Some Remarks on the Importance of 
Doing Nothing‖ (see ―Introduction‖ to Norman Page‘s 1998 edition of The Picture of Dorian Gray, p. 24). 
In fact, at several points in his essay, Wilde comments—usually in disparaging fashion—on some of the 
key arguments in Arnold‘s Function. 
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 Hartman points to an even earlier upending of the division between criticism and creation in romantic 
literature/art, which he characterizes as ―a kind of avant-garde criticism‖ (190). 
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during this period in a sustained effort to fashion a critical science of their own. But this 
would be a Faustian bargain of sorts that would ultimately prove debilitating for (among 
so many other things) the perhaps nascent impulse within the discourse of literary 
criticism itself to move toward what Deleuze-Guattari call an ―enterprise of co-creation‖ 
(What is? 173)—an impulse that finds its first fruits in the work of Oscar Wilde. 
In ―The Critic as Artist,‖ Wilde argues at length for the ―importance of the critical 
element in all creative work‖ (900); then, in a somewhat creative turn of his own—one 
that harkens back to the dramatic structure of Dryden‘s ―Essay of Dramatick Poesie‖ and 
Plato‘s dialogues—Wilde mounts a forceful challenge to the creative/critical divide: 
Ernest: The highest criticism, then, is more creative than 
creation, and the primary aim of the critic is to see the 
object as in itself it really is not. 
Gilbert: Yes, that is my theory. To the critic, the work of 
art is simply a suggestion for a new work of his own, that 
need not necessarily bear any obvious resemblance to the 
thing it criticizes. (907) 
There are a couple of key points in this exchange, including the somewhat provocative 
suggestion that the work of criticism ―need not necessarily bear any obvious resemblance 
to the thing it criticizes.‖ Does this mean the critic is summarily discharged of any and all 
responsibility, vis-à-vis the text, and free to do whatever? Or that criticism is a kind of 
free-for all? A wild(e) flight of fancy? A rambling flow of signifiers? Parody? Irony? A 
―proliferating absurdity‖ (Massumi, ―Introduction‖ xv)? Is this the new orthodoxy? 
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Recall Ernest‘s initial prompt: ―the primary aim of the critic is to see the object as 
in itself it really is not.‖ The point here, it would seem, is not that the critic simply gives 
herself over to some sort of fitful delirium that ultimately side-steps the text altogether, 
but that criticism, in and of itself, becomes an elemental act of falsification—that, as 
Ernest remarks, involves, seeing ―the object as in itself it really is not.‖ Elsewhere in the 
essay, Wilde reinforces the point as follows: ―the critic reproduces the work he criticizes 
in a mode that is never imitative,‖ because criticism‘s ―charm…consist[s] in the rejection 
of resemblance‖ (909). In the end, Gilbert concludes, ―the critic is he who exhibits to us a 
work of art in a form different from that of the work itself‖ (910). So then we ask: what 
does it mean to eschew resemblances in this context—or better, to repeat the text in a 
differential way? First off, we need to recognize that critics actually do intervene; they 
encounter, experience, operate on the text, but do so—and this is key—with the goal of 
extracting something new, something different. So the goal is to unleash a pure potential 
from the text, rather than simply ―lampoon‖ it through the neurotic display of ―an 
‗unmotivated‘ excess of signification‖ (Massumi, ―Introduction‖ xv–xvi). Art, in effect, 
goads the critic by offering itself up, as Wilde says, ―a suggestion for a new work‖—a 
work that may even be ―more creative than creation.‖ So, in a sense, art demands its own 
falsification. Put another way, critics are not tasked with simply mirroring the text by 
habitually (nay ritualistically) tracing its semiotic coordinates—who needs that? They are 
not tasked with assessing/assigning value, passing judgment, or rendering the work of art 
redundant to its secondary representation—critics should ―not treat Art as a riddling 
Sphinx‖ (Wilde 910). Instead, they should affirm what Deleuze calls ―the powers of the 
false‖ (Cinema 2:126):
129
 ―lying—as art—is the ethical practice of affirmation, the 
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 Deleuze writes that it is Nietzsche who ―substitutes the power of the false for the form of the true and 
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affirmation of life‖ (Zepke 27). This may involve (or result in), as Gilbert suggests, 
―[inventing] fresh forms‖ (901), in large part by side-stepping the faculties of ―reason‖ 
and ―recognition‖ (908); this may further involve ―showing…the work of art in some 
new relation to our age‖ (911), because as Gilbert says, ―the one duty we owe to history 
is to rewrite it‖ (903); or it may involve any number of other creative turns: 
the one characteristic of a beautiful form is that one can put into it 
whatever one wishes, and see in it whatever one chooses to see; and the 
Beauty, that gives to creation its universal and aesthetic element, makes 
the critic a creator in his turn, and [does so through] whispers of a 
thousand different things which were not present in the mind of him who 
carved the statue or painted the panel or graved the gem. (907)
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In short, the critic, as if enthralled by the ―whispers of a thousand different things,‖ puts 
art to work by plugging it into (or into it) ―whatever one wishes…whatever one chooses.‖  
Deleuze makes a similar point, we recall, in his letter/reply to Michel Cressole. 
That is, he calls for an ―intensive way of reading,‖ which involves (among other things), 
―tearing the book into pieces, getting it to interact with other things, absolutely anything.‖ 
The basic reason for machining the book in this way (i.e., plugging it into the ―absolutely 
                                                                                                                                                                             
resolves the crisis of truth… in favour of the false and its artistic, creative power‖ (131). In The Will to 
Power, Nietzsche writes that ―whenever man rejoices, he is always the same in his rejoicing: he rejoices as 
an artist, he enjoys himself as power, he enjoys the lie as his form of power‖ (§853). He then adds, ―We 
have need of lies in order to conquer this reality, this ‗truth,‘ that is in order to live…[so] man must be a liar 
by nature, he must be above all an artist‖ so as to take ―flight from truth.‖ In Twilight of the Idols 
(―Expeditions of an Untimely Man‖), Nietzsche disparages philosophers because their ―entire trade 
demands that they concede only certain truths…truths of practical reason‖ (§42). Hence, ―They know what 
they have to prove, they are practical in that — they recognise one another by their agreement over 
‗truths.‘—‗Thou shalt not lie‘—in plain words: take care, philosopher, not to tell the truth.‖ 
130
 At this point I should qualify my use of Wilde. While in some ways his work participates in historical 
efforts to overcome the transcendent orientation to literature, in some ways he renews that transcendence. 
Wilde‘s idealism, or near spiritual aestheticism—clearly manifest in phrases like ―the Beauty…that gives to 
creation its universal and aesthetic element,‖ or, ―great works of art are living things…are, in fact, the only 
things that live‖ (911)—distances him from Deleuze, and the sort of materialist criticism I posit herein. 
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anything‖) is to palpate difference, or to induce becomings in and through the book, 
itself, so as to ultimately ―see,‖ as Gilbert claims, ―the object as in itself it really is not.‖ 
And again, by attuning themselves to the ―whispers of a thousand different things‖ (i.e., 
things not actualized), critics not only bring a ―richer unity‖ or fuller aspect to the work, 
but ultimately promote the idea that all bodies, all ―living things‖—materially speaking—
operate in and through their variable hook-ups, relays, connections, and conduits. Life, in 
fact, as I will show in our discussion of Kerouac (below), is effectively defined by its 
forms of passage and propulsion. So the ‗greatness‘ attributed to certain works of art can 
be measured through the relative openness of those works to new inputs or new 
machines—e.g.,―a war-machine, love-machine, revolutionary-machine…bureaucratic-
machine‖ (Deleuze-Guattari, Plateaus 4)—that which stimulates (or sets in motion) the 
powers of affective variance and creative transformation. So while, yes, the art object 
may be a kind of leaping-off point for the critic—or better, a mobilization, a relay, a 
propulsion (―simply a suggestion for a new work‖); a middle, Deleuze would say, not an 
end in itself—the fact that Wilde‘s critic turns away from the fixed figures and structural 
logic of the text, so as ―to see the object as in itself it really is not,‖ becomes an important 
affirmation of the art—a point that will require additional clarification as we proceed. 
So Wilde, it would seem, retains Pope‘s more abstract suggestion that ―The 
gen‘rous Critick fan[s] the Poet‘s Fire,‖ but summarily drops, if not directly counters, the 
related claims that the critic has somehow ―taught the World, with Reason to Admire,‖ 
and that ―Criticism the Muse‘s Handmaid prov‘d.‖ For Wilde, whatever it might mean in 
practical terms to enflame or intensify a given work of art has little, if anything, to do 
with mastering that work (i.e., consuming it whole): ―It must be perfectly easy in half an 
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hour to say whether a book is worth anything or worth nothing. Ten minutes are really 
sufficient, if one has the instinct for form. Who wants to wade through a dull volume. 
One tastes it, and that is quite enough‖ (902). Criticism also has little to do with bringing 
reason or rationality to the text (908), with noting its resemblance to other texts, or with 
interpreting and, by extension, demystifying its supposed truths (910). In short, Wilde‘s 
critic need not pursue the requirement of disciplinary mastery—a requirement that, as we 
know, would first see the light of day in Socrates‘ indictment of the rhapsodes (Ion, sects. 
532–33). Not until the twentieth century, though, would the New Critics (and others) 
fulfill the dream of ―the poisoned gift of Platonism,‖ in part by giving a powerful 
autonomy to the critical act—which admittedly is not inconsistent with Wilde‘s position 
(at least generally speaking). The difference is that while many currents of twentieth-
century criticism would make despotic use of that power to capture and contain the 
literary artefact (e.g. formally, structurally, generically), for Wilde, the critical faculty 
serves primarily to deepen or extend what he calls the mystery of art—a move that would 
resonate with the likes of Martin Heidegger and Maurice Blanchot. According to Wilde, 
the critic ―will look upon Art as a goddess whose mystery it is his province to intensify‖ 
(910); and to ―deepen its mystery‖ (909), the critic will ―raise round it, and round its 
maker, that mist of wonder which is dear both to the gods and worshippers alike.‖ So 
again we ask: what does it mean, in practical terms, for the critic to ―intensify‖ or 
―deepen‖ the ―mystery‖ of literature? For Wilde, the short answer is that the critic 
exposes the work to difference. That is, the critic listens to (or intuits) the ―whispers of a 
thousand different things‖—things that as Wilde/Gilbert says, ―were not present in the 
mind of him who carved the statue or painted the panel or graved the gem.‖ By then 
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expressing those real, yet unactualized, essences—i.e., by differencing the text—the critic 
intensifies its mystery, expands its purview, and amplifies its powers. In effect, the critic 
draws new variables, new potentials, new affects from the text, and thereby propels it into 
the realm of the unpredictable and the anexact.
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I acknowledge, however, that talk of deepening mysteries in this context carries 
with it some ideological baggage. In an age where critical practices are routinely 
dominated by the pressure to de-mystify, to recover historical precondition, to expose 
prevailing ideologies or other socio-political conceits, and to ultimately pursue the art of 
interrogations, the idea of deepening mysteries may seem on the surface somewhat 
suspect. But leaving aside the question of whether or not critical acts of de-mystification 
actually solve the problems of mystification—at best, it would seem, they exchange one 
set of ideological shackles for another—affirming and/or amplifying the mystery of the 
book has, to my mind, little or nothing to do with re-affirming the legitimacies of, say, 
colonialism, humanism, patriarchy, or enlightenment reason. There is nothing to hide, no 
secret to keep. Deepening the mystery, in fact, has little to do with burdening the text by 
way of some additional interpretative constraint. Instead, the goal here is to pry open the 
text, to expose it to its non-localized powers and potentials, and thereby free it from any 
and all critical constraint. In other words, this is an affirmation of the lightness of the 
book, and of its capacity to take flight, rather than a misguided effort to load the book 
―with the heaviest burdens‖ (Deleuze, Nietzsche 184)—those that include, ―the weight of 
higher values‖ (185), ―the postulates of being‖ (184), the ―truth of the world,‖ ―the self-
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 Deleuze-Guattari link the conceptual discovery of the ―anexact‖ to Husserl: ―It seems to us that Husserl 
brought thought a decisive step forward when he discovered a region of vague and material essences 
(essences that are vagabond, anexact and yet rigorous), distinguishing them from fixed, metric and formal, 
essences‖ (Plateaus 407). 
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sufficiency of the real,‖ and other ―weighty consideration[s]‖ (186): in all, ―the burden of 
what is‖ (185). Again, this is an opening up of the book to the unrecognizable, the 
unpredictable, or to what Deleuze-Guattari refer to as ―unheard-of becomings‖ (Plateaus 
240). As Deleuze himself writes, ―unburden, unharness, and set free that which lives‖ 
(Essays 100), and in a way that expands the possibilities of the book, or at least channels 
those possibilities (if not the book, itself) into uncharted territories. 
So, in summary, Wilde‘s approach to criticism eschews enlightenment models, 
and even to this day stands in stark contrast to the sort of critical agendas that serve to 
tame or domesticate a work of art either by representing it; explaining or interpreting it; 
categorizing it (generically, structurally, etc.); reading it through the lens of certain 
aesthetic/literary values (or constants); or denouncing the so-called ―sins‖ of the writer—
i.e., the writer‘s complicity with dominant ideologies—through, as we recall, a practice 
that Michael Jarrett caustically refers to as ―spanking the writer.‖ In effect, critical 
practices of this sort put limits on the capacity of the book to act in the world—to act, and 
be acted upon; to be used, or put to work; to connect or hook-up; to enter into novel 
arrangements with things other than or outside itself; and ultimately to express itself in 
ways that extant critical or referential frames will simply not sanction. 
So truly being creative in a literary critical setting would never involve something 
so trivial as parody, irony, or any other form of postmodern experiment, nor would it 
involve simply versifying or dramatizing one‘s ideas about literature. The creativity of 
the critic is affirmed by nothing less than the mobilization (intensification, amplification) 
of the unactualized, though no less real, potentials of the book—a mobilization that 
ultimately enables the book to become-other. To anticipate the larger arguments of this 
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chapter, being creative means being able to bring the book to a point of crisis, whereby 
the book, itself, goes ―critical.‖ To this point, though, we only get a preliminary sense 
from writers like Oscar Wilde that the movements of the creative and the critical are 
inextricably bound to one another; they are, it would seem, one and the same movement. 
But this point will need further clarification over the pages that follow. 
Signs of “A Life…” 
Following the clarion call of writers like Geoffrey Hartman, a wave of critical 
practices in recent decades that seek to confront the creative/critical divide have taken on 
a momentum of their own, especially in the wake of the excesses, the play, and (at times) 
―wilful absurdisms‖ (Massumi, ―Introduction‖ xv) of postmodernism.
132
 Foucault—
though not a postmodernist himself—puts forward a post-modern vision of the future: 
I can‘t help but dream about a kind of criticism that would not try to judge, 
but to bring an oeuvre, a book, a sentence, an idea to life; it would light 
fires, watch the grass grow, listen to the wind, and catch the sea-foam in 
the breeze and scatter it. It would multiply, not judgments, but signs of 
existence; it would summon them, drag them from their sleep. Perhaps it 
would invent them sometimes—all the better. All the better. Criticism that 
hands down sentences sends me to sleep; I‘d like a criticism of scintillating 
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 In particular, I am thinking about the work of Jacques Derrida (e.g., Glas; The Postcard); Maurice 
Blanchot (e.g., The Infinite Conversation); Roland Barthes (e.g., The Pleasure of the Text). Other notable 
examples in the American context include—but are not confined to—John Cage (e.g., Silence, Empty 
Words); Avital Ronell (e.g., The Telephone Book, Crack Wars); Elaine Scarry (e.g., The Body in Pain, 
Dreaming by the Book); Greg Ulmer (e.g., Tele-Theory, Heuretics); and David Foster Wallace (A 
Supposedly Fun Thing I‘ll Never do Again, Consider the Lobster)—to name but a few. I am also inclined to 
add writers such as Lance Olsen (Sewing Shut My Eyes, Anxious Pleasures) and Kathy Acker to this list. 
Though Acker may not be a literary critic, her fiction certainly involves a radical critical engagement with 
the likes of Charles Dickens, Cervantes, and Robert Louis Stevenson. But this picks up on the point raised 
in note 1, above, that coding critics as either ―creative‖ (read: radical, avant-garde) or ―traditional‖ (read: 
tedious, mechanical, unimaginative) strikes me as both arbitrary and unnecessary, that is, without a firm 
grasp on what these notions of creativity and experimentation really entail in a literary critical context. 
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leaps of the imagination. It would not be sovereign or dressed in red. It 
would bear the lightning of possible storms. (―Masked‖ 326) 
Foucault dreams of a type of criticism that—rather than ―[handing] down sentences‖ (or 
passing judgment)—tries to do something, or make something happen in and through the 
book. But what would it mean for the critic to bring ―a book, an oeuvre, a sentence, an 
idea to life,‖ as he says? What would it mean to ―multiply…signs of existence‖ in any or 
all of those realms (e.g., sentences, ideas, books, oeuvres)? Foucault does not set down 
anything programmatic, but does—somewhat cryptically—call for ―a kind of criticism 
that would light fires, watch the grass grow, listen to the wind, and catch the sea-foam in 
the breeze.‖ Foucault wants to emphasize (albeit in a roundabout way) the need to 
experiment with the book, to put it to work, to foster connections between the book and 
its radical outside, to test the book (or rather, test its limits). So Foucault‘s critic, then, 
(1) experiences or encounters—i.e., the critic senses (e.g., watches, 
―listen[s]‖); she feels or experiences things (e.g., ―the sea-foam in 
the breeze,‖ ―the wind,‖ ―possible storms‖); 
(2) experiments—i.e., the critic will ―light fires,‖ ―catch the sea foam,‖ 
take ―leaps,‖ ―scatter,‖ ―summon,‖ ―drag,‖ ―invent,‖ ―bear the 
lightning‖; and finally, 
(3) diagnoses or evaluates what the book may be capable of—i.e., 
growth/becoming, a new expression of life. 
By forcing the book to its limits, into a far-from-equilibrium state, the critic taps (into) its 
generative power—i.e., its capacity to produce, to affect, to express, to become, to self-
organize—and thereby multiplies its variable ―signs of existence.‖ This is precisely the 
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critical objective that Éric Alliez (Deleuze‘s student) sets for himself in his book, 
Signature of the World. That is, Alliez plans not to write a commentary on Deleuze-
Guattari‘s What is Philosophy?—not a synopsis, not an interpretation—but what he calls 
a ―commentary effect,‖ or, a mobilization of the expressive potential of the text: ―All 
that‘s left for the reader is to become the artisan of his own reading, step by step…by 
multiplying marginalia; that will then be the guiding principle of this commentary effect‖ 
(1). So Alliez multiplies the book‘s ―signs of existence‖ by ―multiplying marginalia.‖ 
Foucault, in any case, sets down the three pillars of a materialist criticism in the 
passage cited above: a criticism whose ultimate goal is the production of material effects. 
Experience/encounter  Experiment  Diagnose/Evaluate: … Effect. 
More than that, Foucault eschews standard (and often standardizing) critical practices, 
those designed to contain and control the book through transcendent measures: ―Criticism 
that hands down sentences sends me to sleep.‖ Foucault opts, instead, for a form of 
criticism that engages (or stimulates) the book‘s capacity for difference, for the 
production of the real, for intensive and unpredictable variance, for becoming-other (i.e., 
flight, transformation), and for self-organization. So by drawing upon Deleuze‘s oft-
quoted Spinozian maxim, one might suggest that Foucault‘s ―dream‖ critic is similarly 
committed to the idea that ‗we do not even know what a book-body can do.‘ Put another 
way, Foucault hopes that critics who do not ignore the potential of the book, or who 
reject the sort of critical agenda that involves taking static inventories of the text (generic, 
discursive, narratorial), will instead resolve to be experimental in terms of their approach. 
In short, Foucault dreams of a criticism that is both creative and pragmatic. 
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We will deal with the above pillars of a materialist criticism in more detail below 
(in this chapter, and the Interchapter that follows). For the moment, let me stay with this 
idea that the critic could be called upon to bring things (e.g., ―a book, an oeuvre, a 
sentence, an idea‖) ―to life,‖ as Foucault says. This life-giving or life-affirming 
orientation is what Deleuze (especially in his late work) characterizes as immanentist. 
That is, Deleuze entitles his final essay, published a few months before his death, 
―Immanence: A life…‖ Philosopher Giorgio Agamben, in his essay ―Absolute 
Immanence,‖ offers an extended reading of this title, which explores in detail Deleuze‘s 
intriguing use of the colon and the ellipsis—both marks of punctuation that suggest a 
kind of ‗opening on‘ to something (e.g., the outside). The colon, for example, is often 
referred to as the mark of introduction, and so the word ―Immanence‖ in Deleuze‘s title 
effectively introduces (or again, opens on to) ―A Life...‖ But significantly, the word 
―Immanence‖ retains a kind of purity in this word-diagram by being held to one side of 
the colon. That is, the ―Immanence‖ of the title remains uncompromised by the life it 
makes possible. Deleuze ―used a colon,‖ Agamben writes, ―clearly because he had in 
mind neither a simple identity nor a logical connection‖ (223) between ―Immanence‖ and 
―A Life…‖ In other words, Deleuze did not want to subordinate ―Immanence‖ to a life by 
titling his work something like ―Immanence is life.‖ Rather, immanence (as a first 
approximation of this concept) propels life (or ―signs of life‖); it provides an opening to 
life. It unleashes life. 
Deleuze did, in fact, wish to draw attention to a certain passage or relay between 
―Immanence‖ and ―A Life...‖ In other words, ―A Life…‖ in this context refers not to 
living things, not to actualized bodies or organisms, not to empirically determined forms, 
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but to the potential of those things to vary, to become-other, to increase or decrease in 
power. ―A Life…,‖ for Deleuze, is wholly affective: a ―complete power, complete bliss‖ 
(Pure 27); and while impersonal and non-organic, it retains the power to topple 
hierarchies, to consume the living and the lived, and to ―engulf entire armies‖ (29). With 
its deployment of the indefinite article ―a,‖ ―A Life…‖ indexes the ―pure event‖ of life—
i.e., ―singular life,‖ or ―absolute immanent life‖ (28). ―A life…,‖ Deleuze concludes, 
unlike my life or your life, ―contains only virtuals‖ (31); that is, it cannot be summarily 
reduced to any actualized form(s) of life—i.e., to subjects and objects, or ―to the 
subjectivity and objectivity of what happens‖ (28)—that which it nonetheless traverses. 
Put another way, the book conveys, or makes felt, pure (read: unactualized) potential; and 
while that potential may be expressed in and through the book, either through the 
augmentation or diminishment of its powers of becoming, the book‘s potential (i.e., its 
virtual aspect) always exceeds, or is always greater than, its actualization. So life 
conveyed in and through the book cannot be reduced to, nor exhausted by, specific 
empirical determinations of the book (e.g., character, plot, theme, genre); rather, the book 
remains a wholly determinate expression of the transcendental—i.e., the indeterminate 
source that conditions the book in a singular way, yet exceeds its empirical actualization: 
―The indefinite as such is the mark not of an empirical indetermination but of a 
determination by immanence or a transcendental determinability…[moreover, it is not so 
much] the indetermination of the person [at issue] only because it is determination of the 
singular‖ (30). Daniel W. Smith—citing Deleuze‘s late essay ―Literature and Life‖—
writes, ―life is an impersonal and nonorganic power that goes beyond any lived 
experience…and if life has a direct relation to literature, it is because writing itself is ‗a 
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passage of life that traverses both the livable and the lived‘‖ (―Introduction‖ xiv). So, in 
other words, if tapped through writing (or art), immanence infuses lived or actualized 
bodies with that aforementioned ―power and even bliss‖ (Deleuze, Pure 30) by opening 
up a passage for the relay or expression of a life, or of differential life. 
Few writers (to my mind) demonstrate a deeper commitment to ―a life of pure 
immanence‖ (Deleuze, Pure 29) and to the fact that the ―life of the individual gives way 
to an impersonal and yet singular life‖ (28) than Jack Kerouac. On the Road, I would 
argue, maps the immanentist orientation, and its concomitant power—i.e., its power to 
induce becomings, to express singularities (or singular life).
133
 That is, Sal Paradise 
(Kerouac‘s alter ego) functions not so much as a narrator or passive chronicler of the 
early Beats, but as a kind of mad scientist. Sal encounters/experiences much along the 
road. But above all, he experiments, and does so (as is often stated throughout the novel) 
for ―kicks.‖ Like Foucault‘s critic, Sal ―would light fires, watch the grass grow, listen to 
the wind, and catch the sea-foam in the breeze,‖ and would do so for similar reasons: 
because he wants life, or a purer expression of life. He wants new experiences—i.e., new 
ways of thinking and living. He wants to feel things; he wants ―power and even bliss.‖ He 
wants ―IT.‖ For example, talking to Dean Moriarty about jazz musicians (those they had 
seen play the night before), Sal says, 
‗Now, man, that alto man last night had IT—he held it once he found it; 
I‘ve never seen a guy who could hold so long.‘ I wanted to know what 
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 When I speak of ―singularities,‖ I mean that the book (as open system) registers something new or 
different, something unthinkable, something impersonal, and in so doing is propelled along a line of flight. 
In this dissertation, I equate the capacity of open systems, such as the book, to register and express 
singularities (or singular life) with the power or capacity of things to become-other—or better to go critical. 
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―IT‖ meant. ‗Ah well‘—Dean laughed—‗now you‘re asking me impon-
de-rables.‘ (206) 
But it would be the pursuit of those very ―impon-de-rables‖ that would propel Sal‘s 
journey. What is IT? He never stops asking. He wants to know, wants to experience…IT. 
So, in the novel, Sal pursues an experimental agenda. He is part catalyst. That is, 
he machines friends, people, places—plugging one into the other; he maps the transversal 
connections among them, and consumes their residual energies like a junky: 
A tremendous thing happened when Dean met Carlo Marx. Two keen 
minds that they are, they took to each other at the drop of a hat. Two 
piercing eyes glanced into two piercing eyes—the holy con-man with the 
shining mind, and the sorrowful poetic con-man with the dark mind that is 
Carlo Marx…Their energies met head on, I was a lout compared, I 
couldn‘t keep up with them. The whole mad swirl of everything that was 
to come began then; it would mix up all my friends and all I had left of my 
family in a big dust cloud over the American night. Carlo told him of Old 
Bull Lee, Elmer Hassel, Jane….And Dean told Carlo of unknown people 
in the West…They rushed down the street together, digging everything in 
the early way they had, which later became so much sadder and perceptive 
and blank. But then they danced down the streets like dingledodies, and I 
shambled after as I‘ve been doing all my life after people who interest me, 
because the only people for me are the mad ones, the ones who are mad to 
live, mad to talk, mad to be saved, desirous of everything at the same time, 
the ones who never yawn or say a commonplace thing, but burn, burn, 
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burn like fabulous yellow roman candles exploding like spiders across the 
stars and in the middle you see the blue centerlight pop and everybody 
goes ‗Awww!‘ (7–8). 
Critic John Leland points out that there is something Faustian about this passage, as 
perhaps evidenced by the somewhat anomalous question with which Kerouac follows up 
these words: ―What did they call such young people in Goethe‘s Germany?‖ Leland 
suggests that ―Goethe‘s story, like Kerouac‘s, is about a quest for knowledge and 
revelation…[and, in Goethe] Faust is described as one who yearns for the impossible—
one of the ‗mad ones‘—[but] his yearning leads to disaster‖ (51). So Kerouac, it would 
seem, suggests a parallel between making a pact with Mephistopheles and making a pact 
with Dean Moriarty. Both are demonic figures (of a sort): they may offer insight into the 
―impon-de-rables‖; they may promise deliverance/escape, and a deeper understanding or 
experience of life. Sal, like Faust, succumbs to the temptation, to the madness—―the 
whole mad swirl.‖ As the disciple, he ―shamble[s] after,‖ taking notes (writing gospel?); 
he concludes his exaltation to ―the mad ones‖ with an amen: ―everybody goes ‗Awww!‘‖ 
Kerouac reinforces this same sort of religiosity in the following passage, wherein 
Sal defends Dean against the charges of those in his life (e.g., Ed and Galatea Dunkel, 
Roy Johnson, Camille, and others) who fail to appreciate the kind of power of which 
Dean is capable, and the kind of life (or life-force) that courses through his veins:  
 now he‘s alive and I‘ll bet you want to know what he does next and that‘s 
because he‘s got the secret that we‘re all busting to find out and it‘s 
splitting his head wide open and if he goes mad don‘t worry, it won‘t be 
your fault but the fault of God‖ (195). 
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For the likes of Galatea Dunkel, though, and Dean‘s wife (Camille) and daughter, Dean 
was irresponsible, a con-man, ―the worst scoundrel that ever lived‖ (196), ―the HOLY 
GOOF‖ (194), the subject of so much ―bitterness‖ (195), so much recrimination. But no 
matter. The impersonal desire that ceaselessly consumes him invariably repels the 
stinging and stultifying judgments/accusations of the others: 
standing in front of everybody, ragged and broken and idiotic, right under 
the lightbulbs, his bony mad face covered with sweat and throbbing veins, 
saying, ‗Yes, yes, yes,‘ as though tremendous revelations were pouring 
into him all the time now, and I am convinced they were, and the others 
suspected as much and were frightened. He was BEAT—the root, the soul 
of Beatific‖ (195). 
Dean, at that moment, was the living embodiment (or expression) of what Deleuze calls 
(from the Latin) ―‗Homo tantum‘‖ (Pure 28)—i.e., a man stripped of recognizable 
qualities, mere man, singular man, ―with whom everyone‖ (or most everyone at least) 
―empathizes,‖ for he ―attains a sort of beatitude‖ (28–9). 
Deleuze would further liken these ―tremendous revelations,‖ pulsing in and 
through Dean, to a rush of creative emotion—a concept he derives from Henri Bergson. 
According to Deleuze, to be imbued with creative emotion is to ―no longer [have] 
anything to do with the pressures of society, nor with the disputes of the individual…nor 
with a society that constrains‖ (Bergsonism 111); instead, the pure flow of creative 
emotion reflects the infinite movement of a ―cosmic Memory, that actualizes all the 
levels at the same time, that liberates man from the plane (plan) or the level that is proper 
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to him, in order to make him a creator, adequate to the whole movement of creation.‖
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Deleuze also notes the rarity of this phenomenon, tying it to ―privileged souls,‖ while 
adding that ―we pass from one genius to another, through the intermediary of disciples or 
spectators or hearers‖—like Sal, who again chronicles not so much the movements of the 
individual, but the movements or expressions of the BEAT. Deleuze, then, concludes his 
comments on the matter through a statement that speaks directly to the sort of Beatific 
experience that consumes Dean: ―If man accedes to the open creative totality, it is…by 
acting, by creating rather than by contemplating.‖ 
In What is Philosophy?, Deleuze-Guattari argue that ―pure immanence provokes a 
strong, instinctive disapproval in public opinion‖ (42), unlike the normalizing and 
regulatory powers associated with transcendence, which engender a taste for conformity, 
for dogma and indifference. But ―to think,‖ or to think differently, ―is always to follow 
the witch‘s flight‖ (41). Why? Because ―one does not think without becoming something 
else, something that does not think—an animal, a molecule, a particle—and that comes 
back to thought and revives it.‖ To this, Deleuze adds, ―The life of [the individual or 
person] fades away in favour of the singular life immanent to a man who no longer has a 
name, though he can be mistaken for no other. A singular essence, a life…‖ (Pure 29). So 
here again, the ―tremendous revelations…pouring into‖ Dean—or in and through Dean—
transform him, or strip him of all marks of individuality and personhood: he becomes 
―something else…an animal, a molecule, a particle‖—something inhuman, ―something 
that does not think.‖ And in that state—ragged and pulsating, so far-from-equilibrium, 
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 In this context, recall Sal‘s stated attraction to ―the mad ones‖ in the passage cited above, and especially 
his suggestion that they were ―desirous of everything at the same time.‖ 
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yet plugged into what Deleuze-Guattari calls the plane of immanence
135
—Dean is simply 
incapable of orthodoxy, and powerless to placate the will of others. The immanentist 
orientation divorces Dean not only from his family, not only from himself, but from 
prevailing social codes and (let us say) normal or recognizable behaviors. In effect, he no 
longer knows what it would mean to be the responsible husband and father, or the 
principled and upstanding citizen. As the orientation changes from transcendence to 
immanence—or from containment and control to experience and experiment—so too his 
whole way of thinking, or way of life, changes. Dean transforms: becoming-animal, 
becoming-molecule, becoming-other. Deleuze-Guattari write, 
For the affect is not a personal feeling, nor is it a characteristic; it is the 
effectuation of the power of the pack that throws the self into upheaval 
and makes it reel. Who has not known the violence of these animal 
sequences, which uproot one from humanity, if only for an instant, making 
one scrape at one‘s bread like a rodent or giving one the yellow eyes of a 
feline? A fearsome involution calling us toward unheard-of becomings. 
(Plateaus 240; my emphasis) 
In this passage, Deleuze-Guattari speak not of the evolution of consciousness (or of 
bodies), nor of the defining developments of any known species, but of creative undoings 
and essential transformations—those that depend, following Nietzsche, upon the 
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 Briefly, the plane of immanence is not so much an abiding foundation or ground, but more of a 
threshold, a doorway, a window (something like a plane of glass), that which registers the movements 
between inside and outside. From the perspective of the plane, only the passage itself matters, and not that 
which enters (from the outside), nor that which arrives (in the inside). In other words, the plane of 
immanence shifts the focus from identities-in-motion to pure movement itself—movement, in other words, 
fundamentally predicated upon the shedding of any and all recognizable identity. The plane of immanence 
might also be viewed as a kind of liminal space through which not only passage occurs, but transformations 
unfold or take shape. The plane thus potentiates specific processes of individuation, specific becomings. 




ceaseless return of critical difference. The authors speak not of established identity, nor 
of a linear progression toward a specific end or objective, but of ―fearsome involution,‖ 
whereby all semblance of ―form is constantly being dissolved, freeing times and speeds‖ 
(267). Deleuze-Guattari wish to draw attention to the idea of pure propulsion (minus the 
thing propelled), pure dynamism—again, not evolution, but a progressive differentiation 
of things heretofore unheard and unknown. ―Becoming,‖ according to Deleuze-Guattari, 
―is involutionary, [and] involution is creative‖ (238). 
So Dean‘s creative transformations and animal becomings are, in a word, 
involutionary, and by extension ―fearsome‖ or terrifying to some; for Sal, though, Dean‘s 
power lies in that very capacity to make felt the plane of immanence—or rather, make felt 
the force of the outside, the ―unthought‖ (Deleuze-Guattari, What is? 59) in every 
thought—through singular expressions of madness and desire: i.e., through speed (e.g., 
fast cars, fast talk; at one point Dean says, ―we‘ve got a million things to talk about‖ 
(Kerouac 182)); also, through idiocy (―the HOLY GOOF‖); through drink and 
debauchery; through excess (in all its forms). For Deleuze-Guattari, the ―layout‖ of the 
plane—especially for those to whom Sal refers as ―the mad ones‖—involves ―a sort of 
groping experimentation‖ (What is? 41): 
We resort to measures that are not very respectable, rational, or 
reasonable. These measures belong to the order of dreams, of pathological 
processes, esoteric experiences, drunkenness, and excess. We head for the 
horizon, on the plane of immanence, and we return with bloodshot eyes, 
yet they are the eyes of the mind. Even Descartes had his dream. To think 
is always to follow the witch‘s flight. (41) 
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Similarly, Dean would ―resort to measures not very respectable.‖ He would fall prey to 
―pathological processes, esoteric experiences, drunkenness, and excess.‖ He would ―head 
for the horizon, on the plane of immanence, and…return with bloodshot eyes‖—or, as 
Kerouac writes, with ―bony mad face covered with sweat and throbbing veins.‖ He would 
―follow the witch‘s flight.‖ But, as Kerouac suggests, even in that state (again, so far-
from-equilibrium), ―Bitterness, recriminations, advice, morality, sadness—everything 
was behind him, and ahead of him was the ragged and ecstatic joy of pure being‖ (195). 
Recalling, then, the title of Deleuze‘s final essay—i.e., ―Immanence: A Life…‖—
I would argue, in like fashion, that Deleuze ties the mark of omission (i.e., the ellipsis) to 
the phrase ―A life…‖ in order to denote that same sort of enduring openness to what one 
might otherwise refer to as the ―ecstatic joy of pure being‖ (Kerouac 195); in effect, the 
ellipsis indexes an infinite potential, and the ceaseless unfolding of life. But what life? 
Which life? The phrase is literally a suspended sentence, an adjournment. The indefinite 
article ―a,‖ in this context, shifts the focus away from the fixed subject, away from the 
personal (e.g., my life, your life), and toward a more impersonal life or virtual 
existence—a life not so much known as felt or experienced: this is a life only hinted at, a 
life undetermined, undifferentiated, and becoming-actual: a life yet to come. The phrase 
―A Life…‖ draws attention to the ―non-actualized (indefinite)‖ (Pure 31) events through 
which lived realities actualize themselves.
136
 In other words, the incorporeal events that 
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 To experience any sort of dynamic and incorporeal transformation (such as the greening of the tree) is to 
experience ―a life‖ made actual through a given body or state of affairs (e.g., the green tree). Early in The 
Logic of Sense, Deleuze defines the event as an unfolding of incorporeal life, or of what he calls ―extra 
being‖ (35), across the absolute surface of things (e.g., 6, 21, 35). Elsewhere, he adds, ―A life contains only 
virtuals. It is made up of virtualities, events, singularities. What we call virtual is not something that lacks 
reality but something that is engaged in a process of actualization….The immanent event is actualized in a 
state of things and of the lived that make it happen‖ (Pure 31). So a phrase like ―the tree greens‖ indexes a 
passage of life—i.e., the incorporeal event of a tree‘s greening—but that passage is in no way exhausted at 
any point in time, by any one tree. We will pick up on this matter in the next chapter. 
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may filter in and through my life or our lives will thereby transform them either in 
mundane ways (e.g., through the greening of the tree), or in ways so powerful as to 
unseat empirical actualities, deflate social norms, uproot fixed identities, overthrow 
various forms of order and organization, or, as noted above, ―engulf entire armies.‖ So 
these ―signs of existence,‖ to which Foucault refers, at least when first actualized, retain a 
sort of revolutionary potential to induce ―unheard-of becomings‖ in the book—that which 
derives from (1) their being singular (read: non-regulated) expressions of incorporeal 
events; and (2) their never having been assigned a fixed role or identity.
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So finally, the colon of Deleuze‘s title—i.e., ―Immanence: A Life…‖—thrusts 
forward; it connotes passage, relay. Meanwhile, the ellipsis, even as it extends into the 
void (or better, into absolute immanence), connotes movement and trajectory—i.e., ―a 
process of actualization‖ (Pure 31). But what is relayed? What is actualized? In a word, 
life (singular life): ―We will say of pure immanence that it is A LIFE, and nothing else. It 
is not immanence to life, but the immanent that is in nothing is itself a life. A life is the 
immanence of immanence, absolute immanence: it is complete power, complete bliss‖ 
(27). In On the Road, Dean was able (in some way, and to some extent) to access, or at 
least channel, that ―power,‖ that ―bliss.‖ As Deleuze-Guattari would say, Dean ―head[s] 
for the horizon, on the plane of immanence, and…return[s] with bloodshot eyes,‖ and 
ultimately ill health, because the impersonal life invariably brings one into contact with 
the sort of excess that overwhelms the body. 
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 I see a useful comparison to be made here between immanent life and the life of the embryonic stem 
cell. That is, what stem cells are and what they might become are really one and the same question. So one 
might view the stem cell as vector, as direction or pure trajectory; and the so-called life of the stem cell, 




But for an addict like Sal, Dean‘s true worth is measurable by the ―kicks‖ he 
provides: ―Dean uses Sal; Sal uses Dean; each man betrays the other‖ (Leland 55). For 
Sal, Dean is the vehicle. The release and rush of singularities. The way and the light. 
Dean goes mad, goes critical; and as Foucault says, he ―bear[s] the lightning of possible 
storms.‖ Sal, in his turn, not only feeds on those energies, but fears them, as well: 
Suddenly I had a vision of Dean, a burning shuddering frightful Angel, 
palpitating toward me across the road, approaching like a cloud, with 
enormous speed, pursuing me like the Shrouded Traveler on the plain, 
bearing down on me. I saw his huge face over the plains with the mad, 
bony purpose and the gleaming eyes; I saw his wings; I saw his old jalopy 
chariot with thousands of sparking flames shooting out from it; I saw the 
path it burned over the road; it even made its own road and went over the 
corn, destroying bridges, drying rivers. It came like wrath to the West. I 
knew Dean had gone mad again…Everything was up, the jig and all. 
Behind him charred ruins smoked‖ (Kerouac 259). 
Immanence = immolation. Deleuze-Guattari suggest a link between immanence and 
―fire‖ (What is? 45)—a self-consuming fire. That is, they argue that immanence 
―captures everything, absorbs All-One, and leaves nothing remaining to which it could be 
immanent.‖ So as Dean—described in the passage above as ―a burning shuddering 
frightful Angel‖—makes his latest pass across the plain/plane, ―with thousands of 
sparking flames,‖ he consumes everything along that path; he burns roads, destroys 
bridges, dries rivers. Like a vengeful God, Dean spreads wrath across the land, leaving 
only ―charred ruins‖ in his wake. This is the enduring danger posed by immanence: 
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Immanence can be said to be the burning touchstone of all philosophy 
because it takes upon itself all the dangers that philosophy must confront, 
all the condemnations, persecutions and repudiations that it undergoes. 
This at least persuades us that the problem of immanence is not abstract or 
merely theoretical…it is not easy to see why immanence is so dangerous, 
but it is. It swallows up sages and gods. (Deleuze-Guattari, What is? 45)
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In fact, any orientation to immanence—such as that which consumes Dean—carries with 
it explicit ―dangers‖; for immanence not only ―swallows up sages and gods,‖ but destroys 
temples, challenges authority, re-writes laws; as a result, its advocates may be charged as 
immoral relativists by institutional authorities.
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One wonders, then, if the affirmation of literary immanence—or of a uniquely 
immanentist orientation to the book—would similarly be subject to those same 
―condemnations, persecutions and repudiations‖? For the critic who commits to literary 
immanence eschews, as we know, all normative (read: transcendent) measures, all forms 
of order and organization.
140
 In his monograph on Spinoza, Deleuze defines immanence 
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 The translation of this passage was modified by Daniel Smith (―Deleuze‖ 62) from the original English 
translation—by Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell—in slight, but important ways. 
139
 Daniel Smith points out that Spinoza and Nietzsche, the two great philosophers of immanence, were 
condemned as atheists, and as immoral: ―A potent danger was sensed to be lurking in the Ethics and the 
Genealogy of Morals: without transcendence, without universals, one will fall into the dark night of chaos, 
reduced to a pure ‗subjectivism‘ or ‗relativism.‘ A philosophy of immanence, it is argued, far from 
resolving the question of justification, seems to shift the problem onto an unresolvable terrain. It seems 
unable to put forth normative criteria by which certain modes of existence can be judged as acceptable and 
others condemned as reprehensible and winds up espousing a kind of moral nihilism in which all 
‗differences‘ are affirmed in their turn‖ (―Place‖ 252). 
140
 However, to be clear, the immanentist orientation is not entirely free of its own standards, or of what 
Deleuze (following Spinoza) calls the ―natural right‖ (Expressionism 257) of any given body—like a 
book—to ―[extend] its power as far as it can‖ (269), to augment its affections, to pursue compatible 
relations with other bodies, to maximize its joy and minimize its sadness. Deleuze insists that in The Ethics, 
Spinoza ―judges feelings, conduct and intentions by relating them, not to transcendent values, but to 
[immanent] modes of existence they presuppose or imply…A method of explanation by immanent modes of 
existence thus replaces the recourse to transcendent values. The question is in each case: Does, say, this 
feeling, increase our power of action or not? Does it help us come into full possession of that power?‖ 
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not in terms of ―a power of participating,‖ but a power of ―being participated [in]‖ 
(Expressionism 170). So, on this point alone, the immanentist orientation to the book 
defies the capacity of the critic to assert or maintain the constancy of the book 
(generically, structurally, etc.) across its multiple variations. Because the immanentist 
orientation shifts the basis of power from that which is posed from without, or that which 
enters (e.g., the critic, the external judgment), to that which is entered or ―participated‖ in 
(i.e., the book), the latter is now understood in terms of its capacity to envelop, to contain 
or capture, its own outside, and to express that formerly foreign presence differentially. 
So what then becomes of those transcendent measures? They burn up in the fire. The 
book—extrapolating from Deleuze-Guattari—―captures everything.‖ It ―absorbs All-
One‖; it devours, and ―leaves nothing remaining.‖ In other words, the book leaves 
nothing untouched, nothing that transcends it, nothing to which it remains subordinate—
e.g., the critic, the ―judgment of God.‖ Immanence, for its part, consumes its outside: it 
―absorbs All-One‖; it devours and ―leaves nothing remaining.‖ In fact, any transcendent 
measure of the book (any ―judgement of God‖) cannot, on the one hand, participate in, 
alter, or control the book, from without, while at the same time retaining something of 
itself, something essentially unscathed, in the process: critical judgments cannot remain 
intact; they cannot remain transcendent. Rather, they are destined to ―burn, burn, burn 
like fabulous yellow roman candles exploding like spiders across the stars.‖ But how? 
Hölderlin’s Bell 
Speaking before the University of Freiburg, in 1943, on the poetry of Friedrich 
Hölderlin, Martin Heidegger confesses that ―we still do not know to this very hour what 
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Hölderlin‘s poems truly are‖ (222).
141
 At first blush these words have a familiar ring to 
them, one not uncommon in literary critical circles (e.g., a requisite nod to the master, a 
show of humility). We might then expect him to follow with a demonstration of his own 
superior critical skills—i.e., his capacity to wrestle the literary artefact to the ground: to 
track it, trap it, and bag it, like a big game hunter. But, in this instance, Heidegger seems 
to be making a comment about the essential remoteness or inaccessibility of Hölderlin‘s 
poetry, that which holds all critics at bay. His complete statement on the matter reads, 
in spite of the names ‗elegy‘ [e.g., Hölderlin‘s ―song of mourning‖] and 
‗hymn‘ [e.g., Hölderlin‘s ―song of praise‖], we still do not know to this 
very hour what Hölderlin‘s poems truly are. The poems appear like a 
shrine without a temple, which preserves what has been made into poetry. 
[Then] amid the noise of ―unpoetic languages‖ (IV, 257) the poems are 
like a bell that hangs in the open air and is already becoming out of tune 
through a light snowfall that is covering it. (222)
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Heidegger‘s point here is that, for various reasons, the poems frustrate the analytical and 
interpretative overtures of the critic—those that may involve, for example, the tracing of 
certain generic, structural, and/or tropological patterns in and through the object of study; 
or that may involve the tracking of signifiers, or the reproduction of authorial intent (or 
the intentions of the competent reader). Whatever the case, the poems resist this type of 
overcoding;
143
 they resist representation, and all related measures of control and 
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 These comments were later reproduced in an appendix to the second edition of Heidegger‘s collected 
essays on Hölderlin, entitled, Elucidations of Hölderlin‘s Poetry. 
142
 Note: The cited phrase, ―unpoetic languages,‖ in this passage comes from a late, untitled fragment by 
Hölderlin: ―…he has strewn / Our land with many languages, unpoetic, and / This rubbish continues / To 
this very hour‖ (qtd. in Heidegger, 148). 
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 Which, as we know, means that they resist ―phenomena of centering, unification, totalization, 
integration, hierarchization, and finalization‖ (Deleuze-Guattari, Plateaus 41). 
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containment. In short, the poems resist the critic, and by extension reveal the limits of 
critical methodologies designed to abstract, generalize, or unveil essential truths about the 
text. So after acknowledging the limitations of the critical community (vis-à-vis the 
Hölderlin oeuvre), Heidegger cryptically describes the poems, first, as ―a shrine without a 
temple,‖ and second—referring to Hölderlin‘s poem ―Columbus‖—as ―a bell that hangs 
in the open air.‖ Taken together, these suggestive and somewhat complex meta-critical 
images shift the focus from transcendence to what I call the immanentist orientation to 
literature. Over the next few pages I plan to make liberal use of these provocative phrases 
to further map the coordinates of the sort of Deleuzean (or materialist) criticism I propose 
herein—an objective that admittedly moves us far-a-field from Heidegger himself.
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To describe a set of poems, then, as ―a shrine without a temple‖ is to suggest—at 
least from a Deleuzean perspective—that just as the sanctified space of the shrine 
somehow contains or enshrines something greater than itself, something other than, or 
outside, itself—that which may be expressed in a singular way (as a state of becoming) 
across the absolute surfaces of the shrine, though never fully possessed, nor rendered 
intelligible, by such—similarly, Hölderlin‘s poems express something that not only 
exceeds the generic or structural tags conventionally attributed to those poems (e.g., 
―elegy,‖ ―hymn‖), but the capacity of the rational mind to interpret or make sense of 
them, as well. So while the critic might be affected by her experience of the poems, and 
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 While I—much like Maurice Blanchot (as I will discuss below)—find Heidegger‘s images in this 
context entirely useful for exploring the sort of critical landscape that concerns us here, Heidegger‘s 
―nostalgia‖ for being-in-the-world (i.e., ―Dasein‖), or, as Derrida would say,  for a ―metaphysics of 
presence,‖ really has no place in this discussion. That is, we are in no way concerned with questions of 
essential being, or with the elucidation of texts, but with the capacity of the book (1) to encounter its radical 
outside, and (2) to become-different. Most assuredly, these are not Heidegger‘s questions, though his 
relationship to Deleuze remains an open question in Deleuze scholarship. For example, Lawlor 
provocatively argues, ―I think that it is no exaggeration to say that Difference and Repetition is Deleuze's 
Being and Time‖ (Thinking 96). 
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by the attendant feelings they generate—what Wordsworth (in Tintern Abbey) describes 
as ―a sense sublime / Of something far more deeply interfused‖ (ll. 94–6)—any ensuing 
knowledge or rational appreciation of a given set of poems only takes shape at a latter 
stage of conscious reflection through various acts of objectification and representation 
(e.g., identifying the poems; cross-referencing them; assessing their resemblances to, 
and/or opposition from, similar forms; linking them to some sort of discursive or critical 
framework, and so on). While knowledge evolves through fixed practices, habitual 
associations, and expected outcomes—i.e., models of recognition—affective encounters 
take shape or unfold through singular experiences of the poems, in the here and now.
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Before we discern meaning, then, in any context, experience, or encounter—
artistic or otherwise—before we recognize form, we intuit forces, or better, an ensemble 
of impersonal and non-human forces (time, weight, gravity, pressure, germination, 
electro-magnetism, information, dissipation, attraction/repulsion, contraction/expansion, 
constitution/dissolution, etc.—the list is surely long); we intuit forces through their 
effects, both variable and transformative, on/in/through the body in question (e.g., 
movement, propulsion, speed/rest, inertia, vibration, agitation, fear, trauma, pain, 
convulsion, deformation, exhilaration, sympathy/antipathy, loneliness/seclusion). That is, 
all forces are non-localized—i.e., neither possessed by, nor reducible to, the bodies, 
themselves (nor to any actualized form): ―Newton did not see gravity. He felt its effect: a 
pain in the head‖ (Massumi, Parables 160). So forces operate virtually, ceaselessly 
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 I am not, though, proposing a simple return to empirical models, whereby the intelligible is said to 
derive from sensible forms or sensory impressions. Nor am I arguing (following Kant) that experience of 
the poems is rationally mediated by set categories of the mind, and thereby guaranteed by the perceiving 
subject, or the ―I.‖ Instead, following Deleuze‘s concept of ―transcendental empiricism,‖ I am placing the 
emphasis on the transformative relations between ―the concrete richness of the sensible‖ (Deleuze-Parnet, 
Dialogues 54) and the contingent, yet unthought, conditions of all singular experience. This emphasis, as I 
will show, truly affirms life or life-force—i.e., the power and untapped capacities of the poems. 
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colliding, interacting with, and reciprocally determining one another: ―A ‗force‘ is the set 
of invisible, untouchable, self-renewing conditions according to which certain effects can 
habitually be expected to appear.‖ As those habitual reactions increase, the effect or 
charge of the force (in and through the body) is effectively dampened or quelled—just as 
institutional, transcendent-oriented criticism dampens the forces upon literature (or the 
book). But as forces are registered anew, the body is newly charged or re-vitalized (e.g., 
feelings grow stronger, capacities swell, the ―pain in the head‖ intensifies). 
So how, then, are forces registered in and through poetry (or through art)? Forces 
can be intuited, as Massumi argues, through repeatable force-effects (Parables 161). 
Forces add to reality; they extend or augment reality; they are of the wider make-up of 
reality, but are not, strictly speaking, in reality. They are neither actualized, nor 
actualisable, and so require some conduit of expression, some conveyance device. 
Deleuze labels that device sensation: forces are the contingent condition of all sensation. 
But the story does not end there. Just as forces require some form of conveyance, 
similarly sensation—i.e., that which conveys force—requires a material medium of its 
own through which to be expressed or distributed. In an artistic milieu, sensation 
expresses itself through the various materials employed by artists (words, paints/colours, 
sounds, etc.); and those materials are the logical conduits for some form of sensory 
expression because they, themselves, cannot be owned by, or reduced to the actions of, a 
single artist or a single work of art. That is, language, sound, clay, stone, metal, wood, 
colour, and so forth—again, the various materials employed by artists—are all open 
systems. They each, in their own way, retain the capacity to be plugged into, or machined 
by, their non-actualized outsides, and to be effectively stressed by those outsides. They 
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each retain the capacity to both register and transform the forces thrust upon them 
through non-mimetic channels of sensation. I say ―non-mimetic‖ in this context because 
the various sensations of which a material body is made or composed in no way 
represent, copy, or imitate the forces they embody. While the body indexes the action of a 
forcible stimuli, that which suggests the play (or working) of a radical, non-actualized 
outside—because again we only know that outside through the effects it produces in and 
through a given material—that material, in its turn, will have its own unique way of 
expressing those forces. 
But there is one final stage to the process. Sensations, themselves—though 
registered materially, in and through any body, in any context or setting—have a mode of 
expression particular to art itself. In What is Philosophy?, Deleuze-Guattari refer to the 
sensory relays of the artist—i.e., the passage of sensation in a uniquely artistic milieu—as 
compounds of affect and percept. These concepts will be discussed later in the 
dissertation, so let me just say, briefly, that for Deleuze-Guattari all art, and the 
aggregates of percept, affect, and sensation from which that art is composed, has an 
ontology of its own—an aesthetic ontology. In fact, Deleuze-Guattari refer to works of 
art as ―beings of sensation‖ (165): ―we paint, sculpt, compose, and write with sensations. 
We paint, sculpt, compose and write sensations‖ (166); and through the rendering of that 
sensation—again, in and through the uniquely artistic languages of affect and percept—
art ―must stand up on its own‖ (164), independent of all external support. Put another 
way, art is in no way subordinate to the non-actualized forces it registers—in the way that 
the book (among critics committed to the transcendent-orientation) is invariably rendered 
subordinate to, say, various generic, structural, or narrative constraints, by being thought 
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an extensive copy or instantiation of those abstractions. Rather, art has its own integrity, 
its own set of powers. Art slows down and channels (i.e., gives a material rendering to) a 
set of contingent forces; it takes an accounting of those forces—or better, preserves them 
in variable states of action and reaction, strength and weakness. So for Deleuze-Guattari, 
all art is defined by its actualization of those non-actualized forces: art preserves, and, by 
extension, gives consistency to, the variable forces it embodies. In essence, art is defined 
through its basic acts of preservation and expression, and so too poetry—i.e., poetry 
preserves forces; it ―preserves,‖ as Heidegger says, ―what has been made into poetry.‖ 
To summarize: all forces act on one another, and do so in ways that leave those 
forces either strong or weak, active or reactive; the poems (or whatever the art in 
question) express the relative power of those forces, and in ways that the actual materials 
(e.g., language, paint, etc.) of the artist will allow. So, in the case of poetry, force is 
actualized through language: through words, grammar, and syntax. In painting, force is 
actualized through colour; in sculpture, through clay or stone; in music, through sound, 
and so forth. Whatever the case, all artists are tasked with ―making the invisible forces 
visible in themselves‖ (Deleuze-Guattari, What is? 182), and doing so (as I will show) by 
stimulating the expressive capacities of their chosen materials—i.e., forcing them to their 
limits—so as to see what they can do, or better, what they might become: ―the artist is 
always adding new varieties to the world‖ (175). 
We return, now, to this image of the ―shrine without a temple.‖ To detach the 
shrine from the temple (in this metaphor) is to attribute an ontological independence to 
the work of art, whereby it becomes what Deleuze-Guattari call a ―being of sensation‖? 
In What is Philosophy?, for example, they argue that ―the only law of creation is that the 
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compound must stand up on its own. The artist‘s greatest difficulty is to make [art] stand 
up on its own‖ (164). That is, art must stand up independent of both the artist and the 
critic (or audience); independent of representation; independent of the formal, generic, 
structural, narratorial, etc. forms imposed on it, from without; and ultimately, 
independent of the various idealisms discussed in Part 1 of the dissertation. Deleuze-
Guattari claim that art ―is no less independent of the viewer or hearer, who only 
experience it after‖ than it is ―of the creator through the self-positing of the created‖ (my 
emphasis). The ―created‖ is ―self-positing,‖ they argue, precisely because the sensations, 
affects and percepts, of which all art is composed, ―are beings whose validity lies in 
themselves and exceeds any lived.‖ In other words, works of art do not require subjects 
(of reflection)—ideal or otherwise—nor can they be reduced to formal objects (of 
contemplation), in order to validate or authorize them. Nor are they authorized through 
doxa, or critical opinion, as a condition of either their production or reception. So the 
point remains that regardless of how critics actually interpret the literary artefact, because 
works of art, as Deleuze-Guattari contend, must ultimately stand up on their own, as 
―beings of sensation,‖ and because they remain perpetually open to non-actualized forces, 
their meaning or value will always exceed or escape the grasp of the critic. So, of course, 
we ―still do not know to this very hour what Hölderlin‘s poems truly are‖: in fact, we can 
never know anything conclusive, but this is of no concern to the materialist critic. 
We should recall that Heidegger characterizes the poems not just as a ―shrine,‖ 
but as ―a shrine without a temple.‖ From a Deleuzean perspective, the temple—with its 
centralized and hierarchical structures of authority, its dogmatic interpretations (of 
biblical scripture, of culture and society, of politics, of moral law, of heaven and hell, and 
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so forth), and its power to codify and/or standardize those interpretations—not only 
houses the shrine, but extracts—or, in Deleuzo-Guattarian parlance, deterritorializes—
the secret of the shrine (or at least the semblance of secrecy), and makes that secret its 
own. In other words, the shrine is reterritorialized
146
 in the temple, where its history will 
likely be re-written (i.e., re-conceived, re-evaluated, with parts of it altered or suppressed) 
in accordance with the temple‘s own moral and/or socio-political imperatives. Deleuze-
Guattari might also suggest that the temple authority captures
147
 the shrine—again, 
territorially speaking—in order to extract from it a kind of ―proprietary rent‖ (Plateaus 
442), and thereby profit from its purely emotive power, its related suggestion of hidden 
knowledge, and its capacity to ―work‖ on (stimulate, express) the passional commitments 
of the people, before then channelling those surplus values back into its own coffers. The 
shrine, for its part, becomes woven into both the narratorial and historical fabric of the 
temple, and hence the wider religious tradition to which the temple authority belongs. So 
by capturing the shrine, cloaking it in a veil of the temple‘s own social or institutional 
authority (i.e., its own legitimacy), promoting or ramping up its holiness (by, for 
example, consecrating the ground upon which it stands), and assuming the capacity to 
authorize or validate any and all interpretations of the shrine, the temple redirects that 
powerful semiotic back towards itself (as keeper of the shrine), in a ceaseless feed-back 
loop of holy energies. 
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 Reterritorialization is the process whereby newly decoded (or deterritorialized) flows—e.g., the flow of 
desire, of signs, of production, of commodities, etc.—are re-invested, often (but not exclusively) in the 
political and/or socio-economic landscape, or in realms where ownership and control are acknowledged. 
147
 In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze-Guattari view the State, itself, as an ―apparatus of capture‖ that 
operates by (1) taking hold of given territories—such as, the territory of the shrine; (2) overcoding those 
territories by unifying their differential codes (semiological, moral, etc.) under the strict purview of a 
centralized authority; and, as Bonta and Protevi argue, (3) ―channeling their flows into a centralized 
organism [e.g., the temple] or system‖ (52). 
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What I propose, in any case, following Deleuze-Guattari, is a kind of criticism—
or what might best be described as a critical mapping—―entirely oriented toward an 
experimentation in contact with the real‖ (Plateaus 13). This form of experimentation 
does not reproduce an unconscious closed in upon itself; it constructs the 
unconscious. It fosters connections between fields, the removal of 
blockages on bodies without organs, the maximum opening of bodies 
without organs onto a plane of consistency…The [critical] map is open 
and connectable in all of its dimensions; it is detachable, reversible, 
susceptible to constant modification. It can be torn, reversed, adapted to 
any kind of mounting, reworked by an individual, group, or social 
formation. It can be drawn on a wall, conceived of as a work of art, 
constructed as a political action or as a meditation. (13–4) 
The opportunity to produce ―art‖ or to stage some form of ―political action‖ becomes a 
potent counter-balance to the forms of critical transcendence that have long dominated 
the discourse of literary criticism. For example, the critic does not simply ―reproduce‖ or 
trace, say, the historical unconscious of the book, but actively and creatively ―constructs 
the unconscious‖ anew. How? By fostering novel connections between the book and its 
outside; by removing blocks, maximizing openings, and unleashing new powers (or new 
potentials) along a line of flight. The critic, in short, operates from the premise that the 
book-body ―absorbs [an] excess of potential‖ (Massumi, ―Introduction‖ xxxii)—too great 
to be expressed—and assumes the task of unfolding that potential, or of carrying forward 
the felt intensities of the book, so as to ―[magnify] its creative momentum‖ (xxxi). The 
critic, in a sense, becomes a catalyst, by propelling the non-actualized forces of the book: 
210 
 
To tend the stretch of expression, to foster and inflect it rather than trying 
to own it, is to enter the stream, contributing to its probings: this is co-
creative, an aesthetic endeavour. It is also an ethical endeavour, since it is 
to ally oneself with change: for an ethics of emergence. (xxii) 
So again, the critic acts not on the book, but on the non-book, or the outside-book, 
through the non-mimetic mapping (i.e., activation and propulsion) of a field of potential. 
This involves not representation, but an elemental ―shift‖ in focus, as Bosteels claims, 
―from textuality to territoriality‖ (147), in an effort to construct anew the textual 
cartographies of the book. 
To begin to understand the role of the critic in this material re-mapping of the 
book, we need recall Heidegger‘s second characterization of the Hölderlin‘s poems, as ―a 
bell that hangs in the open air.‖ This image, in fact, is a paraphrase from a late poetic 
fragment by Hölderlin, entitled ―Colombo,‖ which reads as follows: 
Put out of tune 
By humble things, as by snow, 
Was the bell, with which 
The hour is rung 
For the evening meal. (qtd. in Heidegger, 22) 
On this point, renowned French novelist and literary critic, Maurice Blanchot
148
—in a 
brief, yet dense essay, ―What is the Purpose of Criticism?‖
149
—picks up the narrative: 
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 Blanchot was also a journalist, political dissident, philosopher, social and cultural critic. He contributed 
widely to French journals on the work of various authors (e.g., Mallarmé, Proust, Kafka, Hölderlin, 
Heidegger, Sartre, Levinas, Bataille), on classical figures or myths (e.g., Orpheus, the Furies, Siren‘s 
Song), and on certain questions of literature that, to varying degrees, have since become familiar concerns 
for literary criticism (e.g., writing, reading, authorship, the book, presence/absence, inside/outside, literary 
language, narrative, the gaze, the other, friendship, conversation, singularities, and, most notably, death). 
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This empty movement [of the falling snow upon the bell], impalpable and 
a bit icy, disappears within the heated agitation it instigates. Here, critical 
discourse, having neither lasting effect nor reality, would like to dissolve 
within creative affirmation: it is never criticism that speaks, when it 
speaks, it is nothing. This is impressive modesty, and yet, on the other 
hand, perhaps not so modest. Criticism is nothing, but this nothingness is 
precisely that in which the literary work, silent and invisible, allows itself 
to be what it is. (4) 
So Blanchot claims that the shearing forces of the critic, much like the chance effects of a 
light snowfall, will disturb the deep, interior silences of the poem—its stillness, its 
equanimity; in so doing, the critic (or better, the critical encounter) activates the text, 
enabling it (in some way, and to some unknown extent) to ring in an untimely fashion 
(more on this in a moment). Blanchot further claims that the critic, upon forcing the book 
to its limits, quickly absents herself from the space (or ―zone of indeterminacy‖)
150
 
opened up by the book‘s becomings. But is this mere ―modesty‖? No. The critic‘s 
―penchant for self-effacement‖ (3) in this context reflects the effort to simply not stand in 
the way, or to occlude, the book‘s positive openings—those wrought by the activation of 
its own critical function (or capacity to go critical).
151
 So after having opened the book up 
to its own becomings, thus enabling it to overcome its outwardly imposed controls (or 
transcendent orientation)—i.e., its textuality, its discoursal constraints, its semiotic 
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 Blanchot‘s essay was written as a short preface and appended to the 1963 republication of his work, 
Lautréamont and Sade—a book of criticism, originally published in 1949. 
150
 Massumi writes, ―A crack has opened in habit, a ‗zone of indeterminacy‘ is glimpsed in the hyphen 
between the stimulus and the response. Thought consists in widening that gap, filling it fuller and fuller 
with potential responses, to the point that, confronted with a particular stimulus, the body‘s reaction cannot 
be predicted‖ (―User‘s Guide,‖ 99). 
151
 Or what I prefer to call, following Brian Massumi, its own ―criticality‖ (Parables 109). 
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capture by various institutional regimes, its interpretative history, etc.—only then, with 
the book‘s assertion of its own difference, does the critic dissolve or disappear into the 
background: ―This is impressive modesty, and yet, on the other hand, perhaps not so 
modest.‖ 
Of note in the Hölderlin excerpt, quoted above, is the fact that the snow puts the 
bell ―out of tune‖—out of tune, not only in the sense of sounding different, or better, 
sounding difference (i.e., giving difference itself a sonorous hearing), but also, I would 
argue, in the sense of being out of time. That is, the snow triggers the ring of the bell, and 
in doing so causes the bell to ring in an ―untimely‖ fashion, to borrow a term from 
Nietzsche.
152
 Deleuze, who was himself fond of this notion of the untimely, likens the 
concept to what he calls pure becomings. In Negotiations, Deleuze argues that 
―Becoming isn‘t part of history; history amounts only to the set of preconditions, 
however recent, that one leaves behind in order to ‗become,‘ that is, to create something 
new. This is precisely what Nietzsche calls the Untimely‖ (171). So the untimely ring of 
the bell in Hölderlin‘s poem is important for the discord or dissonance it introduces into 
the historical and social situation of the community. That is, the sounding of the bell had, 
historically, marked the dinner hour, and had, in turn, set in motion a specific set of 
actions (or reactions) within the community related to the rituals of dinner; in so doing, 
the bell had come to play a pivotal role in the development of a communal order. 
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 In Untimely Meditations, Nietzsche suggests that his work, his ―meditation too is untimely, because I am 
here attempting to look afresh at something of which our time is rightly proud—its cultivation of history—
as being injurious to it, a defect and deficiency in it; because I believe, indeed, that we are all suffering 
from a consuming fever of history and ought at least to recognize that we are suffering from it‖ (60). I have 
similarly argued that the ―cultivation‖ of organized histories in and through the discourse of literary 
criticism may also be ―injurious‖ to the expressive capacities of the book. 
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Now the snow, silently falling, strikes a new chord. On this point, we borrow a 
phrase from Hamlet—a phrase that Deleuze was also fond of—―the time is out of joint‖ 
(I.V.206). That is in the latter stages of Hölderlin‘s poem, he equates the untimely ringing 
of the bell, ―By humble things, as by snow,‖ with a kind of heavenly impatience; he 
writes, ―The earth grew angry, and hurried, while they cried / Manna and Bread from 
Heaven‖ (ll.23–4). With the falling of the snow, then, the bell is put ―out of tune‖ by the 
hungry gods, crying ―Manna and Bread‖: in effect, the gods hasten the dinner hour. So 
being out of tune in this context not only means sounding different/difference, but also 
means being out of step with the community in terms of its rituals and customs, its forms 
of order and organization. The bell, then, until this purely fortuitous point in time, had 
been ‗tuned in‘ to the operations of the community in very regulated and enduring ways. 
As suggested, the sound of the bell had always meant something very specific to the 
people, and had always functioned in lock step with the communal clock. But it would 
take little more than a humble snow to scramble those codes. As Blanchot claims, the 
snow ―disappears within the heated agitation it instigates‖ (―Preface‖ 4); and so, with no 
particular designs of its own, the snow, by chance, lands on the bell and to a sufficient 
degree sets it in motion—i.e., the snow agitates the bell. That slight release of energy 
then melts the snow. Put another way, the bell acts—it agitates, it heats, it sounds, and it 
melts the snow. 
To be clear, the important question here is not so much what does it mean for 
Hölderlin‘s poetry to be constructed (imagined, recognized, etc.) in these ways, but what 
does it mean for the critic to approach poetry (or, more broadly, literature or the book) in 
a way that deliberately departs from or disrupts the sort of institutional critical models 
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represented in the first of Heidegger‘s two images by the transcendent figure of the 
temple? That is, I view these images as provocations, even aggressions, directed squarely 
at the critic. The question now becomes, how do critics engage (i.e., orient themselves to, 
operate upon) the book in ways that not only eschew the temple, but affirm the expressive 
capacities of the book, and hence, what I call the immanentist orientation to literature—
an orientation that Heidegger himself never reached? And to be clear, Blanchot, like 
Heidegger, remains committed to the idea that criticism ―lack[s] in almost any substance 
of its own‖ (2); that ―it must obliterate itself,‖ and that ―in the end it disintegrates,‖ ―drifts 
into transparency,‖ or simply ―disappear[s]‖ (―Preface‖ 4). On these points, he and 
Heidegger are in lock step. Blanchot further reveals his Heideggerian colors when he 
claims, for instance, that by absenting herself from the text, the critic (or the criticism) 
―allows [the text] to be what it is‖ (my emphasis), or allows it to come into the full light 
of its own being. He also suggests that criticism ―seeks to disappear…so that [the] poem 
may truly appear.‖ So as suggested above, impulses such as these are very far-a-field 
from the sort of Deleuzean criticism that interests us here. 
But saying, as Blanchot does, that criticism ―lack[s] in almost any substance of its 
own,‖ is not the same as saying that criticism is some kind of illusion, or is somehow 
unreal, or that critics and their work do not exist. Of course, critics, criticism, et al. are 
entirely real, and in fact play a seminal role in relation to literature, but that role (or 
better, that humble task) involves opening up literature to its own becomings—i.e., its 
own capacity to become-different. As I will show in Chapter 4, the critic is tasked with 
clearing space, or with clearing what Blanchot calls (in a phrase highly reminiscent of 





 In effect—and ‗effect‘ alone—the poem vibrates, and within the 
brief spatio-temporal interval created by that vibration, it opens up to its own potential, its 
own expressive capacities. In that sense the materialist critic makes pivotal, even 
essential, contributions to what Blanchot calls the very ―possibility of literary experience‖ 
(5) by activating the auto-critical processes of the text; when active, then, that criticality 
asserts itself ―as one of [the text‘s] essential moments.‖  
So while, on the one hand, criticism may be tasked with ―catalyzing the very 
creation process‖ (Blanchot, ―Preface‖ 4), on the other hand, criticism effectively 
disappears with the completion of that task. In other words, after sending a quick charge 
in and through the text (i.e., catalyzing it), the materialist critic, just as quickly, vacates 
the premises, lest her criticism(s) interrupt, suspend, or disrupt the catalysis—i.e., the 
unfolding reaction. In other words, critics need to be self-effacing, but this is precisely 
the impulse that they have struggled with in the discourse of literary criticism. In a word, 
critics loiter. They won‘t go away. They never go away. They becomes groupies, 
insufferable hangers-on, fuelling the cult of (literary) celebrity. Or maybe they just love 
too much? They shadow, they stalk. Blanchot writes, ―Is the critic there to add something 
to the literary work: to bring out its latent meaning (present as an absence) and to indicate 
its development within history, little by little raising it toward truth, where in the end the 
work may become stagnant? But why might the critic be necessary for this task?‖ (2–3). 
Why, indeed? The fact is literature does not need the critic, except perhaps in the way the 
flower needs the bee. That is, criticism might be thought of as an act of pollination—an 
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 Blanchot‘s complete statement reads, ―If criticism is this open space into which the poem moves, if it 
seeks to disappear in front of this poem, so that this poem may truly appear, this is because this space and 
this movement toward self-effacement (which is one of the ways in which this space manifests itself) may 
already belong to the reality of the literary work and also be at work within it, while it takes shape, only 
moving outside it when it has achieved its purpose and to accomplish that purpose‖ (―Preface‖ 4). 
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act which is essential to the continued growth or unfolding life of the plant. The problem 
is that unlike the bee, the critic does not know (when) to leave. The critic hangs around, 
admiring his handiwork. But as Blanchot makes clear, ―criticism does not manifest 
literature. Criticism is not one of the ways in which literature asserts itself‖ (1). That is, 
literature—even while it may bear the weight of the judgment of God, or of the logic of 
representation, and even while it may, at times, be hard to distinguish from the various 
fogs and miasmas (i.e., the enduring organizational standards) that have historically 
diminished or diluted it—does not express or affirm itself through the transcendent 
measures of the critic. It escapes those standards. But ―such a disparaging view as this 
one,‖ according to Blanchot, ―does not fluster criticism. It openly welcomes it, as if, on 
the contrary, this very lack revealed its deepest truth‖ (2). As we will see more clearly in 
Chapter 4, critical experiment has a vital role to play in relation to the text. That is, it 
makes an entirely productive contribution to the very capacity of literature to flower 
(behold, the critic-pollinator!). This is why, as Blanchot claims, the critic may not be ―so 
modest‖; that is, there may be no more dramatic and ultimately powerful contribution that 
the critic can make to the text than to open it up to its own becomings, its own difference. 
Conclusion: The Thought of Immanence 
As we know from Part 1 of this dissertation, the immanentist orientation can be 
eclipsed or occluded; it can be denied, though never fully extinguished. The enemy of 
immanence in a literary critical setting is habitual, static, or merely redundant modes of 
thought, what Deleuze, in Difference and Repetition, calls ―the dogmatic image of 
thought‖ (158)—that is, a set of fixed presuppositions about why we think, or about what 
constitutes critical thought. The dogmatic image remains partial to certain fixations of the 
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mind that invariably follow, and hence reinforce, specific conventions, rules, and pre-
established norms, which serve primarily to control thinking (or thought) from without. 
Comparatively, though, the immanentist orientation becomes a matter of what 
Deleuze-Guattari describe as ―finding one‘s bearings in thought‖ (What is? 53); that is, it 
involves ―a sort of groping experimentation‖ (41) with the outside of thought, with the 
un-thought, whereupon any semblance of fixed meaning or understanding remains either 
provisional or illusory. When we think critically—or when we actually think, and not just 
go through the motions—we think not from a secure foundation that somehow escapes or 
transcends our perception of, or engagement with, the world. In fact, as Deleuze claims in 
Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, ―immanence is the very vertigo of philosophy‖ 
(180); and later, with Guattari, he argues that ―a re-orientation of the whole of thought‖—
on the plane of immanence
 
(cf. note 13, above)—―is in principle penetrated by a certain 
delirium‖ (What is? 52–3), such that ―the needle of every compass goes mad‖ (52). This 
notion of ―vertigo‖ suggestively links immanence to a kind of mental or physical 
disorientation, to instability, and to a generalized sense of confusion. Hence, in a state of 
vertigo, there are no fixed points of reference in the surrounding environment, nothing to 
seize hold of, no fixed ground upon which to stand. Similarly, the concept of ―delirium‖ 
reinforces the link between immanence and, for example, hallucinatory experiences, or 
feelings of unreality, confusion, etc. So, to this point, the immanentist orientation I pose 
is fuelled by altered states of consciousness—e.g., by vertigo, delirium, madness, 
irrationality, esoteric experience, dreams, drunkenness, excess, and so forth. The 
coherence of critical perspectives, or of the critic‘s own identity, which is typically 
associated with fixed subjects grounded in specific subject positions, quickly dissipates. 
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The immanentist orientation is, first and foremost, an active, fully absorbed, fully 
integrated mode of thinking that in no way conforms to the requirements of any over-
arching or transcendent principle of thought external to the movements of thinking itself. 
So where transcendence informs (i.e., organizes, patterns, governs) the critic‘s particular 
orientation to the book, again through fixed parameters in and through which thought 
occurs, immanence not only frees the critic from those conceits, but opens the critic to 
her own becomings, her own bodily capacity to intuit the non-actualized forces (or life) 
of the outside-book. 
In this chapter, I have advanced an image of literature as conduit or relay for what 
Deleuze calls ―a passage of life‖—i.e., for something that exceeds language and overrides 
conventional associations. Moreover, I have sought to make the case for a kind of 
criticism that maximizes the expressive powers of the book, and to that end have 
highlighted a dynamic set of relations, or ―enterprise of co-creation,‖ between critic and 
text, thereby blurring the lines between the movements of the critical and those of the 
creative. The basic thesis with which I have been working can be formulated as follows: 
From the perspective of immanence, ―criticality‖—i.e., the movement of the 
critical—is no longer the province of the critic, but as Blanchot claims, ―an 
essential moment of the work.‖ Criticality is involutionary, and hence it manifests 
in and through the creative transformation and becoming-other of the text. So the 
critic‘s twofold task involves both the propulsion and mapping of the critical. 
If literature as a whole is to be understood in terms of its capacity to complexify (or go 
critical), then critics will need to pursue a relationship to literature that endeavours to 
extract difference (from the plane of immanence), primarily by opening the book to its 
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own powers of becoming. Kerouac‘s Sal Paradise was himself a critic—the kind of critic 
I have in mind in this essay—for two basic reasons: (1) he did not judge; and (2) he 
sought new possibilities of life by opening passages, forging relations, and tracing lines 
of flight. On the Road is what Deleuze-Guattari call an assemblage, both ―a machinic 
assemblage of bodies‖ (e.g., people, places, vehicles—mixed together, forging new 
consistencies) and ―a collective assemblage of enunciation‖ (e.g., a way of speaking, a set 
of gestures, a regime of signs—the sound and expression of a people, both diffuse and 
circulating; a people yet to come). By plugging bodies into one another, Sal unleashed 
desires, if not diabolical powers: ―My arrival was somewhat like the coming of the 
strange most evil angel…Apparently Dean had been quiet for a few months; now the 
angel had arrived and he was going mad again‖ (Kerouac 183). Sal crossed lines; he 
extracted new trajectories. He never stopped asking: what‘s possible? 
So from the perspective of immanence, the critical—or rather, the singular, 
―morphogenetic‖
154
 points (e.g., the points of bifurcation, of intensification, of instability; 
the phase shifts; the lines, trajectories, and series; the forces and fluctuations) in and 
through which the text goes critical, releasing something new, something novel vis-à-vis 
the genesis of textual form—becomes essential to the unfolding text, and to how the text, 
both effectively and necessarily, takes shape in a wholly singular fashion. The critic, as I 
have argued, maps essential movements of the text, or of textual production—that which 
appears in the moment when creative transformations of the text, in the here and now, 
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 Deleuze scholar Manuel DeLanda contrasts what he calls the intensive, ―inherently dynamic‖ processes 
of speciation (i.e., the generation of species) with what he calls the ―basically static‖ essentialist accounts 
of species. In a literary critical context, the concept of ―species,‖ I would argue, finds its rough correlate in 
the idea of, let us say, literary genre. DeLanda writes, ―while an essentialist account of species is basically 
static, a morphogenetic account is inherently dynamic. And while an essentialist account may rely on 
factors that transcend the realm of matter and energy (eternal archetypes, for instance), a morphogenetic 
account gets rid of all transcendent factors using exclusively form-generating resources which are 
immanent to the material world‖ (Intensive 10). 
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become separated from the cumulative and collective judgment(s) of critics. In these 
moments—these truly creative and critical moments—the very life of the text, that which 
had heretofore been trapped (hidden, restricted, subordinated) under the weight of 
competing critical judgments, is released and allowed to manifest as an affective power. 
Pursuing a form of criticism that affirms literary immanence reflects, I would 
hold, a certain ethical commitment to literature—a commitment that reveals itself in a 
threefold way: (1) by affirming immanence, we weaken (if not altogether remove) the 
critical capacity to subordinate literature to certain categorical imperatives (e.g., meaning, 
value, significance, genre, and so forth), or, more generally, certain forms of critical 
representation that get laid, grid-like, overtop of literature, thus partitioning it in certain 
ways (i.e., ordering and organizing it according to a certain set of critical mandates). As a 
consequence of this critical overlay, readers are ultimately separated from the concrete, 
here-and-now reality of the text, and denied their own potentially novel encounters with, 
or experiences of, literature; (2) by affirming immanence, we divert critical attention 
away from the transcendent operations of judgment and representation—operations 
carried out by scholars, in territories completely foreign, completely unrecognizable, to 
the realms of literary production; instead, critical attention now turns toward the task of 
bringing literature to its own limits (in ways I will describe later), and exposing it to its 
own outside; finally (3) by affirming immanence, we affirm the capacity of literature to 
become-different, and hence to ceaselessly unfold its own unactualized potentials. 
Let me say, then, in summary fashion, that moving beyond literary critical 
transcendence—or rather, the transcendent orientation to the book—involves nothing less 
than moving beyond (critical) subjects and objects (of scrutiny); also beyond mutual 
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understandings, regimes of justification, claims to validity; beyond what Massumi calls 
―molar-moral containment‖; beyond all signifiers and signifieds, identities and 
categories, interpretations and representations, rules and regulations, abstractions, 
judgments, generalizations, forced unities, codings and over-codings, authorities and 
authorizations—in short, all forms of constraint, and hence beyond the ceaseless renewal 
of Plato‘s ―poisoned gift.‖ Criticism that maintains an adherence to transcendence will 
typically devolve into lecture, into accusation or denunciation, what Jarrett calls 
―spanking the writer,‖ or what Foucault calls ―[handing] down sentences‖ from on high 
(through ―the judgment of God‖). The book, as I have been arguing, retains an essential 
capacity for criticality, a capacity to go critical. Just as the snow is to Hölderlin‘s bell, or 
the heat is to a boiling pot of water, or the sun is to the greening of the plant, the critic is 
to the book. That is, the critic strives to induce creative transformations in the book, to 
machine the book (or make it work), ―to tend the stretch of expression,‖ as Massumi says, 
and thereby open the book to new possibilities. The critic, in fact, must think beyond the 
book as actualized, or as a visible state of affairs, and instead must orient herself to what 
Deleuze-Guattari call the ―absolute ground‖ (What is? 41) of the book—the so-called 
―plane of immanence‖—in order to re-invest or re-singularize the book, to counter-
actualize it, to tap into its expressive power, its power to differ (or become-different), so 
as to ultimately give the book a new consistency. Our task, then, is to see this kind of 
criticism in action, which we will do in Chapter 4 of the dissertation. First, though, we 






On the Materialist Paradigm 
A book has neither object nor subject; it is made of variously formed matters, and very 
different dates and speeds. To attribute the book to a subject is to overlook this working of 
matters, and the exteriority of their relations. It is to fabricate a beneficent God to explain 
geological movements. 







The Greening of the Plant 
The wisdom of the plants: even when they have roots, there is always an outside where they form 
a rhizome with something else—with the wind, an animal, human beings… 
—Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (A Thousand Plateaus, 11) 
I pause in this abbreviated chapter—what I call an ―Interchapter‖—(1) to provide 
a brief overview of a number of Deleuzean concepts, which will be put to work in the 
next chapter; and (2) to plot the primary coordinates of a materialist criticism. Concepts 
discussed below include the book, the outside, the BwO, the encounter, force, singularity, 
affect/sensation, expression, and becoming.
155
 We will augment our discussion of these 
concepts, and of materialism, in general, through a brief consideration of an issue well-
known to Deleuze: the greening of the plant.
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In mapping the complex relational processes associated with acts of 
prehension,
157
 Deleuze, in The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, offers the following series 
of images: 
The plant sings of the glory of God, and while being filled all the more 
with itself it contemplates and intensely contracts the elements [from] 
whence it proceeds. It feels in this prehension the self-enjoyment of its 
own becoming. (78) 
Deleuze—in this somewhat Whitmanesque
158
 passage—ties the material processes of the 
plant to a kind of spiritual testimony (or a bearing-witness to God), and to the consequent 
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 Other Deleuzean concepts not discussed herein, but that will be invoked in the next chapter, and in the 
Epilogue to this dissertation, include, ―Visions and Auditions‖ and the major/minor distinction. 
156
 Deleuze primarily discusses this matter in The Logic of Sense, in relation to his seminal concept of the 
event. See Chapter 3, note 136, for a brief overview of Deleuze‘s unique handling of this issue. 
157
 In general, the concept of prehension refers to the various processes by which bodies grasp, absorb, 
contract, or somehow make use of things, and has wide-ranging applications in such fields as robotics, 
neuroscience, biomechanics, optics, mathematics, educational theory, theology, etc. The term would gain 
prominence in philosophical circles largely through the work of Alfred North Whitehead. 
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feeling of ―self-enjoyment.‖ As well, Deleuze highlights the plant‘s capacity to contract 
―the elements‖ from ―whence it proceeds,‖ or rather, to prehend its source energy through 
a process he characterizes as contemplative in nature. So the plant feels; it thinks; it 
―sings of the glory of God.‖ But what is really going on here? Are we trucking in 
metaphors? Not exactly.
159
 Let us take a closer look at this somewhat cryptic statement 
through a materialist lens. 
Sunlight qua sunlight remains entirely foreign to the plant, and hence unusable as 
such; yet that solar energy, in the first of a two-step biochemical process, stimulates the 
plant in such a way so as to trigger the production of photosynthetic cells—i.e., cells 
designed to absorb light energy; the plant then converts that unusable solar energy into 
usable chemical energy (or glucose). In this light-reactive phase, commonly described in 
terms of ―light dependency,‖ light energy vibrates the surfaces of the plant at productive 
frequencies through a process/reaction known as ―electron excitation.‖ This first phase of 
the process then gives way to a second ―light-independent‖ phase of so-called dark 
reactions, whereby the plant converts the energy it receives into carbohydrate or biomass 
through a process commonly referred to as ―carbon fixing.‖ Stored fuels are then 
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 I say ―Whitmanesque‖ because I am recalling Deleuze‘s claim in a later essay that Whitman ―makes 
something pass between the human body and the tree, in both directions, the body receiving ‗something of 
[the tree‘s] elastic fiber and clear sap,‘ but the tree for its part receiving a little consciousness‖ (Essays 59). 
159
 In Dialogues II, Deleuze-Parnet write, ―It is never a matter of metaphor; there are no metaphors, only 
combinations [of words/signs].‖ (117). According to François Zourabichvili, ―Deleuze undertakes a general 
critique of metaphor‖ (194), and does so, in large part, because metaphor blocks the affective becomings of 
language (i.e., the capacity of words to vary, to become-other). Metaphor closes in upon language—i.e., 
closes it off, limits its capacities, reduces it to a purveyor of resemblances (through the banal transfer of 
meaning from one body to another). Metaphor drains language of its vitality. Deleuze-Guattari argue that 
―The importance some have accorded metaphor and metonymy proves disastrous for the study of language. 
Metaphors and metonymies are merely effects‖ (Plateaus 77). Elsewhere they add, ―Grasp the world, 
instead of extracting impressions from it; work with objects, characters, events, in reality, and not in 
impressions. Kill metaphor.‖ (Kafka 70). In short, Deleuze concludes that metaphor ―just confuses matters 
and has no real importance‖ (Negotiations 29). 
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circulated to all parts of the plant, while oxygen (i.e., the plant‘s primary waste product) 
is released into the atmosphere through the process of ―cellular respiration.‖ 
So, in this example, the plant encounters its radical outside, in the form of light 
energy. That light then stirs the plant to life—or, more precisely, unleashes a series of 
otherwise nascent biochemical reactions in and through the plant. The plant, then, (1) 
converts the light energy forced upon it into viable stores of consumable glucose deposits 
(i.e., food); (2) circulates that glucose through the body of the plant, through a series of 
intercellular energy transfers; (3) exhales oxygen into the atmosphere; and (4) expresses 
itself in singular ways in the form of, say, deeper greens, richer blooms, etc. 
Moreover, the solar radiation produced by the sun immolates just as its effects are 
registered or recorded on the surfaces of the plant, which suggests an important link in 
this context between the immanentist orientation of the sun—reflected by way of various 
biochemical processes/reactions unleashed in and through the plant, itself—and ―fire‖ 
(Deleuze-Guattari, What is? 45), i.e., immanence as immolation. Put simply, a relation 
unfolds between the unactualized forces
160
of light energy and the consumptive powers of 
the plant; these powers or material capacities of the plant express themselves, at least in 
part, through the radical conversion of the plant‘s source energy into vital nutrients the 
plant can actually use. So because light cannot govern or control the plant from without 
(i.e., transcendently), that energy (or light force) immediately dissipates or turns to ash 
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 For Deleuze, a force is a connective energy that affects and transforms bodies by linking them together. 
However, forces not only bind bodies, they perpetually disrupt the unity, stability, and/or homeostatic 
organization (i.e., steady-state) of bodies, as well. That is, bodies are always in transition, or always 
becoming-other, because of the various forces that act upon them. Those forces might be physical (e.g., 
gravitational, electro-magnetic), or they might be historical, psychological, social, economic, ecological, 
legalistic, circumstantial, and so forth. And like the bodies through which a given set of forces may be 
discerned or intuited, the forces themselves remain in a perpetual state of tension with one another, wherein 
they pass from being reactive (i.e., limited, subordinated) to being active (i.e., dominating and fully 
expressive of their potential). 
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(as far as the plant is concerned) just at the moment that the plant itself registers its own 
heightened state of electron excitation, and thereby enters into the twofold process of 
photosynthesis. In all, these multiple chemical reactions unfold at lightening speeds: ―It 
takes eight minutes for a photon of light to travel the 93 million miles from the sun to the 
Earth‘s surface. A green plant needs only a few seconds to capture the energy in that 
light, process it, and store it in the form of a chemical bond‖ (Svetlik). 
Clearly, these processes, these plant-becomings, are decidedly not metaphorical, 
nor merely theoretical. Through the unleashing of its powers of extraction, consumption, 
and conversion, the plant enters into a kind of symbiotic relationship with its outside 
(with the non-plant), and thereby moves beyond the confines of its own steady-state (or 
homeostasis). The plant grows, blooms, greens, etc.; in fact, its entire survival depends on 
its uptake of the forces of light energy and, by extension, the various reactions and self-
organizing processes duly unleashed by those forces. But all that light energy can really 
do, vis-à-vis the chain of causation, is stimulate the plant in such a way that it takes up 
the advances of its outside—however impersonal those advances may be. Obviously the 
sun has no designs on the plant, and vice-versa; the various resonances and couplings 
discussed here may be habitual, but never inevitable, never expected or assumed. They 
are always fortuitous. Still, by extracting an electrical charge from the light it encounters 
on its exposed surfaces—that is, through the manufacture of cellular receptors (or, energy 
carriers)—and by converting that charge into life-giving glucose through various 
chemical reactions, the plant, as Deleuze says, ―sings of the glory of God.‖ So by being 
open to its outside, and by transforming that outside into vital nutrients, the plant 
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expresses itself in singular ways: it grows; it greens; it blooms; it bears fruit, and thereby 
―feels in this prehension the self-enjoyment of its own becoming.‖ 
Again, there are no acts of recognition here; no prearranged agreements between 
sun and plant—just the force of an encounter, the opening of a relational field, and the 
self-organizing (or processual) effects the outside-plant unleashes in the plant, itself. So 
by registering the effects of solar energy on its leaves—or on any other part of its 
anatomy, depending on the type of plant involved—the plant, in a sense, knows its 
outside; or, more precisely, the plant learns of (read: takes up, invests itself in, orients 
itself to) the stream of solar energy that it fortuitously encounters. Because ―to learn,‖ 
according to Deleuze, even among non-human forms (like plants), 
is to conjugate the distinctive points of our bodies with the singular points 
of the objective Idea in order to form a problematic field. This conjugation 
determines for us a threshold of consciousness at which our real acts are 
adjusted to our perceptions of the real relations, thereby providing a 
solution to the problem. (Difference 165) 
So when forced beyond a certain threshold or operative limit by its encounter with the 
outside, the plant opens up to what Deleuze calls an ―objective Idea‖ of the sun (or of the 
solar radiation that strikes its surfaces)—an Idea expressed through the opening of a 
relational or problematic field, in which the plant adjusts itself to its encounter with the 
sun. The plant‘s production of photosynthetic cells, then, speaks to the capacity of the 
plant-body to forge some sort of liaison between its own parts (e.g., the cells themselves; 
also, the electron excitation happening at the surface of the plant) and the singular flow of 
light energy striking the plant at any one time. In effect, the production of these cells is 
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the plant‘s ―solution‖ to the ―problem‖ of light energy, just as a human or animal eye is a 
solution to the same problem—i.e., the problem of registering, relating to, and making 
use of light. In fact, any one solution will never exhaust the potentially infinite number of 
ways a given problem, like light energy, can be solved by different organisms. Any 
solution just brings greater depth and contour to the problem, by demonstrating its ever-
widening range of application, but again never solves the problem for all time. So, in this 
instance, the ―real acts‖ of the plant (i.e., the various biochemical processes/reactions, 
discussed above) reflect the plant‘s own ―perceptions of the real relations‖ unfolding 
between itself and its source energy. We recall from the Introduction to this dissertation 
that those relations cannot be reduced to their terms (i.e., their relata); but those relata 
derive an individual organization, and a related set of meanings, values, and purposes 
(e.g., the sun becomes a life-giving source of energy for the plant; the plant bears fruit, 
aspirates oxygen, etc.) from the independent unfolding of those relations. Hence the 
vibratory effects of solar energy on the plant enable the plant to express itself in ways it 
could or would not on its own. 
Finally, this suggestion that ―the plant sings of the glory of God‖ should in no 
way index the renewal of transcendence, nor should it connote the total isolation or self-
same inwardness of the plant; as we know, all things (including plants) enter into 
absolutely essential relations or encounters with their outside. The thing to remember, 
though, is that that outside cannot be folded, as such, into the plant itself without being 
converted to the plant‘s own material and processual stuff. So the plant owns (or better, 
actualizes) its outside, as evidenced by its ceaseless power or capacity to differ along 




The writer‘s position is no different from that of the painter, musician, or architect. The writer‘s 
specific materials are words and syntax, the created syntax that ascends irresistibly into his work and passes 
into sensation. 
—Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (What is Philosophy? 167 ) 
So what can we take away from the above example in our effort to forge a 
uniquely materialist orientation to the book? To begin, I would point out that materialism 
is in no way driven by the need to render opinion or to build moral and/or communal 
consensus about the book. A materialist criticism experiments with the book, machines 
the book (by forcing it to its limits), and thereby creates new possibilities for the book, 
new modes of expression, new flowerings, if you will. Foucault describes it best: 
From the moment that [critical] discourse ceases to follow the slope of 
self-interiorizing thought and, addressing the very being of language, 
returns thought to the outside; from that moment, in a single stroke, it 
becomes a meticulous narration of experiences, encounters, and 
improbable signs. (―Thought‖ 429; my emphasis) 
From a materialist perspective, the question now becomes how best to ―[address] the very 
being of language‖—i.e., language from the point-of-view of its uptake of forces, and its 
related capacity to vary (or become-different)? The critic‘s experience of the dynamic 
actualization of those non-actualized forces, then prompts ―a meticulous narration‖ (or a 
mapping) of the book‘s transformative encounters with its outside, or, as Foucault says, 
its production of ―improbable signs.‖ 
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I would suggest further that the book operates as what Deleuze-Guattari call a 
body without organs. That is, the book is a ―recording surface‖ (Anti-Oedipus 10), or 
degree zero of intensity. It resists organization, stratification, and the judgment of God: 
In order to resist organ-machines, the body without organs presents its 
smooth, slippery, opaque, taut surface as a barrier. In order to resist linked, 
connected, and interrupted flows, it sets up a counter-flow of amorphous, 
undifferentiated fluid. In order to resist using words composed of 
articulated phonetic units, it utters only gasps and cries that are sheer 
unarticulated blocks of sound. (9) 
So the book—or what might more aptly be called the book-body without organs 
(hereafter, B-BwO)—resists the imposition of codes, or preset values and meanings. 
However, the forcible capture and confinement of the book‘s intensive movements—i.e., 
its powers of emergence, its capacity to vary, to affect, to self-organize, to go critical—
by way of ―an over-all persecution apparatus‖ (i.e., institutional criticism) can obscure 
the B-BwO by imposing various striations (generic, narratorial, etc.) over its flexible 
surfaces. That is, the book may be subordinated to certain lines of articulation, certain 
segments,
161
 which are not only forced on the book, but made into essential laws of the 
book, or into regulatory regimes that convert the book‘s unlimited becomings into 
homeostatic mechanisms. 
By way of example, think of the B-BwO as a blank stretch of electro-magnetic 
tape—a favored example of Deleuze-Guattari that obviously had more purchase in 1972 
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 Deleuze-Guattari develop this notion of ―segmentarity‖ in A Thousand Plateaus, in their plateau on 
micropolitics. They write that ―Segmentarity is inherent to all the strata composing  us…life is spatially and 
socially segmented‖ (208). So, for our purposes, to segment the book (read: to subject it to some form of 
generic, discursive, narratorial, and/or structural organization) is to stratify the book—i.e., divide it up, 
partition and classify it, and thereby rationalize it. 
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(when Anti-Oedipus was first published) than it does today—upon which certain words, 
images, and sounds are recorded. In itself, the tape is ―non-productive,‖ and yet 
―perpetually reinserted into the process of production‖ (8). So while those collected 
words, images, and sounds, circulating on the B-BwO, converge and collide, quite 
fortuitously, the tape ―presents its smooth, slippery, opaque, taut surface as a barrier,‖ or 
as limit to the productive flow of desire.
162
 That is, the recording surface arrests or 
repulses the potentially repetitive or habit-forming flow of those desires. The B-BwO, 
then, as Deleuze-Guattari would say, ―belong[s] to the realm of antiproduction,‖ which, 
put simply, means that it resists the imposition of generic, formal, or narrative 
organization (i.e., preset lines of articulation); it resists regulation and categorization, 
order and organization. It resists abstract standards of judgment, and instead registers the 
intensive and nomadic distribution of what Deleuze-Guattari would call ―desiring-
production‖ that freely traverses its surfaces. In turn, the B-BwO retains the capacity to 
decompose fixed meanings and values (e.g., common sense, good sense—essential 
inscriptions/marks on the B-BwO); it retains the capacity to express the unrecognizable, 
the asignifying, the non-human: ―sheer unarticulated blocks of sound.‖ It retains the 
power of emergence and the inexhaustible capacity to become. it retains the capacity to 
affect, and to be affected. To transform. To differ, to vary. Hence the critical appeal to 
those material powers of the book—typically obscured by transcendent illusion—
becomes the defining moment of the materialist intervention. 
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 For Deleuze-Guattari, desire is understood not as a kind of longing, nor as evidence of a certain 
subjective lack (as in the Lacanian register), but as an entirely impersonal (read: non-Oedipal, non-coded) 
flow of socio-material energies/forces unfolding in and between bodies, and across social networks. Desire, 
then, is variable, free-flowing, and socially productive, and cannot be reduced to a representational logic. 
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We return, then, to this idea of the book as ―recording surface.‖ The point being 
made here is that the book has no essential organization. It has no interiority that one can 
readily access; it has no fixed values or rhetorical/tropological patterns that the critic can 
simply identify and teach others to identify in the same way, through endless cycles of 
critical control. To even enter the book and follow the narrative from beginning to end 
becomes a problem for the materialist critic because it presupposes certain absolutes 
about the book (e.g., a fixed point of entry, an interiority, an essential organization).
163
 By 
ridding themselves of transcendence, then, or by rooting it out wherever it presents itself, 
the materialist operates through the assumption that, as critics, we act not on the book 
itself, but on its virtual multiplicities (read: the pure excess of the book; or, more 
generally, the powers or potentials of systems, when forced out-of-phase)—those that 
subtend the various stratifications of the book. In so doing, the critic releases an intensive 
matter from the book—i.e., a matter imbued with ―variable intensive affects‖ (Deleuze-
Guattari, Plateaus 408), with energy levels both escalating and diminishing, with variable 
powers and capacities, etc.—that crosses established thresholds of book-behavior so as to 
enable new patterns, possibilities, and powers of the book to emerge. Moreover, because 
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 From a materialist perspective, this is an important point to emphasize. That is, at the outset of Kafka 
Deleuze-Guattari rhetorically pose the following question: ―How can we enter into Kafka‘s work?‖ (3). To 
this, the authors offer up the following reply: ―We will enter…by any point whatsoever; none matters more 
than another, and no entrance is more privileged, even if it seems an impasse, a tight passage, a siphon.‖ In 
both question and answer lie the seeds of revolution, or what Baugh calls a ―revolutionary pragmatics of 
reading‖ (as discussed in the Introduction): a problem, newly revived, reconstituted (e.g., ―how can we 
enter into Kafka‘s work?‖); a defiance (e.g., ―we will enter, then, by any point whatsoever‖); an agitation 
(e.g., ―none matters more than another, and no entrance is more privileged‖); a creative trajectory (e.g., 
―even if it seems an impasse, a tight passage, a siphon‖). Deleuze-Guattari then add, ―Only the principle of 
multiple entrances prevents the introduction of the enemy, the Signifier and those attempts to interpret a 
work that is actually only open to experimentation.‖ So the authors know their enemy, the Signifier (or 
signifying regime of signs); they regard the enemy as ―tyrannical, terrorizing, castrating‖ (Deleuze, 
Negotiations 21), and do so in large part because it remains ―stuck in the question ‗What does it mean?‘‖ 
(22). They also know that their secret weapon in this fight (i.e., ―the principle of multiple entrances‖) will 
destratify (read: decode, decentralize, de-organize) any critical—or, more broadly, institutional or State-
based—apparatus committed to pursuing interpretative domination over the book. 
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materialists actively call attention to the productive, self-ordering capacities of the book, 
they shift the focus away from the plane of transcendence (and the various discursive 
presuppositions that tend to dominate that plane) and re-assert the power of the plane of 
immanence—a plane that we never left. That is, any and all transcendent illusions of the 
book are merely fogs that have rolled in, disguising immanence. So the materialist critic 
is ultimately tasked with renewing or restoring the plane of immanence, or with making 
felt the unactualized potentials of the book. 
From a materialist perspective, then, we ask: what are the positive powers of 
literature (or of the book)? There are many; arguably chief among them the power ―to 
become‖ (i.e., become-other, become-different), that from which all other positive and 
productive powers of the book flow—e.g., the power to affect, to take flight, even to be; 
also the powers of decomposition, expression, and preservation. For the moment, though, 
let‘s stay with this question of becoming and ask, what is this seminal power? And how 
does it operate in and through a literary (or, more broadly, artistic) register? 
Generally speaking, all things (organic and inorganic) become: they alter; they 
vary; they differ—or at least they retain the capacity to do so. The materialist orientation 
to literature seeks to mobilize those powers of becoming, while transcendent modes of 
criticism seek to shut them down. That is, the latter block or suppress the becomings of 
the book—i.e., the book‘s inexhaustible capacity to metamorphosize—by subordinating 
its various intensive capacities (e.g., alteration, variance, decomposition, flight) to a set of 
semiotic coordinates that locate the book spatially:
164
 e.g., as textual whole or narrative 
unity; as generic or structural instantiation; as a period piece (early-modern, romantic); as 
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 Or chronologically, for that matter, which is essentially a spatialized form of time—e.g., clock time, 
historical time: the time that flows between constants or fixed variables. 
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self-sustaining, self-sufficient value, etc. These are effects of the book. They are (1) lifted 
from those aforementioned temporalities (or becomings); (2) hypostatized, or given an 
objective reality; and (3) rendered abstract measures of the literary artifact. As discussed 
in Part 1, the transcendent orientation to literature reduces the book to a representational 
logic (e.g., narratorial, structural, figural, axiological, etc.)—an entire critical overlay that 
unfolds in what Deleuze-Guattari call a supplementary dimension or critical netherworld. 
On this point, the authors argue that ―Unity always operates in an empty dimension 
supplementary to that of the system considered (overcoding)‖ (Plateaus 8), which means 
that any sort of textual, discursive, structural, or symbolic self-containedness or 
interiority will always be assigned to the book. Put simply, all self-sustaining unities 
cannot be derived from the book itself—just as a room cannot be a room by some inward 
feature of its composition; the supposed presence of those interiorities in the minds of, 
among others, the New Critics reflects the fact that certain overcoding operations are in 
play—i.e., ―phenomena of centering, unification, totalization, integration, hierarchization, 
and finalization‖ (41). Deleuze-Guattari put a fine point on the matter as follows: ―unity 
appears only when there is a power takeover in the multiplicity by the signifier or [by] a 
corresponding subjectification‖ (8). So by unifying the book around a fixed body of 
critical codes, or in and through some sort of aesthetic, linguistic, or narrative logic—in 
short, a root command structure (think: literary critical arborescence)
165
—the critic 
effectively takes control of the book and, with nearly unimpeachable authority, 
suppresses its vital powers. 
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 Deleuze-Guattari contrast their concept of the rhizome with that of the tree. The latter indexes the 
presence of a central (or centralizing) authority. It also denotes fixed modes of organization and structure; 
fixed points and positions, with homogenous (or regulated) links between them. 
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While literature retains the power to assert (or make felt) a virtual (or 
unactualized) dimension—which Deleuze variously names difference, Idea, sense, event, 
multiplicity, the plane of immanence, etc.—through its capacity to become-other, 
become-different, those becomings are effectively denatured (i.e., robbed of their 
inherent dynamism) by various critical constants/values that locate the book on a plane of 
transcendence. But while those aforementioned overcoding operations, those ―power 
takeover[s]‖ of the book‘s multiplicities, may block becomings or short-circuit time (i.e., 
extract time from the equation), all resultant constancy, and all related forms of textual 
governance that depend upon, and/or derive from, the perception of that constancy, will 
remain illusory. In other words, the book never fully renounces its power to become-
different; so, in some way or another, the B-BwO continues to vex whatever standards 
that may be applied to it. Only the immanentist orientation to literature, as discussed in 
the last chapter, contributes in co-creative ways to the powers of the book, while offering 
a viable alternative to criticisms of containment, which perpetuate illusory modes of 
order and organization. In fact, the immanentist orientation marks an important shift in 
the discourse of literary criticism from control criticism to catalytic criticism, from 
critical restraint to critical propulsion. It opens the book up to unseen forces and 
―unheard-of becomings‖; it unleashes a revolutionary potential, so as ―to free life from 
where it‘s trapped‖ (Deleuze, Negotiations 141). But how exactly is this accomplished in 
a literary context? 
According to Deleuze, ―Literature…moves in the direction of the ill-formed or the 
incomplete‖ (Essays 1); it moves, in other words, toward the breakdown (or unearthing) 
of its formal unity; it frees itself from the strictures of supposed interiority and the 
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perception of wholeness—and does so, as suggested above, by overcoming its own 
spatial coordinates, its own acquired (or externally imposed) forms of equilibrium and 
constancy. Literary language, Foucault writes, is ―language getting far away from itself 
as possible,‖ thus escaping representation: ―in this setting, ‗outside of itself,‘ it unveils its 
own being, the sudden clarity reveals not a folding-back but a gap, not a turning back of 
signs upon themselves but a dispersion‖ (―Thought‖ 424). Literature, then, in a seeming 
affront to its New Critical representation as ―the well-wrought urn‖—i.e., both self-
contained and self-sustaining—and to critical models beholden to the values of 
enlightenment reason, remains in perpetual retreat from the Cartesian ideal of the ‗clear 
and distinct.‘ That is, literature reveals itself to be more, not less, confused and obscure—
though no less singular, no less decisive in its obscurity; it becomes, as Deleuze-Guattari 
would say, ―vagabond, anexact‖
166
—i.e., less formal, less available to fixed perception; 
or rather, more open and unrestrained than most criticisms know how to handle. So just 
as all things become, becoming itself remains essential to the constitution of all things—
even if we do not know or see it. At the material level of the text (e.g., words and syntax), 
for example, subtle forms of agitation and unrest make essential contributions to literary 
becomings. Consider, then, the following formula: ‗Becoming‘ = ‗being‘ + ‗time‘ (i.e., 
emergent being; being out-of-phase; being untimely). 
As discussed in the last chapter, Deleuze-Guattari describe the work of art as a 
―being of sensation and nothing else: it exists in itself‖ (What is? 164); they then add that 
the various ―sensations, percepts, and affects,‖ of which all works of art are composed, 
―are beings whose validity lies in themselves and exceeds any lived‖—i.e., any extant or 
recognizable form. But are we not with this idea of self-validating ―beings of sensation‖ 
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 See Chapter 3, note 9, for Deleuze-Guattari‘s comments on the anexact, which they attribute to Husserl. 
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re-introducing transcendence into the equation? Are we not returning to the idea that 
being can be represented or understood in a wholly abstract way (read: divorced from 
time; divorced from the flows of becoming)? Not exactly. These so-called beings of 
sensation do not escape their becomings. They are, in fact, emergent beings, untimely 
beings. Which is to say, any material form—e..g, words, syntax—when pushed out-of-
phase through the activation of its affective capacities escapes its ―basin of attraction,‖
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and thereby becomes-other. So, in this context, being is understood as both affirmation 
and testament to its own becomings. Deleuze-Guattari describe the matter as follows: 
being becomes sensation when ―the plane of the material ascends irresistibly and invades 
the plane of composition‖ (166). This irresistible ascension toward ―the plane of 
composition,‖ then, is matter-in-movement, or better, matter as movement—i.e., matter 
as a mobile force, in a state far-from-equilibrium. So what we have is self-differentiating 
matter, matter-becomings, molecularized matter: we have materiality. 
Hence, the materials of the poem or novel, by being subject to (among other 
things) various non-actualized forces related to their use or application within the poem 
itself, collide with one another, stress one another—and do so to the point where the 
words themselves crack open, like atoms, unleashing a wave of expressive power or 
energy. This type of violence, this boiling over of the text, forces literature from its 
―basins of attraction‖ (e.g., meaning, significance, classical syntax, majoritarian 
grammar); it also dilutes any habitual associations that may be tied to the words (or 
language) in everyday social contexts, and, as suggested a moment ago, ―exceeds any 
lived.‖ In short, literature converts its materials into malleable and supple sensory 
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 This is a term from complexity science that simply speaks to the initial conditions and long-term 
behavior of a material system—the so-called ―state space‖—from which all variance effectively flows. 
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aggregates; it extracts from them a revolutionary potential in the form of compounds of 
sensation. Those materials, in turn, emerge not as a language with preset meanings or 
formal syntax, but as a-syntactical, a-grammatical, and a-signifying vibrations; or, in 
other words, as beings of sensation:  
whether through words, colors, sounds, or stone, art is the language of 
sensations. Art does not have opinions. Art undoes the triple organization 
of perceptions [i.e., universals of contemplation], affections [i.e., 
universals of reflection], and opinions [i.e., universals of communication] 
in order to substitute a monument composed of percepts, affects, and blocs 
of sensations that take the place of language. The writer uses words, but 
by creating a syntax that makes them pass into sensation that makes the 
standard language stammer, tremble, cry, or even sing: this is the style, the 
―tone,‖ the language of sensations, or the foreign language within 
language that summons forth a people to come, ―Oh, people of old 
Catawba‖ [referring to Thomas Wolfe], ―Oh, people of Yoknapatawpha‖ 
[referring to Faulkner]. The writer twists language, makes it vibrate, seizes 
hold of it, and rends it in order to wrest the percept from perceptions, the 
affect from affections, the sensation from opinion—in view, one hopes, of 
that still-missing people. (Deleuze-Guattari, What is? 176) 
We will consider the emergence of ―a people to come‖ or this ―still-missing people‖ in 
our next chapter. For the moment, suffice to say that only by way of their irresistible 
ascension into the plane of composition, do the brute materials of literary composition 
(words, syntax) become sensation; that is, they become ―beings of sensation.‖ 
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So finally, we have alluded to a number of positive powers of the book herein, 
beyond this seminal powers of becoming: i.e., the power to enfold outside forces; ―to 
stand up on its own,‖ as Deleuze-Guattari say, independent of any external or 
transcendent support, as ―being of sensation‖;
168
 to connect or machine (i.e., literature 
retains the capacity to hook-up, to enter new arrangements, to release or stimulate 
difference); to ―ascend irresistibly‖ into sensory aggregates; to go critical; to expresses 
difference; to extract a revolutionary potential; and to bring ―new varieties‖ into the 
world: ―A great novelist is above all an artist who invents unknown or unrecognized 
affects and brings them to light as the becoming of his characters‖ (What is? 174). 
With this, then, we have built a preliminary map of some important Deleuzean 
concepts, which we will put to work in our readings of Crane‘s The Red Badge of 
Courage, Melville‘s Moby-Dick, William Gass‘s On Being Blue, and Whitman‘s Leaves 
of Grass in the next chapter. 
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 It bears repeating, however, that literature—despite being its own power of thinking (different from 
philosophy, different from science), with its own unique forms of action in the world, and its own unique 
and singular ways of expressing itself—is activated in those capacities by what it is not—by the outside-
book, or by outside forces. Literature does not exist in a vacuum, but rather, as Deleuze says in his letter to 






Unwording the Word— 
On Literary Chromatic Matters 
At first, it can only be a matter of somehow finding a method by which we can represent this 
mocking attitude towards the word, through words. In this dissonance between the means and 
their use it will perhaps become possible to feel a whisper of that final music or that silence 
that underlies All. 
—Samuel Beckett (Disjecta: Miscellaneous Writings, 172)169 
One must say of every writer: he is a seer, a hearer, “ill seen ill said”…a colorist, a musician. 
—Gilles Deleuze (Essays Critical and Clinical, LV) 
The American language bases its despotic official pretensions, its majoritarian claim to 
hegemony, only on its extraordinary capacity for being twisted and shattered…[for being] a 
language shot with a spray-gun of colors. 
—Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet (Dialogues II, 58) 
What we look for in a book is the way it transmits something that resists coding: flows, 
revolutionary active lines of flight, lines of absolute decoding rather than any intellectual 
culture. 
—Gilles Deleuze (Negotiations, 23) 
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 This title for this chapter comes from a comment made by Samuel Beckett in a letter to Axel Kaun, 
dated 9 July 1937. Beckett suggests that ―On the way to this literature of the unword, which is so desirable 
to me…Let us…act like that mad (?) mathematician who used a different principle of measurement at each 
stage of his calculation. An assault against words in the name of beauty. In the meantime I am doing 
nothing at all. Only from time to time I have the consolation, as now, of sinning willy-nilly against a 
foreign language [Note: Beckett writes this letter in German], as I should love to do with full knowledge 
and intent against my own language—and as I shall do—Deo juvante [i.e., ―with God‘s help‖ (Latin)]‖ 
(173; my emphasis). 
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As I prepare to write this chapter, I acknowledge the feeling of what W. J. T. 
Mitchell refers to as ekphrastic hope—i.e., ―the desire to overcome the ‗impossibility‘ of 
ekphrasis‖ (154). The hope to which Mitchell refers derives from the conviction that any 
presumed aporia between verbal and visual modes of expression (e.g., words and images, 
literature and painting) can be overcome through ekphrasis (i.e., written or verbal 
descriptions of so-called ―mute‖ visual forms). For some—especially within the art 
community—converting the visual, spatial, or plastic arts (e.g., painting, architecture, 
sculpture, photography, animation, graphics, etc.) into, say, ―verbal icon or imagetext,‖
170
 
crosses an aesthetic, if not moral, line in that it subordinates the visual semiotic—
including (1) the socio-cultural meanings and values effectuated by that semiotic; (2) the 
unique sensory and affective attributes of visual forms; and (3) the modes of reception 
and/or interpretation the visual calls upon in the perceiving subject—to the operative and 
expressive capacities of a foreign medium (i.e., language). So, in short, because the visual 
is differently constituted, differently meaningful, and differently perceived, 
A verbal representation cannot represent—[i.e.] make present—its object 
in the same way a visual representation can. It may refer to an object, 
describe it, invoke it, but it can never bring its visual presence before us in 
the way pictures do. Words can ‗cite,‘ but never ‗sight‘ their objects. (152) 
While clearly verbal forms cannot ―sight‖ objects, as Mitchell suggests, or represent them 
―the way pictures do‖—i.e., without doing violence to both visual and verbal modes of 
expression in the process—great writers, according to Deleuze, are still able to produce 
the sort of ―Visions and Auditions that no longer belong to any language‖ (Essays 5). In 
                                                          
170
 Mitchell writes that with ekphrasis, ―The estrangement of the image/text division is overcome, and a 
sutured, synthetic form, a verbal icon or imagetext, arises in its place‖ (154). 
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other words, they are able to draw upon the expressive capacity of language for sight and 
sound. But how, precisely, does the writer draw this type of expression from words?
171
 
In a late essay, Deleuze speaks to the power of literature to act upon language 
(i.e., to expand, intensify, or transform it). Literature, he claims, releases the word from 
its referential confines—i.e., ―forces it out of its usual furrows‖ (Essays 5)—and thereby 
forces language as a whole beyond the threshold of its own habitual uses and fixed 
associations. ―Visions and Auditions,‖ he goes on to suggest, ―are not fantasies, but 
veritable Ideas that the writer sees and hears in the interstices of language, in the gaps of 
language‖; when activated, or drawn to the surface, they become affective conduits for 
―the passage of life within language.‖ In other words, by opening the word to its outside 
(e.g., sound, color), literature—understood in this context as a form of action, a doing—
propels language as a whole into affective registers. It draws new accents, new life from 
the word. In a sense, it unwords the word by opening up 
a kind of foreign language within language, which is neither another 
language nor a rediscovered patois, but a becoming-other of language, a 
minorization of [a] major language, a delirium that carries it off, a witch‘s 
flight that escapes the dominant system. 
So to engender the sort of Visions and Auditions in and through language ―that no longer 
belong to any language,‖ the writer must activate the capacity of language itself to vary, 
to intensify, to take flight, and to become-other. It is the task of the critic, then, to map 
those becomings, or rather, to track that ―witch‘s flight,‖ and—in a final act of co-
creation—to unleash that ―delirium‖ in and through the book. 
                                                          
171
 Ronald Bogue likens this phenomenon to ―Stoic lekta, [i.e.,] surface effects that haunt the bodies of 
words like fogs or auras emanating from their superficies‖ (Deleuze 163). 
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Before proceeding with this agenda, I would simply say that in this chapter I hope 
to challenge the more commonly-held assertion that ―the ekphrastic encounter in 
language is purely figurative‖ (Mitchell 158)—i.e., metaphorical, referential, descriptive, 
thematic—and, by extension, ―a special or exceptional moment in verbal or oral 
representation.‖ Instead, I support the (perhaps) more fringe assertion, espoused by the 
ekphrastic hopeful among us, that ekphrasis—or what Deleuze would call the affective 
capacity of language for Visions and Auditions—is ultimately ―paradigmatic of a 
fundamental tendency in all linguistic expression‖ (153). That is, I define ekphrasis (in 
this context) as language-in-becoming, or as language forced into affective registers, and 
thereby unmoored from conventional association. As such, ekphrasis sheds the distinction 
of mere literary or rhetorical device, relegated to a remote sub-genre of poetry,
172
 and 
instead becomes what Deleuze calls an ―event of language‖ (Logic 185)
173
—a notion first 
intuited by literary critic Murray Krieger.
174
 
Over the pages that follow, I set out to track the literary ekphrasm (i.e., the 
singular point at which language opens up to its outside), so as to evaluate, or account 
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 Some paradigmatic examples of this poetic form include Homer‘s depiction of the shield of Achilles (in 
the Iliad); Keats‘ ―Ode on a Grecian Urn‖; Robert Browning‘s ―My Last Duchess‖; and John Ashbery‘s 
―Self-Portrait in a Convex Mirror.‖ 
173
 Deleuze discusses this matter in a number of his works—in particular, The Logic of Sense. Therein, he 
writes, ―language being a unique event…merges now with that which renders it possible‖ (185). He 
elsewhere adds, ―Events make language possible….Nevertheless, the event does belong to language, and 
haunts it so much that it does not exist outside of the propositions which express it‖ (181). We will explore 
how the incorporeal event ―haunts‖ literature in the upcoming stages of this chapter. 
174
 In a nod to Krieger‘s now seminal treatment of ekphrasis in his 1967 essay, ―Ekphrasis and the Still 
Movement of Poetry; or Laokoön Revisited,‖ Mitchell ties ekphrasis again to the hope ―of achieving vision, 
iconicity, or a ‗still moment‘ of plastic presence through language‖ (156). That is, literature attains or 
affirms, as Mitchell describes it, ―a ‗still moment‘ of plastic presence‖ by being able to ―convert the 
transparency of its verbal medium into the physical solidity of the medium of the spatial arts‖ (90), and 
thereby reconfigure, even overcome, the temporal aspects of writing (read: linear, progressive, narratorial). 
On a number of fronts, however, Krieger remains self-consciously formalist in orientation, relying heavily 
on what he calls the role of ―pattern‖ (i.e., rhetorical pattern, tropological pattern, grammatical or syntactic 
pattern) in ekphrastic poetry, and on a related conception of the poem as both a ―formal necessity‖ (90) and 
what he calls ―a formal and linguistic self-sufficiency‖ (88). James Heffernan writes, ―Krieger‘s theory of 
ekphrasis would hermetically seal literature within the well-wrought urn of pure self-enclosed spatiality, 
where the ashes of New Criticism (still glowing, as ashes will) now repose‖ (2). 
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for, the power of language to unleash difference. That is, we will map the processes of 
language-in-becoming—using as our guide to this mode of literary action Stephen 
Crane‘s The Red Badge of Courage, Herman Melville‘s Moby-Dick, and William Gass‘ 
philosophical inquiry, On Being Blue. In particular, we will look at how Crane, Melville, 
and Gass re-singularize (read: renew, re-activate, unleash new potentials from) specific 
color-words figured prominently within these texts (e.g., red, white, and blue). To 
anticipate my conclusions, I will argue that these words overthrow their conventional 
associations and assume a transformative power in these works, expressed in and through 
the becomings of the characters. In short, by extricating themselves from any perceiving 
subject or fixed meaning, these words become-different. 
Demonstration 1: On Being Red, On Being White, On Being Blue 
Literature is an ally to Deleuze‘s thinking, and even a privileged one, since fiction is a zone 
favourable to the exposure of the illusion of transcendence. 
—Mary Bryden (―Deleuze and Anglo-American Literature‖ 105) 
In Stephen Crane‘s The Red Badge of Courage, Henry Fleming—anonymously 
referred to throughout the novel as ―the young man‖ or ―the young soldier‖—would burn 
to enlist in the army: ―he had read of marches, sieges, conflicts, and he had longed to see 
it all. His busy mind had drawn for him large pictures extravagant in color, lurid with 
breathless deeds‖ (8). While his mother had advised against leaving the farm, the young 
man was ultimately swayed in his decision by ―accounts of…decisive victory‖ (9), 
printed daily in the newspapers; and by ―[t]ales of great movements‖ (8)—told with near-
―Homeric‖ grandeur—that ―shook the land.‖ In addition, Henry saw great virtue in taking 
up arms for a noble cause: ―He had, of course, dreamed of battles all his life…In visions 
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he had seen himself in many struggles. He had imagined peoples secure in the shadow of 
his eagle-eyed prowess‖ (7). In these visions, the youth cast himself as protector, and as 
part of a wider fraternity or band of brothers—those whom he viewed as ―heroes‖ (24), 
and whom he admired both for their ―unspeakable valor‖ (15) and for ―bearing a load of 
courage unseen‖ (24). Going off to war, then, the young man (now the young soldier) 
―basked in the smiles of the girls and was patted and complimented by the old men‖ (13); 
and though he feared the likelihood of ―a Greek-like struggle‖ (7), believing at one point 
―prominent trees spoke to him of tragedies—hidden, mysterious, solemn‖ (41), the youth 
felt he might ultimately have ―the strength to do mighty deeds‖ (13). 
So the young soldier was ruled by ―the color of his ambitions‖
175
—but his 
ambitions, in the end, would prove all too black-and-white. That is, he would fall prey to 
a certain representation of war, and to a somewhat predictable, albeit alluring, portrait of 
himself as war hero. His ambitions were, in effect, colored by various abstract universals 
(e.g., heroic ideals, archetypal characters, stock narratives)—what Crane would refer to 
as the ―laws of tradition‖ (40)—which were then bolstered, both publicly and privately, 
by ―the newspapers, the gossip of the village‖ (8–9), and by the youth‘s ―own picturings‖ 
(9). With the circulation of these ideas/images of war, and the values they embody, the 
young soldier would, in the end, convert those ideas into what Deleuze calls an object of 
recognition (Difference 139). An object recognized (i.e., ―recalled, imagined or 
conceived‖) blocks the immediacy of the encounter—that which unfolds, say, on the 
battlefield—and the affective power of that encounter (i.e., the capacity of battle itself to 
transform, to strengthen or diminish, the young soldier through new experiences, new 
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 This phrase, from The Red Badge of Courage, refers to the young man‘s resolution to enlist in the army, 
despite the resistance of his mother. The entire sentence reads as follows: ―he had made firm rebellion 
against this yellow light thrown upon the color of his ambitions‖ (8). 
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ways of thinking, new becomings, and so forth). Levi Bryant summarizes Deleuze‘s 
position on what he (Bryant) calls the ―moment of the encounter‖ as follows: 
Like Lacan‘s concept of trauma, the encounter exceeds our powers of 
anticipation and thus explodes the symbolic or system of possibility that 
characterizes so much of our organism. However, it evokes the necessity 
of thinking by engendering thought within thought that refuses being 
ignored. Where thought tied to recognition is concerned, we remain 
trapped within the grip of an abstract system of possibilities which fails to 
establish the necessity of that which is thought. By contrast, thought tied 
to the encounter contains all the necessity of the concrete insofar as it 
commands us to think. The encounter is thus imperative in nature. It is that 
which we must think or that which we cannot avoid thinking or that which 
it falls to us to think. (94) 
As I will show, the young soldier‘s experiences of war are transformed by his encounters 
in battle—i.e., by that which he cannot anticipate, by that which forces him to act, to do, 
to think differently, rather than according to certain rules or mandates. I would argue, in 
fact, that the young soldier‘s basic conflict in The Red Badge of Courage—that which he 
ultimately must overcome—derives from his expectations or fixed ideas (i.e., about war, 
being a soldier, the nobility of his cause, etc.), those that not only weigh heavily upon his 
mind in the run-up to the battle, thus distorting his actual experiences, but that trap him, 
as Bryant says, ―within the grip of an abstract system of possibilities.‖ 
Crane, for his part, uses color-words (in particular, ―red‖ and ―blue‖) as markers 
of those abstractions, those fixed possibilities, at various stages in The Red Badge of 
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Courage. That is, he ties color not only to specific codes or symbolic values in the text, 
but to a number of preconceived ideas about war as well—an entire representational 
overlay. However, over the course of the novel, Crane‘s color-words take on new tints, 
new shadings, and in ways that parallel their undoing—i.e., their break from symbolic 
investments, their unmooring from given subjects (of perception)—in Melville‘s Moby-
Dick and William Gass‘s On Being Blue. That is, these words shed their confinements 
(rhetorical, semiotic, axiological, etc.), and do so in ways that have vital implications for 
the characters, and the transformations they undergo. So, simply put, I argue that in these 
works color-words operate as affective conduits, or channels of pure difference, through 
which the young soldier, Captain Ahab, and Gass‘s narrator pass; in so doing, they each 
(in their own way) open up to new experiences, new ways of thinking, and new potentials 
in themselves. In short, they become-different. 
Consider, for example, Crane‘s red. Scattered liberally throughout The Red Badge 
of Courage, red first presents to the young soldier as ―the red, eyelike gleam of hostile 
camp fires‖ (3), and later as ―the red eyes across the river‖ (26). This red, in revealing the 
enemy‘s location to the soldier, applies fixed coordinates (in space and time) to that 
enemy, and to the young soldier as well. So this red positions; it locates. More 
importantly, though, it forces the young soldier to turn inward. That is, while watching 
opposing forces across the river—a river said to be ―amber-tinted,‖ by day; ―a sorrowful 
blackness,‖ by night—the youth has the unnerving sense of being watched: ―In the gloom 
before the break of the day their uniforms glowed a deep purple hue. From across the 
river the red eyes were still peering‖ (25). Those eyes, then—gazing, blood-shot, intently 
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focused—effectively mark the youth as a soldier, and as a potential target; they also 
intensify his feelings of vulnerability and fear in the lead-up to the battle: 
As he looked all about him and pondered upon the mystic gloom, he began 
to believe that at any moment the ominous distance might be aflare, and 
the rolling crashes of an engagement come to his ears. Staring once at the 
red eyes across the river, he conceived them to be growing larger, as the 
orbs of a row of dragons advancing. (26) 
So these dragon eyes bear down upon the soldier, and in such a way that clearly connotes 
danger for the young man from the farm, an ominous and gathering threat. But following 
the narrative grain of the text a step further, this red ultimately activates a series of 
structural binaries in The Red Badge of Courage—e.g., here/there, us/them, self/other, 
centre/margin, mind/body, courage/fear, inside/outside. In fact, the piercing red-eyed 
stare of the enemy not only effectuates (or better, pries open) the yawning chasm between 
North and South in this fight over the soul of America, but intensifies that divide. On the 
one hand, ―the red, eyelike gleam of hostile camp fires,‖ cast across the ―sorrowful 
blackness‖ of the river, signifies to the young soldier that the enemy is poised and ready 
for war—or ready for what Crane elsewhere calls ―the red animal…the blood-swollen 
god‖ (128). On the other hand, these eyes erect borders between opposing forces in The 
Red Badge of Courage. They striate space, territorialize the landscape, forge affiliations, 
organize and distribute bodies. Ultimately they reflect and reinforce values. 
Not unexpectedly, the external conflict (brought to light by the peering, blood-
shot eyes across the river) doubles a series of internal conflicts in the young soldier—i.e., 
―little combats‖ (41) that not only ―deeply [absorb]‖ him, but that ultimately isolate him 
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from the rest of his regiment. The youth believes, in fact, that he is not like the others, 
that ―he was not formed for a soldier‖ (31)—because unlike his comrades, the young 
soldier is given to ―ceaseless calculations‖ (22) and ―his own eternal debate‖ (28). At one 
point, he ―contemplated the lurking menaces of the future, and failed in an effort to see 
himself standing stoutly in the midst of them‖ (16). Later, he let himself be ―bowed down 
by the weight of a great problem‖ (25), even while recognizing that ―he could not long 
bear such a load.‖ He questioned his reliability, his commitment, his judgment (24); and 
at the point when ―his old fears of stupidity and incompetence reassailed him…he 
doggedly let them babble‖ (49). He even ―tried to mathematically prove to himself that 
he would not run from a battle‖ (16), but in the end only managed to deepen his feelings 
of confusion and anxiety. Ultimately, the young soldier‘s self-recrimination and 
paralyzing fears would erode his confidence and dilute ―the color of his ambitions‖: 
In the darkness he saw visions of a thousand-tongued fear that would 
babble at his back and cause him to flee, while others were going coolly 
about their country‘s business. He admitted that he would not be able to 
cope with this monster. He felt that every nerve in his body would be an 
ear to hear the voices, while other men would remain stolid and deaf. (35)  
Needless to say, with the battle approaching, the young soldier felt the ―laws of tradition‖ 
(40) bearing down on him, judging him; and in that light he ―convicted…himself of many 
shameful crimes against the gods of tradition‖ (25). 
What I want to emphasize at this point is that the internal debate, and thus 
deepening interiority of the young soldier, would only augment his feelings of isolation, 
particularly among those against whom he ―continually tried to measure himself‖ (23): 
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His emotions made him feel strange in the presence of men who talked 
excitedly of a prospective battle as of a drama they were about to witness, 
with nothing but eagerness and curiosity apparent in their faces. It was 
often that he suspected them to be liars. (24) 
But regardless of whether or not his comrades were, in fact, deluding themselves, the 
young soldier could in no way share in their ―eagerness and curiosity‖; nor could he 
―speak of victory‖ (29), contribute to ―the blithe and merry speeches that went from rank 
to rank,‖ or allow himself to ―[dodge] implike around the fire‖ (32). The young soldier‘s 
struggle to ultimately connect (or commit himself) to his regiment, and thus the Union 
cause in general, would clearly manifest itself in the contempt he felt for the ―vast blue 
demonstration‖ (14) playing out on the battlefield before him (with blue, in this case, 
referring to the color of the Union army‘s uniforms).
176
 The youth felt both rationally and 
emotionally detached from what he took to be mere spectacle or propaganda—i.e., the 
―shock and awe‖
177
 of his day. This blue, in fact, becomes the military arm of what Crane 
would later refer to as ―the red sickness of battle‖ (246). But rejecting or disassociating 
himself from this demonstration put the soldier at odds not only with his own regiment, 
but with what he imagined the heroic soldier to be. That is, because the young soldier felt 
little affinity for this ―vast blue demonstration,‖ he rightly has greater reason to fear that 
he might desert his comrades, as but one of ―many shameful crimes against the gods of 
tradition.‖ So how, then, might the youth overcome this conflict or confusion in himself? 
Naively, he ―wished that he, too, had a wound, a red badge of courage‖ (100)—for that at 
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 Crane makes repeated reference to this idea of a ―blue demonstration‖ (see, for example, pp. 22, 38, 47).  
177
 I am alluding to the American army‘s strategy of so-called ―rapid dominance,‖ particularly in the early 
stages of the most recent war in Iraq—the so-called ―Battle of Baghdad‖—in March 2003. The strategy 
called for a dominant and overwhelming exercise of military might, and spectacular displays of force.  
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least would clarify things. That is, an outward display of blood and guts might absolve 
the young soldier of any guilt for thinking about abandoning his regiment: ―At times he 
regarded the wounded soldiers in an envious way. He conceived persons with torn bodies 
to be peculiarly happy.‖ In the eyes of his comrades, then, ―a wound, a red badge of 
courage‖ might make the youth a real soldier, and thus legitimize him. 
But to borrow a phrase from William Gass, ―it is not blue I see but myself seeing 
blue‖ (83).
178
 That is, the young soldier, despairing of the grotesque ―blue demonstration‖ 
unfolding before him, would see himself seeing blue; or, put another way, for the first 
time he would come face-to-face with ―the color of his ambitions‖—i.e., the war he had 
dreamed about or imagined—and would find it inauthentic, lacking: ―He wished to return 
to camp, knowing that this affair was a blue demonstration; or else to go into a battle and 
discover that he had been a fool in his doubts, and was, in truth, a man of traditional 
courage‖ (Crane 47). For the youth, in other words, this blue demonstration was ―theory‖ 
(38), conceived in the minds of those higher-up the chain of command—i.e., those who 
the young soldier would ceaselessly vilify throughout the novel (e.g., 43, 46, 80–1, 167–
68, 190); it was war reduced to a set of prearranged tactical manoeuvres and overt 
displays of military might. So because this demonstration felt (in some ways) staged to 
the young soldier, felt forced and artificial, he needed to extricate himself from this all-
too-familiar object of recognition, which had trapped him ―within the grip of an abstract 
system of possibilities.‖ In no way, would this demonstration resolve the young soldier‘s 
lingering doubts about his capacity for courage. Only battle itself, as suggested above, 
could really answer the question of whether or not ―he had been a fool in his doubts, and 
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 We will return to Gass‘s use of this phrase in a moment. 
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was, in truth, a man of traditional courage.‖ We will return to this question of battle, and 
its role in the young soldier‘s liberation, below. 
For the moment, though, let us consider William Gass‘s use of the phrase, ―it is 
not blue I see but myself seeing blue‖ (from On Being Blue). For Gass, this phrase speaks 
to the disappointment he feels at not being able to enter the consciousness of another, at 
just that point when she reveals herself in the bluest way possible (i.e., physically, 
sexually). That is, he imagines having ―gained the famous talisman of Gyges, a ring (as 
Plato tells) which confers invisibility upon its wearer‖ (79). He then imagines using the 
ring to slip unnoticed into a neighbour‘s house so as to take a good look at ―that buxom 
wench with the inviting eyes.‖ But the moment proves unsatisfying. All Gass ends up 
seeing, despite this being a voyeuristic fantasy of his own making, is the woman 
―preparing salad at the sink‖ (82). At first he asks, ―Why doesn‘t she slip out of those 
blue jeans and roll upon the floor in an agony of desire,‖ but soon recognizes a fatal flaw 
in his plan. That is, his invisibility (or lack of color) white-washes the encounter: 
Invisible I can‘t see the faint fuzz of my cheeks or the framing fringe of 
my hair. Suppose…I were inaudible. I should find, very quickly, how 
much I need to hear the sound of my own breathing. To hear the scene, but 
not myself: how odd…how horrible…how whimsical…how unnerving. 
Now I understand what a difference any kind of distance makes. How 
could I taste her lips and not taste my own, or run my hand upon her arm 
without its fingers being felt? Do I wish us both odourless in bed? (82–3)  
So what‘s missing from Gass‘s blue-movie? The body, itself; the affective (or affected) 
body, the intensive body: the body aroused by its encounters—precisely what Gass 
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imagines-away from this scenario. What‘s missing is the expressive force of the 
encounter, which, as Brian Massumi suggests, ―strikes the body first, directly and 
unmediately. It passes transformatively through the flesh before being instantiated in 
subject-positions subsumed by a system of power. Its immediate effect is a differing‖ 
(―Introduction‖ xvii). What‘s missing, then, is not just the pornographic moment—―the 
bluest part of blue‖ (Bayley)—but the involuntary sensation (i.e., something more, 
something unexpected) unleashed by that experience (e.g., lust, curiosity, excitement, 
surprise). What‘s missing is the differential moment, as felt in and through the autonomic 
reactions (or singular becomings) of the body. 
So Gass‘s invisibility opens the door to the mundane—i.e., the recognizable 
rituals of domestic existence (e.g., preparing salad, sitting on the couch, watching 
television)—but, of course, this proves unsatisfying to the would-be voyeur. The 
impotence of his blue imaginings are the reflection of an incongruity between the actual 
experience and the way Gass represents that experience (or that blue) to himself. But 
should Gass really have expected otherwise? Probably not. His ambitions were colored 
by little more than his own fetishistic desires, his own assumptions about the ―buxom 
wench,‖ his own ―picturings‖ and perversions—in short, his own expectations. So despite 
whatever he may have invested in this scene, or whatever he may have wanted to happen, 
Gass cannot ultimately bridge the aporia between his own passions and those of the 
wench next door. Simply put, his expectations flatten the encounter; they block the 
excesses (becomings) of the body. They tie him to the semiotic coordinates of his own 
mind (i.e., himself seeing blue); they turn him inward, where he festers and rankles 
―within the grip of an abstract system of possibilities.‖ They internalize him, contain and 
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control him. In the end, the experience leaves him wanting: no feeling, no sensation, no 
happy ending. This is blue imagined, though there‘s little or nothing blue about it. 
The young soldier experiences a similar phenomenon. On the one hand, the ―blue 
demonstration‖ before him underscores a series of traditional oppositions (e.g., us/them, 
here/there, self/other, victor/vanquished, win/lose, etc.)—the conventional coordinates of 
war. This blue, like the red before it, positions (e.g., the youth, his comrades, the enemy); 
it locates and affiliates. On the other hand, it disassociates the young soldier from his 
comrades. That is, it isolates him, alienates him, trapping him within the confines of his 
own mind. This blue, the young soldier discovers, only feeds or fuels ―the red sickness of 
battle‖—that which he ultimately needs to exorcise from his system. 
Here, then, a parallel emerges between the soldier‘s need to rid himself of ―the red 
sickness‖ and Captain Ahab‘s near-fanatical compulsion, in Moby-Dick, to destroy the 
white whale that ―swam before him as the monomaniac incarnation of all those malicious 
agencies which some deep men feel eating in them, til they are left living with half a 
heart and half a lung‖ (Melville 226). Clearly Ahab was himself one of those ―deep 
men,‖ in that Moby Dick left him ―Gnawed within and scorched without, with the 
infixed, unrelenting fangs of some incurable idea‖ (228)—an idea, it should be stated, 
unrecognizable to the nineteenth-century whaler. That is, Ahab‘s ―monomaniac revenge‖ 
(229)—which grew ―a thousand-fold‖ (227) in the wake of his disfiguration, or 
―dismast[ing]‖ (202), by the leviathan—ultimately put his own motives on a collision 
course with those of the other whalemen of his time, ―bent on profitable cruises‖ (229). 
Melville writes,  
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with the mad secret of his unabated rage bolted up and keyed in him, Ahab 
had purposely sailed upon the present voyage with the one only and all-
engrossing object of hunting the White Whale. Had any one of his old 
acquaintances on shore but half dreamed of what was lurking in him then, 
how soon would their aghast and righteous souls have wrenched the ship 
from such a fiendish man! They were bent on profitable cruises, the profit 
to be counted down in dollars from the mint. He was intent on an 
audacious, immitigable, and supernatural revenge. (228–29) 
Starbuck, Ahab‘s first officer, felt compelled then to remind his captain of the financial 
objectives of the whalemen: after being queried by Ahab about the hunt—―wilt thou not 
chase the white whale? art not game for Moby Dick?‖ (202)—Starbuck replies, 
I am game for his crooked jaw, and for the jaws of Death too, Captain 
Ahab, if it fairly comes in the way of the business we follow; but I came 
here to hunt whales, not my commander‘s vengeance. How many barrels 
will thy vengeance yield thee even if thou gettest it, Captain Ahab? it will 
not fetch thee much in our Nantucket market. (202–3) 
Ahab dismisses Starbuck‘s concerns, as they relate to the ―Nantucket market,‖ and in the 
following passage re-imagines the whole purpose of the hunt: 
All visible objects, man, are but as pasteboard masks. But in each event—
in the living act, the undoubted deed—there, some unknown but still 
reasoning thing puts forth the moldings of its features from behind the 
unreasoning mask. If man will strike, strike through the mask! How can 
the prisoner reach outside except by thrusting through the wall? To me, 
256 
 
the white whale is that wall, shoved near to me. Sometimes I think there‘s 
naught beyond. But ‗tis enough. He tasks me; he heaps me; I see in him 
outrageous strength, with an inscrutable malice sinewing it. That 
inscrutable thing is chiefly what I hate; and be the white whale agent, or 
be the white whale principal, I will wreak that hate upon him. (203) 
In this important passage, Ahab speaks to the need to break through, or extend himself 
beyond, what he calls ―that wall, shoved near to me‖—i.e., the white whale. For Ahab, 
the whale is not, as Starbuck believes, just some ―dumb thing‖ or ―dumb brute…that 
simply smote thee from blindest instinct!‖ (203). Rather, for Ahab, the white whale‘s 
―outrageous strength‖ and ―inscrutable malice‖ makes it a true anomaly. Let us pause, at 
this point, to unpack this seminal confrontation between Starbuck and Ahab. 
In a sense, Starbuck speaks for the whaler, or really for the whaling community; 
that is, he views the whale in a way that all whalers view their quarry, as a ―dumb thing‖ 
or ―dumb brute,‖ propelled by the ―blindest instinct!‖ In this context, then, Ahab‘s idea 
that a whale could somehow be sinewed with ―outrageous strength‖ and ―inscrutable 
malice‖ makes no sense (and certainly has no purchase on the open market). Moreover, it 
contradicts certain basic principles upon which the whaling industry grounds itself—e.g., 
that the whale is reducible to ―profit‖ alone, or reducible to that which can ―be counted 
down in dollars from the mint‖; that the whale is little more than an oil repository—and 
as such a commodity; and that the hunt, Starbuck claims, is strictly business, even if ―the 
jaws of Death…fairly comes in the way of the business we follow.‖ So as to protect the 
integrity of their business, then, the whalers, as a collective, conform to a certain standard 
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or rule of law that transcends the needs or perceptions of any one whaler. That law—
referred to, simply, as ―Fast-Fish/Loose-Fish‖—is defined as follows: 
I. A Fast-Fish belongs to the party fast to it. 
II. A Loose-Fish is fair game for anybody who can soonest catch it. 
(Melville 460) 
Simple enough; though as Melville—or rather, Ishmael—claims, the implications of this 
law are both rich and varied.
179
 Still, the point remains that whaling operations at the time 
were governed by laws that applied, uniformly, to all whalers. No exceptions. 
In fact, the effort to—in some way—unify, regulate, or standardize conceptions of 
the whale, the whaling industry, and whaling practices, in general, becomes a recurring 
motif in Moby-Dick. That is, the book begins with dictionary definitions of the whale, 
and with an inventory of different words for whale from ―the known nations of the 
world‖ (9). ―The pale Usher,‖ Melville tells us, extracts an ―Etymology‖ of the word 
from dusty ―old lexicons and grammars,‖ with the obvious implication being that the 
lexicon itself has the power (culturally speaking) to stabilize and/or regulate conceptions 
of the whale; or rather, that the whale has no identity, no meaning or value, outside the 
lexicons of the world that name or represent it in some way. The whale, in effect, is flesh 
made word. At this point, then, Melville provides a comprehensive, cross-cultural survey 
of ―random allusions‖ (11) to the whale, or to what he otherwise refers to as ―higgledy-
piggledy whale statements,‖ drawn from a wide-range of historical books and documents. 
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 The law, for Ishmael, has everything to do with the rights and freedoms of the individual, and for 
Melville himself, ―the role of the individual in a culture…increasingly democratic‖ (Hovde xxvii). Ishmael 
states, ―What are the Rights of Man and the Liberties of the World but Loose-Fish? What all men‘s minds 
and opinions but Loose-Fish? What is the principle of religious belief in them but Loose-Fish? What to the 
ostentatious smuggling verbalists are the thoughts of thinkers but Loose-Fish? What is the great globe itself 
but a Loose-Fish! And what are you, reader, but a Loose-Fish and a Fast-Fish, too?‖ (462–63). 
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Here again he furthers the idea that the whale has become a ubiquitous presence, not only 
in language, but in literature and the popular imagination, as well. 
These preliminary surveys and classifications (of a linguistic and literary nature) 
would later expand into more scientific realms; at one point, for example, Melville would 
provide a general taxonomy of the whale, by situating various whale species (alongside 
other marine life, derived from the scientific order of the Cetacea) into one of three, size-
related categories: i.e., Folio, Octavo, Duodecimo. Elsewhere, Melville would focus 
directly on the science of whales itself—or rather, the ―science of Cetology‖ (171)—with 
its ―generalizing purpose[s]‖ (170), and again its comprehensive efforts to systematize 
specific aspects of the whale related to evolution, behavior, communal organization, etc. 
In any case, Melville‘s basic point here is that whales, whalers (as further organized by a 
chorus of whaling and nautical terms), whaling ships, and whaling operations, have rarely 
escaped some sort of ―comprehensive classification‖ (171). That is, they all, historically 
speaking, have been relegated to formal modes of categorization, not just by whalers, or 
by the whaling industry, but by culture, science, language, literature, law, myth—and so, 
it would seem, little else remains to be told. 
Enter: Moby Dick, the white whale. 
While again, the novel as a whole is dominated by inventories and surveys, by 
systems of classification and generic description, Melville exposes the inadequacy of 
such classificatory schema at several points in the narrative. For example, Ishmael 
(Melville‘s narrator) acknowledges, on the one hand, that ―the various species of whales 
need some sort of popular comprehensive classification, if only an easy outline‖ (171), 
and takes it upon himself ―to project the draught of a systematization of Cetology.‖ On 
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the other hand, he ―promise[s] nothing complete‖: (1) because Cetology is an ―uncertain, 
unsettled‖ science; and (2) ―because any human thing supposed to be complete, must for 
that reason infallibly be faulty.‖ Ishmael, in fact, goes so far as to claim that ―a regular 
system of Cetology‖ (175) may ultimately be unattainable: 
It is in vain to attempt a clear classification of the Leviathan, founded 
upon either his baleen, or hump, or fin, or teeth…But it may possibly be 
conceived that, in the internal parts of the whale, in his anatomy—there, at 
least, we shall be able to hit the right classification. Nay; what thing, for 
example, is there in the Greenland whale‘s anatomy more striking than his 
baleen? Yet we have seen that by his baleen it is impossible correctly to 
classify the Greenland whale. (175–76) 
So because there are at least some whales that escape ready classification—and Moby 
Dick, who overcomes (or betrays) his so-called ―pasteboard masks‖ (i.e., conventional 
attributions), appears to be one of those whales—Ishmael admits that whatever taxonomy 
he puts forward may be incomplete: ―I am the architect, not the builder‖ (171); that is, he 
will ―draught‖ the system, but promises nothing in terms of the reliability of that system. 
The anomalous aspect of Moby Dick—reflected not only in its ―remarkable hue‖ 
(225), or better yet, its ―peculiar snow-white wrinkled forehead, and…high, pyramidical 
white hump,‖ but in its ―outrageous strength,‖ ―inscrutable malice,‖ and supernatural 
agency—situates the leviathan in a category all his own, one that again defies the ―easy 
outline‖ (171) of most systematized renderings of the whale. Not surprisingly, then, Ahab 
seems unwilling, even unable, to reduce the white whale to what Starbuck dismissively 
refers to as a ―dumb thing‖ or ―dumb brute,‖ operating by sheer instinct alone. For Ahab, 
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at least, the singularity of the leviathan either strains or forces to its limits any system that 
reduces all whales to, say, a set of anatomical coordinates or fixed behaviors; and, here 
again, Ishmael seems sympathetic to this position. That is, he likens the attempt to forge 
―some systematized exhibition of the whale in his genera‖ (169)—within the science of 
Cetology—to ―[the] classification of the constituents of a chaos.‖ He wonders further if 
the capacity to produce this sort of classificatory schema even lies within the purview of 
the sciences in general. For despite having ―swam through libraries and sailed through 
oceans‖ (171), Ishmael cannot help but think, ―what am I that I should essay to hook the 
nose of this leviathan!‖ 
Throughout Moby-Dick, Melville often complicates the various forms of order 
and organization, the various laws, rules, or modes of classification, so carefully mapped 
out in the text. Late in the novel, for instance, Ahab smashes the sailor‘s quadrant—i.e., 
that which fixes the coordinates of the Pequod by striating the oceanic spaces through 
which the ship passes. But while the quadrant tells Ahab where he was, it remains mute 
on where he will be, and (more importantly) on where Moby Dick swims. The captain, 
then, Ahab assigns little or no value to the information the quadrant provides: ―Thou sea-
mark! Thou high and mighty Pilot!...canst thou cast the least hint where I shall be? Or 
canst thou tell where some other thing besides me is this moment living? Where is Moby 
Dick? This instant thou must be eyeing him‖ (574). Ahab, in this instance, imagines a 
form of perception unmoored from human coordinates (or from any perceiving 
eye/subject). For example, he wonders if the quadrant itself might possess a power of 
perception that exceeds his own, or that opens on to seascapes other than his own 
(―Where is Moby Dick? This instant thou must be eyeing him‖). Ahab wants to extract a 
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Vision or power of perception—what Deleuze-Guattari, in What is Philosophy?, refer to 
as a percept—from the ocean itself, first, by eschewing the restrictive, organizing 
confinements of the quadrant and, second, by adopting a kind of immanentist orientation 
to the ocean before him. That is, Ahab will now pursue his quarry by ―dead reckoning‖ 
(574)—that is, by a ―living power‖ (589), freed from human perception and fixed, 
identifiable coordinates. He will proceed ―by log and by line‖ (574), meaning that Ahab 
will record (in his log) speeds, movements, surges, flows, course corrections/alterations, 
intensive affects on the Pequod (e.g., through changes in the current, the wind, or other 
weather-related phenomena). In effect, Ahab will force the ocean into affective registers: 
In Melville, there is a private ocean of which the sailors are unaware, even 
if they have a foreboding of it: it is there that Moby-Dick swims, and it is 
he who is cast into the ocean from the outside, but in order to transmute its 
perception and to ‗abstract‘ a Vision from it. (Deleuze, Essays 117) 
So rather than being perceived by the sailor, and subject to the transcendent mappings of 
the quadrant, the ocean becomes its own perceiving eye, its own eye on Moby Dick.
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Another example of Melville unwriting the strictures of order and organization in 
the novel involves the sailor‘s law, ―Fast Fish/Loose Fish.‖ Recall that 
Alive or dead a fish is technically fast, when it is connected with an 
occupied ship or boat, by any medium at all controllable to the occupant or 
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 On this point, François Zourabichvili‘s remarkable essay, ―Six Notes on the Percept,‖ is instructive. In a 
passage that seems to speak directly to Ahab‘s oceanic becomings, Zourabichvili writes, ―the relation to the 
landscape is no longer that of an autonomous and pre-existent inner life and an independent external 
reality supposed to reflect this life. The landscape is an inner experience…not the redundancy of lived 
experience, but the very element of a ‗passage of life.‘ The landscape does not return me to myself: it 
involves me in a becoming where the subject is no longer coextensive with itself, where the subjective form 
is inadequate when faced with the unformedness of becoming. I no longer contain myself, nor can I recover 
myself in the coherence of a Self or Ego. Similarly, a character in a novel is no longer externally related to 




occupants,—a mast, an oar, a nine-inch cable, a telegraph wire, or a strand 
of cobweb, it is all the same. Likewise a fish is technically fast when it 
bears a waif, or any other recognized symbol of possession. (460) 
Meanwhile, ―A Loose-Fish is fair game for anybody who can soonest catch it.‖ Put 
simply, then, this is a law of possession. But what does this mean for Ahab? Though a 
waif has yet to be thrust into the ―peculiar snow-white wrinkled forehead‖ of Moby Dick, 
for Ahab, the white whale still remains a Fast-Fish. That is, in his ―delirium‖ (227), his 
―full lunacy,‖ Ahab believes that his ownership of the white whale is guaranteed by a 
physical, psychological, or even historical form of possession. It is legitimized by his 
dismasted leg and, by extension, his own tragic past encounters with the whale. In effect, 
these things become Ahab‘s waif—e.g., the leg opens up to its own becoming-waif. For 
other whalers, though, the white whale (just like any other whale) remains a Loose-Fish, 
and thus ―fair game for anybody who can soonest catch it.‖ So by making a Fast-Fish 
claim on a Loose-Fish, Ahab at the very least complicates the whaler‘s law. 
But what does this all this mean for the role of color in Moby-Dick? In the much 
celebrated chapter, ―The Whiteness of the Whale,‖ Melville reflects on ―the mutating 
significance of whiteness‖ (Babb 100). He begins by inventorying a number of prevailing 
ideas/attitudes about white (or whiteness); and by mapping its privileged deployments in 
any number of formal, socio-political, aesthetic, and ritualistic settings. Melville then 
speaks of the ―royal pre-eminence of this hue‖ (230), and adds that ―whiteness refiningly 
enhances beauty.‖ He links the color to certain ideals and values, and also to faith and 
celebration. He speaks of its virtue and nobility; its ―divine spotlessness‖ (231); its 
―imperial‖ aspect; its symbolism—e.g., a ―white flag‖ (237); its role or pre-eminence in 
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nature. With regard to this latter, Ishmael invokes images of ―a midnight sea of milky 
whiteness‖ (236), and of ―the bleak rustlings of the festooned frosts of mountains‖ (237); 
he adds that ―the great principle of light…forever remains white or colorless‖ (238). He 
further points to its more troubling racial dimension (231), also its supernatural or 
spectral powers (234), and its capacity to draw something ―strangely hideous‖ from the 
face of the Albino. Finally, Ishmael links the color itself to ―invisible spheres‖ (238), and 
to various ―transcendent horrors‖ (231). His list, then, comes full circle—from the divine 
to the terrible or horrific. 
But what Melville‘s narrator realizes is that ―all these accumulated associations‖ 
(231) scarcely get at the real power of white to affect things, to alter or transform them. 
That is, he notes that white (or whiteness) operates as an ―intensifying agent‖ (238), a 
―potent…auxiliary‖ (234), and a ―prime agent in exaggerating the terror of objects 
otherwise terrible‖ (236). White intensifies, exaggerates. Casting a white (or colorless) 
light across the surface of a given material body (e.g., a table, a plant, a body of water, 
etc.) extracts or unleashes something from that body (e.g., an expression, an idea, a 
Vision, a power or capacity); or alternatively, it sets in motion a process in and through 
that body (e.g., photosynthesis, boiling)—something, as Melville goes on to say, ―not 
actually inherent in substance‖ (238; my emphasis). White diminishes, enhances, refines; 
it augments terror (e.g., the white shark) and amplifies beauty (e.g., purity, innocence). It 
contributes, confers, imparts; and because the whiteness of the whale operates, as 
Melville suggests, ―without medium upon matter,‖ it retains an expressive power of its 
own, which cannot be standardized, regulated, or fully comprehended. White is anexact, 
ineffable, evocative. When ―stripped of all direct associations‖ (235), it forces things—
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e.g., bodies, objects, surfaces (so colored)—into affective registers. It forces them to go 
critical, and thereby become-different. 
So the whiteness of the whale operates as an affective power, and hence outside of 
consciousness, outside of common sense, outside of affection and perception, outside of 
standards and conventions. ―[It] calls up a peculiar apparition of the soul‖ (234); it 
provokes ―peculiar moods‖ (235), those that open Ahab to his own becomings: ―Ahab 
rushed from his room, was for the time but a vacated thing, a formless somnambulistic 
being, a ray of living light to be sure, but without an object to color, and therefore a 
blankness in itself‖ (246). In this instance, we get a glimpse of something intensive, 
something transformative, channelling through the sea captain—a pure excess that 
exceeds the physical body of the man, and that forces him beyond the confines of his own 
identity as a sea captain or whaler, subject to the whaler‘s law. Ahab becomes-color, 
becomes-light (―a ray of living light to be sure, but without an object to color‖); as such, 
he pierces the ―white wall‖ (i.e., Moby Dick) residing at the limits of his consciousness 
(―sometimes I think there‘s naught beyond‖). But here we must tread carefully. That is, it 
would be inaccurate to say that Ahab, at this point, escapes the confines of his own mind. 
Or that he escapes his obsession, his madness and hate: Ahab ―piled upon the whale‘s 
white hump the sum of all the general rage and hate felt by his whole race from Adam 
down‖ (226). It would even be inaccurate to say that he escapes the past (e.g., history, 
tradition, memory). However, one might more rightly claim that something escapes 
through him, something inhuman: a rush of pure color, ―a ray of living light.‖ That is, he 
is overcome, tragically overcome, by vital, inhuman powers, which, on the one hand, 
open up the possibility of genuine transformation or becoming, but on the other, spell the 
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destructive end (the doom) of both he and the white whale. So those powers are 
liberated—powers that transcend Ahab and Moby Dick, even while they unite the two in 
a unique, yet fatal, bond. Meanwhile, Ahab himself—whose demonic and inhuman 
passions derive from the impersonal forces that pass between he and the leviathan—never 
escapes the passion or hate which must, of necessity, destroy him.
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In fact, those passions form the basis of Ahab‘s relationship with the white whale, 
and propel him in his quest. Ahab‘s relation to the white whale can neither be generalized 
nor explained away by the sciences (i.e., Cetology), nor by the established orders of the 
whaler, nor by cultural traditions (e.g., language, literature, myth). There is nothing, for 
Ahab, that renders the whale intelligible; nothing that ties the leviathan to symbolic 
values: ―how is mortal man to account for it? To analyze it, would seem impossible‖ 
(Melville 235). But as ―a ray of living light,‖ Ahab finds an affective opening, a point of 
connection, with Moby Dick. Moreover, he confronts the problem, posed by Deleuze-
Parnet, of ―how to unmake the face, by liberating in ourselves the questing heads which 
trace the lines of becoming‖ (Dialogues 45–6). Throughout the novel, in fact, Ahab 
progressively unleashes his own ―questing heads‖—i.e., through a ―turning away‖ (40) 
from God, from self, from man, from order and organization. For example, smashing the 
quadrant forces Ahab to invent his own line of flight across the milky-white surfaces of 
his own ―private ocean,‖ wherein he might encounter Moby Dick. He maps an as yet 
uncharted course; he proceeds ―by log and by line,‖ by ―dead reckoning‖; he becomes-
vector, becomes-trajectory. So just as the leviathan is seen ―gliding at high noon through 
a dark blue sea, leaving a milky-way wake of creamy foam, all spangled with golden 
gleamings‖ (Melville 225), Ahab traverses those same oceanic flows, as well, leaving his 
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own whitened trail, his own ―milky-way wake.‖ While ―gazing out‖ (207) through the 
―stern windows‖ of his cabin, he makes note of the Pequod‘s movement through the 
waves: ―I leave a white and turbid wake; pale waters, paler cheeks, where‘er I sail. The 
envious billows sidelong swell to whelm my track; let them; but first I pass.‖ In this 
white wake, Ahab sees a line of flight unfolding. He sees himself making tracks (like the 
whale), but not leaving tracks (i.e., ―The envious billows sidelong swell to whelm my 
track‖). He sees a line of mutation or transformation; his own disruption of molar (read: 
institutional, organizational) lines; his own becoming-white; his own becoming-whale. 
So just as a line opens up between Ahab and Moby Dick, the two converge in a ―milk-
white fog‖ (235). 
Similarly, Crane‘s young soldier, in The Red Badge of Courage, overcomes his 
own sense of disconnect from both his enemy and his comrades through what he deems a 
―mysterious fraternity born of the smoke and danger of death‖ (63). That is, the young 
soldier ―felt the subtle battle brotherhood more potent even than the cause for which they 
were fighting‖; so, in effect, an impersonal war emerges in and through this ―mass of 
vapor‖ (74): ―There was a singular absence of heroic poses. The men bending and 
surging in their haste and rage were in every impossible attitude‖ (65). The battle now 
becomes unfocused, directionless: ―He lost the direction of safety. Destruction threatened 
him from all points‖ (76); and his coordinates, fixed in space and time by the gazing eyes 
from across the river, now scatter (or take flight) along uncontrolled trajectories: ―over 
there, and over there, and over there‖ (70). 
The young soldier would also discover a renewed commitment to the Union blue 
in the form of an inexplicable ―red rage‖ (Crane 63). At first, he would crave a power 
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―that would enable him to make a world-sweeping gesture and brush all back.‖ Then, in a 
somewhat remarkable turn of events, that ―world-sweeping gesture‖ would involve the 
dissolution of his own identity, and a blurring of the line between self and other: 
He suddenly lost concern for himself, and forgot to look at a menacing 
fate. He became not a man but a member. He felt that something of which 
he was a part—a regiment, an army, a cause, or a country—was in a crisis. 
He was welded into a common personality which was dominated by a 
single desire. (62) 
Spurred by crisis, then, and by the loss of his own ―concern for himself,‖ the anonymous 
young soldier now becomes-other and converts ―his rage into that of a driven beast‖ (64). 
He becomes-animal. At one point, Crane describes the soldier as a wild cat, a ―war devil‖ 
(180), propelled by ―his desire to smash into pulp the glittering smile of victory which he 
could feel upon the face of his enemies‖ (177). He goes red, goes critical—a conversion 
hastened by a discovery that would defy his preset ideas of war: ―The youth…was 
smitten with a large astonishment. He discovered that the distances, as compared with the 
brilliant measuring of his mind, were trivial and ridiculous‖ (213). He had ―exaggerated 
and enlarged everything.‖ What he labelled a ―vast blue demonstration‖ would dissolve 
into pure ―frenzy‖ (194), right in front of him, in a ―furious rush‖ of soldiers: 
The men, pitching forward insanely, had burst into cheerings, but tuned in 
strange keys that can arouse the dullard and the stoic. It made a mad 
enthusiasm that, it seemed, would be incapable of checking itself before 
granite and brass. There was the delirium that encounters despair and 
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death, and is heedless and blind to the odds. It is a temporary but sublime 
absence of selfishness. 
More importantly, though—at least for our purposes—the various colors brought to light 
in and through the narrative (e.g., the colors of the union and confederate flags, the 
soldiers‘ uniforms, blood, emotion, the changing landscape, etc.) would, at points, merge 
and then dissolve into strange and unpredictable hues: ―Wild yells came from behind the 
walls of smoke. A sketch in grey and red dissolved into a moblike body of men who 
galloped like wild horses‖ (55). Late in the novel, then, the young soldier ―could not tell 
from the battle flags flying like crimson foam in many directions which color of cloth 
was winning‖ (225). Here, the line between the two sides begins to blur, along with 
whatever ultimately divides winner from loser, victor from vanquished. 
In addition, the fixed colors associated with the union blue, in particular, and with 
war, in general—i.e., ―the red animal…the blood-swollen god‖ (Crane 128)—would 
begin to fragment in the young soldier‘s mind, as he takes flight on ―the red wings of 
war‖ (119) from the ―little combats‖ that weigh so heavily upon his mind. In other words, 
the significance of war, ―the red animal,‖ now begins to mutate, as the young soldier sees 
the possibility of a line of flight opening up for him along an affective channel: ―The 
music of the trampling feet, the sharp voices, the clanking arms of the column near him 
made him soar on the red wings of war. For a few moments he was sublime‖ (my 
emphasis). So he becomes-animal, becomes-red, and in so doing exceeds both the 
confines of his own mind and body, and the fixed position he occupies on the battlefield 
(as a soldier). He ―soar[s] on the red wings of war,‖ and thereby overcomes his 
limitations through non-human becomings. In fact, even the wound, itself, or ―red badge 
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of courage,‖ which the young soldier had intuited would release him (e.g., from his fears, 
his obsessive thoughts, his guilt), would prove to be an affective conduit along which the 
youth would travel and become-other. That is, the wound has an expressive power all its 
own, regardless of the fact that the young soldier received his injury at the butt-end of a 
comrade‘s rifle (in an act of friendly-fire). Nevertheless, with his comrades fussing over 
his battle scar, the youth would need only embody the wound, be its equal; the wound 
qua wound—at least in the eyes of his comrades—was in no way defined by, nor limited 
to, its back-story. 
The wound, then, would have a transformative power; it would release the youth 
from any responsibility for having deserted his comrades, and absolve him of his ―many 
shameful crimes against the gods of tradition.‖ When he realized that his act of desertion 
would not be discovered, he gained confidence, ―self-pride‖ (Crane 160): ―he did not 
shrink from an encounter with the eyes of judges, and allowed no thoughts of his own to 
keep him from an attitude of manfulness. He had performed his mistakes in the dark, so 
he was still a man.‖ The young soldier, in turn, felt ―he had license to be pompous and 
veteran-like.‖ More importantly, though, he had finally ―vanquished‖ (71) the ―red, 
formidable difficulties of war‖ (71), which had earlier consumed the young soldier. Late 
in the novel, in fact, Crane writes that the youth ―had dwelt in a land of strange, squalling 
upheavals and had come forth. He had been where there was red of blood and black of 
passion, and he was escaped‖ (241–2). So the young soldier would overcome his various 
confinements by varying the meaning and value of the color-codes before him. He would 
force difference from red and blue, and take flight along a line of continuous variation. 
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Similarly, the whiteness of the whale, which operates on the threshold between 
the actual and the virtual, expresses that which cannot be contained in the actual, and so it 
becomes an affective channel through which Ahab must pass, or break through, in order 
to ―reach outside.‖ By lashing out against the leviathan, Ahab not only defuses the 
subjugating power of the whale, but affirms life, affirms action (―the living act‖); he 
affirms the event, the deed, the doing—affirms all, beyond the limiting or restrictive roles 
(or forms of identity) that render him prisoner. Propelled, then, by his own delirium, he 
goes off-grid. He escapes to a non-human life; he is liberated. Ahab becomes-different, 
becomes-animal, becomes-imperceptible. So the killing of the white whale in no way 
reflects Ahab‘s need to carry out a specific action in order to reap a specific reward in the 
Nantucket market, as it does for Starbuck. Killing the whale reflects his need to overcome 
what constrains him. The doing, in other words, carries Ahab beyond himself, outside 
himself, to perhaps unknown or even non-human extremes. The doing renders him other, 
and thus breaks him of the sinews of hate that inextricably link him to the white whale, 
until he is ―left living on with half a heart and half a lung.‖ So, in short, striking out at the 
white whale, or at that which renders him subject to a debilitating and enduring hate that 
metastasizes within him, aligns Ahab with a pure expression of becoming. For Deleuze-
Guattari, becomings are not concerned with either beginnings (i.e., points of entry) or 
goals/objectives; rather, they have their own, irreducible integrity. So the actor (Ahab) 
becomes conflated with the act, and is rendered imperceptible by the merging. So too the 
young soldier. For Deleuze-Guattari, all becomings tend toward imperceptibility. 
I would further suggest that Moby-Dick (much like The Red Badge of Courage 
and On Being Blue) becomes an assault on the one (color) as pure or superior; the one is 
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revealed, not as transcendent, but as multiple. One = multiple. For example, Melville‘s 
inventories of white, in ―The Whiteness of the Whale,‖ are multi-cultural, pluralistic—
i.e., none holds sway—which breaks down the superiority of the one white, or the one, 
pure race. The whale itself is the anomalous: a pure variable along a line of continuous 
variation; and by singling out the anomalous—or, what Deleuze-Guattari, in A Thousand 
Plateaus, variously call the ―borderline,‖ the ―peripheral,‖ the ―threshold‖—Ahab is able 
―to reach the pack as a whole and pass beyond it‖ (245); that is, he is able to push through 
(or overcome) the white wall. So by becoming-different (or becoming-animal, becoming-
whale, becoming-other), all molar constructions of identity are revealed as identities-in-
passing. In fact, the stability of given identities are, at best, epiphenomenal; in other 
words, they are passing, yet singular, effects of underlying causal processes. So all 
becomings have a decisive and irreducible integrity of their own—that which cannot be 
reduced to any end, beginning, or subject position along the way—which is manifest in 
and through their capacity to uproot or destabilize essential structures of identity ascribed 
to bodies (e.g., soldiers, voyeurs, whales or whalers).  
The mutating significance of white in Moby-Dick, and red (and blue) in The Red 
Badge of Courage, finds its correlate in Gass‘s handling of blue in On Being Blue. That 
is, Gass unleashes blue from its narrow confines, its reduction to ready identification, 
representation, and recognition: ―Again and again we strike the bigotry about blue, the 
same confusion of categories, the same errors of mind…and the same disastrous lapses of 
taste‖ (75). Blue, he insists, retains an affective power, that which cannot be categorized-
away; blue is its own doing, its own action: ―If color is one of the contents of the world as 
I have been encouraging someone—anyone—to claim, then nothing stands in the way of 
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blue‘s being smelled or felt, eaten as well as heard‖ (76). Or rather, nothing stands in the 
way of blue functioning as what Deleuze calls a ―being of sensation‖ (i.e., a living power; 
a vibrating, expressive body): ―Yellow cannot readily ingest grey. It clamors for white. 
But blue will swallow black like a bell swallows silence…blue contracts, retreats‖ (76). 
Gass then goes on to suggest that blue is the color of language, or, better yet, of 
language-in-becoming. That is, blue ―penetrates the pages‖ (84), imbuing words with 
―physical qualities‖ (88) that reveal everything, immediately. Blue opens the word to its 
own becomings, its own unwording. It is the flow of excess in and through language—
especially literary language—denied to Gass in his imagined invisibility: ―For the voyeur, 
fiction is what‘s called going all the way‖ (85). ―Words,‖ he adds, ―are one-way mirrors‖ 
(84)—the voyeur‘s tool—and so ―every loving act of definition,‖ or every attempt to look 
through those ―mirrors‖ to isolate a meaning, a value, a referent, ―reverses the retreat of 
attention to the word and returns it to the world‖ (87). Gass claims, though, that ―when 
there‘s nothing left but language‖ (90), only then does it ―[fill] the mouth as it was meant 
to. We feel the need to speak it. Accepting the words as our own, speaking the words as 
our own, we believe at last in their denotations‖ (88). Or rather, we believe ―at last‖ in the 
expressive power of language. So predictably, Gass resists diminishing blue by tying it to 
any sort of fixed idea, association, or application; he argues, instead, ―every color is a 
completed presence in the world, a recognizable being apart from any object‖ (74). 
So Ahab, the young soldier, and Gass himself ride the flow of color to a point of 
radical depersonalization. The red, white, and blue in these texts are sites of affective 
modulation, where the anomalous insists and channels its way through the characters (in 
their becomings). Their identities dissolve and become imperceptible (i.e., non-
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subjectified, non-human). But this is not always the case. For colors can readily be tied to 
human coordinates, fixed landmarks, symbols and flags. For example, color stabilizes a 
people around their flag, their colors (e.g., the red-white-blue). Also around their political 
affiliations (e.g., red states, blue states), thus distorting the flow of causality. That is, any 
nation takes shape in and through a collective investment in certain intensities and 
affects—i.e., certain phrases, images, sounds; certain assemblages of bodies, etc.—
which, in turn, build territories, and effectuate the narratives of that nation. But more 
often than not the identity of a people is not so much retroactively assumed (i.e., as an 
outgrowth of those circulating, yet impersonal, signs), but deemed rather the grounding 
spirit of the nation itself. The colors of that nation, in turn, are thought to embody the pre-
existing spirit of a people. Political colors, in fact, become a label, a short-hand, for 
specific identities, values, codes; they designate an insider status, again built upon the 
regularity of certain sounds, gestures, rhythms. They tie a people to various ideological 
and/or epistemological confinements. They further prevent people from acting outside the 
confines of majoritarian models. So a collective and enduring investment of bodies in 
repeated affects invariably raises those affects to the level of symbolic abstraction, which, 
in turn, closes-off or closes-in on a people. America, in particular, by tying itself—i.e., its 
past and future—to the symbolic values and fixed identity associated with its flag, 
suppresses its own singularity, its own flirtation with the anomalous. America loses its 
capacity for emergence, for interaction with the outside; it loses (or at least diminishes) 
its revolutionary fervor by reducing that fervor, that excess, to generalities, inevitabilities 
(e.g., Manifest Destiny), laws, rules, objectivities, standards, traditions, familiarities. 
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But literature, as we know, typically frustrates (or works against) these impulses. 
That is, Gass, Melville, and Crane unleash non-symbolic modes of color in and through 
their works. They break color of its extant associations and affections, and its predictable 
links to established points-of-view. By foregrounding the affective power of these words, 
the authors extract something unthought from them, something unseen, undesignated, 
unactualized, unrepresented. They extract difference. So color itself becomes a conduit to 
other worlds, other people—a people not yet formed. Gass, Melville, and Crane work to 
―dehumanize‖ color constants, to liberate them from everyday recognition, from fixed 
meanings and values. They force colors beyond their established norms (or normative 
associations), by re-investing them with the power to go to the limits of what they can do 
(ethics). So the work of color in these narratives, or with color-affect, involves the 
renewal and progressive differentiation of color itself. I would add, though, that the 
breaking of habitual associations, of (consensual) opinion, of common sense (or good 
sense), of unambiguous, undistorted communication, of universal agreements, of fixed 
symbolic concepts, etc., through the productive use of the color machine has important 
political consequences as well. That is, by placing color in variation, Melville, Crane, and 
Gass extract a revolutionary force from these words, which again they express in and 
through the becomings of their characters. They create the potential for new thoughts, 
new feelings, by doing violence to the everyday language of opinion or symbol that, of 
necessity, puts limits on what individuals can see or do, while subordinating color itself 
to higher values (e.g., nation, courage, innocence). But color, as we have seen, becomes a 
schizoid body in these narratives: a regulation to be overcome, a threshold to be crossed, 
a naked intensity to be felt. 
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On the whole, then, these works make investments in the thisness of America 
(i.e., the revolutionary excesses of such), by treating color not as an actual thing, but as a 
potential for (or power of) perception, action, creation. These works invest American 
democracy, itself; they renew its flight. They invent a people. They speak to an impure 
race of voyeurs, outcasts, and what Melville (referring to Ahab‘s crew) refers to as an 
disorderly band of ―mongrel renegades, and castaways, and cannibals‖—i.e., a bastard 
race. Collectively, these works become a call for the renewal of the anomalous—a 
quintessentially American ideal. For America itself was the untimely, the unseeing, the 
unpredictable, the something-new. America haunts history, escapes from history. At one 
point, America was an interference in history, a new sensitivity, a new expression of life, 
a new opening that extracted a surplus-value (an excess of being, an excess of affect), 
resulting in an emergence of order (or a self-ordering). This is an America not reducible 
to its individual terms, but defined—as we will see more clearly later in the chapter with 
our reading of Walt Whitman—by its felt relations, its forms of consistency, its emergent 
nature, and ultimately its inalienable capacity to become-different. 
The Trouble with Color, the Trouble with Color-Words 
For some critics, color functions as a ―structural device‖ (Riley 258) in literature, 
as ―conceptual substructure‖ (223), or as narrative cipher. Color is decoded, traced and 
tabulated, and becomes an allegory of values in the hands of the literary critic. For 
example, Allan Pasco, in an exhaustive survey of every reference to color in Proust‘s A la 
Recherche du Temps Perdu, demonstrates that the systematic and patterned usage of 
color-words in Proust‘s masterpiece provides the key (or set of keys) to the book‘s 
thematic sub-structure and overall unity. Through color, he traces meaning in Proust; he 
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deciphers the code. Charles Riley suggests that Pasco‘s work, while ambitious, is 
ultimately forced to simplify its representation of color in order to maintain the code, or 
keep the code—and, by extension, its preset values—intact (224). In the end, such efforts 
get us nowhere. 
Yet commenting on the role of color in Pynchon‘s Gravity‘s Rainbow, Riley 
makes a representative claim of his own: ―As in the work of Joyce, color functions [in 
Gravity‘s Rainbow] both within the matrix of a code and descriptively. The main 
advantage of determining the color code in the novel is that it helps to establish the 
identities and relative importance of characters‖ (258). But this makes no allowance for 
the capacity of these words to vary, re-singularize, or take flight. Color-codes impose 
strict semiotic coordinates on the text, which, in turn, control interpretations of the story 
and its characters. Nonetheless, this approach to literary color endures. Riley points out, 
Tracking the color codes of literature seems a simple enough exercise 
even for introductory courses in literature. Following the progress of F. 
Scott Fitzgerald‘s yellow in The Great Gatsby or Thomas Hardy‘s red in 
Return of the Native, as well as Walt Whitman‘s green or Hart Crane‘s 
white, is largely a matter of knowing the symbolic code and spotting the 
deployment of the color. (220) 
In fact, simply ―knowing the symbolic code and spotting the deployment of the color‖—
or, what amounts to the same thing, pursuing predictable appeals to, and interpretations 
of, those symbolic ―deployment[s]‖—has little to offer any useful understanding of how 
color actually works in literature, or how it actualizes itself through language. As we will 
see later in the chapter, color has an important role to play in Whitman‘s Leaves of Grass, 
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but that role is neither guaranteed nor executed through the coded ―deployment‖ of 
certain color-words in the text (e.g., Whitman‘s green), nor does it depend on any 
uniform (or cultural) understanding of the conventional meanings and symbolic 
associations linked to specific color-words. For the likes of Allan Pasco, the color-word 
may, in fact, bear the load of various symbolic or political values, various stock 
associations; and, in so doing, it might play a conventional role in the text as part of a 
larger color code that the critic can readily trace and interpret. As materialists, we need 
avoid the mistake of presupposing color, or of presupposing something we all identify as, 
say, ―red‖ or ―blue‖—i.e., something we all share. This way of thinking, I will argue, not 
only constitutes an assault on color, but on the dual powers of language and literature. 
In Dialogues II, Deleuze-Parnet would affirm the idea (first proposed by D. H. 
Lawrence) that ―the highest aim of literature‖ is ―to leave, to escape…to trace a line‖ 
(27); and by taking that flight, literature not only breaks with figurative constraint, but 
becomes an expression of pure difference. In fact, over the course of his career, Deleuze 
would discuss a number of writers he thought capable of producing such difference (e.g., 
Melville, Lewis Carroll, Proust, Kafka, Virginia Woolf—to name a few). In particular, he 
would single out the work of German novelist Heinrich Von Kleist for its capacity to 
produce a language ―deep within German by means of grimaces, slips of the tongue, 
screechings, inarticulate sounds…‖ (Essays 110); similarly, Antonin Artaud would send 
language along a witch‘s flight through a ―deviant syntax‖ (112) and his use of so-called 
―breath-words,‖ whereby Artaud would ―fuse consonants and vowels in inseparable sonic 
amalgams‖ (Bogue, Deleuze 27). T. E. Lawrence, who Deleuze would characterize as 
―one of the greatest portrayers of landscapes in literature‖ (Essays 116), would produce a 
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―private desert‖ in words, just as Melville would produce ―a private ocean.‖ However, of 
all the writers with whom Deleuze would take an active interest, Samuel Beckett would 
arguably be the greatest purveyor of difference in language. In a celebrated letter to a 
correspondent (see note 1, above), Beckett makes the following claims (which I quote at 
length) that speak directly to his desire to force language to its limits:  
It is indeed becoming more and more difficult, even senseless, for me to 
write an official English. And more and more my own language appears to 
me like a veil that must be torn apart in order to get at the things (or the 
Nothingness) behind it. Grammar and Style. To me they seem to have 
become as irrelevant as a Victorian bathing suit or the imperturbability of 
a true gentleman. A mask. Let us hope the time will come, thank God that 
in certain circles it has already come, when language is most efficiently 
used where it is being most efficiently misused. As we cannot eliminate 
language all at once, we should at least leave nothing undone that might 
contribute to its falling into disrepute. To bore one hole after another in it, 
until what lurks behind it—be it something or nothing—begins to seep 
through; I cannot imagine a higher goal for a writer today. Or is literature 
alone to remain behind in the old lazy ways that have been so long ago 
abandoned by music and painting? Is there something paralyzingly holy in 
the vicious nature of the word that is not found in the elements of the other 
arts? Is there any reason why that terrible materiality of the word surface 
should not be capable of being dissolved, like for example the sound 
surface, torn by enormous pauses, of Beethoven‘s Seventh Symphony, so 
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that through whole pages we can perceive nothing but a path of sounds 
suspended in giddy heights, linking unfathomable abysses of silence? 
(171–72; my emphasis). 
Deleuze, in seeming lockstep with Beckett, would go so far as to suggest that music and 
painting, as ―events at the edge of language‖ (Essays LV), ―seep through‖ the words of 
great writers, but in ways that ―language alone makes possible.‖ That is, great writers, by 
being able to actualize the outside of language, bring language itself to a breaking-point. 
Language, then, gives evidence of that outside through effects of 
1) silence—i.e., ―the Thing in its muteness—vision‖ (98); 
2) sonority—i.e., a sonic body, expressed through hums, stutters, 
murmurs, cries, screams (110; see also, 172); 
3) or both. 
As suggested, we will look at how Whitman‘s magisterial Leaves of Grass draws color-
visions (or effects of color) from words. First, though, we must further our considerations 
of the fraught relationship between language and color. 
Put simply, color creates a special problem for language. Why? Because color 
resists coding; more precisely, it resists linguistic encoding (lexicalization), and does so 
(1) despite the formation of an International Commission on Illumination, 
in 1931, and an International Color Consortium, in 1993, designed in 
both instances to establish an authoritative, universal (or trans-cultural) 




                                                          
182
 In his essay, ―Too-Blue—Color-Patch for an Expanded Empiricism,‖ Massumi argues that psychologist 
David Katz, in a landmark series of color-matching experiments (from the early twentieth century), made 
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(2) despite efforts within the cognitive sciences ―to yoke the structures of 
color-language to the mechanisms of color-vision‖ (Gage 189); 
(3) despite the attempt to tie socio-cultural constructions of color to ―the 
lexical and grammatical structures of particular languages‖ (Lyons 
197–98), especially among socio-linguists; 
(4) despite attempts to adopt a universal color vocabulary rooted, for 
example, in ―archetypal human experiences of black night, white bone, 
red blood, and so on‖ (Gage 179; my emphasis);
183
 and finally, 
(5) despite the near ubiquitous deployment of color-words in everyday 
speech (e.g., ―feeling blue?‖; ―I‘m green with envy‖; ―you‘re yellow‖). 
Despite all, and despite the enduring hopes—ekphrastic hopes?—of researchers and 
academics alike, such efforts do little to forge a clear path between words and colors: 
Languages have never been used for labelling more than a tiny fraction of 
the millions of color-sensations which most of us are perfectly well 
equipped to enjoy…[and while] most of us are perfectly capable of 
discriminating among an extensive continuum of color-nuances very few 
of these nuances have been named, and modern color-systems…have 
usually resorted to numbers in order to distinguish perceptible differences 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the crucial methodological error of assuming that color-words (e.g., ―blue,‖ ―red‖) operate neutrally, or as 
―transparent designator[s]‖ (Parables 208), in the laboratory setting. In other words, Katz believed (perhaps 
following the dictates of the International Commission on Illumination) that both the researcher and test 
subject would (or should) have ―equal access‖ to the meaning or value of given color-words, thus erasing 
the need to control for any possible ―asymmetry in their relation to the word.‖ 
183
 In their renowned study of the cross-cultural production of color-based lexicons, Basic Color Terms, 
Brent Berlin and Paul Kay map what they take to be a universal evolution in the naming of colors, which 
begins with the linguistic encoding of a few basic colors by more ancient or primitive peoples and 
culminates with the more refined (though still limited) color vocabularies of modern industrial societies. 
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of hue or value (lightness or darkness) in what has turned out to be a far 
from symmetrical color-space. (180–81) 
But what Gage elsewhere calls ―the relative poverty of color-vocabularies‖ (183) is not 
the only disconnect between language and color. The problem is further compounded, as 
linguist John Lyons claims, by ―grammatical ambivalence‖ (206) in the English language 
toward the creation of specific structural categories for color-based communication. He 
argues, for example, that content words or ―lexical items‖ (e.g., ―green,‖ ―blue‖) 
conventionally linked to perceived color-sensations have no functional or operative role 
within language.
184
 That is, they are not connectives or demonstratives; they do not 
establish nominal relationships between objects, entities, participants/agents in a given 
discourse in the way that, say, pronouns or prepositions do. 
So again we ask why color resists efforts to be coded, classified, or otherwise 
systematized by language? According to Massumi, the inability to name (as Gage says) 
anymore than ―a tiny fraction of the millions of color-sensations‖ may be attributable to 
the fact that things we see (like color) ―retain a synaesthetic tinge of singularity‖ 
(Parables 169), and thus tend to ―settle…slowly into general classes divided according to 
sense mode.‖ He adds, further, that color ―is the last objective ‗element‘ to hypostasize 
by meeting the measure of words‖; and though, over time, it may be ―inculcated through 
conventional language, [i.e.] language used as an abstract standard of comparison,‖ its 
relationship to language will never be entirely square or symmetrical. Which is to say, the 
fluidity of color, or, more precisely, the fact that color itself is always changing, always 
being inflected from without, always being touched and re-touched—e.g., by other 
                                                          
184
 This is clearly a debatable claim, for even lexical items retain functional powers of cohesion—think of a 
list, for example. As we will see, Whitman‘s Leaves of Grass provides one of the best literary examples of 
how grammatical cohesion unfolds between lexical items. 
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colors, other wavelengths of light (through what Massumi calls the ―brightness 
confound‖), other sensory inputs (taste, texture, sound), other forces, other bodies—
makes it (color) ultimately hard to pin down through words, i.e., hard to stabilize, hard to 
isolate. Color, like language, is always in a state of becoming-different, and in that purely 
transformative state tends to disclose or make felt something more, something that (as I 
will show) need not be colorful, visual, or even actual. So my point is that while a given 
color-word may be adequate for the limited purpose of referring to a preset value—or 
then again it may not—there is simply no way of translating the affective or expressive 
power(s) of color into words, without restricting or grossly over-simplifying the coloring-
sensation itself. There is something about color that cannot be generalized away.  
In one sense, then, the problem is that color-words (read: lexically-encoded color-
sensations) condition the mind—let alone the shared sensibilities of entire communities, 
cultures, or nation-states—to internalize certain ―ideas about colors‖ (Gage 184)—i.e., 
what they designate, symbolize, represent. Color-words, in fact, contribute to what 
Massumi calls the ―unacknowledged ideality‖ (Parables 170) of color. Which is to say 
that color vocabularies (or lexicons of color) (1) cloud perceptions of color; (2) fuel 
conditioned responses; (3) normalize attitudes; and (4) propel the black-and-white 
symbolism often tied to certain colors (e.g., politically, communally). Meanwhile, the 
purely affective power of those colors—i.e., their capacity to express themselves in 
variable ways, to enter new arrangements, to become-different, etc.—all such power 
collapses (or is occluded) under the weight of color-based lexicons (designed by the likes 
of the International Commission on Illumination); these lexicons standardize color by 
again generalizing away its singular aspect, by blocking its powers of becoming, and by 
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neutralizing its expressive capacities. So color-words, then—at least when thought to 
operate as what Massumi calls neutral or ―transparent designator[s]‖ (208) in the lab or 
on the political stage—are little more than purveyors of abstraction or generality. 
But there is another problem, as well, which we briefly touched on above—a 
problem perhaps well-rehearsed within the ―specialized sub-vocabularies‖ (Lyons 201) of 
artists, designers, interior decorators, paint manufacturers, art-historians, or even children 
playing with crayons. That is, color, both in terms of its physical production and optical 
reception along visible wavelengths of light, in no way operates independently of other 
colors; nor does it operate independently of ambient light, which may augment or 
diminish the color in question (e.g., through shadow or glare). Something like texture 
may also play a pivotal role in the visual production of color: ―surface colors possess 
several characteristics apart from the hue, value and saturation (chroma), which have 
usually been held to define the parameters of color as perceived. One of these 
characteristics is texture‖ (Gage 184). Also, as suggested above, color may be altered by 
the various objects, bodies, or surfaces, as well as other sensory inputs or stimuli (e.g., 
taste, sound), which either disperse or absorb, intensify or dampen, the color in question. 
In short, color is defined by its encounters, by the unactualized forces that act upon it, by 
the relations into which it enters, and by the ensuing amplifications or modulations (i.e., 
affective variances, lines of flight) that derive from those relations. Color has no innate 
centre, no pure presence to which the researcher (or anyone else) can point, and thereby 
name. Colors are purely relational phenomena, meaning ―convivial by nature. Deprive 
them of company and they ‗blank out‘‖ (Massumi, Parables 163). Restore that company, 
or that force of the outside, and they ceaselessly push toward states other than 
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themselves: they brighten, darken, weaken, fade, blur, distress, etc. Put another way, 
color is in a constant state of becoming: becoming-augmented, becoming-diminished, 
becoming-bright, becoming-blurry, etc. It is constantly being composed and decomposed, 
constantly coming and going. It clashes. It complements. It enters into arrangements with 
things other than itself (again: other bodies, other surfaces, other colors), and adjusts to 
those arrangements in singular ways: it agrees or disagrees; it harmonizes or disperses.  
So color, in a word, is a rhizome—i.e., defined by its relations (or relational 
fields), its movements and propulsions, its contractions and expansions. Color always 
exceeds and/or retreats from any essential presence. It exists only in passing, much like 
that of a diminished or augmented chord in music, whose root depends entirely on the 
company it keeps (or on the sonic assemblages into which it enters). Color lives on the 
outside; it lives in and through its relations—i.e., through, on the one hand, the complex 
absorption and dispersion of electromagnetic radiation, and, on the other, the processing 
capacities of both the eye and brain. In so doing, color (as visually produced) ceaselessly 
breaks with resemblances; it eschews identity, frees itself from restraints, surpasses its 
own limits. Hence, there are no pure colors, only inflections of the light along lines of 
continuous variation. From this, we conclude that color-words, by bringing an artificial 
symmetry to an asymmetrical color-space, profoundly denature color. That is, they not 
only fail to account for the operative capacities and affective powers of color—i.e., the 
capacity of such to alter or vary in terms of intensity, saturation, value, hue, brightness—
but they actively flatten or restrain those powers in their monochromatic representation of 
visible color. Put simply, color cannot be coded either lexically or grammatically, 
through its ―synthetic articulation into classes and categories‖ (Massumi, Parables 169), 
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without (1) devaluing its singular aspect; (2) without flattening or restraining it; and (3) 
without robbing color itself of everything we know to be the case (aesthetically, 
scientifically, visually/perceptually) about its production and reception. Color-words are, 
in short, a wash-out. They generalize away the open borders and ill-defined edges of the 
color continuum, while ignoring the capacity of visible color to be accented or inflected 
by its relations, encounters, or arrangements with other colors, other bodies. 
Even still, I cling to my ―ekphrastic hope.‖ That is, I argue (following Deleuze) 
that in literature, the saying exceeds the said, the emergent exceeds the emerged. Put 
another way, language—like color—retains its own ―synaesthetic tinge of singularity,‖ 
which indexes something unseen, something incorporeal—i.e., a force that acts upon 
language, or a non-linguistic outside that cannot be coded as language. The critic, then, in 
an act of co-creation with the text, grasps the word in its becomings (or even hastens 
those becomings), and thereby pulls new sayings, new dynamisms, new affects to the 
variable surfaces of language. We will see below how color enters into, and actualizes 
itself through, literary language; for the moment I would simply suggest that language in 
its color-becomings effectively expands the saying by opening up the word to its own 
expressive potential; in so doing, ―language in its entirety‖ is pushed ―to its very limit in 
order to discover its Outside‖ (Deleuze, Essays 72). That is, language in its entirety is 
severed ―from all reference‖ (74) and sent ―racing along a line of flight‖ (58), toward 
something no longer linguistic; it is made to ―stutter‖ (107), made ―convulsive‖ (58). 
Deleuze-Guattari write, ―It‘s easy to stammer, but making language itself stammer is a 
different affair; it involves placing all linguistic, and even non-linguistic, elements in 
286 
 
variation‖ (Plateaus 109). It involves writing ―like a foreigner in one‘s own language‖ 
(Deleuze-Parnet, Dialogues 3); it involves opening up language to its own becomings: 
A style is managing to stammer in one‘s own language. It is difficult, 
because there has to be a need for such stammering. Not being a 
stammerer in one‘s speech, but being a stammerer of language itself. 
Being like a foreigner in one‘s own language. Constructing a line of flight. 
So, in short, whenever words are opened to their unactualized potential, language as a 
whole is sent reeling. By activating that potential, language goes critical, and in so doing 
disassociates itself from whatever transcendent makers may be ascribed to it (e.g., 
culturally, socially, institutionally, etc.). In this way, color-words overcome the Platonic 
rule of identity, where specific words are thought to instantiate universal values. 
In any case, it is certainly well-known to both painters and scientists that colors 
are never solid, never fixed. They are passing effects of the light, as are the deep greens 
of a mid-summer flora. Moreover, colors never exist in isolation. In fact, all colors are 
composites. They are mixed, created. They are inflected or altered by the relations into 
which they enter (e.g., with other colors, other bodies). Colors contrast and complement 
one another, and thereby differentiate themselves in unique and ephemeral ways. From a 
scientific perspective, for example, color is a complex and entirely variable effect, 
generated by the dispersion and absorption of electromagnetic radiation, and by the 
processing capacities of both the eye and brain. Put simply, color is generated through a 
set of relational processes, or through what I call the forces of reciprocal inflection—e.g., 
absorption, saturation, refraction, reflection, contraction, expansion, contrast and 
complementarity. Yet these forces are in no way exhausted by their actualization. As 
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discussed in chapter 3, all forces are virtual; so that which is perceived in this context 
(e.g., the color red) is, in a sense, the bloom, actualized along visible wavelengths of light 
by the forces of reciprocal inflection. Color is an emergent property, a singular effect—an 
effect that, in turn, makes felt the virtual processes through which it unfolds. Put simply, 
visible color actualizes (or illuminates) the uncolored forces of reciprocal inflection. 
Now, of course, visually perceived color retains an affective power all its own, 
expressed along visible wavelengths of light. But the point here is that the forces or 
virtual processes that enable that color to visibly actualize, or to be perceived, operate 
independent of the color itself, on the radical outside of such; hence, any other medium—
e.g., words, music, clay—in ways entirely unique to that medium, retain the capacity for 
variable expressions of reciprocal inflection. For example, literature can actualize, again, 
in uniquely linguistic ways, the processes of (say) contrast and complementarity—
processes essential to the production and reception of color. Thus when color enters into 
language, it does not enter symbolically, nor obviously does it enter as a visible 
expression of light energy; rather, it enters affectively, as yet another actualization of a 
set of relational processes that, yes, reveal themselves along visible wavelengths of light, 
but again are not exhausted thereby. Even visible color itself will not exhaust these 
processes. That is, color becomes-color (or remains in a state of becoming-color) through 
its ceaseless renewal of the processes of reciprocal inflection. Similarly, words become-
color, and thereby produce effects of color or color-sensations, by unfolding the same set 
of virtual processes that go into the production of color. These processes are ―events of 
language‖ (Deleuze-Parnet, Dialogues 69), just as surely as they are events of sight or 
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sound. We will explore just how language produces color-sensation in our reading of 
Whitman, below. 
All art, Deleuze suggests, shares ―a common problem‖ (Francis 56) that of 
―capturing‖ or harnessing what are ostensibly insensible forces (read: non-sonorous, non-
visual, non-colored, non-linguistic),
185
 and expressing those forces through a given set of 
materials. So the virtual processes that actualize (say) a specific shade or hue on the 
canvas only do so by entering into transformative relations with the artist‘s materials. In 
the case of writing, those same relational processes (e.g., juxtaposition, transition, 
reflection, contraction, expansion, contrast and complementarity, etc.), channelled or 
unfolded through pigments on the canvas, are channelled—again, incorporeally—through 
words on the page, and in a way that transforms those words into what Deleuze-Guattari 
call ―blocs of percepts and affects‖ (What is? 164); they add that ―the only law of 
creation is that the compound must stand up on its own,‖ i.e., independent of any 
perceiving subject, authorial intention, or situated emotion. Thus affective language is 
language unleashed from either subjective or objective attribution, from grounds, from 
containments. Affects/percepts are markers of an infinite potential, and it is through these 
channels that coloring forces travel; that is, they make felt unactualized forces. 
So as color moves into literature—again, as a set of relational processes, along 
affective channels—it enters into transformative relations with words; and provided the 
writer finds the literary or linguistic means of doing so, she—no less than the painter or 
                                                          
185
 Deleuze gives the example of ―time‖ as force, asking, ―how can time be painted, how can time be 
heard?‖ (Francis 57). While being able to render forces of time is a problematic for all artists, so too are 
―elementary forces like pressure, inertia, weight, attraction, gravitation, germination—how can they be 
rendered?‖ Deleuze adds the proviso that sometimes the artist is tasked with unleashing forces invisible to 
one form of art but given to another; he writes, ―how to paint sound, or even the scream? (And conversely, 
how to make colors audible?)‖—these questions clearly resonate with the issues here discussed. 
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colorist—effectively invents color; that is, the writer opens up language to its own color-
becomings, and in so doing forges a kind of literary chromaticism. By extracting color-
sensation or sound-sensation from words, by actualizing those effects, literature becomes 
a painting or a piece of music, but a music of words, a painting with 
words, a silence in words, as if the words could now discharge their 
content: a grandiose vision or a sublime sound. What is specific to the 
drawings and paintings of great writers (Hugo, Michaux…) is not that 
these works are literary, for they are not literary at all; they attain pure 
visions, but visions that are still related to language in that they constitute 
an ultimate aim, an outside, an inverse, an underside, an inkstain or 
unreadable handwriting. Words paint and sing, but only at the limit of the 
path they trace through their divisions and combinations. Words create 
silence. (Deleuze, Essays 112–13) 
So the unique color- or sound-effects produced in and through literature not only disrupt 
conventional associations tied to words, but open up new possibilities of language, new 
ways of thinking, new colorings of life. We turn, then, to the question of how color 
expresses itself through language, and to that end ask the following: How does literature 
make or produce color? Of what effects (or coloring-sensations) is literature capable? 
How do the processes of reciprocal inflection raise language itself to an affective power 
or being of sensation? Can literature become a color-machine? Few works, I would hold, 
provide a better orientation to these matters than Whitman‘s Leaves of Grass. 
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Demonstration 2: Whitman’s Color-Machine 
 ―I will make the poems of materials, for I think they are to be the most spiritual poems…‖ 
—Walt Whitman (Leaves of Grass, ―Starting from Paumanok‖ 6.3) 
In the Preface to Essays Critical and Clinical, Deleuze suggests that there may be 
―a painting and a music characteristic of writing, like the effects of colors and sonorities 
that rise up above words‖ (LV). He later presses the issue in an essay on Walt Whitman, 
arguing that ―Whitman no doubt fabricated one of the most coloristic of literatures that 
could ever have existed‖ (59). So building on our earlier discussion, we again pose the 
question: How does color enter into language? Or, more precisely, what does it mean for 
a literature to be ―coloristic‖? To answer these questions (and perhaps test Deleuze‘s 
somewhat novel conception of Whitman‘s poetry as ―one of the most coloristic of 
literatures‖), we turn to Leaves of Grass, and, in particular, ―Salut Au Monde‖—a cycle 
of poems within Leaves that provide a solid orientation to a uniquely literary chromatics. 
At the outset of stanza 3, the poet (or poet-narrator) asks, ―What do you hear Walt 
Whitman?‖ and later, in stanza 4, ―What do you see Walt Whitman?‖ Following each 
question, the poet begins ensuing lines with the repeated phrase, ―I hear… I hear … I 
hear…‖; then, ―I see… I see… I see…‖ John Hollander describes this not atypical verse-
form in Whitman as ―anaphoric catalogue‖ (183)—with anaphora here referring to the 
rhetorical device of repeating the opening word(s) to sequential lines so as to privilege or 
stress those openings. I would argue, however, that Whitman‘s hypnotic chants—turning 
the same phrase over and over again—drain the anaphora of its rhetorical power. In 
―Salut Au Monde,‖ Whitman begins lines with ―I hear…‖ 18 times; ―I see…‖ a minimum 
of 83 times; also, ―You…‖ 45 times, etc. The repetition in these instances becomes so 
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extreme, if not exhaustive, that Whitman anaesthetizes the reader to the grammatical 
privilege typically accorded agents and agency within the clause. That is, his repetitions 
not only neutralize the functional power invested in the subject or noun-head (―I,‖ ―You,‖ 
―It‖), as doer of the deed, but de-activate the process (verb), as well, by sapping it of its 
energy, its action, its force. Hearing and seeing are ritualized, nominalised, made thing. 
Whitman shifts the emphasis away from what the functional grammarian calls the 
theme of the sentence (i.e., subject, topic) and re-locates that emphasis in the sights and 
sounds, or various objects of perception, enumerated within the poems.
186
 In so doing, he 
blurs the grammatical/functional constraints (i.e., meaning, value, role, purpose, etc.) 
normally assigned to those elements within the clause by the sentential theme. Or, put 
another way: that these things are seen or heard becomes progressively less important in 
this cycle of poems, as does the fact that ―I‖ see or hear them. So I would argue that by 
neutralizing, even emasculating, the subject,
187
 Whitman draws an affective power from 
what Michael Halliday labels the ―structural residue‖ (78) of the clause—a power that 
exceeds any lived perception or felt emotion. That is, the residue—in taking the form of 
what Whitman calls, ―The divine list for myself or you or for any one making, / The face, 
the limbs, the index from head to foot, and what it arouses, / The mystic deliria, the 
madness amorous, the utter abandonment‖ (―From pent-up aching rivers‖ 24–6)—floats 
                                                          
186
 In a part of the clause that functional grammar refers to as the rheme, or sentential complement. 
187
Though I will speak of Whitman‘s assault on the grammatical subject over the pages that follow, I fully 
acknowledge his enduring and powerful commitment to the ―I‖—or to the ego that experiences, that 
consumes, that sings and chants—throughout his Leaves. But on this point, Whitman himself, in a late 
statement, entitled, ―A Backward Glance O‘er Travel‘d Roads,‖ suggests that while ―I avowedly chant ‗the 
great pride of man in himself,‘ and permit it to be more or less a motif of nearly all my verse…I think it not 
inconsistent with obedience, humility, deference, and self-questioning‖ (698). That is, a man‘s pride is ―not 
inconsistent‖ with a man‘s willingness to re-examine his own actions (or motives); to learn, grow, and 
change; to demonstrate humility; or to cede some degree of power to his fellow man. So, in some ways, 
Whitman extends the purview of the ―I‖ beyond the fixed sensibilities of the ego. And, as we will see, his 
anaphora affirms the subject-in-becoming—i.e., the subject conflated with its actions, its doings, its other. 
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free, unrestrained and unrestricted by the perceiving I/eye. So Whitman suppresses the 
more conventional, more predictable or mechanical controls of the clause, and thereby 
subverts the superordinate (or hierarchical) relations of the subject-predicate bond; and 
though the residuals (e.g., complement, adjunct) are normally subjugated by the 
sentential theme—with the meaning and value of the residual inextricably bound to the 
dominant interests of the theme—Whitman unleashes desire in and through the structural 
residue of the clause, desire that cannot be turned back on the poet (or subject of 
perception) as some form of Oedipalized neurosis or unfulfilled wish: ―none of the 
hierarchical orders are supported any more, they dissolve, they liquefy, while complex 
enumerations in quasi-biblical rhythms are allowed to verge on chaos‖ (Fletcher 107). 
Whitman, in effect, thematizes the rhematic content of the line by assigning 
topical or newsworthy value to that portion of the sentence which again—grammatically 
speaking—tends to complete the meaning of the clause rather than initiate or organize its 
own functional values, as is the case in Leaves.
188
 So by subverting the extant theme, 
Whitman opens up new vistas (i.e., new possibilities, new becomings, new lines of flight) 
for the residual. He demonstrates, for example, that the veritable riches of things seen or 
heard in ―Salut Au Monde‖ (e.g., railroads, rivers, workmen, distant lands, myths, songs, 
world religions, etc.) have an integrity, a value or import, that needs to be experienced, 
experimented with, and ultimately evaluated independently of their being seen or heard. 
So Whitman, I would argue, draws a power of reciprocal inflection from the structural 
residues of the clause—a power most amenable to the residue itself. Why? Because to 
                                                          
188
 Halliday contrasts ―marked‖ sentential themes with the ―unmarked‖ themes of ―I‖ or ―You‖ (44). That 
is, he reserves the term unmarked for clauses that begin with phrases like ―I see…‖ or ―I hear…,‖ just 
because such phrases are so ubiquitous and hence standard-bearers of the English language. So the 
repetition of unmarked themes in ―Salut Au Monde‖ reinforces Whitman‘s plan to drain the fixed subject 
of its power. 
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suppress the theme is to force the sentential complement out of its basin of attraction (i.e., 
the clause); the complement, then, when unhinged from the gravitational pull of the 
theme, derives its fortunes elsewhere (i.e., its meaning, value, purpose, etc.). That is, the 
complement expresses itself through the outside—i.e., through that which complements 
it, or through that with which it contrasts—more on this in a moment. 
So the power of individual units of enumeration in Whitman‘s leaves derive not 
from any transcendent value (assigned to those units)—for, democratically speaking, ―all 
the things of the universe are perfect miracles, each as profound as any‖ (―Starting from 
Paumanok‖ 12.16)—but from enumerative propulsions, mutual reinforcements, and what 
Whitman himself calls the ―ensemble.‖ He writes, ―I will not make poems with reference 
to parts, / But I will make poems, songs, thoughts, with reference to ensemble‖ (12.17–
18). In other words, his poems retain a collective value, a power of connection and 
reciprocal inflection, whereby they not only shed their isolated identities, but assume 
their meaning or value through the company they keep: ―The armies of those I love 
engirth me and I engirth them, / They will not let me off till I go with them, respond to 
them, / And discorupt them, and charge them full with the charge of the soul‖ (―I Sing the 
Body Electric‖ 1.2–4). In fact, Angus Fletcher speaks to the ―power‖ of Whitman‘s 
poems ―to radiate an absorption‖ (94), which I take to mean the power of these poems (or 
poetic lines) to reflect or express what they deterritorialize from other sources, other 
vernaculars, other bodies, other people and places, other poems (or poetic cycles) in 
Leaves and elsewhere; moreover, they retain the capacity to renew or reinvent—or, in the 
language of this chapter, to inflect, to color—what they lift from those realms. Put 
another way, Whitman‘s poems both absorb and convert their outside, and in so doing 
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forge connections (both ephemeral and durable) with that outside; that is, the poems 
spread like grass, sprouting extensions, and extensions on extensions. This is a poetry of 
ceaseless distributions, of progressive developments and modulations, of new vistas, new 
peoples, new languages, new worlds. This is a poetry of pure passage, pure relation: 
Shot gold, maroon and violet, dazzling silver, emerald, fawn, 
The earth‘s whole amplitude and Nature‘s multiform power consign‘d for 
once to colors; 
The light, the general air possess‘d by them—colors till now unknown, 
No limit, confine—not the Western sky alone—the high meridian—North, 
South, all, 
Pure luminous color fighting the silent shadows to the last. (―A Prairie 
Sunset‖) 
The Whitman line, then, either fragment or phrase, becomes an opening—i.e., receptive 
to, and expressive of, ―earth‘s whole amplitude and Nature‘s multiform power‖—because 
it overcomes the confinements of the self-contained, self-sustaining clausal unit(y). His 
catalogues replace the horizontal and linear progression of the clause with the ―ramified 
growth of subordinate clauses‖ (Hollander 182); and in the variable juxtapositions and 
transitions that ensue—i.e., in the leaps and gaps between lines—Whitman discovers the 
drama of reciprocal inflection, whereby coloring-sensation courses through his verses. 
Deleuze claims that for Whitman, 
Selecting singular cases and minor scenes is more important than any 
consideration of the whole. It is in the fragments that the hidden 
background appears, be it celestial or demonic…[be it] a bloody or 
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peaceful reality. But the fragments—the remarkable parts, cases, or 
views—must still be extracted by means of a special act, an act that 
consists, precisely, in writing. For Whitman, fragmentary writing is not 
defined by the aphorism or through separation, but by a particular type of 
sentence that modulates the interval. It is as if the syntax that composes 
the sentence, which makes it a totality capable of referring back to itself, 
tends to disappear by setting free an infinite asyntactic sentence, which 
prolongs itself or sprouts dashes in order to create spatiotemporal 
intervals. Sometimes it appears as an occasional enumerative sentence, an 
enumeration of cases as in a catalogue (the wounded in the hospital, the 
trees in a certain locale), sometimes it is a processionary sentence, like a 
protocol of phases or moments (a battle, convoys of cattle, successive 
swarms of bumblebees). It is an almost mad sentence, with its changes in 
direction, its bifurcations, its ruptures and leaps, its prolongations, its 
sproutings, its parentheses. (Essays 57–8) 
Deleuze‘s point here is that Whitman‘s verses unfold rhizomatically. In other words, they 
are engendered—if not propelled—by connective energies, by retreat from essential 
presences, by unrestrained passage, by transversal connections: ―Nature without check 
with original energy‖ (Whitman, ―Song of Myself‖ 1.13). Whitman puts the point in 
another way: ―Take my leaves America, take them South and take them North, / Make 
welcome for them everywhere, for they are your own offspring…connect lovingly with 
them, for they connect lovingly with you‖ (―Starting from Paumanok‖ 4.1–2, 4). So, in 
short, his poems spread wildly, through cyclic expansion; they take their leave from 
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poetic tradition, from European ideals. He writes, ―Expanding and swift, henceforth, / 
Elements, breeds, adjustments, turbulent, quick and audacious, / A world primal again, 
vistas of glory and incessant branching‖ (17.1–3). Whitman‘s poetry, like the America he 
imagines, is non-totalizable; it is a map of shifting relations; it is free verse (or better, 
freedom verse): ―Exulting words, words to Democracy‘s lands‖ (14.5). And in the 
intervals both between words and between lines, Whitman pries open spaces; he 
experiments with new possibilities for a people—a people as yet unformed or wholly 
unified—struggling with the collision between past and future, between entrenched ideals 
and new exigencies. Through his verse—i.e., through, as Deleuze says in the passage 
above, ―its changes in direction, its bifurcations, its ruptures and leaps, its prolongations, 
its sproutings, its parentheses‖—Whitman modulates the intervals between complements 
(or linguistic residues) forcing unknown effects, unheard-of becomings, and ultimately a 
new camaraderie through his verses, that which extends itself into what Whitman, in 
Specimen Days, calls, ―the foundation and tie of all…Unionism‖ (68). In Leaves, he 
writes, ―I will sing the song of companionship‖ (―Starting from Paumanok‖ 6.18); and 
later, ―who but I should be the poet of comrades?‖ (6.26). Finally, in ―Songs of Parting,‖ 
he adds, ―Of seeds dropping into the ground, of births, / Of the steady concentration of 
America, inland, upward, to impregnable and swarming places‖ (2.1–2). For Whitman, 
America itself—in its ―steady concentration,‖ its ―divine list[s] for myself or you or for 
any one making,‖ its ―mystic deliria,‖ its ―swarming‖ extension of itself—becomes a 
literature, a literature haunted by secession (from the clause), by an uneasy union and all-
too ephemeral encounter with the outside, in the open air: ―I think heroic deeds were all 
conceiv‘d in the open air, and all free poems also‖ (―Songs of the Open Road‖ 4.11). 
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Whitman‘s colorism derives from the poem‘s variable openness to the outside, to 
light, to ―The play of shine and shade on the trees‖ (―Song of Myself‖ 2.14). Contrastive, 
complementary, ―convulsive‖ (Deleuze, Essays 58), brightened by a new democratic 
ideal, and yet dampened by the death of a president, Whitman‘s Leaves is a work of pure 
modulation, ―free and lawless‖ (―From pent-up aching rivers‖ 29). In Whitman, relations 
are invented, collapsed, and renewed. Put another way, he colors his leaves through the 
forces of reciprocal inflection; he captures and, at every turn, expresses unrestrained 
sympathies, resonances, and couplings: ―For every atom belonging to me as good belongs 
to you‖; meanwhile, ―My tongue, every atom of my blood, form‘d from this soil, this air‖ 
(―Song of Myself‖ 1.3, 6). Whitman is compelled to magnify or amplify relations, to 
open up spaces—or what he repeatedly calls new ―vistas‖ (read: new ways of seeing), 
from which any whole (any united whole, or political union, or ―Unionism‖) derives. In 
fact, Whitman‘s poems are themselves a clearing of space, of poetic space, geographical 
space, historical space—all of which open the door for America to rush through: 
―Leaving such to the States they melt, they depart, charging the water and the land with 
names‖ (―Starting from Paumanok‖ 16.9). His work becomes an agitation, a movement 
headlong into the ―unknown‖ and the ―unseen.‖ He writes, ―What is known I strip away, / 
I launch all men and women forward with me into the Unknown‖ (―Song of Myself‖ 
44.2–3); and ―You road I enter upon and look around, I believe you are not all that is 
here, / I believe that much unseen is also here‖ (―Songs of the Open Road‖ 2.1–2). In 
fact, Whitman‘s rambling processual clauses vex the interpretative or analytical overtures 
of the critic, and any related appeals made to conventional opinion or common sense. 
Why? Because the Whitman line, in its resistance to clausal confinement and insular 
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value, projects something impersonal or unrecognizable, that which continually jams the 
circuits of recognition and representation: ―Mélange mine own, the unseen and the seen‖ 
(―Starting from Paumanok‖ 10.6); and because the specific identity of elements 
inventoried in Whitman‘s verses becomes progressively less clear—again, given the 
diminishing power accorded subject and verb in the clause—they need not necessarily be 
so inventoried; in short, nominalised sequences can always be reshuffled. 
Whitman‘s story of America is the story of shifting relations and continuous 
reshufflings. His poetry is permeated by restlessness, by a perpetual unease about the 
state of the Union (and the shifting tectonic plates beneath it), and by linguistic or 
grammatical forms ceaselessly colliding and re-modulating. In all these ways, coloring 
force pours into (in and through) Whitman‘s verses, and in that way advances the cause 
of an America that need resist the confinements of its own color codes (red-white-blue): 
How many hold despairingly yet to the models departed, caste, myths, 
obedience, compulsion, and to infidelity, 
How few see the arrived models, the athletes, the Western States, or see 
freedom or see spirituality, or hold any faith in results… 
How society waits unform‘d, and is for a while between things ended and 
things begun… (―Songs of Parting‖ 1.5-6, 10) 
Whitman here imagines America as a nation ―unform‘d,‖ or yet to come; a nation still in 
the throes of its processes of individuation, its ceaseless renewals and reinventions of 
itself, its becoming-different. Elsewhere, he writes, ―the ambitious thought of my song is 
to help the forming of a great aggregate Nation‖ (698). To that ambitious end, the 
Whitman line is marked by relational forces (e.g., juxtaposition, contrast and 
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complementarity, expansion and contraction, communication and convergence), by 
ceaseless renewals, and by the linguistic tonalities that emerge from these variable 
collisions. Here, then, Whitman‘s color-machine unfolds. That is, the color of the 
Whitman line—e.g., phrase, fragment, or even ―spear of summer grass‖ (―Song of 
Myself‖ 1.5)—is similarly unleashed through its proliferating bonds, its expressions of 
complementarity and contrast, its reciprocal nature and break with grammatical isolation, 
etc. In short, Whitman‘s coloring (or coloring-sensation) emerges through felt relations—
relations amplified, inflected, and ceaselessly renewed. 
*** 
So, finally, as we have seen, literary color must be liberated; that is, literature 
must enter into its own color-becomings, so as to ―acquire a real presence…an intense 
clarity‖ (Deleuze, Francis 120). In fact, anything (in life and art), any material, is capable 
of expressing color and becoming a color-machine—though not in any predictable 
fashion. For example, color-words often block color, by reducing it to conventional 
associations; literary language, though, creates new color mixes, new linguistic accents. 
Literature opens up language as a whole to its own becomings, its own revolutionary 
potential, its own coloring-sensation, and does so by shaking language loose from its 
symbolic associations and conventional attributions. Literature cracks open color-words, 
re-coloring them in the process. So, in this context, we speak not of color-words in 
literature but the color-becomings of literature, shaped through processes of extraction, 
conversion, production, and ―affective modulation‖ (Massumi, Parables 222). 
Literature delivers or offers up color not in a visual way, not as appearance, but in 
and through the invisible, non-colored, non-localized processes (e.g., contrast and 
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complementarity, modulation, juxtaposition, transition, etc.) of which color itself 
(visually understood) is but one manifestation, one projection of a non-colored field of 
forcible relations. The painter or visual artist employs materials to which they do not own 
the exclusive rights—the saying (i.e., the coloring) exceeds the said (i.e., the color). The 
artist employs a certain visual range of colorings, and those colorings have certain 
affects. But as I have tried to argue, coloring-forces can be directed away from the canvas 
and toward other materials (e.g., words, sounds), producing additional color-effects; and 
though those effects may not be visual, they are certainly no less coloristic. Again, the 
outward manifestation of color does not have exclusive rights to the non-colored 
processes/forces that visual color makes felt/known in certain ways. So the writer, the 
musician, the political orator (or whomever else) has full access to the non-localizable 
machinery of the forces that color takes up, in order to create sonic hues, grammatical 
shadings, vocal complementarities, and so forth—all in the service of producing a certain 
coloring or coloristic effect. And these effects are not metaphorical, nor any less material 






Critic as Artisan 
Sal Paradise: “I didn’t want to interfere, I just wanted to follow.” 
—Jack Kerouac (On the Road, 132) 
The artisan is the itinerant, the ambulant. 
—Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (A Thousand Plateaus, 409) 
The artisan must…follow the accidents and local vagaries of a piece of material. He must let 
the material have its say in the final form produced. This involves a sensual interaction with 
[that material], applying a tool in a way that does not fight the material but conforms to it. 
—Manual DeLanda (War in the Age of Intelligent Machines, 30) 
All that’s left for the reader is to become the artisan of his own reading, step by step…by 
multiplying marginalia; that will then be the guiding principle of this commentary effect. 
—Éric Alliez (The Signature of the World, 1) 
The pure critic does not exist; the pure critic transists. 




Let me suggest, in conclusion, that the materialist critic—given what I have called 
her co-creative encounters with the book—shares much in common with the artisan. That 
is, rather than simply representing the book by tracing its conventional figures, unpacking 
its structural logic, or exposing its relation to dominant ideologies, the materialist 
machines the book (read: connects it to its outside, puts it to work), so as to liberate the 
powers and potentials of a set of linguistic materials. To understand how this approach 
advances a uniquely artisanal agenda, consider the following scenarios: 
 A folk artist, always on the lookout for new and interesting objects, 
happens upon a lamp made of sea shells piled high among some trash 
at the side of the road. She thinks to herself, ―…maybe I can use this.‖ 
 A gardener, frustrated by the annual yields of both his pear and apple 
trees, decides to graft disease-resistant rootstock onto their damaged 
trunks in hopes of maximizing their capacity to fight off root-rot over 
the winter months. He knows the transplantation will require a keen 
eye and steady hand—as the incision may be too deep, or not deep 
enough, for the tissues of the scion to merge with those of the stock—
and so he consults a member of his regional gardening club, schooled 
in the vagaries of local flora.  
 A flower arranger, walking on the beach, spies a piece of oddly-
shaped driftwood; believing it to have broken free from the moulded 
hull of a sunken fishing vessel, the man is struck by the thought that 
what has become little more than marine debris now testifies to how 
the various forces of nature (e.g., high winds, tall waves, powerful 
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currents, the corrosive effects of sea water) ceaselessly collide with the 
pride and sense of familial duty that compels fishermen to risk life and 
limb on the high seas in hopes of bringing home the catch. Turning to 
a friend, he says, ―…I have an idea for a new arrangement.‖ 
 An apprentice weaver lays eyes on a rare, nineteenth-century Jacquard 
loom at auction. Notable for its pioneering use of punch cards, the 
Jacquard is thought to be a prototype for the programming 
technologies of today. Wanting to know everything she can about this 
remarkable specimen, the weaver excitedly asks the seller, ―how do I 
work this?‖ ―what are its moving parts?‖ ―what can it do?‖ 
 A woodworker intently studies the grain of a piece of mahogany—and 
with that, Deleuze-Guattari (in a passage from A Thousand Plateaus) 
pick up the commentary. The authors suggest that for the woodworker 
―it is a question of surrendering to the wood, then following where it 
leads‖ (408)—i.e., along ―the variable undulations and torsions of the 
[wood] fibres.‖ Which is to say, the woodworker tracks a set of 
expressive traits in the wood—―an entire energetic materiality‖—in an 
effort to tap its unexploited potentials and self-ordering capacities; and 
so through its ―submission to the sensible and sensitive evaluations‖
189
 
of the woodworker, the mahogany opens to its own becomings—i.e., 
its power to vary, to differ, to self-organize. 
                                                          
189
 I take this phrase from The Signature of the World, a book by Deleuze‘s student Éric Alliez, to 
emphasize the fact that—in this instance—the artisan is tasked with evaluating the empirical conditions and 
expressive capacities of the wood (i.e., its sensible nature) (48). 
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These scenarios are meant to highlight just some of the ways that artisans (such as, the 
folk artist, gardener, flower-arranger, woodworker—not to mention the soap-maker, 
stone-mason, jewellery-maker, blacksmith, etc.) put to work, and/or orient themselves to, 
the materials they encounter (e.g., in nature, at auction, at the side of the road). 
But what can we take away from these scenes? Here are a few particulars: 
First of all, the artisan pursues the interesting and the remarkable (i.e., the ‗what 
can be…?‘), rather than the clear and distinct (i.e., the ‗what is…?‘). Her approach—or 
really, her whole way of thinking—is propelled by curiosity, by intuition, by ―a sort of 
groping experimentation‖ (Deleuze-Guattari, What is? 41), and by the thrill of encounters 
with the unknown and the unrecognizable. 
The artisan places the emphasis on concrete practices, and on engaging life where 
it stands—in the here and now. 
The artisan does not treat her materials like inert receptacles. Instead, she 
negotiates or traverses their idiosyncratic features—i.e., ―an energetic materiality [that] 
overspills the prepared matter, and a qualitative deformation or transformation [that] 
overspills the form‖ (Deleuze-Guattari, Plateaus 410)—rather than generalizes those 
things away. 
The materials the artisan encounters (or comes across) become a kind of 
provocation: amenable to local interventions, while resistant to general structures of 
knowledge, institutionally produced and dogmatically applied by experts in the field. 
Artisans belong to loosely organized and heterogeneous groupings or collectives 
of variable sizes and forms of organization: ―the metallurgist is the first specialized 
artisan, and in this respect forms a collective body (secret societies, guilds, journeymen‘s 
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associations)‖ (Deleuze-Guattari, Plateaus 412). But these bodies, these organizations, 
need not be stifling, nor exclusive. Recall: ―we do not even know what a body can do‖—
and this includes collective bodies. Their anarchic distributions are based on temporary 
and highly variable partnerships, alliances, exchanges, and interactions.  
For the artisan, space (e.g., material, social, mercantile) unfolds in and through 
variable forms of organization and assembly. That is, the artisan imagines space, creates 
it, pries it open. There are no prescribed relations, no prefigured orders: relations are 
made, territories created. For example, flower arrangements are a free distribution of 
dried grasses, mosses, pods and petals, marked by a spontaneous order and open-ended 
structure (nomos), where arrangement precedes essence.  
But what truly links artisans to one another is their collective relation to the 
problem (or the problematic). For example, the artisan will perpetually be tasked with 
needing to locate and/or procure certain materials—and possibly in large quantities—and 
needing to work (with) those materials in novel and interesting ways. Moreover, the 
artisan must choose what to make, before then confronting the inevitable question of 
what else to make. For, in fact, artisans will always need to invent new forms, and 
thereby re-invent themselves, and their practices, in the process, so as to remain 
competitive in a fickle and ever-changing marketplace. Finally, the threefold problem of 
how to sell things, of when and where to sell them, and of how to meet the demands of 
the consumer are the enduring concerns of any artisan. 
These problems, however, rarely lend themselves to fixed solutions. For example, 
markets dry up. Venues change. Prices fluctuate, as do consumer needs or demands. 
Moreover, suppliers go out of business. The quality of available materials varies widely, 
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perhaps even with the changing of seasons, as does the expense accorded such materials. 
As well, the artisan may be required to call upon different skill sets, different creative 
and/or practical capacities, as again competitive forces create unpredictability in the 
marketplace. In short, the artisan‘s solutions will always be temporary, always 
approximate; at the same time, they may only serve to deepen, nuance, and/or alter the 
problem, rather than resolve it for any protracted period of time. 
So what does all this mean for the critic? As suggested above, I would add the 
critic—or at least the Deleuzean-inflected materialist critic—to this guild. My intuition is 
that the materialist may have more to learn from the artisanal agenda than from any 
institutional body when it comes to, for example, engaging—i.e., making use of, 
orienting themselves to—a set of literary or linguistic materials. Let us consider a few 
points of convergence: 
The critic-artisan pursues the interesting and the unusual. In a short, but 
compelling, passage in A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze-Guattari tie the artisanal 
economies to the broader field of what they call minor science.
190
 In brief, the authors 
claim that ―artisans are those who follow the matter-flow as pure productivity‖ (411); that 
is, they track, exploit, unleash what Deleuze-Guattari variously refer to as ―machinic 
phylum,‖ ―traits of expression,‖ or ―singularities‖—and do so in threefold fashion. First, 
they actively follow (read: track, pursue) a given material by travelling to where those 
materials may lie (e.g., the seed-catalogue, the beach, the trash), or by tracking them 
down through merchants—i.e., individuals mired in mercantile flows of their own, as 
                                                          
190
 Deleuze-Guattari contrast minor or nomad science with major or Royal science. In brief, the non-
sovereign minoritarian tradition works on/with materials to liberate their affective and metamorphic 
powers; the latter divests materials of those powers by imposing a formal metrics on a subservient matter. 
(See Plateaus 361-374 passim for an extended treatment of this relationship; see also note 4, below.) 
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distributors of material goods. Next—and most importantly for our purposes—artisans 
follow the aforementioned ―matter-flow‖ in and through their chosen materials, and do 
so, as Deleuze-Guattari point out, by ―connecting‖ their own particular ―operations‖—
i.e., their own way(s) of working with, or operating on,
191
 the materials they 
find/encounter—to ―an entire energetic materiality‖ (408).
192
 Finally, artisans follow a 
largely travelling marketplace that moves from school yards to side streets; from 
fairgrounds to convention-halls; from hotel lobbies to private homes; from malls to flee-
markets; from the Internet to the trunk of a car; from town to town, season to season—
both indoors and outdoors. For this reason, Deleuze-Guattari describe the artisan as ―the 
itinerant, the ambulant‖ (409), always following, always in flight. Artisans are, in fact, 
prospectors, migrants, nomads; most of all, they are apprentices, following the signs.
193
 
So Deleuze-Guattari conclude that ―to follow the flow of matter is to itinerate, to 
ambulate. It is intuition in action.‖ 
Setting aside for the moment this question of the artisan following-after materials, 
or following-after a marketplace, let me suggest that the critic-artisan—in tracking the 
book‘s singularities or traits of expression—follows a matter-flow, and, in so doing, maps 
the unusual, the interesting, or the remarkable in and through the book. On the one hand, 
the trait is formless—i.e., ―opposed to the image or to the expressed form‖ (78); so traits 
of expression escape resemblance, form, and reference; they, in fact, contaminate such 
                                                          
191
 Cf. Massumi‘s notion of ―operative reason‖; see pp. 29–30, above. 
192
 Tracking the machinic phylum or traits of expression in and through a set of materials is not the same as 
identifying formal (or otherwise essential) aspects of that material—which is the work of State science. The 
minoritarian agenda involves tracking something intensive, energetic, and singular, something ―active and 
affective‖ (Deleuze-Guattari, Plateaus 408) through a kind of material sub-strata, whereby ―singularities, or 
self-ordering processes…provide opportunities for intervention by artisans‖ (Bonta and Protevi 162). 
193
 In Proust and Signs, Deleuze writes ―We are wrong to believe in facts; there are only signs‖ (92); he 
goes on to say that any true ―apprenticeship to signs‖ means, above all else, knowing that ―Everything 
exists in those obscure zones that we penetrate as into crypts, in order to decipher hieroglyphs and secret 
languages. The Egyptologist, in all things, is the man who undergoes an initiation—the apprentice.‖ 
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things (i.e., resemblances, forms): ―A trait of expression contaminates everything, 
escaping linguistic form‖ (Deleuze, Essays 77). On the other hand, the trait gives voice to 
something uncertain or unknown, an entire ―zone of indetermination‖ (76); in doing so, 
the trait indexes the potential of material forms to go beyond, to become-different. That 
potential, that power or capacity to become, is precisely what the critic-artisan pursues. 
Elsewhere, Deleuze makes the point that ―Something in the world forces us to 
think. This something is an object not of recognition but of a fundamental encounter‖ 
(Difference 139); he then adds, 
It is not the gods [or, in this context, the structures, the narrative forms, the 
themes, the values, etc.] which we encounter: even hidden, the gods are 
only the forms of recognition. What we encounter are the demons, the 
sign-bearers: powers of the leap, the interval, the intensive and the instant; 
powers which only cover difference with more difference. (145) 
These encounters, moreover, are ―involuntary adventures‖—or what Massumi calls a 
shock to thought
194
—in that they provoke something unexpected in the mind and body of 
the artisan: ―that which can only be sensed…moves the soul, ‗perplexes‘ it‖ (Deleuze, 
Difference 140)—e.g., certain sensations or feelings (e.g., excitement, surprise, 
anticipation, curiosity, suspicion—something more?); a new awareness or understanding; 
new ways of thinking, new modes of action.
195
 Brian Massumi describes the matter in the 
following way: ―the force of expression…strikes the body first, directly and unmediately. 
                                                          
194
 This is the title of a collection of essays by Massumi. 
195
 Deleuze makes a pivotal distinction in his work between recognition, or better yet, the recognizable—
i.e., ―that which bears directly on the senses in an object which can be recalled, imagined or conceived‖ 
(Difference 139)—and that which is empirically unrecognizable (or imperceptible) to the senses, though no 
less real. The encounter proves critical to Deleuze‘s notion of a ‗superior empiricism‘ because the 
encounter itself, and not the object empirically recognized, gives rise to an involuntary level of sensation or 
sensibility beyond that which can be routinely recognized by way of the senses. So, in short, the encounter 
forces thought, and forces an awareness of that which can only be thought or sensed. 
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It passes transformatively through the flesh before being instantiated in subject-positions 
subsumed by a system of power. Its immediate effect is a differing‖ (―Introduction‖ xvii). 
In this moment, then, we are imbued with ―the thought of immanence.‖
196
 
The critic-artisan opens up a critical space in the book. This we spoke about at 
length in Part 2 of the dissertation, particularly with regard to Blanchot, and what he 
termed ―the space of resonance,‖ opened up by the movement of the critical. In Chapter 
4, for example, I sought to not only enumerate Whitman‘s various spatial constructions, 
but to open up his Leaves, as a whole, to their own color-becomings, or, to borrow a 
phrase from Deleuze, ―the spatializing energy of color‖ (Francis 134). 
In Kafka, Deleuze-Guattari treat Kafka‘s body of work spatially, like ―a rhizome, 
a burrow‖ (3)—i.e., something to be tracked, mapped, followed—and thus make the 
following pronouncement: ―We will enter, then, by any point whatsoever.‖ That is, they 
will pass through ―multiple entrances‖ if need be, making connections, following a line 
of flight. This kind of ―internal itinerancy‖ (Plateaus 414), or this moving-with the book‘s 
matter-flow, becomes the hallmark of what I have called the immanentist orientation. 
The critic-artisan negotiates the problem (i.e., the problematic sub-structures of 
the book) rather than imposes critical constants on the book (i.e., literary or linguistic 
axioms). Critical axioms, of the sort discussed in Chapter 2, totalize the literary artefact 
through a cluster of critical idealisms. Comparatively, a materialist criticism is propelled 
by the problem of use, of function (more on this below), and by an epistemology 
designed to negotiate the local vagaries of a set of literary or linguistic materials. Critics 
look at the book not by the set of static properties that align it with all other books—that 
                                                          
196
 I derive this phrase from Leonard Lawlor‘s book, The Implications of Immanence. He writes, ―Let us 
say that immanence is opposed to the transcendent, meaning that the thought of immanence is the thought 
of life‖ (70). We discussed this question of ―life‖ at length in Chapter 3 of the dissertation.  
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is, they eschew such classification, such predictability—but in terms of its expressive 
capacities and thus how the book itself may be affected by events, by outside forces, and 
thereby metamorphosized. In short, the emphasis shifts to the dynamic relations between 
matter and energy (or matter-force relations) and away from matter-form relations—i.e., 
from the axiomatic of ―what is?‖ to the problematic of ―what can be?‖: 
Reproducing implies the permanence of a fixed point of view that is 
external to what is reproduced: watching the flow from the bank. But 
following is something different from the ideal of reproduction. One is 
obliged to follow when one is in search of the ―singularities‖ of a matter, 
or rather of a material, and not out to discover a form… when one engages 
in the continuous variation of variables, instead of extracting constants.‖ 
(Deleuze-Guattari, Plateaus 372) 
So drawing these variables to the surface—i.e., these impurities, idiosyncrasies, 
heterogeneities—makes manifest, or makes felt, the book‘s vague essences and capacity 
for spontaneous transformation (into, say, a color-machine or sound-machine). Moreover, 
because there is nothing inevitable or predictable about a given actualization of the book-
body, we now ask what makes the emergence/experience of the book-body possible? 
How do the materials of the book play a participatory role in the book‘s actualization? 
The critic-artisan pays heed to a people yet to come. Here, I imagine the 
possibility of criticism becoming a minor science, that which not only breaks its 
institutional bonds, but at last overcomes the enduring blight of ―the poisoned gift of 
Platonism.‖ As far back as Plato‘s Ion, the critic (or proto-critic) has been denied her co-
creative role. That is, the critic was forced from the stage and into the gallery—i.e., a 
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place where judgment unfolds, where laws are made and sanctions are imposed. But what 
might it mean for the critic to regain her ionic charge (lost to the ages) and thereby re-
assume her creative, if not political, role in relation to the book? I imagine, at the very 
least, a criticism that occupies the affective registers of the text, such as a rhapsodic (i.e., 
spoken word or performance-based) criticism—a form of criticism that indeed has a 
contemporary following. I imagine a much expanded notion of what Sussman calls ―the 
task of the critic,‖ one defined not institutionally, not in the classroom, but socially, 
politically. I imagine new, and as yet unformed, coteries of critics determined to take up 
the artisanal agenda as it relates to the magnification of the book‘s powers and potentials 
of expression. A critic‘s guild? 
The mistake of mid-twentieth century criticisms (e.g., Formalism, New Criticism, 
Structuralism) was to pursue a State or majoritarian science, which involved the ceaseless 
enumeration and application of a set of critical axioms; however, in a strange and 
unlikely return to the dream of the New Critics (et al.) to forge a critical science, I 
suggest that a viable future for the critical enterprise may involve the turn, not to State 
science, but to minor science (and to its related artisanal agenda). In this latter context, 
we might imagine that the rude critic (e.g., Ion)—who like the smiths and journeymen of 
old—is looked upon as ignoble, even immoral, for his work with base materials and his 
supposed lack of cultural refinement; we might imagine such a critic playing more of an 
operative role, getting their hands dirty in the text and thereby forcing new becomings, 
rather than making it conform to a deadening representational logic. 
The critic-artisan renews the functional orientation to the book. Finally, I would 
suggest that by asking the empirico-pragmatic questions of the artisan (e.g., ―how do I 
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use this?‖ ―what does it do?‖ ―how do I make this work?‖), the critic-artisan goes along 
way to reviving the problem first formally posed in the nineteenth century, by Matthew 
Arnold, concerning ―the function of criticism at the present time.‖ Recall that in Chapter 
2, I critiqued the fact that Arnold‘s functional inquiry, in and through the twentieth 
century, would be fuelled by the presumed need to establish norms of critical action and 
by questions/concerns related to the socio-political value of literary criticism (or literary 
theory). Moreover, I pointed out that the evolving functional concerns of the critic tended 
to derive from a perceived crisis either in prevailing approaches to literary criticism or in 
the role of art, generally, in a morally bankrupt society. The perception of that crisis 
would, in turn, stimulate efforts to legitimize or purify the critical apparatus through the 
erection of certain pan-critical agreements about the function of criticism, both 
institutionally and on the public stage. 
However, I have a different reason for appealing to functional matters in this 
context. The materialist critic—again, much like the artisan—is solely motivated by the 
desire to force crisis, not resolve it. In an interview (with Deleuze) on the publication of 
Anti-Oedipus, Guattari clarifies the functionalist agenda as follows:  
We‘re strict functionalists: what we‘re interested in is how something 
works, functions—[thus] finding the machine...Functionalism has only 
failed when people have tried to introduce it where it doesn‘t belong, into 
great structured wholes [e.g., the State, social movements, language, even 
institutional criticism] that can‘t themselves come about, [or] be produced, 
in the same way they function. Functionalism does rule, however, in the 
world of micro-multiplicities, micro-machines, desiring-machines, 
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molecular formations….The only question is how anything works, with its 
intensities, flows, processes, partial objects. (Deleuze, Negotiations 21–2) 
In fact, because ―desiring-machines‖ remain open to their own becomings, i.e., their own 
powers of transformation, precisely how those machines work and what they can do (e.g., 
expressively, affectively) remain open questions—i.e., irreducible to any conventional 
measure. In Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze-Guattari draw a clear distinction between molar 
formations (e.g., institutions, statistical norms, society or the State)—or what Guattari (in 
the statement above) refers to as ―great structured wholes,‖ and what Deleuze-Guattari 
call ―large heavy aggregates‖ (Anti-Oedipus 288)
197
—and ―molecular formations‖ (read: 
the deviant, unregulated, asignifying actions and behaviours of systems pushed far-from-
equilibrium). In short, they draw a distinction between the molar and the molecular, 
between fixity and movement, between product and the process of production, and 
between institutional unities and variable arrangements: 
It is only at the sub-microscopic level of desiring-machines that there 
exists a functionalism—machinic arrangements, an engineering of desire; 
for it is only there that functioning and formation, use and assembly, 
product and production merge. All molar functionalism is false, since the 
organic or social machines are not formed in the same way they function, 
and the technical machines are not assembled in the same way they are 
used, but imply precisely the specific conditions that separate their own 
production from their distinct product. (288) 
                                                          
197
 Deleuze-Guattari still perceive these lumbering ―aggregates‖ and ―great structured wholes‖ as desiring-
machines, but machines limited by ―determinate conditions‖— i.e., by the fixed, ―statistical forms into 
which [those] machines enter as so many stable forms‖ (Anti-Oedipus 287–88). 
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So with this perspective in mind, I distinguish between, on the one hand, the book—
where functional capacity collides with the processes of formation (effectuating what 
Deleuze-Guattari call ―desiring-production‖)—and, on the other hand, the literary 
artefact—where form and function are divorced from one another; that is, I distinguish 
between a criticism that mobilizes the book‘s capacity to ―go critical‖ and a criticism that 
blocks the book‘s becomings, often by forcing its compliance with pre-existing critical 
norms. Put simply, I draw a distinction between molecular functionalism (which again 
involves forcing the book to its limits) and the sort of ―molar functionalism‖—to which 
Deleuze-Guattari refer in the passage above—that has long plagued the Arnoldian inquiry 
into ―the function of criticism at the present time.‖ The salient difference between the two 
can be formulated as follows: the latter falsely concerns itself with pre-established unities 
or ―large heavy aggregates‖—e.g., the literary artefact, the author, the ideal reader, even 
institutional models themselves—while the former concerns itself with the subterranean 
currents of desire (or schizoid flow) unfolding across the affective registers of the book. 
Finally, for Deleuze, as for Whitman, literature has both a creative and political 
role: ―The ultimate aim of literature is to set free, in the delirium, this creation of a health 
or this invention of a people, that is, a possibility of life‖ (Deleuze, Essays 4). Similarly, 
Whitman writes, ―I see tremendous entrances and exits, new combinations, the solidarity 
of races, I see that force advancing with irresistible power on the world‘s stage…[while] 
issuing forth against the idea of caste‖ (―Years of the Modern‖ 4–5, 8). So, in the end, 
―the ultimate aim of literature‖—a uniquely artisanal aim—is ―to liberate a living and 
expressive material that speaks for itself‖ (Deleuze-Guattari, Kafka 21). What this means, 
as we know, is that literature pries open and modulates words, exposes them to their own 
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becomings, and in so doing overrides their conventional associations. My argument all 
along has been that the critic need participate in this dual agenda (i.e., both creatively and 
politically), not by dictating outcomes or by forcing socio-political codes from the book, 





Agamben, Giorgio. ―Absolute Immanence.‖ Potentialities: Collected Essays in 
Philosophy. Trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1999. 220–39. 
Alliez, Éric. The Signature of the World: Or, What is Deleuze and Guattari‘s 
Philosophy? Trans. Eliot Ross Albert. New York: Continuum, 2004. 
Ansell-Pearson, Keith. ―Deleuze Outside/Outside Deleuze: On the Difference Engineer.‖ 
Deleuze and Philosophy: The Difference Engineer. Ed. Ansell-Pearson. London: 
Routledge. 1–22. 
Arnold, Matthew. ―The Function of Criticism at the Present Time.‖ Leitch 806–32. 
Artaud, Antonin. ―To Have Done with the Judgment of God.‖ Antonin Artaud: Selected 
Writings. Trans. Helen Weaver. Berkeley: U of California P, 1988. 555–74. 
Asmis, Elizabeth. ―Plato on Poetic Creativity.‖ The Cambridge Companion to Plato. Ed. 
Richard Kraut. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1992. 338–64. 
Babb, Valerie Melissa. Whiteness Visible: The Meaning of Whiteness in American 
Literature and Culture. New York: New York UP, 1998. 
Bains, Paul. The Primacy of Semiosis: An Ontology of Relations. Toronto: U of Toronto 
P, 2006. 
Baldick, Chris. Criticism and literary theory, 1890 to the present. New York: Longman, 
1996. 
Barthes, Roland. ―The Death of the Author.‖ Image, Music, Text. Trans. Stephen Heath. 
New York: Hill and Wang, 1977. 142–47. 
---. ―Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narratives.‖ A Barthes Reader. Trans. 
Stephen Heath. Ed. Susan Sontag. New York: Hill and Wang, 1982. 251–95. 
317 
 
---. S/Z. Trans. Richard Miller. New York: Hill and Wang, 1974. 
Baugh, Bruce. ―Body.‖ The Deleuze Dictionary. Ed. Adrian Parr. New York: Columbia 
UP, 2006. 30–2. 
---. ―Deleuze and Empiricism.‖ Deleuze and Guattari: Critical Assessments of Leading 
Philosophers. Ed. Gary Genosko. London: Routledge, 2001. 357–75. 
---. ―How Deleuze Can Help Us Make Literature Work.‖ Deleuze and Literature. Eds. 
Ian Buchanan and John Marks. Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2001. 34–56. 
Bayley, John. ―In the Heart of the Heart of a Color.‖ New York Times on the Web 7 
November 1976. 25 August 2009 
<http://www.nytimes.com/books/98/11/01/specials/gass-blue.html>. 
Baynes, Kenneth. ―The Transcendental Turn: Habermas‘s ‗Kantian Pragmatism.‘‖ The 
Cambridge Companion to Critical Theory. Ed. Fred Rush. Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 2004. 194–218. 
Beckett, Samuel. Disjecta: Miscellaneous Writings and a Dramatic Fragment. Ed. Ruby 
Cohn. New York: Grove, 1984. 
Berlin, Brent and Paul Kay. Basic Color Terms: Their Universality and Evolution. Rpt. 
ed. Stanford, CA: Centre for the Study of Language and Information, 1998. 
Bhaba, Homi. ―The Commitment to Theory.‖ The Location of Culture. London: 
Routledge, 1994. 19–39. 
Blanchot, Maurice. The Infinite Conversation. Trans. Susan Hanson. Minneapolis: U of 
Minnesota P, 1993. 
---. ―Preface: What is the Purpose of Criticism.‖ Lautréamont and Sade. Trans. Stuart 
Kendall and Michelle Kendall. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2004. 1–6. 
318 
 
Bleich, David. Subjective Criticism. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1978. 
Bloom, Alan. The Closing of the American Mind. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987. 
Bloom, Harold. The Anxiety of Influence: A Theory of Poetry. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1997. 
Bogue, Ronald. Deleuze on Literature. New York: Routledge, 2003. 
---. ―Minor Writing and Minor Literature.‖ Symploke 5.1–2 (1997): 99–118. 
Bonta, Mark and John Protevi. Deleuze and Geophilosophy: A Guide and Glossary. 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2004. 
Bosteels, Bruno. ―From Text to Territory: Félix Guattari‘s Cartographies of the 
Unconscious.‖ Deleuze & Guattari: New Mappings in Politics, Philosophy, and 
Culture. Eds. Eleanor Kaufman and Kevin Jon Heller. Minneapolis: U of 
Minnesota P. 145–74. 
Brooks, Cleanth. The Well Wrought Urn: Studies in the Structure of Poetry. Orlando, FL: 
Harcourt, 1956. 
Bryant, Levi R. Difference and Givenness: Deleuze‘s Transcendental Empiricism and the 
Ontology of Immanence. Evanston, IL: Northwestern UP, 2008. 
Bryden, Mary. ―Deleuze and Anglo-American Literature: Water, Whales, and Melville.‖ 
An Introduction to the Philosophy of Gilles Deleuze. Ed. Jean Khalfa. London: 
Continuum. 105–13. 
Colebrook, Claire. Deleuze: A Guide for the Perplexed. London: Continuum, 2006. 
---. ―Deleuzean Criticism.‖ Introducing Criticism at the 21
st
 Century. Ed. Julian 
Wolfreys. Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2002. 219–37. 
---. Gilles Deleuze. London: Routledge, 2002.  
Crane, Stephen. The Red Badge of Courage. New York: Modern Library, 2000. 
319 
 
Culler, Jonathan. Structuralist Poetics: Structuralism, Linguistics, and the Study of 
Literature. London: Routledge, 2002. 
Debord, Guy. ―Theory of the Dérive.‖ Situationist International Anthology. Ed. and trans. 
Ken Knabb. Berkeley, CA: Bureau of Public Secrets, 1981. 50–4. 
DeLanda, Manuel. Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy. Rpt. ed. New York: 
Continuum, 2004. 
---. A New Philosophy of Society: Assemblage Theory And Social Complexity. New York: 
Continuum, 2006. 
---. War in the Age of Intelligent Machines. New York: MIT, 1991. 
Deleuze, Gilles. L‘Abecedaire de Gilles Deleuze. Interview with Claire Parnet. Dir. 
Pierre-André Boutang. May 2004. 8 May 2008 
<http://www.langlab.wayne.edu/CStivale/D-G/ABC1.html>. Summary by 
Charles Stivale. Transcript. 
---. Bergsonism. Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam. New York: Zone, 
1991. 
---. Cinema 2: The Time-Image. 2 vols. Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta. 
Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1989. 
---. Difference and Repetition. Trans. Paul Patton. New York: Columbia UP, 1994. 
---. Essays Critical and Clinical. Trans. Daniel. W. Smith and Michael Greco. 
Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1997. 




---. The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque. Trans. Tom Conley. Minneapolis: U of 
Minnesota P, 1993. 
---. Foucault. Trans. Seán Hand. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1988. 
---. Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation. Rpt. ed. Trans. Daniel W. Smith. London: 
Continuum, 2002. 
---. The Logic of Sense. Trans. Mark Lester and Charles Stivale. New York: Columbia 
UP, 1990. 
---. Negotiations 1972–1990. Trans. Martin Joughin. New York: Columbia UP, 1995. 
---. Nietzsche and Philosophy. Trans. Hugh Tomlinson. New York: Columbia UP, 1983.  
---. Proust and Signs: The Complete Text. Trans. Richard Howard. Minneapolis: U of 
Minnesota P, 2000. 
---. Pure Immanence: Essays on a Life. Trans. Anne Boyman. New York: Zone, 2001. 
---. Spinoza: Practical Philosophy. Trans. Robert Hurley. San Francisco: City Lights, 
1988. 
---. Dialogues II. Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam. New York: Columbia 
UP, 2002. 
Deleuze, Gilles and Félix Guattari. Anti‐Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Trans. 
Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, Helen Lane. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1983. 
---. Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature. Trans. Dana Polan. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota 
P, 1986. 
---. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Trans. Brian Massumi. 
Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1987. 
321 
 
---. What is Philosophy? Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell. New York: 
Columbia UP, 1994. 
de Man, Paul. Allegories of Reading: Figural Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke, 
and Proust. New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 1979. 
Eagleton, Terry. After Theory. New York: Basic, 2003.  
---. The Function of Criticism. London: Verso, 1984.  
---. Literary Theory: An Introduction. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1983. 
Eco, Umberto. A Theory of Semiotics. Bloomington, IN: Indiana UP, 1976. 
Edgar, Andrew. The Philosophy of Habermas. Montreal: McGill-Queen‘s UP, 2005. 
Eichenbaum, Boris. ―From The Theory of the ‗Formal Method.‘‖ Trans. Lee T. Lemon 
and Marion J. Reis. Leitch 1062–87. 
Eliot, T. S. ―The Function of Criticism.‖ Selected Prose of T. S. Eliot. Ed. Frank 
Kermode. New York: Harcourt, 1975. 68–76. 
Ellmann, Richard. James Joyce. Rev. ed. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1983. 
Fish, Stanley. Is There a Text in this Class?: The Authority of Interpretive Communities. 
Harvard, Mass: Harvard, UP, 1980. 
Fletcher, Angus. A New Theory for American Poetry: Democracy, the Environment, and 
the Future. Harvard: Harvard UP, 2004. 
Foucault, Michel. The Archaeology of Knowledge. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: 
Routledge, 2002. 
---. ―The Masked Philosopher.‖ Michel Foucault: Politics, Philosophy, Culture—
Interviews and Other Writings (1977–1984). Trans. Alan Sheridan. Ed. Lawrence 
D. Kritzman. New York: Routledge. 323–30. 
322 
 
---. ―The Thought of the Outside.‖ The Essential Foucault. Eds. Paul Rabinow and 
Nikolas Rose. Trans. Brian Massumi. New York: New Press, 2003. 423–41. 
---. ―What is an Author?‖ The Essential Foucault. Eds. Paul Rabinow and Nikolas Rose. 
Trans. Josué V. Harari. New York: New Press, 2003. 377–91. 
Frye, Northrop. Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2000. 
Gage, John. ―Color and Culture.‖ Color: Art & Science. Eds. Trevor Lamb and Janine 
Bourriau. Edinburgh, UK: Cambridge UP, 1995. 175–93. 
Gass, William. On Being Blue: A Philosophical Inquiry. Boston: David R. Godine, 1976. 
Gramsci, Antonio. Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci. Trans. and 
ed. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith. New York: International, 1971. 
Grube, G. M. A. ―Introduction: Aristotle as a Literary Critic.‖ Aristotle: On Poetry and 
Style. Trans. Grube. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989. ix–xxx. 
Guattari, Félix. Chaosmosis: An Ethico-Aesthetic Paradigm. Trans. Paul Bains and Julian 
Pefanis. Bloomington, IN: Indiana UP, 1995. 
Habermas, Jürgen. ―Modernity—An Incomplete Project.‖ The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on 
Postmodern Culture. Trans. Seyla Ben-Habib. Ed. Hal Foster. New York: New 
Press, 1998. 1–15. 
---. The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume 1: Reason and the Rationalization of 
Society. 2 vols. Trans. Thomas McCarthy. Boston: Beacon, 1984. 
---. The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume 2: Lifeworld and System—A Critique 
of Functionalist Reason. 2 vols. Trans. Thomas McCarthy. Boston: Beacon, 1987. 
Halliday, Michael (M. A. K.). An Introduction to Functional Grammar. 2nd ed. London: 
Edward Arnold, 1994. 
323 
 
Hartman, Geoffrey. Criticism in the Wilderness: The Study of Literature Today. New 
Haven, CT: Yale UP, 1980. 
Heffernan, James. Museum of Words: The Poetics of Ekphrasis from Homer to Ashbery. 
Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1993. 
Heidegger, Martin. Elucidations of Hölderlin‘s Poetry. 2
nd
 ed. Trans. Keith Hoeller. 
Amherst, NY: Humanity, 2000. 
Hölderlin, Friedrich. ―Colombo.‖ Friedrich Hölderlin: Selected Poems and Fragments. 
Trans. Michael Hamburger. London: Penguin, 1998. 305–12. 
Hollander, John. The Work of Poetry. New York: Columbia University Press, 1997. 
Hovde, Carl F. Introduction. Moby-Dick, or The Whale. By Herman Melville. New York: 
Barnes & Noble, 2003. xv–xli. 
Jakobson, Roman. ―Closing Statements: Linguistics and Poetics.‖ Style in Language. Ed. 
Thomas Sebeok. Cambridge, Mass: MIT, 1960. 350–77. Rpt. in Leitch 1258–69. 
Kafka, Franz. The Castle. Trans. Mark Harman. New York: Schocken, 1998. 
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Judgment. Trans. J. H. Bernard. Mineola, NY: Dover, 2005. 
Kerouac, Jack. On the Road. New York: Penguin, 1991. 
Krieger, Murray. ―Ekphrasis and the Still Movement of Poetry; or Laokoön Revisited.‖ 
Close Reading: The Reader. Eds. Frank Lentricchia and Andrew Dubois. 
Durham, NC: Duke UP, 2003. 88–110. 
Lambert, Gregg. The Non-Philosophy of Gilles Deleuze. New York: Continuum, 2002. 
---. ―On the Uses and Abuses of Literature for Life.‖ Deleuze and Literature. Eds. Ian 
Buchanan and John Marks. Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2001. 135–66. 
---. Who‘s Afraid of Deleuze and Guattari? New York: Continuum, 2006. 
324 
 
Lawlor, Leonard. The Implications of Immanence: Toward a New Concept of Life. New 
York: Fordham UP, 2006. 
---. Thinking Through French Philosophy: The Being of the Question. Indiana: Indiana 
UP, 2003. 
Leibniz, Gottfried W. ―Monadology.‖ Leibniz: Philosophical Writings. Ed. G. H. R. 
Parkinson. Trans. Mary Morris and G.H.R. Parkinson. London: J. M. Dent & 
Sons, 1973. 179–94. 
Leitch, Vincent B., ed. The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism. New York: 
Norton, 2001. 
Leland, John. Why Kerouac Matters: The Lessons of On The Road (They‘re Not What 
You Think). New York: Penguin, 2008.  
Lyon, John. ―Color in Language.‖ Color: Art & Science. Eds. Trevor Lamb and Janine Bourriau. 
Edinburgh, UK: Cambridge UP, 1995. 194–224. 
Mackenzie, Iain. The Idea of Pure Critique. London: Continuum, 2004. 
Massumi, Brian. A User‘s Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia: Deviations from 
Deleuze and Guattari. Cambridge: MIT, 1992. 
Massumi, Brian. ―Introduction: Like a Thought.‖ A Shock to Thought: Expression after 
Deleuze and Guattari. Ed. Brian Massumi. New York: Routledge, 2002. xiii–
xxxix. 
---. Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation. Durham, NC: Duke UP, 2002. 
---. A User‘s Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia: Deviations from Deleuze and 
Guattari. Cambridge, Mass: MIT, 1992. 
May, Todd. Gilles Deleuze: An Introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2005. 
Melville, Herman. Moby-Dick, or The Whale. New York: Barnes & Noble, 2003. 
325 
 
Mitchell, W. J. T. Picture Theory: Essays on Verbal and Visual Representation. Chicago: 
U of Chicago P, 1994. 
Morson, Gary Saul and Caryl Emerson. Mikhail Bakhtin: Creation of a Prosaics. 
Stanford: Stanford UP, 1990. 
Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Birth of Tragedy. Basic Writings of Nietzsche. Trans. Walter 
Kaufmann. New York: Modern Library, 2000. 15–144. 
---. Ecce Homo. Basic Writings of Nietzsche. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: 
Modern Library, 2000. 655–791. 
---. Twilight of the Idols (or, How to Philosophize with a Hammer). Trans. R. J. 
Hollingdale. Middlesex, UK: Penguin, 1968. 
---. Untimely Meditations. Trans. R. J. Hollingdale. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997. 
---. The Will to Power. Ed. Walter Kaufmann. Trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. 
Hollingdale. New York: Vintage, 1968. 
Pasco, Allan. The Color-Keys to A la Recherche du Temps Perdu. Geneva: Droz, 1976. 
Plato. Ion. Leitch 37–48. 
---. Laws. Trans. Benjamin Jowett. Middlesex, UK: Echo, 2006. 
---. Meno. Classics of Western Philosophy. 2nd ed. Ed. Steven M. Cahn. Trans. G. M. A. 
Grube. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1984. 4–27. 
---. Phaedrus. Trans. Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff. Indianapolis: Hackett, 
1995. 
---. Republic. Trans. G. M. A. Grube. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1974. 
Pope, Alexander. ―An Essay on Criticism.‖ Leitch 441–58. 
326 
 
Protevi, John. ―The Organism as the Judgment of God: Aristotle, Kant and Deleuze on 
Nature (that is on biology, theology and politics).‖ Deleuze and Religion. Ed. 
Mary Bryden. London: Routledge, 2001. 30–41. 
Richards, I. A. Practical Criticism: A Study of Literary Judgment. Orlando, FL: Harcourt, 
1929. 
---. Principles of Literary Criticism. Rpt. ed. London: Routledge, 2001. 
Riley, Charles A. Color Codes: Modern Theories of Color in Philosophy, Painting and 
Architecture, Literature, Music, and Psychology. Lebanon, NH: UP of New 
England, 1995. 
Rorty, Richard. Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. New York: Cambridge UP, 1989. 
Said, Edward. The World, the Text, and the Critic. Harvard, Mass: Harvard UP, 1983. 
Shereen, Faiza W. ―Form, Rhetoric, and Intellectual History.‖ Literary Theory and 
Criticism: An Oxford Guide. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2006. 233–44. 
Sidney, Philip. ―An Apology for Poetry.‖ Leitch 326–62. 
Smith, Daniel W. ―Deleuze and Derrida, Immanence and Transcendence: Two Directions 
in Recent French Thought.‖ Between Deleuze and Derrida. New York: 
Continuum, 2003. 46–66. 
---. ―Introduction: A Life of Pure Immanence—Deleuze‘s ‗Critique et Clinique‘ Project.‖ 
Essays Critical and Clinical. Trans. Smith and Michael Greco. Minneapolis: U of 
Minnesota P, 1997. xi–liii. 
---. ―The Place of Ethics in Deleuze‘s Philosophy: Three Questions of Immanence.‖ 
Deleuze & Guattari: New Mappings in Politics, Philosophy, and Culture. Eds. 
Eleanor Kaufman and Kevin Jon Heller. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P. 251–69. 
327 
 
Sussman, Henry. The Task of the Critic: Poetics, Philosophy, Religion. New York: 
Fordham UP, 2005. 
Svetlik, John. ―The Power of Green.‖ ASU Research (Winter 1997). 15 January 2009 
<http://149.169.2.179/stories/power.html>. 
Todorov, Tzvetan. Introduction to Poetics. Trans. Richard Howard. Minneapolis: U of 
Minnesota P, 1981. 
Ulmer, Gregory. ―The Object of Post-Criticism.‖ The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on 
Postmodern Culture. Ed. Hal Foster. New York: New Press, 1998. 93–125. 
Whitman, Walt. Leaves of Grass: The ‗Death-Bed‘ Edition. New York: Modern Library, 
2001. 
---. Specimen Days & Collect. Mineola, NY: Dover, 1995. 
Wilde, Oscar. ―The Critic as Artist.‖ Leitch 900–12. 
Wimsatt, W. K. The Verbal Icon: Studies in the Meaning of Poetry. Lexington, KY: U of 
Kentucky P, 1954. 
Wordsworth, William. ―Lines: Composed a Few Miles Above Tintern Abbey…‖ English 
Romantic Writers. Ed. David Perkins. Orlando, FL: Harcourt. 1967. 209–11. 
Zepke, Stephen. Art as Abstract Machine: Ontology and Aesthetics in Deleuze and 
Guattari. New York: Routledge, 2005. 
Zourabichvili, François. ―Six Notes on the Percept (On the Relation Between the Critical 
and the Clinical).‖ Trans. Iain Hamilton Grant. Deleuze: A Critical Reader. Ed. 
Paul Patton. Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1996. 188–216. 
 
